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PREFACE

Volume 8 contains the works of Lenin written between January and July 1905, during the early period of the first Russian revolution. Most of the book consists of articles published in the underground Bolshevik newspapers *Vperyod* and *Proletary*.

The articles "The Autocracy and the Proletariat", "The Fall of Port Arthur", "European Capital and the Autocracy", and "Debacle" give an analysis of the military defeat and political crisis of the autocracy and predict the inevitability of the revolution in Russia.

The articles "Two Tactics", "Should We Organise the Revolution?", "New Tasks and New Forces", "On the Provisional Revolutionary Government", "The Revolutionary-Democratic Dictatorship of the Proletariat and the Peasantry", and "The Revolutionary Army and the Revolutionary Government" examine and develop the revolutionary tactics of the Bolshevik Party and expose and criticise the opportunist tactics of the Mensheviks.

Lenin's campaign against the splitting activities of the Mensheviks and for preparing the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.—the first Bolshevik congress—is unfolded in his articles "Time to Call a Halt!", "A Brief Outline of the Split in the R.S.D.L.P.", "General Plan of the Third Congress Decisions", "Draft Resolutions for the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.", "The First Step", "What the Bonapartists Are Up To", "The Second Step", and "Open Letter to Comrade Plekhanov, Chairman of the Council of the R.S.D.L.P."

A considerable part of the volume consists of documents pertaining to the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.—Lenin's reports and speeches at the Congress, and resolutions

drafted by him on the armed uprising, on the provisional revolutionary government, on support to the peasant movement, on the events in the Caucasus, and on other questions.

The volume includes articles directed against bourgeois liberalism, such as "The Agrarian Programme of the Liberals", "Political Sophisms", "The First Steps of Bourgeois Betrayal", "'Revolutionaries' in Kid Gloves", and "The Struggle of the Proletariat and the Servility of the Bourgeoisie".

Fourteen articles and briefer items, published for the first time in the *Collected Works* of Lenin, are devoted to an analysis of the revolutionary events in Russia and to questions pertaining to the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.

In his article "Revolution in Russia", Lenin for the first time evaluates the events of January 9 as the beginning of the revolution and salutes the insurgent proletariat. His articles "The First Steps", "The Eve of Bloody Sunday", "The Number of Killed or Wounded", "The Battles on the Barricades", and "St. Petersburg After January 9" deal with the early days of the revolutionary struggle in St. Petersburg and with the growing political consciousness of the Russian proletariat.

In his "First of May" leaflet, Lenin sets forth the tasks of the proletariat and the peasantry in the revolution and calls for the preparation of the popular armed uprising.

The item "Conferences of the Committees" reports on the conferences of the local committees which went on record for the immediate convocation of the Third Party Congress. The article "From the New-*Iskra* Camp" exposes the systematic deception of the Party by the Mensheviks.

The documents "Resolution on the Armed Uprising", "Speech on the Procedure of the Discussion of the Resolutions on the Relations Between Workers and Intellectuals Within the Social-Democratic Organisations", "Resolution on the Publication of the Congress Proceedings", and "Draft Resolution on the Events in the Caucasus" pertain to the materials of the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.

In the short article "The New Russian Loan" Lenin deals with the decline of the tsarist government's credit abroad due to the military defeats and the growing discontent within the country.

THE AUTOCRACY AND THE PROLETARIAT ¹

Published in *Vperyod*, No. 1,
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Russia is experiencing a resurgence of the constitutional movement. Our generation has never witnessed anything like the present political ferment. Legal newspapers are attacking the bureaucracy, demanding participation of the people's representatives in the state administration, and pressing for liberal reforms. All varieties of meetings of Zemstvo officials,² doctors, lawyers, engineers, farmers, municipal councillors,³ etc., etc., are adopting resolutions more or less definitely demanding a constitution. Passionate appeals for liberty and political accusations of a boldness to which the Russian man in the street is unaccustomed can be heard at every turn. Under pressure of the workers and the radical youth, liberal gatherings are converted into open public meetings and street demonstrations. Undercurrents of discontent are manifestly stirring among wide sections of the proletariat, among the poor of town and country. Although the proletariat is taking a comparatively small part in the more spectacular and ceremonious manifestations of the liberal movement, although it seems to be standing somewhat aloof from the polite conferences of the solid citizens, everything points to the fact that the workers are keenly interested in the movement. Everything points to the fact that the workers are eager for big public meetings and open street demonstrations. The proletariat is holding itself back, as it were, carefully taking its bearings, gathering its forces, and deciding the question whether or not the moment for the decisive struggle for freedom has come.

Apparently, the wave of liberal excitation is beginning to subside somewhat. The rumours and foreign newspaper reports to the effect that reactionaries have gained the upper hand in the most influential Court circles are being confirmed. The ukase of Nicholas II, published the other day, was a direct slap in the face for the liberals.⁴ The tsar intends to

preserve and uphold the autocratic regime. The tsar does not want to change the form of government and has no intention of granting a constitution. He promises—only promises—all manner of reforms of a quite paltry nature. No guarantees, of course, are given that these reforms will really be implemented. Police restrictions against the liberal press are becoming daily and hourly more stringent. All open demonstrations are being suppressed again, if anything, with greater severity than before. The screw is being put on the liberal councilors again, both Zemstvo⁵ and municipal, still more so in the case of those officials who play the liberal. The liberal newspapers are falling into a despondent tone and apologising to their correspondents for not publishing their letters, which they dare not do.

It is quite within the realm of possibility that the wave of liberal agitation which rose so rapidly after the permission granted by Svyatopolk-Mirsky⁶ will abate just as quickly after the new ban. One must distinguish between the profound causes, which inevitably and unavoidably lead—and will lead more and more—to opposition and struggle against the autocracy, and the trivial reasons of a passing liberal ferment. The profound causes lead to profound, powerful, and persistent popular movements. Trivial reasons are at times Cabinet changes or the usual attempt on the part of the government to pursue for an hour the policy of “the sly fox” after some terrorist act. The assassination of Plehve⁷ evidently cost the terrorist organisation tremendous effort and involved long preparation. The very success of this terrorist act bears out all the more strikingly the experience of the entire history of the Russian revolutionary movement, which warns us against such methods of struggle as terrorism. Russian terrorism has always been a specifically intellectualist method of struggle. And whatever may be said of the importance of terrorism, not in lieu of, but in conjunction with, the people’s movement, the facts irrefutably testify that in our country individual political assassinations have nothing in common with the forcible actions of the people’s revolution. In capitalist society a mass movement is possible only as a class movement of the workers. This movement is developing in Russia according to its own independent laws; it is proceeding in its own way, gaining in depth and in breadth, and pass-

ing from a temporary lull to a new upsurge. It is only the liberal wave that rises and falls strictly in accord with the moods of the different ministers, whose replacement is accelerated by bombs. Small wonder, then, that sympathy with terrorism is to be met with so often in our country among the radical (or radical-posing) representatives of the bourgeois opposition. Small wonder that, among the revolutionary intelligentsia, the people most likely to be carried away (whether for long or for a moment) by terrorism are those who have no faith in the vitality and strength of the proletariat and the proletarian class struggle.

The fact that the spurt of liberal activity for one or another reason is short-lived and unstable cannot, of course, make us forget the irremovable contradiction that exists between the autocracy and the needs of the developing bourgeois society. The autocracy is bound to be a drag on social development. The interests of the bourgeoisie as a class, as well as the interests of the intelligentsia, without which modern capitalist production is inconceivable, clash more and more with the autocracy as time goes on. Superficial though the reason for the liberals' declarations may be and petty though the character of the liberals' half-hearted and equivocal position, the autocracy can maintain real peace only with a handful of highly privileged magnates from the landowning and merchant class, but in no sense with that class as a whole. Direct representation of the interests of the ruling class in the form of a constitution is essential for a country that wants to be a European country and, on pain of political and economic defeat, is obliged by its position to become a European country. It is therefore extremely important for the class-conscious proletariat to have a clear understanding both of the inevitability of the liberals' protests against the autocracy and of the actual bourgeois character of these protests.

The working class is setting itself the great and epoch-making aims of liberating humanity from every form of oppression and exploitation of man by man. Throughout the world it has striven hard for decades on end to achieve these aims, steadily widening its struggle and organising itself in mass parties, undaunted by occasional defeats and temporary set-backs. Nothing can be more vital for such a truly revolutionary class than to rid itself of all self-deception, of all

mirages and illusions. One of the most widespread and persistent illusions with us in Russia is the notion that our liberal movement is not a bourgeois movement, and that the impending revolution in Russia will not be a bourgeois revolution. The Russian intellectual, from the most moderate *Osvobozhdeniye* liberal⁸ to the most extreme Socialist-Revolutionary,⁹ always thinks that one makes our revolution colourless, that one degrades and vulgarises it, by admitting it to be a bourgeois revolution. To the Russian class-conscious proletarian this admission is the only true class characterisation of the actual state of affairs. To the proletarian the struggle for political liberty and a democratic republic in a bourgeois society is only one of the necessary stages in the struggle for the social revolution which will overthrow the bourgeois system. Strictly differentiating between stages that are essentially different, soberly examining the conditions under which they manifest themselves, does not at all mean indefinitely postponing one's ultimate aim, or slowing down one's progress in advance. On the contrary, it is for the purpose of accelerating the advance and of achieving the ultimate aim as quickly and securely as possible that it is necessary to understand the relation of classes in modern society. Nothing but disillusionment and unending vacillation await those who shun the allegedly one-sided class point of view, who would be socialists, yet are afraid openly to call the impending revolution in Russia—the revolution that has begun in Russia—a bourgeois revolution.

Characteristically, at the very height of the present constitutional movement, the more democratic of the legal publications took advantage of the unusual freedom to attack, not only the "bureaucracy", but also the "exclusive and hence erroneous theory of the class struggle" which is alleged to be "scientifically untenable" (*Nasha Zhizn*,¹⁰ No. 28). If you please, the problem of bringing the intelligentsia closer to the masses "has hitherto been dealt with solely by throwing the emphasis on the class contradictions existing between the masses and those sections of society from which ... the greater part of the intelligentsia springs". Needless to say, this presentation of the facts is completely at variance with the real state of affairs. The very opposite is true. The entire mass of the Russian legally-active uplift intelligentsia, all

the old Russian socialists, all political figures of the *Osvobozhdeniye* type have always completely ignored the profound nature of the class contradictions in Russia in general and in the Russian countryside in particular. Even the extreme Left Russian radical intelligentsia, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, sins most in ignoring this fact; one need only recall its usual arguments about the "labouring peasantry", or about the impending revolution being "not a bourgeois, but a democratic one".

No, the nearer the moment of revolution draws and the more acute the constitutional movement becomes, the more strictly must the party of the proletariat guard its class independence and not allow its class demands to be swamped in general democratic phrases. The more frequently and decidedly the representatives of so-called society come forward with what they claim to be the demands of the whole people, the more relentlessly must the Social-Democrats expose the class nature of this "society". Take the notorious resolution of the "secret" Zemstvo congress held on November 6-8.¹¹ You will find there, thrust into the background, deliberately hazy and half-hearted constitutional aspirations. You will find mention there of the people and society, more often society than the people. You will find the most detailed and comprehensive suggestions for reforms of the Zemstvo and municipal institutions — institutions, that is, which represent the interests of the landowners and the capitalists. You will find mention of reforms in the living conditions of the peasantry, of the liberation of the peasantry from tutelage, and of the safeguarding of correct judicial forms. It is quite clear that you are dealing with representatives of the propertied classes who are only bent on securing concessions from the autocracy and have no thought of changing in any way the foundations of the economic system. If people like these want a "radical [allegedly radical]* change in the present state of inequality and oppression of the peasantry", it only proves anew that the Social-Democrats were right in tirelessly stressing the backwardness of the system and of the

* Interpolations in square brackets (within passages quoted by Lenin) have been introduced by Lenin, unless otherwise indicated.—*Ed.*

living conditions of the peasantry in relation to the general conditions of the bourgeois order. The Social-Democrats have always urged that the class-conscious proletariat should strictly distinguish in the general peasant movement the over-riding interests and demands of the peasant bourgeoisie, however much these demands may be veiled and nebulous, and in whatever cloak of utopian "levelling" the peasant ideology (and "Socialist-Revolutionary" phrase-mongering) may invest them. Take the resolutions of the engineers' banquet in St. Petersburg on December 4. You will find that the 590 banquet guests, and together with them the 6,000 engineers who subscribed to the resolution, declared for a constitution, "without which Russian industry cannot be properly protected", while at the same time protesting against the placing of government orders with foreign concerns.

Can anyone still fail to see that it is the interests of all sections of the landowning, commercial, industrial and peasant bourgeoisie which are at the bottom of the constitutional aspirations that have erupted to the surface? Are we to be led astray by the fact that these interests are represented by the democratic intelligentsia, which everywhere and always, in all European revolutions of the bourgeoisie, has assumed the role of publicists, speakers, and political leaders?

A grave task now confronts the Russian proletariat. The autocracy is wavering. The burdensome and hopeless war into which it has plunged has seriously undermined the foundations of its power and rule. It cannot maintain itself in power now without an appeal to the ruling classes, without the support of the intelligentsia; such an appeal and such support, however, are bound to lead to constitutional demands. The bourgeois classes are trying to force an advantage for themselves out of the government's predicament. The government is playing a desperate game; it is trying to wriggle out of its difficulties, to get off with a few paltry concessions, non-political reforms, and non-committal promises, with which the tsar's new ukase is replete. Whether this game will succeed, even temporarily and partially, will in the long run depend on the Russian proletariat, on the degree of its organisation and the force of its revolutionary onset. The proletariat must take advantage of the political situation, which is greatly in its favour. The proletariat must support the constitutional move-

ment of the bourgeoisie; it must rouse and rally to its side the broadest possible sections of the exploited masses, muster all its forces, and start an uprising at the moment when the government is in the most desperate straits and popular unrest is at its highest.

What immediate form should the proletariat's support of the constitutionalists take? Chiefly, the utilisation of the general unrest for the purpose of carrying on agitation and organising the least involved and most backward sections of the working class and the peasantry. Naturally, the organised proletariat, Social-Democracy, should send its forces among all classes of the population; yet the more independently the classes now act, the more acute the struggle becomes, and the nearer the moment of the decisive battle approaches, the more should our work be concentrated on preparing the proletarians and semi-proletarians themselves for the direct struggle for freedom. At such a moment only opportunists can qualify the speeches of individual workingmen in Zemstvo and other public assemblies as a very active struggle, or a new method of struggle, or the highest type of demonstration. Such manifestations can only be of quite secondary importance. It is far more important now to turn the attention of the proletariat to really high and active forms of struggle, such as the famous mass demonstration in Rostov and a number of mass demonstrations in the South.¹² It is far more important now to increase our ranks, organise our forces, and prepare for an even more direct and open mass conflict.

Of course, there is no suggestion in this that the ordinary day-to-day work of the Social-Democrats should be abandoned. Social-Democrats will never give up that work, which they regard as the real preparation for the decisive fight; for they rely wholly and exclusively on the activity, the class-consciousness, and the organisation of the proletariat, on its influence among the labouring and exploited masses. It is a question of pointing out the right road, of calling attention to the need for going forward, to the harmfulness of tactical vacillations. The day-to-day work, which the class-conscious proletariat should never forget under any circumstances, includes also the work of organisation. Without broad and diverse workers' organisations, and without their connection with revolutionary Social-Democracy, it is impossible

to wage a successful struggle against the autocracy. On the other hand, organisational work is impossible without a firm rebuff to the disorganising tendencies displayed in our country, as everywhere else, by the weak-willed intellectual elements in the Party, who change their slogans like gloves; organisational work is impossible without a struggle against the absurd and reactionary organisation-as-process "theory", which serves to conceal confusion of every description.

The development of the political crisis in Russia will now depend chiefly on the course of the war with Japan. This war has done more than anything else to expose the rotteness of the autocracy; it is doing more than anything else to drain its strength financially and militarily, and to torment and spur on to revolt the long-suffering masses of the people, of whom this criminal and shameful war is demanding such endless sacrifices. Autocratic Russia has already been defeated by constitutional Japan, and dragging on the war will only increase and aggravate the defeat. The best part of the Russian navy has been destroyed; the position of Port Arthur is hopeless, and the naval squadron sent to its relief has not the slightest chance of even reaching its destination, let alone of achieving success; the main army under Kuropatkin has lost over 200,000 men and stands exhausted and helpless before the enemy, who is bound to crush it after the capture of Port Arthur. Military disaster is inevitable, and together with it discontent, unrest, and indignation will inevitably increase tenfold.

We must prepare for that moment with the utmost energy. At that moment, one of the outbreaks which are recurring, now here, now there, with such growing frequency, will develop into a tremendous popular movement. At that moment the proletariat will rise and take its stand at the head of the insurrection to win freedom for the entire people and to secure for the working class the possibility of waging the open and broad struggle for socialism, a struggle enriched by the whole experience of Europe.

GOOD DEMONSTRATIONS OF PROLETARIANS AND POOR ARGUMENTS OF CERTAIN INTELLECTUALS

The present-day constitutional movement among the propertied classes in our country differs sharply from former movements of the same type at the end of the fifties and seventies. The constitutional demands of the liberals are essentially the same. The speeches of the radical orators reiterate the familiar propositions of Zemstvo liberalism. The proletariat's participation in the movement provides a significant and very important new factor. The Russian working class, whose movement was the pivot of the entire revolutionary movement of the past decade, has long since reached the stage of open struggle, of street demonstrations, of popular mass meetings in defiance of the police, and of head-on clashes with the enemy in the streets of the southern cities.

And the liberal-bourgeois movement is at this moment marked by the bold, determined, incomparably sharper and more daring entry of the proletariat upon the scene. We would mention, first, the demonstration in St. Petersburg, in which the workers' participation was unfortunately weak, owing to the disorganising activity of the "Mensheviks", and the demonstration in Moscow. Next we would mention the presence of workers at a liberal-bourgeois banquet, in Smolensk; at a meeting of the Educational Society in Nizhni-Novgorod; and at conferences of scientific, medical, and other societies in various cities. Further, there were the large meeting of workers in Saratov, the demonstration of November 6 in the Kharkov Law Society, that of November 20 in the Ekaterinodar Municipal Council, that of November 18 in the Odessa Health Protection Society, and, again in Odessa, somewhat later, in the Regional Law Court. We would add that both demonstra-

Such are the facts of the case. Such are the demonstrations of the Russian proletarians.

Now, as to the line of reasoning of certain Social-Democratic intellectuals. It relates to the demonstration in Ekaterinodar, to which an entire article has been devoted. Read attentively: "In this demonstration for the first time the organised Russian proletariat came face to face with our liberal-minded bourgeoisie!"... The demonstration "is a further step in the development of forms of political struggle"; it is, "when all is said and done, a really new method of political struggle which yields very evident fruitful results"; the workers in such demonstrations "feel that they are acting as definite political units", they acquire "a sense of competence to act as the political fighters of the party". We see spreading "in the broadest social circles the idea of the party as of something quite definite, something that has taken shape, and, what is most important, something that has the right to *put forth demands*". People are beginning to look upon the whole party "as an active, fighting political force which states its demands clearly and definitely". It is necessary "to make wider use of the new method of struggle—in the councils, in the Zemstvos, and at every kind of assembly of public figures". And the editors of *Iskra*, in unison with the author of these views, speak of "the idea of demonstrations of a new type", of the fact that "in Ekaterinodar in particular our comrades were able to show 'society' that they were acting as an independent party which feels capable of influencing the course of events and endeavours to do so".

Well, well. "In Ekaterinodar in particular." ... A new step, a new method, a new practice, face to face for the first time, very evident fruitful results, definite political units, a sense of political competence, the right to put forth demands.... To me these pompous attempts at profound reasoning smacked of something stale, *passé*, and almost forgotten. But before accounting to myself how I sensed the staleness, I involuntarily asked: Pardon me, gentlemen, but why "in Ekaterinodar in particular"? Why indeed is it a new method? Why is it that the Kharkov and Odessa comrades do not brag (excuse the vulgar expression) about the newness of the method and the evident fruitful results, about meeting face to face for the first time, and a sense of political competence?

Why are the results of a meeting of a few dozen workers together with several hundred liberals within the four walls of a council hall more evident and fruitful than the meetings of thousands of workers, not only in medical and law societies, but *in the streets*? Can it really be that street meetings (in Odessa, as well as those previously held in Rostov-on-Don and other cities) are less likely to develop a sense of political competence and the right to put forth demands than meetings in municipal councils?... True, I must admit that I feel rather uncomfortable in quoting this last expression (the right to *put forth demands*); it is so stupid. But you can't throw the words out of a song.

In one instance, however, this expression acquires some meaning, and not only this expression, but *Iskra's* entire line of reasoning, namely, if we presume the existence of parliamentarism, if we visualise for a moment that the Ekaterinodar Municipal Council has been transplanted to the banks of the Thames, next to Westminster Abbey. On this slight assumption it becomes clear why, within the four walls of a delegates' meeting hall one can have more "right to put forth demands" than in the streets; why struggle against a Prime Minister, that is, the Mayor of Ekaterinodar, is more fruitful than struggle against a policeman; why the sense of political competence and the knowledge of oneself as a definite political unit is heightened precisely in the hall of a parliament or in the hall of a Zemstvo Assembly. Indeed, why not play at parliamentarism for lack of a real parliament? One can obtain here such a vivid mental picture of "a meeting face to face", of "a new method", and all the rest of it. True, these mental pictures will inevitably divert our thoughts from the issues of a real mass struggle *for* parliamentarism, instead of playing *at* parliamentarism; that, however, is a trifle. But then what evident, tangible results....

Tangible results.... The expression immediately reminds me of Comrade Martynov and *Rabocheye Dyelo*.¹⁴ Without reverting to the latter it is impossible to appraise the new *Iskra* correctly. The arguments about "a new method of struggle" in connection with the Ekaterinodar demonstration are a repetition of the arguments used by the editors in their "Letter to Party Organisations" (incidentally, is it wise to keep the original a secret, stacked away, and to circulate

only a copy openly for general information?). The editors' arguments follow *Rabocheye Dyelo*'s usual trend of thought, but in another connection.

Wherein lay the error and the harmfulness of the *Rabocheye Dyelo* "theory" of imparting a political character to the economic struggle itself, the "theory" of the economic struggle of the workers against the employers and the government, of the need to present to the government concrete demands which promise certain tangible results? Should we not impart a political character to the economic struggle? We certainly should. But when *Rabocheye Dyelo* deduced the political aims of a revolutionary party of the proletariat from the "economic" (trade-unionist) struggle, it unjustifiably narrowed and vulgarised the Social-Democratic conception, it detracted from the tasks of the proletariat's all-round political struggle.

Wherein lie the error and the harmfulness of the new *Iskra*'s theory of a new method, of a higher type of mobilisation of the proletarian forces, of a new way of developing the sense of political competence among the workers, their "right to put forth demands", and so on, and so forth? Should we not organise workers' demonstrations both in the Zemstvo Assemblies and on the occasion of these assemblies? We certainly should. But in speaking of good proletarian demonstrations we should not talk highbrow nonsense. We shall only demoralise the class-consciousness of the proletariat, we shall only divert the proletariat from the tasks, increasingly pressing, of the real, serious, open struggle, if we extol as a new method those very features of our ordinary demonstrations which least resemble active struggle and which it would be ludicrous to declare as productive of excellent results or as heightening the sense of political competence, etc.

Both our old acquaintance, Comrade Martynov, and the new *Iskra* are guilty of the sin peculiar to the intelligentsia—lack of faith in the strength of the proletariat; in its ability to organise, in general, and to create a party organisation, in particular; in its ability to conduct the political struggle. *Rabocheye Dyelo* believed that the proletariat was still incapable, and would be incapable for a long time to come, of conducting the political struggle that goes beyond the limits of the economic struggle against the employers and the gov-

ernment. The new *Iskra* believes that the proletariat is still incapable, and will be incapable for a long time to come, of independent revolutionary action, and so it calls a demonstration of a few dozen workers before the Zemstvo people a new method of struggle. Both the old *Rabocheye Dyelo* and the new *Iskra* religiously repeat the phrases about the independent activity and self-education of the proletariat only because this religious fervour screens the intellectual incomprehension of the real forces of the proletariat and of the urgent tasks that confront it. Both the old *Rabocheye Dyelo* and the new *Iskra* talk absolute nonsense with an air of profundity about the special significance of tangible and evident results, and about a concrete contraposition of bourgeoisie and proletariat, thereby diverting the attention of the proletariat from the increasingly pressing task of a direct onset upon the autocracy, at the head of a popular uprising, towards playing at parliamentarism. In undertaking to revise the old organisational and tactical principles of revolutionary Social-Democracy and fussily searching for new formulas and "new methods", both the old *Rabocheye Dyelo* and the new *Iskra* are in fact dragging the Party back, proposing superseded, at times even downright reactionary, slogans.

We have had enough of this new revision that leads to the old rubbish! It is time to go forward and stop covering up disorganisation with the notorious organisation-as-process theory; it is time, in workers' demonstrations, to accentuate and advance to the foreground those features that tend to bring them closer to the real, open struggle for freedom.

TIME TO CALL A HALT!

All eyewitnesses agree that the demonstration of November 28 was a failure because of the almost complete absence of workers. But why did the workers keep away from the demonstration? Why did the St. Petersburg Committee, in response to whose call the student youth had come to the demonstration, fail to take steps to secure the attendance of the workers, thus defeating its own enterprise? The answer to these questions is given in the following letter from a worker, a member of the Committee, from which we print the most important passages:

"Feeling (at the beginning of November) was running high and seeking an outlet. This outlet was to be provided by a demonstration, and in fact a leaflet did appear at that time, issued in the name of the Students' Social-Democratic Organisation and calling for a demonstration on November 14. On learning of this, the Committee proposed to the organisation that the demonstration be postponed until the end of November, to permit joint participation with the St. Petersburg proletariat. The students agreed.... The class-conscious workers were very eager to have a demonstration. Many workers came to Nevsky Prospekt on November 14 under the impression that the students' demonstration would take place. When they were told that they should not have come without a call by the Committee, they conceded the point, but said that they 'thought there would be something doing there anyway'. At any rate, this fact illustrates the mood of the class-conscious workers.

"At a meeting of the Committee on November 18 it was decided to hold the demonstration on the 28th. A subcommittee was immediately set up to organise the demonstration and work out a plan of action; it was decided to issue two preparatory agitational leaflets and a call. We threw ourselves into the job with all energy. The writer of these lines personally arranged several meetings of workers, study circle members, at which we discussed the role of the working class and the aim and significance of a demonstration at the present moment. We discussed the question of an armed or an unarmed demonstration, and all these meetings adopted resolutions supporting the decision of the Committee. The workers demanded as many leaflets as possible for distribution. 'Give us wagon-loads,' they said.

"And so, a demonstration, which promised to be really impressive, was being prepared for the 28th. But here our St. Petersburg 'Minority', like the 'All-Russian' 'Minority' and the 'Minority' abroad, could not help playing a purely negative role, the role of a disorganiser. To make that role perfectly clear, I shall have to say a few words about the local 'Minority' and its activities. Before the demonstration, and after, the Committee consisted largely of adherents of the Majority of the Second Party Congress.* Arrests and the differences that are tearing the Party asunder have in many ways weakened the activity of the local Social-Democratic organisations. In its fight against the 'Majority' the local 'Minority' tries, for its own factional purposes, to discredit our local Committee. District representatives who adhere to the 'Minority' do not admit comrades of the 'Majority' into their districts and do not supply the Committee with any contacts. The result is terrible disorganisation and lowered efficiency in the districts concerned. The following is a case in point. For the last five or six months the representative of one district has been a 'Menshevik'. Due to the fact that it has been out of touch with the general activity, this district has lost ground terribly. Where there were formerly from fifteen to twenty study circles, there are now barely from four to five. The workers are dissatisfied with this state of affairs, and their representative is seeking to exploit this dissatisfaction against the 'Majority' by setting the workers against the Committee. The 'Minority' seeks to turn every weakness in the local Social-Democratic organisation to account against the 'Majority'. Whether its attempts are successful or not is another matter, but the fact remains that this is so.

"Three days before the demonstration, the Committee was called together on the initiative of the 'Minority'. For certain reasons three members of the 'Majority' on the Committee could not be notified in advance and were absent. The 'Minority' made a motion to call off the demonstration, threatening, otherwise, to work against it and not distribute a single leaflet. Owing to the absence of the three comrades that would have supported the demonstration, the motion was carried. It was decided not to distribute any leaflets and to destroy those containing the call.

"The broad mass of the general public, as well as the workers, prepared to attend the demonstration and waited only for the Committee's call. Rumours began to circulate that the demonstration had been called off and indefinitely postponed. Many strongly objected to the cancellation; the technical workers¹⁵ protested and refused to work for the Committee in the future.

"A meeting of the Committee was called on Friday, and the three members who had been absent at the previous meeting protested against the improper revision of the decision to hold the demonstration.

* The Russian terms for "majority" and "minority" are, respectively, *bolshinstvo* and *menshinstvo*. Hence, Lenin's adherents, who obtained a majority of votes in the elections to the leading organs of the Party at the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. held in London in 1903, were called Bolsheviks, and their opponents, the minority, were called Mensheviks.—*Ed.*

Since a mass of people would gather in Nevsky Prospekt anyway, even if no leaflets were distributed, they urged that all steps be taken to get the workers as well to participate in the demonstration. A representative of the 'Minority' objected on the grounds that '*not all workers are sufficiently developed to participate consciously in the demonstration and to be able to defend the demands put forward by the Committee*'. The question was put to the vote; the meeting decided, with only one opposing vote, to hold the demonstration. But it transpired that many of the printed leaflets—over 12,000—containing the call had been burnt. Besides, their mass distribution at the factories was impossible, since they could not be delivered anywhere by Saturday morning, and on Saturdays the factories stop work at two or three o'clock. Thus, the leaflets could be distributed only among a small circle of workers, among acquaintances, but not among the broad masses. Under the circumstances the demonstration was foredoomed to failure. And fail it did....

"Now our 'Minority' can rejoice. It has won! Here is a new fact that discredits the Committee (read: the 'Majority'). But we hope that the reader will consider more seriously the reasons why the demonstration turned out as it did, and will say with us: 'Yes, as things now are in the Party it is impossible to work with any success. We must put an end to the crisis within the Party as soon as possible, we must close our ranks, otherwise we are in danger of complete enfeeblement and, unless we take advantage of the present favourable moment, we shall find ourselves trailing at the tail-end of great events.'"

This disruptive act of the St. Petersburg "Minority", which, in their own petty factional interests, prevented a proletarian demonstration, is the last drop that should make the cup of the Party's patience run over. That our Party is seriously ill and has lost a good half of its influence during the past year is known to the whole world. We appeal now to those who are incapable of regarding this serious ailment with sneers or malicious joy, who cannot dismiss the accursed questions of the Party crisis with mere sighs and shakes of the head, with snivelling and whining, who consider it their duty, even at the cost of a supreme effort, to achieve full clarity on the causes of the crisis—to fulfil that duty and pluck up the evil by its roots. For these people, *and these people only*, we shall recapitulate the history of the crisis; for without studying this history it is impossible to understand the present split, which the "Mensheviks" have finally contrived to bring about.

First stage of the crisis: At the Second Congress of our Party the principles of the *Iskra* position win, despite the opposition of the *Rabocheye Dyelo* and semi-*Rabocheye Dyelo*

people. After the Congress, the Minority begins to tear the Party asunder over the question of bringing into the Editorial Board persons whom the Congress rejected. Disorganisation, boycott, and preparation for a split go on *for three months*, from the end of August to the end of November.

Second stage: Plekhanov yields to the gentlemen who yearn for co-optation and makes manifest to all in public print, in the article "What Should Not Be Done" (No. 52), that he is offering a personal concession to the revisionists and anarchists-individualists in order to avert a greater evil. The gentlemen take advantage of this concession to go on rending the Party. Having taken their seats on the Editorial Board of the Central Organ and on the Council of the Party, they form a *secret organisation* for the purpose of getting their people into the Central Committee and obstructing the Third Congress. Unheard-of and incredible though it may be, this fact is proved by documentary evidence in the form of a letter of the new Central Committee concerning deals made with this worthy crew.

Third stage: Three members of the Central Committee side with the conspirators against the Party. They *co-opt three pretenders from the Minority* (assuring the committees, in writing, of the contrary), and, with the aid of the Council, *decidedly obstruct the Third Congress*, which was favoured by the overwhelming majority of the committees that voiced their opinions on the crisis. In Orlovsky's¹⁶ pamphlet (*The Council Against the Party*) and in Lenin's (*Statement and Documents on the Break of the Central Institutions with the Party**), these facts are likewise proved by documentary evidence. The mass of the Party workers in Russia are unaware of these facts, but they should be known to everyone who wishes to be a Party member in more than name.

Fourth stage: The Party workers in Russia unite for action against the group abroad which has disgraced our Party. The adherents and the *Committees of the Majority* arrange *several private conferences* and elect representatives. The new Central Committee, which is controlled completely by the co-opted pretenders, *makes it its business to disorganise*

* First published in pamphlet form, January 1905, Geneva. See present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 529-39.—*Ed.*

and split all local committees of the Majority. The comrades should not entertain any illusions on this score; the Central Committee has no other purpose. The creatures of the clique abroad are preparing and forming new committees everywhere (in Odessa, Baku, Ekaterinoslav, Moscow, Voronezh, etc.). The group abroad is preparing its own, hand-picked congress. The secret organisation, having finished with the central bodies, has turned against the local committees.

The disruptive trick of the St. Petersburg Mensheviks is no accident; it is a calculated step towards splitting the Committee, a move made with the help of the "Mensheviks" co-opted into the Central Committee. We repeat: The Party workers in Russia in their majority are unaware of these facts. We warn them and say to them most emphatically that everyone who wishes to struggle for the Party and against disorganisation, everyone who does not want to be utterly duped, must know all these facts.

We have made all possible concessions and several quite impossible ones in order to continue working in one party with the "Minority". Now that the Third Congress has been obstructed and the disruptive tactics have been directed against the local committees, all hope of achieving this is lost. Unlike the "Mensheviks", who work by underhand means, behind the Party's back, we must declare openly and prove by deeds that the Party has broken off any and all relations with these gentry.

CONFERENCES OF THE COMMITTEES ¹⁷

Three conferences of local committees of our Party have recently been held: (1) the conference of the four Caucasian committees, (2) the conference of the three southern committees (Odessa, Ekaterinoslav, and Nikolayev), and (3) the conference of the six northern committees (St. Petersburg, Moscow, Tver, Riga, the North, and Nizhni-Novgorod). We hope shortly to be able to give detailed information about these conferences. ¹⁸ For the time being we can report that all three conferences emphatically went on record for the immediate convocation of the Third Congress of the Party and in support of the publicists' group of the "Majority".

Vperyod, No 1, January 4, 1905
(December 22, 1904)

Published according to
the text in *Vperyod*

THE NEW RUSSIAN LOAN

Under the above headline, the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, mouthpiece of the big German stockjobbers, gives the following interesting report:

"Rumours of a new big Russian loan have been current for several weeks now. All these rumours were promptly denied. It is now officially admitted, however, that a loan was recently [reported on December 29, new style] negotiated in St. Petersburg. No doubt, these official negotiations were preceded by private inquiries, which gave rise to the rumours. It is reported that German financiers took part this time in the negotiations. The loan is to be floated on the German market. Until now, since the beginning of the war, Russia has raised funds in three different ways: first, about 300 million rubles was borrowed from the cash holdings of the Treasury, increased by cuts in previous allocations. This was followed by a loan of 800 million francs (about 300 million rubles) obtained through French bankers. In August Russia floated a domestic loan of 150 million rubles. The war is consuming heavy sums which are growing from month to month, and Russia is again planning to raise a big foreign loan. Russian stocks have recently shown a strong (serious, *bedenkliche*) downward trend. How the German public will react to the Russian loan is unpredictable. The fortunes of war, so far, have invariably favoured the Japanese. And whereas, so far, Russian loans have been considered a safe investment, they are now becoming more or less speculative (*Beigeschmack*), especially in view of the tsar's recent Manifesto, which throws characteristic light on what is going on in Russia. It remains to be seen whether the new loan will be offered to the German public on terms (the interest rate and the price of issue) that would make up for the impaired quality of the Russian loan."— — —

Another warning to the Russian autocracy by the European bourgeoisie! It is losing credit as a result both of the military defeats and of the growing discontent within the country. The European bankers are beginning to regard the autocracy as a gambling speculation, while the "quality" of Russian loans, in the sense of their reliability, is frankly declared to be impaired.

And what a mass of money this criminal war, which must be consuming no less than *three million rubles a day*, is still going to cost the people!

Written after December 16 (29), 1904

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TO A. A. BOGDANOV

January 10, 1905

My dear friend,

At last we have launched *Vperyod*, and I would like to discuss it with you in greater detail. Issue No. 2 will appear the day after tomorrow. We intend to bring it out weekly. We have sufficient literary forces for the task. We are all in excellent spirits and at the top of our working form (with the slight exception of Vasily Vasilyevich,¹⁹ who has a touch of the blues). We are sure that things will go well, so long as we don't go bankrupt. We need 400 francs (150 rubles) per issue, but we have only 1,200 francs all in all. We shall need the deuce of a lot of help for the first few months; for, unless we can make it a regular publication, the entire position of the Majority will be dealt a terrific, well-nigh irreparable blow. Do not forget this and get whatever you can (*especially from Gorky*).

Next. It is particularly important now to let Rakhmetov²⁰ know that he should push on as hard as he can with the arrangements for literary contributions from Russia. The success of a weekly depends largely upon the energetic collaboration of Russian writers and Social-Democrats. Write to Rakhmetov that he should mobilise *both Finn and Kollontai* for the purpose (we badly need articles *on Finland*), *as well as Rumyantsev and Andrei Sokolov*, the latter especially and particularly. I know by long experience that the people in Russia are devilishly, unpardonably, and incredibly slow at this sort of thing. It is therefore necessary to act, first of all, by personal example; secondly, not to rely on promises, but to see that you get the things written. Let Rakhmetov be sure to order the articles and the correspondence himself, and receive them himself, and send them off himself, keeping at it until

he gets the material. (I would also add *Suvorov and Lunts*, but I am sure Rakhmetov knows many others besides.) We badly need: (1) articles on questions of Russian life, from 6,000 to 18,000 letters; (2) paragraphs on the same subjects, from 2,000 to 6,000 letters; (3) correspondence of diverse length about everything; (4) interesting passages and quotations from local Russian and special Russian publications; (5) paragraphs on articles in Russian newspapers and magazines. The last three points are quite within the range of contribution by working-class and especially the student youth, and therefore the thing should be given attention; this work should be popularised, people should be roused and filled with zeal; they should, by concrete example, be taught what is wanted and how necessary it is to utilise every trifle; they should be made to see how badly needed the *raw* material from Russia is abroad (we shall be able to work it up from a literary angle and make use of it ourselves), that it is foolish in the extreme to feel embarrassed about literary shortcomings, that they must learn to speak simply and correspond simply with the periodical abroad if they wish to make it their own journal. In view of this I would consider it simply necessary and positively essential to hand out a *Vperyod* address (a foreign address, of which we have many now and shall have more) to *every* student circle and to *every* workers' group. I assure you that there is an idiotic prejudice among our committee-men against handing out addresses on a broad scale to the periphery youth. Combat this prejudice with all your might, hand out the addresses, and demand *direct contact* with the Editorial Board of *Vperyod*. Unless this is done there will be no newspaper. Workers' correspondence is very badly needed, and there is so little of it. What we need is scores and hundreds of workers corresponding directly with *Vperyod*.

We must also get the workers to communicate their own addresses to which *Vperyod* may be mailed in closed envelopes. The workers will not be afraid. The police will not be able to intercept a tenth of the envelopes. The small (four-page) size and frequent appearance of *Vperyod* make the question of envelope delivery a most vital one for our newspaper. We should make it our direct objective to develop workers' subscriptions to *Vperyod*, to develop the habit of sending the

money (a ruble isn't something God knows what!) and one's address abroad. If we tackle this properly, my word, we could revolutionise the distribution of underground literature in Russia. Don't forget that transportation, at best, takes four months. And that's with a weekly paper! As for the enveloped copies, probably from 50 to 75 per cent will be delivered at postal speed.

Now, as to the writers. They ought simply to be obligated to write regularly once a week or once a fortnight; otherwise—so, indeed, tell them—we cannot consider them decent people and will have nothing more to do with them. The usual excuse is: We don't know what theme to choose, we're afraid to waste our effort, we think "they already have this". It is against these trite and idiotic pretexts that Rakhmetov must wage a personal, a definitely personal, fight. The principal themes are the domestic topics of Russia (of the kind that comprise in periodical literature reviews of the domestic political scene and reflections of social life), as well as articles and brief comments on material appearing in Russian special publications (statistical, military, medical, prison, ecclesiastical, and other periodicals). We are always in need of copy for these two sections. Only people living in Russia, and such people alone, can conduct these two sections well. *The keynote here is fresh facts, fresh impressions, special materials that are inaccessible to the people abroad, and not just arguments, not evaluations from the Social-Democratic point of view.* Therefore, such articles and comments will never go to waste, for we shall always make use of them. It is Rakhmetov's duty now to organise this thing at once and give us at least half a dozen good, useful contributors, who would not be lazy or try to shirk their jobs, but would each get in direct touch with the Editorial Board. Only by direct contact with contributors can we arrange all the details of the work. People should be enlisted by being made to realise that nowhere else can they "get into print" as quickly as in a weekly newspaper.

In conclusion, a word or two about the organisational slogan of today. After the article "Time to Call a Halt!" (*Vperyod*, No. 1),* this slogan should be clear; but people are so

* See pp. 35-39 of this volume.—*Ed.*

inert that Rakhmetov, here again, will have to explain and explain again, and hammer it into their heads as hard as he can. The *split* is now *complete*; for we have exhausted all means. It is the *Third Congress* against the will of the Central Committee and the Council and *without them*. Complete rupture with the Central Committee. An open statement that we have our own Bureau. The complete removal of the Mensheviks and the new-Iskrists everywhere. We did everything we could to get on together, and should now declare openly and bluntly that we are obliged to work separately. All trustfulness and naïveté can only cause tremendous harm.

For Christ's sake hurry up and issue an open and emphatic statement on the Bureau.²¹ It is necessary: (1) to line up fully with "Time to Call a Halt!" and re-issue its appeal; (2) to declare that *Vperyod* is the organ of the majority of the committees and that the Bureau is working with it in complete and friendly agreement; (3) that the C.C. and the Council have deceived the Party in the most disgraceful way and sabotaged the Congress; (4) that there is no way out now other than the convening of a congress of the committees themselves *without* the C.C. and the Council; (5) that the Bureau undertakes to help the constructive work of the committees; (6) that the Central Organ has utterly lost the membership's confidence by its vacillations and lies.

Believe me, we highly appreciate Zemlyachka, but she is wrong in her opposition to Papasha,²² and it is for you to correct her mistakes. Let us hurry up and break with the C.C. all along the line, and publish a statement about the Bureau at once to the effect that it is the Organising Committee and that it is convening the Third Congress.

Published according to
the manuscript

THE FALL OF PORT ARTHUR "

"Port Arthur has surrendered.

"This event is one of the greatest events in modern history. These four words, flashed yesterday to all parts of the civilised world, create a crushing impression, the impression of an overwhelming and appalling catastrophe, a disaster that beggars description. The moral power of a mighty empire is crumbling, the prestige of a young race is waning before it has had the chance to prove itself. Sentence has been passed upon an entire political system. A long chain of asserted claims has been broken and mighty efforts have been frustrated. True, the fall of Port Arthur had long been predicted, and for a long time people had sought to dismiss it in a few words and to find consolation in ready-made phrases. But the hard, brutal fact shatters all conventional lies. The significance of the disaster cannot be underrated now. For the first time the old world has been humiliated by an irreparable defeat dealt it by the new world, a world mysterious, and, to all appearances, adolescent, which was only yesterday won to civilisation."

Thus writes a respectable European bourgeois newspaper under the direct impact of the event. Admittedly, it has done more than merely express in trenchant words the sentiments of the entire European bourgeoisie. Through the words of this newspaper speaks the true class instinct of the bourgeoisie of the old world, which is perturbed by the victories of the new bourgeois world and alarmed by the collapse of Russia's military power, which for a long time had been considered the bulwark of European reaction. Small wonder that even the European bourgeoisie, which has taken no part in the war, feels humiliated and depressed. It had grown so accus-

tomed to identify Russia's moral strength with the military strength of the gendarme of Europe. In its eyes the prestige of the young Russian race was inseparably bound up with that of tsarism, that unshakable authority, which strongly safeguarded the existing "order of things". Small wonder that the disaster which has overtaken the rulers and commanders of Russia seems "appalling" to the whole European bourgeoisie. This disaster implies a tremendous acceleration of worldwide capitalist development, a quickening of history's pace; and the bourgeoisie knows only too well from bitter experience that this means the acceleration of the social revolution of the proletariat. The bourgeoisie of Western Europe felt so secure in the atmosphere of long-lasting stagnation, under the wing of the "mighty Empire", and now suddenly some "mysterious, adolescent" power dares to disturb this stagnation and shatter this pillar.

Indeed, the European bourgeoisie has cause for alarm. The proletariat has cause for rejoicing. The disaster that has overtaken our mortal enemy not only signifies the approach of freedom in Russia, it also presages a new revolutionary upsurge of the European proletariat.

But why and to what extent is the fall of Port Arthur really an historic disaster?

The first thing that strikes the eye is the effect of this event on the trend of the war. The main objective of the Japanese in this war has been attained. Advancing, progressive Asia has dealt backward and reactionary Europe an irreparable blow. Ten years ago this reactionary Europe, with Russia in the lead, was perturbed by the defeat of China at the hands of young Japan, and it united to rob Japan of the best fruits of her victory. Europe was protecting the established relations and privileges of the old world, its prerogative to exploit the Asian peoples—a prerogative held from time immemorial and sanctified by the usage of centuries. The recovery of Port Arthur by Japan is a blow struck at the whole of reactionary Europe. Russia held Port Arthur for six years and spent hundreds of millions of rubles on the building of strategic railways, harbours, and new towns, on fortifying a stronghold which the entire mass of European newspapers, bribed by Russia and fawning on Russia, declared to be impregnable. Military commentators write that Port Arthur was as strong as six Sevas-

topols. And behold, little Japan, hitherto despised by all, captures this stronghold in eight months, when it took England and France together a whole year to capture Sevastopol. The military blow is irreparable. The question of supremacy on the seas, the main and vital issue of the present war, has been settled. The Russian Pacific fleet, which at the outset was certainly not weaker, if actually not stronger, than the Japanese fleet, has been completely destroyed. The very base for naval operations has been lost, and the only thing left for Rozhdestvensky's naval squadron is to turn back shamefully after a useless expenditure of more millions, after the great victory of his formidable battleships over the English fishing smacks. It is believed that Russia's loss in naval tonnage alone amounts to 300,000,000 rubles. More important, however, is the loss of some ten thousand of the navy's best men, and the loss of an entire army. Many European papers are now trying to minimise the importance of these losses, and their efforts to do so lead them to such ridiculous assertions as that Kuropatkin is now "relieved", "freed" of his worries over Port Arthur! Russia's military forces have also been relieved of an entire army. According to the latest English reports, no fewer than 48,000 *men* have been taken prisoner, and there is no telling how many thousands more were killed in the battles of Kinchow and at the fortress itself. The Japanese are in complete possession of the Liaotung Peninsula; they have acquired a base of operations of incalculable importance for exerting pressure on Korea, China, and Manchuria; they have released for action against Kuropatkin a battle-ried army of from 80,000 to 100,000 strong, reinforced by formidable heavy artillery which, when brought up to the Shaho River, will give them an overwhelming superiority over the main Russian forces.

According to reports in the foreign press, the autocratic government has decided to continue the war at all costs, and to send Kuropatkin 200,000 more men. It is highly probable that the war will drag on for a long time, but its hopelessness is already apparent, and all delays will only aggravate the innumerable calamities which the Russian people are suffering because they still tolerate the yoke of the autocracy on their neck. As it is, the Japanese have reinforced their troops after every big battle in less time and in greater numbers

than the Russians. And now that they have achieved complete supremacy on the sea and have utterly annihilated one of Russia's armies, they will be able to send twice as many reinforcements as the Russians. As it is, the Japanese beat the Russian generals time and again, although the bulk of their best artillery was engaged in siege warfare. Now they have achieved complete concentration of their forces, while the Russians have to fear for Vladivostok, as well as for Sakhalin. The Japanese have occupied the best and most populated part of Manchuria, where they can maintain an army at the expense of the conquered territory and with the help of China, whereas the Russians have to depend more and more upon supplies transported from Russia, and it will soon be impossible for Kuropatkin to increase his army any further, in view of the impossibility of bringing up sufficient supplies.

But the military debacle which the autocracy has suffered has deeper implications; it signifies the collapse of our entire political system. The days when wars were fought by mercenaries or by representatives of a caste half-isolated from the people have gone for ever. Wars today are fought by peoples; even Kuropatkin, according to Nemirovich-Danchenko, has begun to realise that this is the truth and not a mere copy-book motto. Wars today are fought by peoples; this now brings out more strikingly than ever a great attribute of war, namely, that it opens the eyes of millions to the disparity between the people and the government, which heretofore was evident only to a small class-conscious minority. The criticism of the autocracy by all progressive Russians, by the Russian Social-Democrats, by the Russian proletariat, has now been confirmed in the criticism by Japanese arms, confirmed in such wise that the impossibility of living under the autocracy *is felt* more and more even by those who do not know what autocracy means, even by those who do know, but yet would maintain it with all their soul. The incompatibility of the autocracy with the interests of social development, with the interests of the entire people (apart from a handful of bureaucrats and bigwigs), became evident as soon as the people actually had to pay for the autocracy with their life-blood. Its foolish and criminal colonial adventure has landed the autocracy in an impasse, from which the people can ex-

tricate themselves only by their own efforts and only at the cost of destroying tsarism.

The fall of Port Arthur is a great historic outcome of tsarism's crimes, which began to reveal themselves at the outset of the war, and which will now reveal themselves more and more extensively and unrestrainedly. After us the deluge! argued all the big and little Alexeyevs," scarcely thinking or believing that the deluge would actually come. The generals and commanders-in-chief proved themselves incompetent non-entities. In the expert opinion of an English military observer (in *The Times*), the whole story of the 1904 campaign was one of criminal neglect of the elementary principles of naval and military strategy. The civil and military bureaucracy proved as parasitic and venal now as in the days of serfdom. The officers proved uneducated, undeveloped, and untrained. They were not in close touch with the soldiers, nor did they enjoy their confidence. The ignorance, illiteracy, and backwardness of the peasant masses became appallingly obvious when they came up against a progressive nation in modern warfare, which requires high-quality manpower as imperatively as does modern technique. Success in modern warfare is impossible without intelligent soldiers and sailors who possess initiative. No amount of endurance or physical strength, no herding of men into solid ranks for mass actions can guarantee superiority in an age of quick-firing small arms and quick-firing cannon, when naval battles are fought with the aid of intricate mechanisms and land actions are fought in extended order. The military might of autocratic Russia has proved to be a sham. Tsarism has proved to be a hindrance to the organisation of up-to-date efficient warfare, that very business to which tsarism dedicated itself so wholeheartedly, of which it was so proud, and for which it offered such colossal sacrifices in defiance to all opposition on the part of the people. A whited sepulchre is what tsarism has proved to be in the field of external defence, which was its favourite speciality, so to say. Events have corroborated the opinion of those foreigners who laughed upon seeing hundreds of millions squandered on the purchase and building of splendid warships, and who declared that those expenditures were useless if no one knew how to manipulate such modern vessels, if there were no people with the necessary technical

knowledge to utilise the latest achievements of military engineering. Both the navy and the fortress, the field fortifications and the army proved to be antiquated and utterly useless.

Never before has the military organisation of a country had such a close bearing on its entire economic and cultural system. The military debacle, therefore, could not but precipitate a profound political crisis. Here again, as so often in history, the war between an advanced and a backward country has played a great revolutionary role. And the class-conscious proletariat, an implacable enemy of war — this inevitable and inseverable concomitant of all class rule in general — cannot shut its eyes to the revolutionary task which the Japanese bourgeoisie, by its crushing defeat of the Russian autocracy, is carrying out. The proletariat is hostile to every bourgeoisie and to all manifestations of the bourgeois system, but this hostility does not relieve it of the duty of distinguishing between the historically progressive and the reactionary representatives of the bourgeoisie. It is quite understandable, therefore, that the most consistent and staunch representatives of revolutionary international Social-Democracy, such as Jules Guesde in France and Hyndman in England, unequivocally expressed their sympathy with Japan, which is routing the Russian autocracy. Here in Russia, of course, some socialists were found to have muddled ideas on this question, too. *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya*²⁵ rebuked Guesde and Hyndman, saying that a socialist could only be in favour of a workers' Japan, a people's Japan, and not of a bourgeois Japan. This rebuke is as absurd as blaming a socialist for admitting the progressive nature of the free-trade bourgeoisie as compared with the protectionist bourgeoisie. Guesde and Hyndman did not defend the Japanese bourgeoisie or Japanese imperialism; they correctly noted in this conflict between two bourgeois countries the historically progressive role of one of them. The muddle-headedness of the "Socialists-Revolutionaries" was, of course, an inevitable result of the failure on the part of our radical intelligentsia to understand the class point of view and historical materialism. Neither could the new *Iskra* help showing muddled thinking. It had quite a lot to say at first about peace at any price. It then made haste to "correct itself", when Jaurès showed plainly whose interests,

those of the progressive or those of the reactionary bourgeoisie, would be served by a quasi-socialist campaign for peace in general. And now it has ended up with platitudes about the unreasonableness of "speculating" (!) on a victory of the Japanese bourgeoisie and about war being a calamity "regardless of whether" it ends in the victory or the defeat of the autocracy.

No. The cause of Russian freedom and of the struggle of the Russian (and the world) proletariat for socialism depends to a very large extent on the military defeats of the autocracy. This cause has been greatly advanced by the military debacle which has struck terror in the hearts of all the European guardians of the existing order. The revolutionary proletariat must carry on a ceaseless agitation against war, always keeping in mind, however, that wars are inevitable as long as class rule exists. Trite phrases about peace *à la* Jaurès are of no use to the oppressed class, which is not responsible for a bourgeois war between two bourgeois nations, which is doing all it can to overthrow every bourgeoisie, which knows the enormity of the people's sufferings even in time of "peaceful" capitalist exploitation. While struggling against free competition, we cannot, however, forget its progressive character in comparison with the semi-feudal system. While struggling against every war and every bourgeoisie, we must draw a clear line in our agitational work between the progressive bourgeoisie and the feudal autocracy; we must recognise the great revolutionary role of the historic war in which the Russian worker is an involuntary participant.

It was the Russian autocracy and not the Russian people that started this colonial war, which has turned into a war between the old and the new bourgeois worlds. It is the autocratic regime and not the Russian people that has suffered ignoble defeat. The Russian people has gained from the defeat of the autocracy. The capitulation of Port Arthur is the prologue to the capitulation of tsarism. The war is not ended yet by far, but every step towards its continuation increases immeasurably the unrest and discontent among the Russian people, brings nearer the hour of a new great war, the war of the people against the autocracy, the war of the proletariat for liberty. There is good reason for the concern shown by that most sedate and sober European bourgeoisie, which would

heartily sympathise with the granting of liberal concessions by the Russian autocracy, but which stands in mortal fear of a Russian revolution, as the prologue to a European revolution.

"There is a deep-rooted opinion," writes one such sober organ of the German bourgeoisie, "that it is absolutely impossible for a revolution to break out in Russia. Every kind of argument is used to support this view: the inertness of the Russian peasantry, its faith in the tsar, its dependence on the clergy; the extreme elements among the discontented, it is claimed, constitute a mere handful, who can organise putsches and terrorist attempts, but are absolutely incapable of calling forth a general popular uprising. The broad mass of the discontented, we are told, lack organisation, arms, and—most important of all—the determination to risk their lives. As for the Russian intellectual, he is usually revolutionary-minded only until about the age of thirty, after which he settles down comfortably in some cushy government job, and thus most of the hotheads undergo a metamorphosis and become run-of-the-mill officials." But now, the newspaper continues, there are many indications of a big change. The revolutionaries are not the only ones now who speak about a revolution in Russia; the topic is even in the mouths of such "unenthusiastic" and solid pillars of law and order as Prince Trubetskoi, whose letter to the Minister of the Interior is now being reprinted by the entire European press. "There is evidently real ground for the fear of a revolution in Russia. True, no one believes that the Russian peasants will take up their pitchforks and go forward to fight for a constitution. But, then, are revolutions made in villages? In modern history the big cities long ago became the vehicles of the revolutionary movement. And in Russia it is the cities that are in ferment, from north to south and from east to west. No one will venture to predict the outcome, but it is an incontrovertible fact that the number of people who consider a revolution in Russia impossible is diminishing day by day. And if a serious revolutionary outbreak does occur, it is more than doubtful whether the autocracy, weakened by the war in the Far East, will be able to cope with it."

Yes, the autocracy is weakened. The most sceptical of the sceptics are beginning to believe in the revolution.

General belief in revolution is already the beginning of revolution. The government itself, by its military adventure, is seeing to its continuation. The Russian proletariat will see to it that the serious revolutionary onset is sustained and extended.

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FINE WORDS BUTTER NO PARSNIPS

We draw the attention of our readers to the pamphlet *Workers and Intellectuals in Our Organisations*, by "A Worker", which the new-Iskrists have just issued with a foreword by Axelrod. We shall probably have occasion more than once to refer to this edifying tract, which illustrates beautifully what fruits the demagogic preaching of the "Minority", or new-Iskrists, has borne and continues to bear, and how the latter are now trying to get out of the verbal mess into which they have talked themselves. For the present we shall merely note the main points in the pamphlet and the foreword.

"A Worker" had the misfortune to believe the rantings of the new-Iskrists. Hence we find so many *Rabocheye Dyelo* phrases à la Akimov in his pamphlet. "Our leaders from among the intellectuals ... did not set themselves the task ... of developing the class-consciousness and initiative of the workers...." Any endeavour to display initiative was "systematically persecuted". "In no single type of organisation has there been room for developing independent activity of the workers...." "The economic struggle was wholly neglected"; "workers were not admitted" even to agitation and propaganda meetings (who would have believed it!). Demonstrations "have outlived themselves"—all these horrors (which the old *Rabocheye Dyelo* used to cast in the teeth of the old *Iskra* long ago) are, of course, the work of "the bureaucratic centralists", viz., the majority at our Second Congress, which fought against *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ism. Set on against the Party Congress by the sulky minority, the poor "Worker" attacks this Congress because it was held "without us" (without the workers), "without our participation", because there was "hardly a single worker" there. Of course, the fact that all the real worker delegates at the Congress—Stepanov, Gorsky, and

Braun—staunchly supported the majority and opposed the spinelessness of the intellectuals is discreetly passed over. But this does not matter. What matters is the depth of depravity that results from the rantings of these new-*Iskra* people, who “attack” the Congress after being defeated at the elections, who attack it before those who did not participate in the Congress, inciting them to treat all Social-Democratic congresses with contempt; who attack it at the very time when they have so nobly wormed their way into the central bodies which act exclusively by authority of the Congress. Is not Ryazanov’s stand far more honest? (See his pamphlet *Shattered Illusions*.) He bluntly declared that the Congress was *packed*; but at least he has not been invested by this “packed congress” with any title or office.

It is highly characteristic of the psychology of a worker, even though his mind has been turned against the “Majority”, that he is not satisfied with phrases about autonomy, workers’ independent activity, etc. He repeats these words like every new-Iskrist or *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ist; but with sober proletarian instinct he insists on *deeds in confirmation of words*, he does not want his parsnips buttered with fine words. “*Without a change in the composition*” (“A Worker’s” italics) of the leadership, fine words remain but words, he declares. It is necessary to demand the *admission* of workers to all important Party bodies, to secure for them *equal rights* with the intellectuals. With the deep distrust of a true proletarian and a true democrat towards all bombast, “A Worker” exclaims: *What guarantee is there that the committees will not have only intellectuals sitting on them?* This hits the nail on the head as far as our new-Iskrists are concerned. This excellent question shows that the *Rabocheye Dyelo* incitements have so far failed to befuddle the clear mind of the proletarian. He states bluntly that the committee in which he worked “remained a committee of the Minority only in principle, on paper [mark this!], while in its actions it differed in no way from a committee of the Majority. We workers have had no access to any important, that is to say leading, Party body (let alone the Committee)”.

No one could have shown up the Mensheviks better than this Menshevik worker has done. He understands that *without guarantees* all this ranting about autonomy and independent

activity of the proletariat remains what it is—cheap phrase-mongering. But what *guarantees* are possible in Social-Democratic organisations—have you ever thought of that, Comrade “Worker”? What guarantees are there that revolutionaries who gathered at a Party congress, resentful over the fact that the Congress did not elect them, will not afterwards shout that the Congress was a reactionary attempt to put over the viewpoint of the Iskrists (see Trotsky’s pamphlet issued *under the editorship of the new “Iskra”*), that its decisions are not sacred, that there were no workers from among the masses at the Congress? What guarantees are there that the general decision concerning the forms and guiding rules of Party organisation, a decision called the Organisational Rules of the Party and which cannot exist except in the form of such Rules—that this decision is not broken eventually by characterless people, with regard to that part of it which they find distasteful, on the pretext that such things as Rules are bureaucratic and formalistic? What guarantees are there that people who have broken the collectively adopted Rules of organisation will not afterwards begin to argue that organisation is a process, that organisation is a tendency, that organisation is a form that keeps in step with its content, and that it is therefore absurd and utopian to demand observance of the Rules of organisation? “A Worker”, the author of the pamphlet, did not ponder over any one of these questions. But he approached them so closely, so very closely, he put them so bluntly, so candidly and boldly to the phrase-mongers and politicians, that we heartily recommend his pamphlet. It shows admirably how the knights of the “fine phrase” are exposed by their own followers.

“A Worker”, acting on second-hand information, objects to Lenin’s “organisational plan”, but as usual he does not indicate *a single* clear and precise ground for his objection. He mentions Panin and Cherevanin* (who have contributed nothing but angry words), but he does not so much as *take a glance* at Lenin’s much-talked-of letter to a St. Petersburg comrade. If “A Worker” had not taken his abettors at their word, but had looked at that letter, he would have read, to his great surprise, the following:

“We should particularly see to it that as many workers as possible become fully class-conscious and professional

revolutionaries and members of the committee. We must try to get on the committee revolutionary workers who have the greatest contacts and the best 'reputation' among the mass of the workers. The committee should, therefore, include, as far as possible, all the principal leaders of the working-class movement from among the workers themselves." ("Letter", pp. 7-8).*

Read and re-read these lines, Comrade "Worker", and you will see how *you have been hoodwinked* by the *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists and new-Iskristis, who are attacking the old *Iskra* and its followers, the "majority" of the Second Congress. Read the lines carefully and see if you will accept the challenge I put forth. Find me *another passage* in our Social-Democratic literature where the question you raised about "the workers and intellectuals in our organisations" is presented so *clearly, directly, and decidedly*, and where, moreover, the necessity is pointed out of getting as many workers as possible *on the committee*, of getting to the extent possible all leaders of the labour movement from among the working class *on the committee*. I say that you will not be able to point to another such passage. I say that anyone who takes the trouble to study our Party differences from documents, *from Rabocheye Dyelo*, from *Iskra*, and from the pamphlets—and not from tales spread by gossips—will see the falsity and the demagogic nature of the new *Iskra*'s preaching.

You will perhaps answer: Lenin may have written this, but his advice was not always taken. Of course, that is possible. No Party writer will vouch that all who call themselves his adherents always actually follow his counsels. But, in the first place, would not a Social-Democrat who called himself an adherent of the "Letter" while at the same time not following its counsels be exposed by that very letter? Was the letter printed for intellectuals only, and not for workers as well? Has a writer any means of stating his views other than a printed statement? Secondly, if these counsels were not heeded, as "A Worker", for instance, testifies, either by the Mensheviks or by the Bolsheviks, does it not clearly follow that the Mensheviks had no right to *invent* such a "disagreement" with the

* "A Letter to a Comrade on Our Organisational Tasks". See present edition, Vol. 6, p. 237.—Ed.

Bolsheviks, that their incitement of the workers against the Bolsheviks on the grounds that the latter ignored the workers' independent activity was sheer demagoguery?

Wherein, then, lies the *real* difference *on this point* between the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks? Is it not in the fact that the Bolsheviks came forward much earlier and much more directly with clear and definite advice to place workers on the committee? Is it not in the fact that the Bolsheviks have always despised "fine phrases" about the workers' autonomy and independent activity, when such utterances remain mere words (as they do with the Mensheviks)?

See now how the respectable, worthy, patriarchal Axelrod wriggles in his foreword when he is driven into a corner by the proletarian bluntness and boldness of a worker, who has imbibed so much *Rabocheye Dyelo* wisdom from Axelrod's "admirable" *feuilletons*, Martov's unforgettable articles, and (from the point of view of the interests of the "Majority") Trotsky's excellent pamphlet.

"A Worker" tries to question Ryadovoi's²⁷ assertion that since the time of Economism the membership of our Party organisation has become relatively more proletarian. "A Worker" is obviously wrong. Anyone who has observed the activities of our Party at close range for any length of time knows this. Most curious of all, however, is the sight of our old Axelrod changing front. Who does not remember his stout assertions, so skilfully utilised by the enemies of Social-Democracy, the *Osvobozhdeniye* liberals, that the Social-Democratic Party is an organisation of intellectuals? Who does not remember how the new-Iskrists, with their grudge against the Party, harped on this slander of the Party? And now the selfsame Axelrod, frightened by the direct and honest conclusions which "A Worker" has drawn from this slander, tries to dodge the issue:

"During the period of the inception and early development of Social-Democracy," he says in his foreword, "the Russian revolutionary party was purely a party of the intelligentsia.... Now the class-conscious revolutionary workers form the main body [mark this!] of the Social-Democratic Party" (*op. cit.*, p. 15).

Poor "Worker"! How severe his punishment is for having believed Axelrod's "fine words"! Such punishment is the inev-

itable consequence of trust in writers who for a year and a half have been saying first one thing then another to suit the exigencies of "co-optation".

See how Axelrod dodges the question of "guarantees" when he has to meet it outright. Why, it is a positive delight, a gem of new-*Iskra* literature. "A Worker" speaks of the relation between the workers and the intellectuals *within the organisations*. "A Worker" is *profoundly correct* in declaring that without guarantees, without equal rights, i.e., without the principle of elective office, all fine words about non-bureaucratic centralism are mere phrase-mongering. And what does Axelrod say in answer? "Over-zealousness for the idea of change in the status of the workers in our organisations is one-sidedness." The author erroneously shifts the issue of eradicating evil "into the sphere of formal organisational relations"; he forgets that "the particular question of equalisation of rights" can be solved only "in the process of the further development of our experience in a Social-Democratic direction". "The problem that particularly engages the author of the pamphlet can be radically dealt with only in the process of consciously collective work by our Party."

Truly a gem! Why, it was none other than Axelrod who was the first to raise this very question of organisation, and only of organisation, at the League Congress* and in the new *Iskra* (No. 55); but when "A Worker" writes a special pamphlet on organisation, he is told pontifically that it is not formality that counts, but the process of work!

It is not the principles of organisation that matter to the new *Iskra* and to Axelrod, but the process of twaddle to justify an unprincipled stand. There is no meaning except a defence of unprincipledness in the whole notorious organisation-as-process theory (see particularly Rosa Luxemburg's articles), a theory that vulgarises, and prostitutes Marxism.

We repeat, "A Worker's" admirable pamphlet cannot be recommended too highly as evidence of the utter falseness of the new-Iskrist position on the organisational question. We recommend this pamphlet particularly to workers whom the Mensheviks are trying to turn against the Bolsheviks by

* See Note 52.—Ed.

preaching the elective principle.* The workers are splendid at exposing phrase-mongers and liars. They put the question excellently: either the elective principle or only the advice to place workers on the committees. If it is to be the elective principle, give us formal guarantees, guarantees of equality embodied in the Rules. The workers will see the new-Iskrists running from a solution of this question as the devil runs from holy water. If advice to place workers on the committees is desirable, if the old *Iskra* was right in maintaining that democracy, i.e., the universal application of the elective principle in *Russian* secret organisations, is incompatible with the autocratic police-ridden regime, then *nowhere* will you find such direct and instructive advice to place workers on the committees as that given by the Majority.

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* See N. Lenin, *Statement and Documents on the Break of the Central Institutions with the Party* [see present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 529-39.—Ed.] The letter by the leader of the *Mensheviks* quoted in this pamphlet reads as follows: "... the workers are demanding the system of office by election. That is a clear symptom of the agony of the Stone-Hards". I belong to the Stone-Hards, but this agony satisfies me very well. The workers' demand that offices be elective shows plainly that the new-Iskrists did not succeed in buttering the workers' parsnips with fine words, and that no evasions can now save Axelrod from complete exposure.

A LETTER TO THE ZURICH GROUP OF BOLSHEVIKS

Genève, le 18. I. 1905*

Dear Comrades,

We are unable to call a meeting of the Editorial Board to answer your inquiry, and I therefore take the liberty of answering you myself. The Zurich group of Bolsheviks asks "what our attitude is to the Central Organ and the Central Committee; whether we consider them as existing legitimately but operating illegitimately and are in opposition to them, or whether we refuse to recognise them altogether as Party centres."

It seems to me that your question savours somewhat of casuistry. The announcement of the newspaper *Vperyod*** and the first issue ("Time to Call a Halt!"**), together with my *Statement and Documents**** would seem to have answered this question *in substance*. The leading centres (the Central Organ, the Central Committee, and the Council) *have broken* with the Party, sabotaged the Second and the Third Congresses, duped the Party in the most brazen way, and usurped their snug jobs in a truly Bonapartist manner. How can one speak here of the legitimate existence of the centres? Is a swindler the legitimate owner of the money he has pocketed on a forged note?

It seems strange to me that the Zurich Bolsheviks should still be puzzled, after this question has been thrashed out again and again. That the centres did not want to submit to the Party has been proved conclusively. Then what are we to

* Geneva, January 18, 1905.—*Ed.*

** See pp. 35-39 of this volume.—*Ed.*

*** See present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 529-39.—*Ed.*

do? Convene the Third Congress? They have deceived us on that score, too. One thing remains—to break with the Mensheviks as *completely*, as quickly, and as definitely (openly, publicly) as possible, and to convene our own Third Party Congress, without the consent of the central bodies and without their participation, to begin *immediately* (without waiting for this centre either) to work with our own Party centres, the Editorial Board of *Vperyod*, and the Russian Bureau elected by the Northern Conference.

I repeat: the centres *have put themselves outside* the Party. There is no middle ground; one is either with the centres or with the Party. It is time to draw the line of demarcation and, unlike the Mensheviks, who are splitting the Party secretly, to accept their challenge openly. Yes, a split, for you have gone the whole hog with your splitting. Yes, a split, for we have exhausted *all* means of delay and of obtaining a *Party* decision (by a Third Congress). Yes, a split, for everywhere the disgusting squabbles with the disorganisers have only harmed the cause. We have received letters from St. Petersburg saying that things have taken a turn for the better since the split, that one can work without squabbles, with people whom one trusts. Is not this perfectly clear? Down with the Bonapartists and the disorganisers!

Let us know whether you are satisfied with this answer.

It is essential that the groups of the Majority abroad close their ranks. Write about the issue immediately to the Berne comrades (Herrn Kazakow, Bäckereiweg, 1. Bern). They are already at it and will answer you better than I can. We must tackle the matter more energetically. Correspond with all the groups, spur them on in regard to money and material, initiate groups in new places, etc.

We likewise have begun to feel much better since we broke decisively with the Minority. We heartily wish you, too, a speedy riddance of them.

I clasp your hand,

Yours,

N. Lenin

P.S. Please give my special personal regards to Meyerson. How is he getting on? Does he feel better?

I am angry at Steiner—tell her it's disgusting; she promised to write about Nikolayev by Christmas, and we're nearly at the end of January!

The Berne group has undertaken to unite the Bolsheviks abroad, under the leadership of the Bureau, of course. Ask the Berne group for their letter to us on this question and the answer of the Geneva group.

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A LETTER TO Y. D. STASOVA AND TO THE OTHER COMRADES IN PRISON IN MOSCOW

January 19, 1905

Dear Friends,

I have received your inquiry concerning the tactics to be pursued in court (in Absolute's²² letter and the note "reported verbatim" through an unknown person). Absolute writes of two points of view. The note speaks of three groups; perhaps it has in mind three shades of opinion, which I shall attempt to reconstruct as follows: (1) To refuse to recognise the court and to boycott it outright. (2) To refuse to recognise the court and not to participate in the court proceedings; to employ a lawyer only with the understanding that he speak exclusively about the court's lack of jurisdiction from the point of view of abstract law; in the concluding speech for the defence to make a *profession de foi** and to demand a trial by jury. (3) The same applies to the defendant's last statement. To use the trial as a means of agitation and, for this purpose, to take part in the court proceedings with the aid of legal counsel; to show up the unlawfulness of the trial and even to call witnesses (to prove alibis, etc.).

There is this further question: should you say only that you are a Social-Democrat by conviction, or should you admit that you are a member of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party?

You write that a pamphlet is needed on this question. I do not think it is advisable to issue a pamphlet straight away

* Declaration of faith, a programme, the exposition of a world outlook.—Ed.

without any experience to go by. Perhaps we shall mention it somehow in the newspaper when the opportunity occurs. Perhaps one of the people in prison will write a short article for the paper (from 5,000 to 8,000 letters)? I think this would be the best way to start the discussion.

I personally have not yet formed a definite opinion and should prefer, before committing myself, to talk it over in detail with comrades who are in prison or have stood trial. To get such a talk started I shall state my own ideas on the subject. Much depends, I think, on *the kind* of trial it will be, viz., whether or not there will be a possibility to utilise it for purposes of agitation. In the first instance, policy No. 1 will not do; in the second, it is appropriate, but only after an open, definite, and energetic protest and statement. However, if there is a chance of taking advantage of the trial for agitational purposes, policy No. 3 is desirable. A speech with a *profession de foi* is generally most desirable, and, I think, very useful, and it could in most cases have an agitational effect. Particularly when the government has begun to utilise the courts, the Social-Democrats should speak out about the Social-Democratic programme and tactics. Some hold that it is not advisable to declare oneself a member of the Party, particularly of any definite organisation; that one should rather declare oneself a Social-Democrat by conviction and limit the statement to that. I think that one's affiliations should be omitted entirely from the speech, i.e., that one should say: For obvious reasons I shall not speak about my affiliations, but I am a Social-Democrat and I shall speak of *our* Party. Such a formulation has two advantages: it states directly and specifically that one is not to speak of one's affiliations (viz., whether one belongs to an organisation, and if so, to which, etc.), while at the same time one speaks of *our* Party. This is necessary in order that Social-Democratic speeches in court may become Party speeches and statements, in order that the Party may benefit by this propaganda. In other words, I waive my formal affiliations; I pass them over in silence, I do not speak formally in the name of any organisation whatever, but as a Social-Democrat I speak to the court of *our* Party and ask it to accept my statements as an endeavour to expound precisely the Social-Democratic views that have been set forth in all *our* Social-Democratic

literature, in such-and-such pamphlets, leaflets, and newspapers.

As to lawyers. Lawyers should be kept well in hand and made to toe the line, for there is no telling what dirty tricks this intellectualist scum will be up to. They should be warned in advance: Look here, you confounded rascal, if you permit yourself the slightest impropriety *or political opportunism* (if you speak of socialism as something immature or wrong-headed, or as an infatuation, or if you say that *the Social-Democrats reject the use of force*, speak of their teachings and their movement as peaceful, etc., or anything of the sort), then I, the defendant, will pull you up publicly, right then and there, call you a scoundrel, declare that I reject such a defence, etc. And these threats must be carried out. Only clever lawyers should be engaged; we do not need others. They should be told beforehand: Confine yourselves to criticising and "laying traps" for witnesses and the public prosecutor on the facts of the case, and to nailing trumped-up charges; confine yourselves exclusively to discrediting the Shemyakin-trial¹⁰ features of the proceedings. Even a smart liberal lawyer is extremely prone to mention *or hint* at the peaceful nature of the Social-Democratic movement, at the recognition of its cultural influence even by people like Adolf Wagner, etc. All such attempts should be nipped in the bud. The lawyers, as Bebel, I believe, said, are the most reactionary of people. The cobbler should stick to his last. Be a lawyer only, ridicule the witnesses for the State and the Public Prosecutor; at most, draw a comparison between such a trial and a trial by jury in a free country; but leave the defendant's convictions alone, do not even dare to mention what you think of his convictions and actions. For you, a measly liberal, have so little understanding of these convictions that even in praising them you will not be able to avoid saying something banal. Of course, all this need not be explained to the lawyer *à la* Sobakevich¹¹; it can be done mildly, tactfully, discreetly. Still, it is better to be wary of lawyers and not to trust them, *especially* if they say that they are Social-Democrats and Party members (as defined by our Clause 1!).

The question of taking part in the court proceedings, it seems to me, depends on the question of the lawyer. Retaining counsel means participating in the court proceed-

ings. And why not participate in order to show up witnesses and agitate against the court? Of course, one must be very careful not to slip into a tone of unbecoming self-vindication—that goes without saying. It is best to declare immediately, *before* the taking of testimony, in answering the presiding judge's first questions: I am a Social-Democrat, and in my speech to the court I shall explain what that means. In each case, the question whether or not to take part in the court proceedings depends entirely upon the circumstances. Let us assume that you have been proved guilty, that the witnesses are telling the truth, that the entire accusation rests on unassailable documentary evidence. In that case it may be of no use to take part in the court proceedings, and all attention should be centred on the declaration of principles. If, however, the facts are dubious, if the police witnesses are confused and lie, then it is hardly worth while to miss an opportunity of making propaganda by exposing the case as a frame-up. Much depends also on the defendants; if they are very tired, ill, or worn-out, and if there is no one among them with experience in "pleading" and word-tilting, then, perhaps, it would be more expedient to refuse to participate in the court proceedings, to make a statement to that effect, and to concentrate on the declaration of principles, which it is desirable to prepare in advance. At any rate, the speech on the principles, the programme, and the tactics of the Social-Democratic Party, on the working-class movement, on the socialist aims, and on uprising is the most important thing.

In conclusion, I repeat once more: These are my first reflections, which should not be regarded in the least as an attempt to solve the problem. We must wait until experience gives us certain hints. And while accumulating this experience the comrades, in the majority of cases, will have to be guided by a consideration of the concrete circumstances and by their *revolutionary instinct*.

My very best regards to Kurz, Ruben, Bauman, and all the other friends. Cheer up! Things are going well with us now. We are through with the trouble-makers at last. We have done with the tactics of retreat. We are attacking

now. The committees in Russia are also beginning to break with the disorganisers. We have founded a newspaper of our own. We have our own practical centre (the Bureau). Two issues of the paper have appeared and shortly (January 23, 1905, new style) the third will be coming out. We hope to publish it as a weekly. Best of health and good cheer! We shall meet again, I am sure, and carry on the fight under better conditions than amid the squabbling and wrangling we have here, after the manner of the League congresses.

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REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA

Geneva, January 10 (23)

The working class, which would seem to have stood aside for a long time from the bourgeois opposition movement, has raised its voice. With incredible speed the broad masses of the workers have caught up with their advanced comrades, the class-conscious Social-Democrats. The workers' movement in St. Petersburg these days has made gigantic strides. Economic demands are giving way to political demands. The strike is turning into a general strike and it has led to an unheard-of colossal demonstration; the prestige of the tsarist name has been ruined for good. The uprising has begun. Force against force. Street fighting is raging, barricades are being thrown up, rifles are crackling, guns are roaring. Rivers of blood are flowing, the civil war for freedom is blazing up. Moscow and the South, the Caucasus and Poland are ready to join the proletariat of St. Petersburg. The slogan of the workers has become: Death or freedom!

Today and tomorrow a great deal will be decided. The situation changes with every hour. The telegraph brings breathtaking news, and all words now seem feeble in comparison with the events we are living through. Everyone must be ready to do his duty as a revolutionary and as a Social-Democrat.

Long live the revolution!

Long live the insurgent proletariat!

WORKING-CLASS AND BOURGEOIS DEMOCRACY

The question of the attitude of the Social-Democrats, or working-class democrats, to the bourgeois democrats is an old and yet ever new question. It is old because it has been an issue ever since the inception of Social-Democracy. Its theoretical principles were elucidated in the earliest Marxist literature, in the *Communist Manifesto* and in *Capital*. It is ever new because every step in the development of every capitalist country produces a peculiar, original blending of different shades of bourgeois democracy and different trends within the socialist movement.

In Russia, too, this old question has become particularly new at the present time. To make clear for ourselves how this question should be presented today, we shall begin with a brief excursion into history. The old Russian revolutionary Narodniks³² held a utopian, semi-anarchist point of view. They considered the peasants in the village communes ready-made socialists. Behind the liberalism of the educated Russian society they clearly perceived the ambitious desires of the Russian bourgeoisie. They repudiated the struggle for political freedom on the grounds that it was a struggle for institutions advantageous to the bourgeoisie. The Narodnaya Volya members³³ made a step forward when they took up the political struggle, but they failed to connect it with socialism. The clear socialist approach to the question was even overshadowed when the waning faith in the socialist nature of our communes began to be renewed with theories in the spirit of V. V.³⁴ about the non-class, non-bourgeois nature of the Russian democratic intelligentsia. The result was that Narodism, which in the past had positively rejected bourgeois liberalism, began gradually to merge with the latter in a single

liberal-Narodist trend. The bourgeois-democratic nature of the movement among the Russian intellectuals, beginning with the most moderate, the uplift movement, and ending with the most extreme, the revolutionary terrorist movement, became more and more obvious with the rise and development of a proletarian ideology (Social-Democracy) and a mass working-class movement. But the growth of the latter was attended by a split among the Social-Democrats. A revolutionary and an opportunist wing of Social-Democracy became clearly defined, the former representing the proletarian tendencies in our movement, the latter the tendencies of the intelligentsia. Legal Marxism¹⁵ soon proved in fact to be "the reflection of Marxism in bourgeois literature",¹⁶ and, via Bernsteinian opportunism,¹⁷ ended up in liberalism. On the one hand, the Economists in the Social-Democratic movement were carried away by the semi-anarchist conception of a labour movement pure-and-simple; they regarded socialist support of the bourgeois opposition as a betrayal of the class point of view and declared bourgeois democracy in Russia to be a phantom.* On the other hand, the Economists of another shade, carried away by the selfsame idea of a labour movement pure-and-simple, accused the revolutionary Social-Democrats of ignoring the social struggle against the autocracy which our liberals, Zemstvo men and uplifters wage.**

The old *Iskra* pointed to elements of bourgeois democracy in Russia at a time when many did not yet perceive them. It demanded support for this democratic trend on the part of the proletariat (see *Iskra*, No. 2, on support of the student movement***; No. 8, on the illegal Zemstvo Congress; No. 16, on the liberal Marshals of the Nobility****; No. 18*****, on the ferment within the

* See the *Rabocheye Dyelo* pamphlet *Two Conferences* (p. 32), directed against *Iskra*.

** See "Separate Supplement" to *Rabochaya Mysl*, September 1899.

*** "The Drafting of 183 Students into the Army", *Iskra* February 1901. See present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 414-19.—*Ed.*

**** "Political Agitation and 'The Class Point of View'", *Iskra*, February 1, 1902. See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 337-43.—*Ed.*

***** "A Letter to the Zemstvo-ists", *Iskra*, March 10, 1902. See present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 151-59.—*Ed.*

Zemstvo* *et al.*). It constantly stressed the class, bourgeois nature of the liberal and radical movement and said of the vacillating *Osvobozhdeniye* people: "It is high time to understand the simple truth that it is not political chicanery, not what the late Stepnyak ** once called self-restriction and self-concealment, not the conventional lie of diplomatic mutual recognition that ensure a genuine (and not merely verbal) joint struggle against the common enemy, but actual participation in the struggle, actual unity in struggle. When the struggle of the German Social-Democrats against the military-police and feudal-clerical reaction really became one with the struggle of any genuine party which relied for support upon a definite class of the people (for instance, the liberal bourgeoisie), then joint action was instituted without any phrase-mongering about mutual recognition" (No. 26).***

This approach to the question on the part of the old *Iskra* brings us directly to the present differences over the attitude of the Social-Democrats towards the liberals. These disputes, as we know, began at the Second Congress, which adopted two resolutions representing the points of view of the majority (Plekhanov's resolution) and of the minority (Starover's resolution **), respectively. The first resolution accurately defines the class character of liberalism, as a movement of the bourgeoisie, and brings to the fore the task of explaining to the proletariat the anti-revolutionary and anti-proletarian essence of the main liberal trend (the *Osvobozhdeniye* movement). While recognising the need for the proletariat's support of bourgeois democracy, this resolution does not resort to the politicians' mutual recognition device, but, in the spirit of the old *Iskra*, makes it a question of concerted struggle. "To

* I take this opportunity to express my sincere appreciation to Starover and Plekhanov, who undertook the very useful job of revealing the authors of the unsigned articles in the old *Iskra*. It is to be hoped that they will complete this work—the material will be highly interesting for an appraisal of the new *Iskra*'s *volts-face* to the standpoint of *Rabocheye Dyelo*.

** Stepnyak-Kravchinsky, S. M. (1851-95)—*Narodnaya Volya* revolutionary; author.—*Ed.*

*** "Political Struggle and Political Chicanery", *Iskra*, October 15, 1902. See present edition, Vol. 6, pp. 260-61.—*Ed.*

the extent that the bourgeoisie is revolutionary or merely oppositional in its struggle against tsarism", the Social-Democrats "must support" it.

Starover's resolution, on the contrary, does not give a class analysis of liberalism and democracy. It is full of good intentions, it devises terms of agreement that are possibly loftier and better, but unfortunately fictitious, *just words*: the liberals or the democrats must *declare* so-and-so, must not put forward such-and-such *demands*, must adopt such-and-such a *slogan*. As if the history of bourgeois democracy anywhere and everywhere has not warned the workers against putting their trust in declarations, demands, and slogans. As if history has not afforded us hundreds of instances in which bourgeois democrats came forward with slogans demanding, not only full liberty, but also equality, with socialist slogans—without thereby ceasing to be bourgeois democrats—and thus "befogged" the minds of the proletariat all the more. The intellectualist wing of Social-Democracy wants to combat this befogging by setting conditions to the bourgeois democrats that they abstain from befogging. The proletarian wing, in its struggle, resorts to an analysis of the class content of democratism. The intellectualist wing hunts out words for terms of an agreement. The proletarian wing demands actual co-operation in the struggle. The intellectualist wing devises a criterion of a good and kind bourgeoisie, worthy of concluding agreements with. The proletarian wing expects no kindness from the bourgeoisie, but supports any, even the very worst bourgeoisie, *to the extent that it actually fights tsarism*. The intellectualist wing slips into a huckster's standpoint: if you side with the Social-Democrats and not with the Socialists-Revolutionaries, we shall agree upon a pact against the common enemy; otherwise we won't. The proletarian wing maintains the point of view of expediency: the support we shall lend you will be exclusively conditioned on whether it will put us in a better position to aim a blow—greater or lesser—at our enemy.

All the shortcomings of Starover's resolution came to light upon its very first impact with reality. The touchstone was provided by the famous plan of the new *Iskra's*

Editorial Board, the plan "of a higher type of mobilisation", bearing on the debated questions of principle in No. 77 (the editorial "Democracy at the Parting of the Ways") and No. 78 (Starover's *feuilleton*). The plan was dealt with in Lenin's pamphlet, but the arguments will need to be more closely discussed here.

The main idea (or rather the main confusion of ideas) of the new *Iskra*'s arguments is the differentiation *between* the Zemstvo liberals *and* the bourgeois democrats. This differentiation is the guiding thread that runs through both articles. Incidentally, the attentive reader will observe that in place of the term bourgeois democracy, parallel with it and synonymously, the following terminology is used: democracy, radical intelligentsia (*sic!*), nascent democracy, and intellectualist democracy. This differentiation was hailed by the new *Iskra* with characteristic modesty as a great discovery, an original conception that was "beyond" poor Lenin. The differentiation is linked directly with the new method of struggle of which we have heard so much both from Trotsky and directly from the *Iskra* editors, namely, that Zemstvo liberalism "is fit only to be chastised with scorpions", while intellectualist democracy is suitable for agreements with us. Democracy must act independently, as an independent force. "Russian liberalism, bereft of its historically essential part, its motive nerve [mark that!], its bourgeois-democratic half, is fit only to be chastised with scorpions." In Lenin's conception "of Russian liberalism there was no room for such social elements on which the Social-Democrats, in their role of vanguard of democracy, could at any time [!] exert their influence".

Such is the new theory. Like all new theories of the present *Iskra*, it is a complete muddle. In the first place, the claim to priority in the discovery of intellectualist democracy is unfounded and absurd. Secondly, the differentiation made *between* Zemstvo liberalism *and* bourgeois democracy is erroneous. Thirdly, the conception that the intelligentsia can become an independent force does not hold water. Fourthly, the assertion that Zemstvo liberalism (without its "bourgeois-democratic" half) is fit only to be chastised, etc., is unjust. Let us examine all these points.

Lenin is supposed to have ignored the birth of intellectualist democracy and the third element.

Let us open *Zarya*,^{*} No. 2-3,^{*} and take the "Review of Home Affairs" which is quoted in Starover's *feuilleton*. We read *the heading of the third section*, "The Third Element". Throughout this section we read about "the increase in the numbers and in the influence of such persons serving in the Zemstvos as doctors, technicians, and so on"; of "the unsubmissive economic development ... which gives rise to the need for intellectuals, who are becoming increasingly numerous"; of "the inevitability of conflicts between these intellectuals and the bureaucrats and administration bigwigs"; of "the outright epidemic character of these conflicts lately"; of "the irreconcilability of autocracy with the interests of the intelligentsia generally". We read *a direct appeal* to these elements to rally "to the banner" of Social-Democracy....

Quite a pretty account, wouldn't one say? The newly discovered intellectualist democracy and the need for rallying it to the banner of Social-Democracy were "discovered" by that mischievous Lenin *three years ago*!

Of course, the antithesis between the Zemstvo men *and* the bourgeois democrats had not yet been discovered at that time. But contraposing the two would be just as rational as saying, "Moscow Gubernia ** *and* the territory of the Russian Empire". Both the Zemstvo people, who believe in qualified suffrage, and the Marshals of the Nobility are *democrats*, to the extent that they oppose autocracy and serfdom. Their democratism is limited, narrow, and inconsistent, just as any and all bourgeois democratism is in one or another degree limited, narrow and inconsistent. The editorial in *Iskra*, No. 77, analyses our liberals by dividing them into the following groups: (1) serf-owning landlords; (2) liberal landlords; (3) the liberal intelligentsia,

* See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 281-89.—*Ed.*

** *Gubernia, uyezd, volost*—Russian administrative-territorial units. The largest of these was the gubernia, which had its subdivisions in uyezds, which in turn were subdivided into volosts. This system of districting continued under the Soviet power until the introduction of the new system of administrative-territorial division of the country in 1929-30.—*Ed.*

which stands for a constitution with qualified suffrage; and (4) the extreme Left—the democratic intelligentsia. This analysis is incomplete and muddled, since the division of the intelligentsia is confounded with those of various classes and groups whose interests are expressed by the intelligentsia. Besides the interests of a broad section of the landlords, Russian bourgeois democratism reflects the interests of the mass of tradesmen and manufacturers, chiefly medium and small, as well as (and this is particularly important) those of the mass of proprietors and petty proprietors among the peasantry. The first flaw in *Iskra's* analysis is its ignoring of this broadest section of Russia's bourgeois-democratic sphere. The second flaw is its failure to see that the Russian democratic intelligentsia breaks up necessarily, not by accident, into three main trends corresponding to their political stand: the *Osvobozhdeniye*, the Socialist-Revolutionary, and the Social-Democratic. All these trends have a long history, and each expresses (as definitely as is possible in an autocratic state) the point of view of the moderate and the revolutionary ideologists of the bourgeois democrats and the point of view of the proletariat. Nothing could be more amusing than the innocent wish of the new *Iskra* that "the democrats should act as an independent force", while at the same time the democrats are identified with the radical intelligentsia! The new *Iskra* has forgotten that the radical intelligentsia or intellectual democratic movement, which has become "an independent force", is none other than our "Socialist-Revolutionary Party"! Our democratic intelligentsia could have no other "extreme Left". It stands to reason, however, that one can speak of the independent force of such an intelligentsia only in the ironical or terrorist sense of the word. To stand on the same platform with the bourgeois democrats and move Leftward away from the *Osvobozhdeniye* means to move towards the Socialists-Revolutionaries, and in no other direction.

Finally, still less does the latest discovery of the new *Iskra* stand up to criticism, namely, the discovery that "liberalism without its bourgeois-democratic half" is fit only to be chastised with scorpions, that "it is wiser to scrap the idea of hegemony" if there is no one to turn to except

the Zemstvo people. Liberalism, of whatever kind, merits support by the Social-Democrats only to the extent that it actually opposes the autocracy. It is this support of all the inconsistent (i.e., bourgeois) democrats by the only really consistent democrat (i.e., the proletariat) that makes the idea of hegemony a reality. Only a petty-bourgeois huckster's idea of hegemony can conceive it as a compromise, mutual recognition, a matter of worded terms. From the proletarian point of view hegemony in a war goes to him who fights most energetically, who never misses a chance to strike a blow at the enemy, who always suits the action to the word, who is therefore the ideological leader of the democratic forces, who criticises half-way policies of every kind.* The new *Iskra* is sadly mistaken if it thinks that half-heartedness is a moral and not a politico-economic attribute of bourgeois democracy, if it thinks it possible and necessary to fix such a degree of half-heartedness *up to* which liberalism deserves only the scorpion's lash and *beyond* which it deserves agreements. This simply means "determining in advance the permissible degree of baseness". Indeed, ponder the meaning of these words: to make it the term of an agreement with the opposition groups that they recognise universal, equal, and direct suffrage by secret ballot means "to present them with the infallible reagent of our demands, the litmus-paper test of democracy, and to place the whole weight of the proletariat's valuable support on the scale of their political plans" (No. 78). How prettily this is put! And how one feels like saying to the author of these fine words, Starover: My dear friend, Arkady Nikolayevich, your fine words are wasted! Mr. Struve rendered Starover's infallible reagent ineffectual with a single stroke of the pen when he wrote universal suffrage into the programme of the *Osvobozhdeniye* League. And the same Struve has proved to us in deeds on more than one occasion that all these programmes are

* A note for a shrewd new-Iskrist. We shall probably be told that the energetic struggle of the proletariat *without any terms* will result in the theft of the fruits of victory by the bourgeoisie. Our reply to this is the question: what possible guarantee can there be for the fulfilment of the proletariat's terms other than the independent force of the proletariat?

mere scraps of paper as far as the liberals are concerned, not litmus-paper, but ordinary paper, since a bourgeois democrat thinks nothing of writing one thing today and another tomorrow. This is characteristic even of many bourgeois intellectuals who go over to the Social-Democrats. The entire history of European and Russian liberalism provides hundreds of instances wherein word and deed are at variance, which is why Starover's desire to think up infallible paper reagents is so naïve.

This naïve desire leads Starover to the great idea that supporting the anti-tsarist struggle of bourgeois who do not agree to universal suffrage means "bringing to nought the idea of universal suffrage"! Perhaps Starover will write us another pretty * *feuilleton* to prove that by supporting the monarchists in their struggle against the autocracy we are reducing to nought the "idea" of a republic? The trouble is that Starover's thoughts revolve helplessly in a vicious circle of terms, slogans, demands, and declarations, and overlook the only real criterion—the degree of actual participation in the struggle. In practice, this inevitably results in varnishing the radical intelligentsia with whom an "agreement" is declared to be possible. With disdain for Marxism, the intelligentsia is declared to be the "motive nerve" (not the glib servant?) of liberalism. The French and Italian radicals are honoured with the designation of people to whom anti-democratic or anti-proletarian demands are alien, although everyone knows that these radicals have betrayed their platforms and misled the prole-

* Another specimen of our Arkady Nikolayevich's prose: "Anyone who has been following public life in Russia during the last few years could not have failed to note the growing democratic urge towards an untouched-up concept of constitutional liberty stripped of all ideological trappings, of all survivals of the historical past. This urge was, in a way, the realisation of a long process of molecular changes within the democratic trend, of its Ovidian metamorphoses, whose kaleidoscopic variety has held the attention and interest of several successive generations over a period of two decades." A pity, indeed, that this is not true; for the idea of liberty is not stripped, but, on the contrary, touched up with the idealism of the latest philosophers of bourgeois democracy (Bulgakov, Berdayev, Novgorodtsev, and others. See "Problems of Idealism" and *The New Way*). A pity, too, that all these kaleidoscopic Ovidian metamorphoses of Starover, Trotsky, and Martov reveal an unadulterated urge for florid phrases.

tariat times out of number, although on the very next page (p. 7) of the same issue of *Iskra* (No. 78) you may read that the monarchists and the republicans in Italy were "at one in the fight against socialism". The resolution of the Saratov intellectuals (the Sanitary Service Society), pressing for participation of representatives of all the people in legislative activities, is declared to be "the real voice [!] of democracy" (No. 77). The practical plan for proletarian participation in the Zemstvo campaign is accompanied by the advice "to enter into some agreement with the representatives of the Left Wing of the oppositional bourgeoisie" (the famous agreement not to create panic fear). In answer to Lenin's question, what had happened to Starover's notorious terms of agreement, the Editorial Board of the new *Iskra* wrote:

"These terms should always be present in the minds of Party members, and the latter, knowing on what conditions the Party consents to enter into formal political agreements with a democratic party, are morally bound, even in the case of local agreements referred to in the letter, to differentiate strictly between the reliable representatives of the bourgeois opposition—the real democrats, and the liberal milk-skimmers."*

Step leads to step. In addition to Party agreements (the only permissible ones, according to Starover's resolution), local agreements have appeared in various cities. Side by side with formal agreements, moral ones have appeared. It now seems that verbal recognition of "terms" and their "moral" binding force carries with it the title of a "reliable" and "real democrat", although every child understands that hundreds of Zemstvo windbags would make any verbal statements and even give the word of honour of a radical that they are socialists—anything to keep the Social-Democrats quiet.

* See the second editorial, "A Letter to the Party Organisations", likewise published secretly ("for members of the Party only"), although there is nothing secret about it. It is very instructive to compare this reply of the whole Editorial Board with Plekhanov's "secret" pamphlet, *On Our Tactics Towards the Struggle of the Liberal Bourgeoisie Against Tsarism* (Geneva, 1905. A letter to the Central Committee. For Party members only). We hope to return to both these works.

No, the proletariat will not be drawn into this game of slogans, declarations, and agreements. The proletariat will never forget that bourgeois democrats never make reliable democrats. The proletariat will support the bourgeois democrats, not on the basis of deals to abstain from creating panic fear, not on the basis of belief in their reliability, but when and to the extent that they actually struggle against the autocracy. Such support is necessary in the interests of achieving the independent social-revolutionary aims of the proletariat.

Vperyod, No. 3,
January 24 (11), 1905

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FROM NARODISM TO MARXISM

ARTICLE ONE

A legal newspaper recently expressed the opinion that this is no time to dwell on the "antagonism" of interests among the different classes opposing the autocracy. This opinion is not new. We have come across it, of course, with reservations of one sort or other, in the columns of *Osvo-bozhdeniye* and *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya*. It is natural that such a point of view should prevail among the representatives of the bourgeois democrats. As far as the Social-Democrats are concerned, there can be no two opinions among them on this question. The combined struggle of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie against the autocracy must not and cannot make the proletariat forget the antagonism of interests between it and the propertied classes. To get a clear idea of this antagonism it is necessary to have a clear idea of the profound differences that exist between the points of view of the different trends. This does not imply, of course, that we should reject temporary agreements with the adherents of other trends, both with the Socialists-Revolutionaries and the liberals, such as the Second Congress of our Party declared permissible for Social-Democrats.

The Social-Democrats consider the Socialists-Revolutionaries to be the representatives of the extreme Left group of our bourgeois democracy. The Socialists-Revolutionaries resent this opinion of them and regard it as a mean attempt to humiliate an opponent and to question his sincerity and good faith. Actually, such an opinion has nothing whatever to do with suspicion; it is merely a Marxist definition of the class origin and the class nature

of the views of the Socialists-Revolutionaries. The more clearly and definitely the Socialists-Revolutionaries state their views, the more they confirm the Marxist characterisation of them. Of great interest in this respect is the draft programme of the Party of the Socialists-Revolutionaries published in *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya*, No. 46.

This draft is a considerable step forward, not only in relation to clarity of exposition of principles. The progress is to be noted in the content of the principles themselves, the progress from Narodism to Marxism, from democracy to socialism. Our criticism of the Socialists-Revolutionaries has obviously borne fruit; it has compelled them to lay particular stress on their socialist good intentions and the views which they hold in common with Marxism. All the more glaring, on the other hand, are the features of their old, Narodnik, vaguely democratic views. We would remind those who are prone to accuse us of being contradictory (recognising the socialist good intentions of the Socialists-Revolutionaries, while defining their social nature as bourgeois-democratic) that examples of socialism, not only of the petty-bourgeois but of the bourgeois variety, were long ago analysed in the *Communist Manifesto*. The good intentions of being a socialist do not rule out a bourgeois-democratic essence.

A study of the draft reveals three main features of the Socialist-Revolutionary world outlook. First, theoretical emendations of Marxism. Second, the survivals of Narodism in their views of the labouring peasantry and the agrarian question. Third, the same Narodnik survivals in their view of the impending Russian revolution as non-bourgeois in character.

I said *emendations* of Marxism. Precisely. The whole main trend of thought, the whole framework of the programme, points to the victory of Marxism over Narodism. The latter is still alive (kept so with the aid of injections of revisionism of the latest style), but only as partial "corrections" of Marxism. Let us take the main general theoretical emendation, the theory of the favourable and unfavourable relation between the positive and negative sides of capitalism. This emendation, insofar as it is not completely muddled, introduces the old Russian subjectiv-

ism into Marxism. The recognition of the "creative" historical activity of capitalism, which socialises labour and creates "a social force" capable of transforming society, the force of the proletariat, denotes a break with Narodism and a transition to Marxism. The theory of socialism is founded on the objective development of economic forces and of class division. The emendation: "In some branches of industry, especially agriculture, and in entire countries" the relation between the positive and negative sides of capitalism "is becoming [how far they have gone!] less and less favourable". This is a repetition of Hertz and David, of Nik. —on,⁴⁰ and of V. V. with his theory of the special "destinies of capitalism in Russia". The backwardness of Russia in general and of Russian agriculture in particular is no longer regarded as the backwardness of *capitalism*, but as a uniqueness justifying backward theories. Alongside the materialist conception of history we get the time-worn view according to which the intelligentsia is capable of choosing more or less favourable paths for the country and of becoming the supraclass judge of capitalism, not the mouthpiece of the class that is begotten by capitalism's destruction of the old forms of life. The fact that capitalist exploitation in Russia takes on particularly repellent forms because of the survival of pre-capitalist relations is overlooked in typical Narodnik fashion.

The Narodnik theory stands revealed still more clearly in the notions on the peasantry. Throughout the draft the following words and phrases are used without discrimination: the toilers, the exploited, the working class, the labouring masses, the class of the exploited, the exploited classes. If the authors stopped to think over the last term ("classes"), which escaped them unguardedly, they would realise that it is the petty bourgeois as well as the proletarians who work and are exploited under capitalism. What has been said of the legal Narodniks can be said of our Socialists-Revolutionaries: to them goes the honour of discovering an unheard-of type of capitalism without a petty bourgeoisie. They speak of the labouring peasantry, but shut their eyes to a fact which has been proved, studied, weighed, described, and pondered, namely, that the

peasant bourgeoisie now definitely predominates among our labouring peasantry, and that the well-to-do peasantry, although entitled to the designation labouring peasantry, cannot get along without hiring farm-hands and already controls the better half of the peasantry's productive forces.

Very odd, indeed, from this point of view, is the goal which the Party of the Socialists-Revolutionaries has set itself in its minimum programme: "In the interests of socialism and of the struggle against bourgeois-proprietary principles, to make use of the views, traditions, and modes of life of the Russian peasantry, both as toilers in general and as members of the village communes, particularly its conception of the land as being the common property of all the toiling people." This objective seems, at first blush, to be a quite harmless, purely academic repetition of the village-commune utopias long since refuted both by theory and life. In reality, however, we are dealing with a pressing political issue which the Russian revolution promises to solve in the very near future: Who will take advantage of whom? Will the revolutionary intelligentsia, which believes itself to be socialist, utilise the toiler conceptions of the peasantry in the interests of the struggle against bourgeois-proprietary principles? Or will the bourgeois-proprietary and at the same time toiling peasantry utilise the socialist phraseology of the revolutionary-democratic intelligentsia in the interests of the struggle against socialism?

We are of the view that the second perspective will be realised (despite the will and the consciousness of our opponents). We are convinced that it will be realised because it has already nine-tenths been realised. The "bourgeois-proprietary" (and at the same time labouring) peasantry has already made good use of the socialist phrases of the Narodnik, democratic intelligentsia, which harboured illusions of sustaining "the toiler traditions and modes of life" by means of its artels, co-operatives, fodder grass cultivation, ploughs, Zemstvo warehouses, and banks, but which actually promoted the development of capitalism within the village commune. Russian economic history has thus proved what Russian political history will prove tomorrow. The class-conscious proletariat has the duty to

explain to the rural proletarian, without in any way withholding support of the progressive and revolutionary aspirations of the *bourgeois* labouring peasantry, that a struggle against that peasantry is inevitable in the future; it has the duty to explain to him the real aims of socialism, as opposed to the bourgeois-democratic fancies of equalised land tenure. With the bourgeois peasantry against the survivals of serfdom, against the autocracy, the priests, and the landlords; with the urban proletariat against the bourgeoisie in general and against the bourgeois peasantry in particular—this is the only correct slogan for the rural proletarian, this is the only correct agrarian programme for Russian Social-Democracy at the present moment. It was this programme that our Second Congress adopted. With the peasant bourgeoisie for democracy, with the urban proletariat for socialism—this slogan will have a far stronger appeal to the rural poor than the showy but empty slogans of the Socialist-Revolutionary dabblers in Narodism.

We come now to the third of the above-mentioned main points of the draft. Its authors have by now broken with the view of the consistent Narodniks, who were opposed to political freedom on the grounds that it could only result in turning over power to the bourgeoisie. But the survivals of Narodism stand out very clearly in the part of the draft which characterises the autocracy and the attitude of the various classes towards it. Here too, as always, we see that the very first attempts of the petty-bourgeois revolutionary intelligentsia to clarify its conception of *reality* lead inevitably to the complete exposure of its contradictory and superannuated views. (Let us, therefore, remark, parenthetically, that disputes with the Socialists-Revolutionaries should always be reduced to this very question of their conception of reality, since this question alone clearly reveals the causes of our deep-seated political divergence.)

“The class of big manufacturers and tradesmen, who are more reactionary than anywhere else,” we read in the draft, “stands more and more in need of the protection of the autocracy against the proletariat”.... This is false; for nowhere in Europe is the indifference of the advanced bourgeoisie towards the autocratic form of rule so evident as

in our country. Discontent with the autocratic regime is growing among the bourgeoisie, regardless of its fear of the proletariat, in part simply because the police, for all its unlimited powers, cannot crush the working-class movement. In speaking of "a class" of *big* manufacturers, the draft confounds the subdivisions and groups within the bourgeoisie with the entire bourgeoisie as a class. The incorrectness is all the more patent in that it is precisely the middle and petty bourgeoisie that the autocracy is least of all capable of satisfying.

"...The landed nobility and the village kulaks stand more and more in need of such support against the labouring masses in the villages...." Indeed? Where, then, does Zemstvo liberalism come from? Whence the attraction for the enterprising muzhik on the part of the uplift (democratic) intelligentsia and vice versa? Or does the kulak have nothing in common with the enterprising muzhik?

"...An irreconcilable and growing antagonism is arising between the existence of autocracy and the whole economic, social-political and cultural development of the country...."

In this they have reduced their own premises *ad absurdum*. Is it possible to conceive of an "irreconcilable antagonism" with the entire economic, as well as other, growth of the country that would not be reflected in the mood of the classes in economic command? It is one or the other: *Either* the autocracy is really incompatible with the economic development of the country; in that case it is incompatible also with the interests of the *entire class* of manufacturers, tradespeople, landlords, and enterprising muzhiks. That this class has been controlling "our" economic development since 1861⁴¹ is probably not unknown even to the Socialists-Revolutionaries (although they were taught the contrary by V. V.). That a government incompatible with the bourgeois class in general can make capital out of the conflicts between the groups and strata of the bourgeoisie, that it can make peace with the protectionists against the free traders, enlist the support of one stratum against another, and keep up these equilibristics for years and decades, is borne out by the whole trend of European history. *Or*, in our country the manufacturers, the landlords, and the peasant bourgeoisie "stand more

and more in need" of the autocracy. In that case we should have to accept the notion that they, the economic lords of the country, even taken as a whole, as a class, do not understand the interests of the country's economic development, that not even the advanced, educated and intelligent representatives and leaders of these classes understand these interests!

But would it not be simpler to accept the idea that it is our Socialists-Revolutionaries who do not understand the situation? We need but see: a little further on, they themselves admit "the existence of a liberal-democratic opposition, which embraces chiefly (in point of class) the intermediate elements of the educated society". But is our educated society not a bourgeois society? Is it not bound by a thousand ties to the tradesmen, manufacturers, landlords, and enterprising muzhiks? Can God have possibly ordained for Russia a capitalism in which the liberal-democratic opposition is not a bourgeois-democratic opposition? Do the Socialists-Revolutionaries know of any precedent in history or can they conceive of any case in which the opposition of the bourgeoisie to the autocratic regime *was not* or *would not* be expressed through the liberal, educated "society"?

The muddle in the draft is the inevitable outcome of confounding Narodism with Marxism. Only Marxism has given a scientifically correct analysis, confirmed more and more by reality, of the relation between the struggle for democracy and the struggle for socialism. We, like the rest of the world, have bourgeois democratism and working-class democratism. With us, as with the rest of the world, the Social-Democrats must expose mercilessly the inevitable illusions of the bourgeois democrats and their ignorance of their own nature. With us, as with the rest of the world, the class-conscious proletariat must support the bourgeois democrats in their opposition to the survivals of serfdom and their struggle against them, against the autocracy, without forgetting for an instant that it is a class by itself, and that it has as its class aim the overthrow of the bourgeoisie.

THE ST. PETERSBURG STRIKE

The strike that began at the Putilov Works on January 3 is developing into one of the most imposing manifestations of the working-class movement. Our information so far is limited to reports in the foreign newspapers and the legal Russian press. But even these sources leave no doubt that the strike has already become a political event of tremendous importance.

The strike started quite spontaneously. It was one of the clashes between labour and capital that are ever recurring. This time the impetus was the dismissal of four workers by the factory management. The workers rose in a high spirit of solidarity and demanded their reinstatement. The movement gained rapidly. The legally functioning Russian Factory and Mill Workers' Society is taking part in it, and the strike is entering its next and higher phase.

This legal workers' society has been an object of special attention on the part of the Zubatovists.⁴² And now the Zubatov movement is outgrowing its bounds. Initiated by the police in the interests of the police, in the interests of supporting the autocracy and demoralising the political consciousness of the workers, this movement is turning against the autocracy and is becoming an outbreak of the prolétarian class struggle.

The Social-Democrats long ago predicted that *such* would be the inevitable outcome of the Zubatov movement in our country. The legalisation of the working-class movement, they said, would definitely benefit us Social-Democrats. It would draw certain sections of the workers into the movement, especially the backward sections; it would

help to rouse those who would not soon, perhaps ever, be roused by a socialist agitator. And once drawn into the movement and having acquired an interest in their own future, the workers would go further. The legal labour movement would only be a new and broader basis for the Social-Democratic labour movement.*

Without a doubt, this is precisely what happened in St. Petersburg.

The movement owes its rapid expansion to two circumstances: first, the moment was propitious for an economic struggle (the government was in pressing need of the fulfilment of the orders placed by the War Ministry and the Admiralty); secondly, the constitutional movement among the social strata was expanding. Having begun the strike in defence of some dismissed comrades, the workers took the further step of presenting broad economic demands. They demanded an eight-hour day, a minimum wage (one ruble for men and seventy kopeks for women), the abolition of compulsory overtime work (and double pay for overtime), improvement of sanitary conditions and medical aid, etc. The strike began to develop into a general strike.

The foreign papers report under date of Saturday, January 8 (21, new style), that even according to official Russian information 174 mills, factories, and workshops involving 96,000 workers are on strike.

We are witnessing one of the great clashes between the developing proletarian class and its enemies, clashes that will leave their mark for many years to come.

But things did not stop at economic demands. The movement has begun to assume a political character. The local Social-Democrats have attempted (although, it seems, still very feebly) to participate in it. At huge mass meetings of the workers attended by several thousand people political demands have come to be discussed and resolutions in favour of political freedom have been put to the vote. The petition drawn up by the workers, it is reported, comprises three parts.** The first sets forth demands of

* Cf. N. Lenin, *What Is To Be Done?*, pp. 86-88. (See present edition, Vol. 5, pp. 454-56.—Ed.)

rights for the people; the second, measures to relieve the people's poverty; the third, measures against the oppression of labour by capital. The first part contains the following demands: inviolability of the person; freedom of speech, assembly, and conscience; compulsory schooling at the expense of the state; participation of elected representatives of the people in the legislature; equality of all before the law; a responsible Cabinet; abolition of the redemption payments⁴; cheap credit; gradual sharing out of the state lands among the people; an income-tax. (If this report is true, it points to an extremely interesting interpretation of the Social-Democratic programme in the minds of the masses or their not very class-conscious leaders.) The correspondent of *The Standard*, an English newspaper, reports that three meetings took place on January 5 (18) (of which one was attended by 4,000 and another by 2,000) and that the following political demands were endorsed: (1) the immediate convocation of a Constituent Assembly elected by a general vote; (2) an end to the war; (3) full amnesty for political exiles and prisoners; (4) freedom of the press and of conscience; (5) freedom of assembly and the right of association. The foreign press for January 8 (21) reports that preparations are under way for a demonstration to be held on Sunday, January 9 (22), outside the Winter Palace, at which a petition is to be presented "to the tsar himself". Freedom or death, declare the workers. Moscow and Libau are sending workers' delegates to St. Petersburg.

Such is the limited and still unconfirmed information to have reached us to date. Obviously the movement has not yet attained its zenith by far, and we must await further events before we can form a definite opinion of what is occurring. One is struck by the amazingly rapid shift of the movement from the purely economic to the political ground, by the tremendous solidarity and energy displayed by hundreds of thousands of proletarians—and all this, notwithstanding the fact that conscious Social-Democratic influence is lacking or is but slightly evident. The primitive character of the socialist views held by some of the leaders of the movement and the tenacity with which some elements of the working class cling to their naïve faith in

the tsar enhance rather than lessen the significance of the revolutionary instinct now asserting itself among the proletariat. The political protest of the leading oppressed class and its revolutionary energy break through all obstacles, both external, in the form of police bans, and internal, in the form of the ideological immaturity and backwardness of some of the leaders. The work of the Social-Democrats during the last ten years and the lessons of the working-class movement during this period have borne fruit; the ideas of socialism and of the political struggle are streaming through the broadest channels. The proletariat is proving in action that on the political scene in Russia there are not only two forces (autocracy and bourgeois society), as some in their faintness of heart have been ready to believe. It is showing us manifestly superior forms of mobilisation of the revolutionary class forces; this mobilisation, of course, is not to be classed with demonstrations of minor importance in this or that municipal council, but with mass movements, like the Rostov demonstration and the strikes of 1903 in the South. The mobilisation of the revolutionary forces of the proletariat in this new and higher form is bringing us with gigantic strides nearer to the moment when the proletariat will even more decisively and more consciously join battle with the autocracy.

OUR TARTUFFES

Issue No. 83 of *Iskra*, which we have just received, contains a declaration by the Mensheviks and the Central Committee concerning "the complete cessation of the Minority's organisational separateness". "The Minority," we are assured, "ceases to consider itself *a camp*, and there can be no further question of either boycotting the Central Committee or presenting *ultimatums* to it." This statement comes just a wee bit late! The Party now knows from Lenin's pamphlet (*Statement and Documents on the Break of the Central Institutions with the Party**) that the "ultimatums" to co-opt Popov, Fisher, and Fomin *have already been enforced*, to be sure, on the quiet, *by deception of the Party*. The ultimatum to sabotage the Third Congress through similar deceptions has also been enforced. The disorganisation of local work is continuing, and the so-called Central Committee has approved the setting-up in St. Petersburg (by the report in *Iskra*) of "*a special organisation*" or group, "in view of the fact that its numerous [?] members are obviously unable to work under the leadership of the local committee".

And so, what the "Majority" said and predicted, beginning with Lenin's "Letter" ("Why I Resigned from the *Iskra* Editorial Board", December 1903**) and ending with Orlovsky's pamphlet *The Council Against the Party*, has now been *wholly and unquestionably* confirmed by events. The actual object of the eighteen months' struggle was the co-optation of four to the Central Organ and three to

* See present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 529-39.—*Ed.*

** *Ibid.*, pp. 119-25.—*Ed.*

the Central Committee. For the sake of co-optation the organisation-as-process theory and a heap of differences "on points of principle" were concocted. For the sake of this co-optation our centres have now broken completely with the Party and are breaking with the local committees piecemeal. The correctness of our slogan that "the Majority must break off all relations with the disorganisers" (*Vperyod*, No. 1, "Time to Call a Halt!"*) is now fully confirmed.

Extremely interesting, too, is the following passage from the *Iskra* statement: "The decision of the delegates [of the Minority] was submitted for discussion to all the adherents of the Minority working in the Kiev, Kharkov, Don, Kuban, St. Petersburg, and Odessa committees, the Donets and Crimean leagues, and other Party organisations." Thus, after a furious campaign of *nearly eighteen months*, the circle abroad, with the aid of the Central Organ, the Council, and (since May) the Central Committee, won to its side *only five Russian committees out of the twenty attending the Second Congress!*** Outside the committees, sizable groups considered worthy of being listed in *Iskra* were set up in only two cities, in St. Petersburg and in Odessa. The Kuban Committee, apparently, was only recently knocked together for the sake of an extra pair of votes.

Consequently, *Iskra*, the organ of the Minority, now, in January, confirms the correctness of the analysis of the Party situation which another Menshevik gave in September. It was the agent of the Central Committee, sympathising with the Minority and now co-opted to the C.C., who wrote in September to Glebov,*** a member of the C.C.,

* See pp. 35-39 of this volume.—*Ed.**

** Of the committees attending the Congress only the Kiev Committee went over from the Majority to the Minority, i.e., at the Congress both its delegates were Bolsheviks, but now in the committee the Mensheviks predominate. In the Nikolayev and Siberian committees, on the contrary, both delegates to the Congress were Mensheviks, but after the Congress these committees sided with the Majority. The Odessa, Don, Ufa, and Moscow committees were divided at the Congress between the Majority and the Minority (one delegate in each). Of these only the Don Committee is now Menshevik.

*** See Note 77.—*Ed.*

that "*in Russia the Minority is powerless*", that it is backed by only *four committees*. It was this powerlessness of the circle abroad that made it engineer the Bonapartist coup in the C.C. and side-track, by deceit, the Third Congress.

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THE BEGINNING OF THE REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA

Geneva, Wednesday, January 25 (12)

Events of the greatest historical importance are developing in Russia. The proletariat has risen against tsarism. The proletariat was driven to revolt by the government. There can hardly be any doubt now that the government deliberately allowed the strike movement to develop and a wide demonstration to be started more or less without hindrance in order to bring matters to a point where military force could be used. Its manoeuvre was successful. Thousands of killed and wounded—such is the toll of Bloody Sunday, January 9, in St. Petersburg. The army defeated unarmed workers, women, and children. The army vanquished the enemy by shooting prostrate workers. "We have taught them a good lesson!" the tsar's henchmen and their European flunkies from among the conservative bourgeoisie say with consummate cynicism.

Yes, it was a great lesson, one which the Russian proletariat will not forget. The most uneducated, backward sections of the working class, who naively trusted the tsar and sincerely wished to put peacefully before "the tsar himself" the petition of a tormented people, were all taught a lesson by the troops led by the tsar or his uncle, the Grand Duke Vladimir.

The working class has received a momentous lesson in civil war; the revolutionary education of the proletariat made more progress in one day than it could have made in months and years of drab, humdrum, wretched existence. The slogan of the heroic St. Petersburg proletariat, "Death or freedom!" is reverberating throughout Russia. Events

are developing with astonishing rapidity. The general strike in St. Petersburg is spreading. All industrial, public, and political activities are paralysed. On Monday, January 10, still more violent clashes occurred between the workers and the military. Contrary to the mendacious government reports, blood is flowing in many parts of the capital. The workers of Kolpino are rising. The proletariat is arming itself and the people. The workers are said to have seized the Sestroretsk Arsenal. They are providing themselves with revolvers, forging their tools into weapons, and procuring bombs for a desperate bid for freedom. The general strike is spreading to the provinces. Ten thousand have already ceased work in Moscow, and a general strike has been called there for tomorrow (Thursday, January 13). An uprising has broken out in Riga. The workers are demonstrating in Lodz, an uprising is being prepared in Warsaw, proletarian demonstrations are taking place in Helsingfors. Unrest is growing among the workers and the strike is spreading in Baku, Odessa, Kiev, Kharkov, Kovno, and Vilna. In Sevastopol, the naval stores and arsenals are ablaze, and the troops refuse to shoot at the mutineers. Strikes in Revel and in Saratov. Workers and reservists clash with the troops in Radom.

The revolution is spreading. The government is beginning to lose its head. From the policy of bloody repression it is attempting to change over to economic concessions and to save itself by throwing a sop to the workers or promising the nine-hour day. But the lesson of Bloody Sunday cannot be forgotten. The demand of the insurgent St. Petersburg workers—the immediate convocation of a Constituent Assembly on the basis of universal, direct, and equal suffrage by secret ballot—must become the demand of all the striking workers. Immediate overthrow of the government—this was the slogan with which even the St. Petersburg workers who had believed in the tsar answered the massacre of January 9; they answered through their leader, the priest Georgi Gapon, who declared after that bloody day: “We no longer have a tsar. A river of blood divides the tsar from the people. Long live the fight for freedom!”

Long live the revolutionary proletariat! say we. The general strike is rousing and rallying increasing masses

of the working class and the urban poor. The arming of the people is becoming an immediate task of the revolutionary moment.

Only an armed people can be the real bulwark of popular liberty. The sooner the proletariat succeeds in arming, and the longer it holds its fighting positions as striker and revolutionary, the sooner will the army begin to waver; more and more soldiers will at last begin to realise what they are doing and they will join sides with the people against the fiends, against the tyrant, against the murderers of defenceless workers and of their wives and children. No matter what the outcome of the present uprising in St. Petersburg may be, it will, in any case, be the first step to a wider, more conscious, better organised uprising. The government may possibly succeed in putting off the day of reckoning, but the postponement will only make the next step of the revolutionary onset more stupendous. This will only mean that the Social-Democrats will take advantage of this postponement to rally the organised fighters and spread the news about the start made by the St. Petersburg workers. The proletariat will join in the struggle, it will quit mill and factory and will prepare arms for itself. The slogans of the struggle for freedom will be carried more and more widely into the midst of the urban poor and of the millions of peasants. Revolutionary committees will be set up, at every factory, in every city district, in every large village. The people in revolt will overthrow all the government institutions of the tsarist autocracy and proclaim the immediate convocation of a Constituent Assembly.

The immediate arming of the workers and of all citizens in general, the preparation and organisation of the revolutionary forces for overthrowing the government authorities and institutions—this is the practical basis on which revolutionaries of every variety can and must unite to strike the common blow. The proletariat must always pursue its own independent path, never weakening its connection with the Social-Democratic Party, always bearing in mind its great, ultimate objective, which is to rid mankind of all exploitation. But this independence of the Social-Democratic proletarian party will never cause us to forget the importance of a common revolutionary onset at the

moment of actual revolution. We Social-Democrats can and must act independently of the bourgeois-democratic revolutionaries and guard the class independence of the proletariat. But we must go hand in hand with them during the uprising, when direct blows are being struck at tsarism, when resistance is offered the troops, when the bastilles of the accursed enemy of the entire Russian people are stormed.

The proletariat of the whole world is now looking eagerly towards the proletariat of Russia. The overthrow of tsarism in Russia, so valiantly begun by our working class, will be the turning-point in the history of all countries; it will facilitate the task of the workers of all nations, in all states, in all parts of the globe. Let, therefore, every Social-Democrat, every class-conscious worker bear in mind the immense tasks of the broad popular struggle that now rest upon his shoulders. Let him not forget that he represents also the needs and interests of the whole peasantry, of all who toil, of all who are exploited, of the whole people against their enemy. The proletarian heroes of St. Petersburg now stand as an example to all.

Long live the revolution!

Long live the insurgent proletariat!

REVOLUTIONARY DAYS

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1

WHAT IS HAPPENING IN RUSSIA?

Revolt or revolution? This is the question that European journalists and reporters have been asking themselves in connection with the events in St. Petersburg, which they are reporting to the whole world and attempting to evaluate. Are they rebels or insurgents—the tens of thousands of proletarians against whom the tsarist army successfully took the field? And the foreign papers, though sooner in a position to view the events with “detachment”, with the impartiality of chroniclers, find it difficult to answer the question. They are constantly getting their terms mixed. And small wonder. It is not without reason that a revolution is said to be a successful revolt, and a revolt an unsuccessful revolution. People who witness the beginning of great and momentous events, who can obtain only very incomplete, inexact, and third-hand information of what is taking place, will not, of course, hazard a definite opinion until a timelier moment comes. The bourgeois papers, which continue as of old to speak of revolt, rioting, and disturbances, cannot help seeing the truly national, nay, international, significance of these events. Yet it is this significance which invests events with the character of revolution. And those who have been writing of the last days of the rioting find themselves involuntarily referring to them as the first days of the revolution. A turning-point in Russia’s history has been reached. This is not denied even by the most hidebound of European conservatives, however enthusiastic and sentimental they may wax over the mighty, unrestricted power of the all-Russian autocracy. Peace between the autocracy and the people is unthinkable. Revolution is not only in the mouths of a few fearless souls, not only of “nihilists”—as Europe persists in calling the Russian revolutionaries—but of every person capable of taking any interest in world politics.

The Russian working-class movement has risen to a higher level in the last few days. It is developing before our very eyes into a national uprising. Naturally, here in Geneva, so damnably far away, we find it exceedingly difficult to keep pace with events. But so long as we have to linger at such an accursed distance, we must try to keep pace with events, to sum them up, to draw conclusions, to draw from the experience of today's happenings lessons that will be useful tomorrow, in another place, where today "the people are still mute" and where in the near future, in some form or other, a revolutionary conflagration will break out. We must make it the constant job of publicists to write the history of the present day, and to try to write it in such a way that our chronicles will give the greatest possible help to the direct participants in the movement and to the heroic proletarians there, on the scene of action—to write it in such a way as to promote the spread of the movement, the conscious selection of the means, ways, and methods of struggle that, with the least expenditure of effort, will yield the most substantial and permanent results.

In the history of revolutions there come to light contradictions that have ripened for decades and centuries. Life becomes unusually eventful. The masses, which have always stood in the shade and have therefore often been ignored and even despised by superficial observers, enter the political arena as active combatants. These masses are learning in practice, and before the eyes of the world are taking their first tentative steps, feeling their way, defining their objectives, testing themselves and the theories of all their ideologists. These masses are making heroic efforts to rise to the occasion and cope with the gigantic tasks of world significance imposed upon them by history; and however great individual defeats may be, however shattering to us the rivers of blood and the thousands of victims, nothing will ever compare in importance with this direct training that the masses and the classes receive in the course of the revolutionary struggle itself. The history of this struggle is measured in days. And for good reason some foreign newspapers have already started a "diary of the Russian revolution". Let us, too, start one.

2

FATHER GAPON

That Father Gapon is an *agent-provocateur* is a surmise that would seem to be borne out by the fact that he is a member and one of the ringleaders of the Zubatov society. Furthermore, the foreign newspapers, like our own correspondents, note the fact that the police deliberately allowed the strike movement to spread as widely and freely as possible, and that the government generally (and Grand Duke Vladimir in particular) *wanted* to provoke bloody reprisals under conditions most favourable to itself. The English correspondents even point out that the energetic participation of the Zubatovists in the movement could only have been of especial advantage to the government under the circumstances. The revolutionary intelligentsia and the class-conscious proletarians, who would have been the most likely to provide themselves with arms, were bound to keep aloof from the Zubatov movement, to give it a wide berth. The government thus had its hands free to play a winning game. The demonstration, so they reckoned, would be made up of the most peaceful, least organised, and most backward workers; it would be child's play for our soldiery to handle them, and the proletariat would be taught a wholesome lesson; an excellent excuse would be furnished for shooting down anybody and everybody in the streets; at Court the victory of the reactionary (or Grand Ducal) party over the liberals would be complete; the harshest repressions would follow.

Both the English and the conservative German newspapers directly ascribe such a plan of action to the government (or to Vladimir). It is most likely true. The events of the bloody Ninth of January confirm this only too well.

But the existence of such a plan by no means rules out the possibility that Father Gapon was an *unconscious* instrument of this plan. That there is a liberal, reformatory movement among certain sections of the young Russian clergy cannot be doubted; this movement has found its spokesmen both at meetings of the religio-philosophic society and in church publications. It has even been given a name of its own—the “New-Orthodox” movement. We cannot, therefore, flatly dismiss the idea that Father Gapon may be a sincere Christian Socialist and that it was Bloody Sunday which converted him to the truly revolutionary path. We are inclined to support this idea, especially since Gapon’s letters written after the massacre of January 9 declaring that “we have no tsar”, his call to fight for freedom, etc., are facts that speak for his honesty and sincerity; for it could not possibly be part of the duties of an *agent-provocateur* to agitate so powerfully for the continuation of the uprising.

However that may be, the policy of the Social-Democrats in regard to this new leader was self-evident: to maintain a careful, guarded, sceptical attitude towards this Zubatovist; in any case, to participate vigorously in the initiated strike movement (even though it was initiated by a Zubatovist); to popularise energetically the Social-Democratic views and slogans. As appears from the letters printed above, these have been the tactics followed by our comrades on the St. Petersburg Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.⁴⁵ “Cunning” as the plans of the reactionary Court clique may have been, the realities of the class struggle and of the political protest of the proletarians acting as the vanguard of the whole people have proved infinitely more so. That the plans of the police and the military have worked against the government, that out of the Zubatov movement, which served as a minor cause, there has emerged a great and extensive revolutionary movement embracing all Russia, is an established fact. Despite all police snares and stratagems, the revolutionary energy and the revolutionary instinct of the working class have asserted themselves with irresistible force.

3

THE PLAN OF THE ST. PETERSBURG BATTLE

It seems strange, at first glance, to refer to the peaceful march of unarmed workers to present a petition as a battle. It was a massacre. But the government had looked forward to a battle, and it doubtlessly acted according to a well-laid plan. It considered the defence of St. Petersburg and of the Winter Palace from the military standpoint. It took all necessary military measures. It removed all the civil authorities, and placed the capital with its million and a half population under the complete control of the generals (headed by Grand Duke Vladimir), who were thirsting for the blood of the people.

The government deliberately drove the proletariat to revolt, provoked it, by the massacre of unarmed people, to erect barricades, in order to drown the uprising in a sea of blood. The proletariat will learn from these military lessons afforded by the government. For one thing, it will learn the art of civil war, now that it has started the revolution. Revolution is war. Of all the wars known in history it is the only lawful, rightful, just, and truly great war. This war is not waged in the selfish interests of a handful of rulers and exploiters, like any and all other wars, but in the interests of the masses of the people against the tyrants, in the interests of the toiling and exploited millions upon millions against despotism and violence.

All detached observers now are of one accord in admitting that in Russia this war has been declared and begun. The proletariat will rise again in still greater masses. What is left of the childish faith in the tsar will now vanish as quickly as the St. Petersburg workers changed from

petitioning to barricade fighting. The workers everywhere will arm. What matters it that the police will keep a tenfold greater watch over the arsenals and arms stores and shops? No stringencies, no prohibitions will stop the masses in the cities, once they have come to realise that without arms they can always be shot down by the government on the slightest pretext. Everyone will try his hardest to get himself a gun or at least a revolver, to conceal his fire-arms from the police and be ready to repel any attack of the blood-thirsty servitors of tsarism. Every beginning is difficult, as the saying goes. It was very difficult for the workers to go over to the armed combat. The government has now forced them to it. The first and most difficult step has been taken.

An English correspondent reports a typical conversation among workers in a Moscow street. A group of workers was openly discussing the lessons of the day. "Hatchets?" said one. "No, you can't do anything with a hatchet against a sabre. You can't get at him with a hatchet any more than you can with a knife. No, what we need is revolvers, revolvers at the very least, and better still, guns." Such conversations can be heard now all over Russia. And these conversations after "Vladimir's Day" in St. Petersburg will not remain mere talk.

The military plan of the tsar's uncle, Vladimir, who directed the massacre, was to keep the people from the suburbs, the workers' suburbs, away from the centre of the city. No pains were spared to make the soldiers believe that the workers wanted to demolish the Winter Palace (by means of icons, crosses, and petitions!) and kill the tsar. The strategic task was simply to guard the bridges and the main streets leading to the Palace Square. And the principal scenes of "military operations" were the squares near the bridges (the Troitsky, Samsonievsky, Nikolayevsky, and Palace bridges), as well as the streets leading from the working-class districts to the centre (the Narvskaya Zastava, Schlüssenburg Highway, and Nevsky Prospekt), and, lastly, the Palace Square itself, to which thousands upon thousands of workers penetrated in spite of the massed troops and the resistance they met with. Military operations were, of course, rendered much easier by the fact that everybody

knew perfectly well where the workers were going, that there was but one rallying point and one objective. The valiant generals attacked "successfully" an enemy who had come unarmed and made his destination and purpose known in advance.... It was a dastardly, cold-blooded massacre of defenceless and peaceful people. For a long time to come now the masses will think over and re-live in memory and in story all that took place. The sole and inevitable conclusion drawn from these reflections, from the assimilation of "Vladimir's lesson" in the minds of the masses, will be *à la guerre comme à la guerre*. The working-class masses, and, following their lead, the masses of the rural poor, will realise that they are combatants in a war, and then ... then the next battles of our civil war will be fought according to plan, but no longer according to the "plan" of grand dukes and the tsars. The call "To arms!" which sounded among a crowd of workers in Nevsky Prospekt on January 9 cannot die away now without reverberation.

4

SUPPLEMENT TO THE ARTICLE
"THE PLAN OF THE ST. PETERSBURG BATTLE"

The plan of the St. Petersburg battle was described by us in *Vperyod*, No. 4.* The English newspapers now give us some details of this plan which are not without interest. The Grand Duke Vladimir appointed General Prince Vasilchikov Commander of the Army in the Field. The entire capital was split up into areas among the officers. The tsar played at war quite seriously, as though confronted by the invasion of an armed foe. During the military operations the General Staff sat round a green-topped table on Vasilyevsky Island, receiving reports from every area commander at half-hour intervals.

For the information of the St. Petersburg workers.

Written at the end of January
(beginning of February) 1905

Published according to
the manuscript

* See pp 107-09 of this volume.—Ed.

5

"OUR FATHER THE TSAR" AND THE BARRICADES

In reviewing the events of Bloody Sunday one is struck by the combination of naïve patriarchal faith in the tsar and the fierce armed street fighting against the tsarist rule. The first day of the Russian revolution brought the old Russia and the new face to face with startling force and showed the death agony of the peasants' age-old faith in "Our Father the Tsar", and the birth of a revolutionary people, the urban proletariat. No wonder the European bourgeois newspapers say that Russia of January 10 is no longer the Russia of January 8. No wonder the cited German Social-Democratic newspaper⁴⁶ recalls how seventy years ago the working-class movement started in England, how in 1834 the English workers held street demonstrations to protest against the banning of the trade unions, how in 1838 they drew up the "People's Charter" at monster meetings near Manchester, and how Parson Stephens proclaimed "the right of every man that breathes God's free air and treads upon God's free earth to have his home and hearth." And the same parson called on the assembled workers to take up arms.

Here, in Russia, too, a priest found himself at the head of the movement; one day he appealed for a march with a peaceful petition to the tsar himself, and the next day he issued a call for revolution. "Comrades, Russian workers!" Father Georgi Gapon wrote, after that bloody day, in a letter read at a meeting of liberals. "We no longer have a tsar. Today a river of blood divides him from the Russian people. It is time for the Russian workers to begin the struggle for the people's freedom without him. For today I give

you my blessing. Tomorrow I shall be with you. Today I am busy working for our cause."

This is not Father Georgi Gapon speaking. This is the voice of those thousands upon thousands, of those millions upon millions of Russian workers and peasants who until now could believe naively and blindly in the Tsar Father and seek alleviation of their unbearable lot from Our Father the Tsar "himself", who put the blame for all the atrocities and outrages, the tyranny and plunder, *only* on the officials that were deceiving the tsar. Generation after generation of downtrodden, half-civilised, rustic existence cut off from the world tended to strengthen this faith. Every month of life of the new, urban, industrial, literate Russia has been undermining and destroying this faith. The past decade of the working-class movement has produced thousands of advanced proletarian Social-Democrats who have consciously broken with this faith. It has educated scores of thousands of workers in whom the class instinct, strengthened in the strike movement and fostered by political agitation, has shattered this faith to its foundations. Behind these scores of thousands, however, stood hundreds of thousands, millions, of toiling and exploited people, proletarians and semi-proletarians, suffering every insult and indignity, in whom this faith could still survive. They were not ready for revolt, they could only beg and plead. Their feelings and their mood, their level of knowledge and political experience were expressed by Father Georgi Gapon; herein lies the historic significance of the role played at the beginning of the Russian revolution by a man who, but yesterday unknown, has today become the hero of the hour in St. Petersburg and, as a result, in the entire European press.

It is clear now why the St. Petersburg Social-Democrats, whose letters we quoted above, at first treated Gapon, as they could not help doing, with distrust. A man who wore the cassock, who believed in God and acted under the august patronage of Zubatov and the secret police, could not but arouse suspicion. Whether he was sincere or not in rending his cassock and cursing the fact that he belonged to that vile social-estate, the priesthood, which robs and demoralises the people, no one could say with

certainty, beyond those who knew him well personally, that is, a mere handful. Only the course of historical events could decide this, only facts, facts, facts. And the facts decided in Gapon's favour.

Will Social-Democracy be able to gain the lead of this spontaneous movement? our St. Petersburg comrades asked themselves with concern, seeing the swift irresistible growth of the general strike, which is involving unusually broad strata of the proletariat, seeing the magnetism of Gapon's influence on the "backward" masses who were so ignorant that they could be swept off their feet even by an *agent-provocateur*. And the Social-Democrats not only did not encourage any naïve illusions with regard to the possibility of peaceful petitioning but, on the contrary, opposed Gapon in argument, openly and firmly defending all their views and their tactical line. History, which the working-class masses were making without Social-Democracy, has confirmed the correctness of these views and the tactical line. The logic of the proletariat's class position proved stronger than Gapon's mistakes, naïvetés, and illusions. Grand Duke Vladimir, acting on behalf of the tsar and invested with all the power of the tsar, undertook by his executioner's exploit to demonstrate to the working-class masses the very thing that the Social-Democrats have always demonstrated and will continue to demonstrate to them through the printed and spoken word.

The masses of workers and peasants who still retained a vestige of faith in the tsar were not ready for insurrection, we said. After January 9 we have the right to say that now they are ready for insurrection and will rise. By his massacre of unarmed workers "Our Father the Tsar" himself has driven them to the barricades and given them their first lessons in barricade fighting. The lessons of "Our Father the Tsar" will not be lost.

It remains for the Social-Democrats to see to it that the news of the bloody days in St. Petersburg is spread as far and as wide as possible; to rally and organise their forces still better and popularise still more energetically the slogan they have long since advanced: *general armed uprising of the people*.

6

THE FIRST STEPS

The fire was sparked off by a quite ordinary clash between labour and capital—a strike at a factory. It is interesting to note, however, that this strike of twelve thousand Putilov workers, which broke out on Monday, January 3, was before everything a strike in the name of proletarian solidarity. It was caused by the dismissal of four workers. “When the demand for their reinstatement was turned down,” writes a comrade from St. Petersburg on January 7, “the factory struck work immediately to a man. The strike is fully disciplined. The workers put several men to protect the machines and other property against possible damage by the less class-conscious workers. They then sent a delegation to other factories to communicate to them their demands and to ask them to join the strike.” Many thousands of workers began to join the movement. The legal Zubatov workers’ society, sponsored by the government in order to demoralise the proletariat by systematic monarchist propaganda, rendered no little service in organising the movement in its early stages and in extending it. What happened was something that the Social-Democrats had long pointed out to the Zubatovists, namely, that the revolutionary instinct of the working class and the spirit of solidarity would prevail over all petty police ruses. The most backward workers would be drawn into the movement by the Zubatovists, and then the tsarist government would itself take care to drive the workers farther; capitalist exploitation itself would turn them away from the peaceable and out-and-out hypocritical Zubatov fold towards revolutionary Social-Democracy. The practice of proletarian life and proletarian struggle would prove superior

to all the "theories" and all the vain efforts of the Zubatov gentry.*

And that is what has happened. One comrade, a worker and member of the St. Petersburg Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, gives his impressions as follows in a letter addressed to us under date of January 5.

"I am writing under the fresh impression of a meeting of workers of the Semyannikov Shipyard just held at the Nevskaya Zastava. But first, a word about the feeling among the St. Petersburg workers. As you know, 'Zubatov' organisations have lately begun to crop up here, or rather are being revived under the leadership of the priest Gapon. These organisations have grown considerably in number and strength in a very short time. There are now 11 branches of the so-called Russian Factory Workers' Assembly. As was to be expected, the results of these meetings were inevitably the same as in the South.

"We can now say with certainty that a sweeping strike movement is starting in St. Petersburg. Almost every day you hear of a new strike at one or another factory. The Putilov Works has been on strike now for two days. About a fortnight ago the Schau Cotton Mills in the Vyborg Quarter went on strike. The strike lasted about four days. The workers lost it. The strike may break out anew any day. A fighting spirit prevails everywhere, but it could hardly be said to be in favour of the Social-Democratic line. Most of the workers stand for a purely economic struggle and against a political one. However, we may expect and hope that this feeling will change and the workers will realise that without a political struggle they can achieve no economic improvements. Today the Nevsky Shipyard (Semyannikov's) went on strike. The local branch of the Russian Factory Workers' Assembly is trying to lead the strike, but it will not succeed, of course. The Social-Democrats will be the leaders, notwithstanding the fact that they are woefully weak here.

"Leaflets have been issued by the St. Petersburg Committee: two addressed to the Schau Cotton Mills and one to

* Cf. Lenin, *What Is To Be Done?*, pp. 86-88. (See present edition Vol. 5, pp. 454-56.—Ed.)

the Putilov workers. A meeting of the Nevsky Shipyard workers was held today. It drew about 500 workers. Members of the local branch of the Assembly spoke for the first time. They avoided political demands and put forward chiefly economic demands. Shouts of disapproval were heard in the crowd. At this point Stroyev, of *Russkaya Gazeta*, who is greatly respected among the St. Petersburg workers, came forward and proposed a resolution, which, he said, had been drafted by him and representatives of Social-Democracy. The resolution, though emphasising the antagonism of class interests between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, did this inadequately. Social-Democratic workers spoke after Stroyev and supported the resolution in principle, although stressing its limited character and its inadequacy. This started a commotion; some of those present did not like the speeches of the Social-Democrats and tried to obstruct the meeting. The majority voted against the chairman, who was among the obstructionists, and elected a new chairman, a socialist. The members of the (Zubatov) 'society', however, refused to keep silent and continued to make disturbances. Although the overwhelming majority of the meeting (90 per cent) sided with the socialists, the meeting in the long run broke up without achieving anything and postponed its decision until the next day. One thing can be said at any rate—the Social-Democrats succeeded in turning the mood of the workers in their favour. Tomorrow there is to be a big meeting. There may be two or three thousand people there. An imposing demonstration is to be expected one of these days, something like the July demonstration in the South in 1903. The Franco-Russian Society Works is on strike—about four to five thousand people. They say a strike has started at the Stieglitz Cotton Mills—about five thousand. A strike is expected at the Obukhov Works—five or six thousand."

Comparing this information of a Social-Democrat, a local committee-man (who could only know, of course, what was happening in a small area in St. Petersburg), with the foreign press reports, especially the English, we are led to the conclusion that the latter are distinguished by a high degree of accuracy.

The strike spread from day to day with amazing speed. The workers held numerous meetings and drew up a "charter" of their own—their economic and political demands. Both these demands, despite the Zubatovist leadership, coincided on the whole with the demands of the Social-Democratic Party programme, including the slogan for the convocation of a Constituent Assembly on the basis of universal, direct, and equal suffrage by secret ballot. The spontaneous growth of this strike, unexampled in point of magnitude, was far, far in advance of the planned participation in the movement on the part of the organised Social-Democrats. But let them speak for themselves.

7

THE EVE OF BLOODY SUNDAY

In our account of the movement's progress we stopped at the point at which, on the initiative of Gapon, the procession of the working-class masses to the Winter Palace to present a "petition" to the tsar for convening a Constituent Assembly was set for Sunday, January 9. By Saturday, the 8th, the strike in St. Petersburg had become a general strike. Even official reports placed the number of strikers at 100-150 thousand. Russia had never yet witnessed such a gigantic outbreak of the class struggle. The whole industrial, business, and public life of the great centre with its population of one and a half million was paralysed. The proletariat showed by deeds that modern civilisation owes its existence to *it* and to *it alone*, that its labour creates wealth and luxury and that upon it rests our whole "culture". The city found itself without newspapers, without lighting, and without water. And the general strike bore a clearly defined political character; it was a direct prelude to the revolutionary events.

An eyewitness thus describes the eve of the historic day in a letter addressed to us:

"Beginning with January 7 the strike in St. Petersburg became a general strike. Not only all the big factories and mills, but many workshops came to a standstill. Today, January 8, not a single newspaper, except for *Pravitelstvenny Vestnik* ⁴⁷ and *Vedomosti S. Peterburgskovo Gradonachalstva*,* has appeared. The leadership of the movement

* *St. Petersburg City Administration News.—Ed.*

is still in the hands of the Zubatovists. We are witnessing an unprecedented scene in St. Petersburg, and the suspense makes one's heart contract with fear as to whether the Social-Democratic organisation will be able to take the movement into its own hands, at least after a while. The situation is extremely grave. Throughout these past days mass meetings of workers are daily taking place in all city districts at the headquarters of the 'Association of Russian Workers'. The surrounding streets are filled with thousands of workers. From time to time the Social-Democrats make speeches and distribute leaflets. They are received on the whole sympathetically, although the Zubatovists try to set up an opposition. When the autocracy is mentioned, the Zubatov people shout: 'We don't care about that, the autocracy doesn't stand in our way!' On the other hand, the speeches which the Zubatovists make at the 'Association' headquarters contain all the Social-Democratic demands, beginning with the eight-hour day and ending with the convocation of a Constituent Assembly on the basis of equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot. Only the Zubatovists assert that the granting of these demands implies, not the overthrow of the autocracy, but the bringing of the people closer to the tsar and the elimination of the bureaucracy, which stands between the tsar and the people.

"The Social-Democrats address meetings, too, in the headquarters of the Association, and their speeches are listened to sympathetically; but the initiative in practical proposals comes from the Zubatovists. Despite the objections of the Social-Democrats, these proposals are adopted. They boil down to the following: on Sunday, January 9, the workers are to go to the Winter Palace and, through the priest Georgi Gapon, hand the tsar a petition listing all the demands of the workers and ending with the words, 'Give us all this or we must die'. Those who direct the meetings add: 'If the tsar refuses, then our hands will be untied; for it means that he is our enemy, and then we will come out against him and unfurl the red banner. If our blood is shed, it will be upon his head.' The petition is being adopted everywhere. The workers swear that they will come out into the square on Sunday 'with their wives

and children'. Today the petition is going to be signed by districts, and at 2 o'clock all are to assemble at the 'People's House' for the final meeting.

"All this is taking place with the full connivance of the police, who have been everywhere withdrawn, although some buildings have mounted gendarmes hidden in the yards.

"Today the streets are placarded with notices from the City Administrator banning meetings and threatening the use of armed force. The workers tear them off. Troops are being drawn up into the city from the environs. The tramway employees (conductors and drivers) have been forced to go to work by Cossacks with drawn sabres."

8

THE NUMBER OF KILLED OR WOUNDED

Reports as to the number of killed or wounded differ. Naturally, there can be no question of an exact count, and a visual estimate is very difficult. The government's report giving 96 killed and 330 wounded is obviously false, and no one believes it. According to the latest press reports, journalists handed the Minister of the Interior a list of *4,600 killed or wounded*, as compiled by reporters. Of course, even this figure *cannot be* complete, since it would be impossible even in the day-time (let alone at night) to count all the killed and wounded in the various clashes.

The victory of the autocracy over the unarmed people took a toll no smaller than did the big battles in Manchuria. No wonder the St. Petersburg workers, according to the reports of foreign correspondents, cried out to the officers that they were more successful at fighting the Russian people than they were the Japanese.

9

THE BATTLES ON THE BARRICADES¹¹

As we have seen, most of the correspondents' reports refer to the barricades on Vasilyevsky Island, and partly in Nevsky Prospekt. The official report published on Monday, January 10 (23), reads: "The mob threw up barricades with barbed wire entanglements and red flags on the Schlüsselburg Highway, then at the Narvskaya Zastava, on the Troitsky Bridge, at the Alexandrovsky Gardens, and at the public gardens in Nevsky Prospekt. Stones were thrown and shots fired at the troops from the adjoining houses. The crowd disarmed the police. Schoff's armoury was looted. In the first and second areas of Vasilyevsky Island the mob cut the telegraph-wires and knocked down the telegraph-poles. A police station was smashed up."

A French correspondent telegraphed at 2:50 p.m. on Sunday: "Shooting is continuing. The troops, apparently, have lost their head completely. Crossing the Neva, I saw several signal lights and heard volleys of rifle shots. On Vasilyevsky Island the barricades are illumined with bonfires kindled by the strikers. This was as far as I could get. A sinister bugle sound is the signal to fire. A battalion of soldiers with bayoneted rifles atilt charged a barricade made of piled up sleighs. A real massacre started. The bodies of about a hundred workers were strewn over the scene of battle. Some fifty wounded prisoners were escorted past me. The officer threatened me with his pistol and ordered me to be off."

Correspondents give very few details of the barricade fighting. This is understandable, because they tried to keep more or less at a safe distance from the danger spots.

As for the participants in the barricade fighting, probably only very few survived. There is even a report that the barricades were subjected to artillery fire, but it does not seem to have been confirmed.

Published according to
the manuscript

THE TSARIST PEACE

The foreign press reported that at recent conferences in Tsarskoye Selo (after the victory of January 9), with or without the tsar attending, the question of the desirability of peace with Japan was animatedly discussed. In principle, all who surround the adored monarch stand for peace now. The number of state dignitaries who ten days ago were emphatically for continuing the war has now dwindled considerably, and many of them have now become convinced advocates of peace.

We mention this for the information of the simple Social-Democrats of the so-called Central Organ of our Party, who failed to understand that the phrases about "peace *at any price*", while remaining empty phrases (for no one asked the opinion of the Social-Democrats, and their opinion counted for nought), actually, in the present situation, have merely played into the hands of the frightened adherents of the autocracy. Our new-Iskrists missed the change of mood on the part of the whole European bourgeoisie (which began with sympathy towards Japan and has long since started to shift in favour of Russia through fear of the revolution—cf. *Frankfurter Zeitung* and others). Now they miss the fact that the empty, hackneyed phrases about peace *at any price* are beginning to be utilised also by the St. Petersburg Ugryum-Burcheyevs⁴⁹ for their own purpose.

Written January 19 (February 1),
1905

Published according to
the manuscript

A BRIEF OUTLINE OF THE SPLIT IN THE R.S.D.L.P.⁵⁰

In his letter of February 1, 1905, to the editors of the newspaper *Vperyod* (Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party), the well-known leader of the Swiss Social-Democrats, Hermann Greulich, incidentally expressed his regret at the new split in the ranks of the Russian Social-Democrats and remarked: "*Wer die grössere Schuld an dieser Zersplitterung trägt, das werde ich nicht entscheiden und ich habe den internationalen Entscheid bei der deutschen Parteileitung angeregt*" ("I do not undertake to decide who is more to blame for this split. I have proposed to the leadership of the German Social-Democratic Party that this question be settled through international channels").

The editors of *Vperyod*, together with Comrade Stepanov, representative abroad of the Russian Bureau of Committees of the Majority, answered Greulich in the letter appended below.

Since Comrade Greulich intends to call for an international decision, we are communicating to all friends of *Vperyod* in foreign countries the contents of our letter to him and request them to *translate* it into their respective languages, and to bring it to the notice of the greatest possible number of foreign Social-Democrats.

It is also desirable to translate into foreign languages Lenin's *Statement and Documents on the Break of the Central Institutions with the Party*, as well as: (1) the resolutions of the Northern Conference, (2) the resolutions of the Caucasian Conference; and (3) the resolutions of the Southern Conference.

Please let us know whether this request will be carried out.

THE LETTER TO GREULICH

February 3, 1905

Dear Comrade,

In your letter you touch on the question of which group of our Party (the R.S.D.L.P.) is to blame for the split. You say that you have asked for the opinion of the German Social-Democrats and the International Bureau on this point. In view of this, we feel bound to explain to you how the split occurred. We shall confine ourselves to the *presentation of definitely proved facts* and refrain, as far as possible, from an evaluation of the facts.

Until the end of 1903, our Party was the aggregate of the disconnected local Social-Democratic organisations called *committees*. The Central Committee and the Central Organ elected at the Party's First Congress (in the spring of 1898) were non-existent. They had been suppressed by the police and never been revived. Abroad, a split had occurred between the Union of Russian Social-Democrats (publication—*Rabocheye Dyelo*; hence, *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists) and Plekhanov. *Iskra*, founded in 1900, sided with the latter. In the space of three years, between 1900 and 1903, *Iskra* gained overwhelming influence among the Russian committees. *Iskra* upheld the principles of revolutionary Social-Democracy against "Economism" (alias *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ism = Russian variety of opportunism).

The lack of unity in the Party was felt keenly by all.

Finally, in August 1903, it became possible, abroad, to assemble the *Second Party Congress*, at which were represented all the Russian committees, the Bund¹ (independent organisation of the Jewish proletariat), and *both* groups abroad—the *Iskra* group and the *Rabocheye Dyelo* group.

All participants in the Congress recognised its validity. The struggle at the Congress was between the Iskrist and the anti-Iskrist (the *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists and the Bund); in between was the so-called "Marsh". The Iskrist carried the day. They achieved the adoption of the Party programme (*Iskra*'s draft). *Iskra* was recognised as the Central Organ, and its line as the line of the Party. A number of resolutions on tactics were Iskrist in spirit, and the ac-

cepted Rules on organisation (Lenin's draft) were Iskrist. Only with respect to certain details were the Rules marred by the anti-Iskrists with the aid of a minority of the Iskrists. The voting at the Congress was as follows: of the total 51 votes, 33 were *Iskra* (24 Iskrists of the present *Majority* and 9 of the present *Minority*), 10 were "Marsh", and 8 were anti-Iskrists (3 *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists and 5 Bundists). Towards the end of the Congress, before the elections, *seven* delegates (2 *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists and the 5 Bundists) walked out. (The Bund withdrew from the Party.)

The minority of the Iskrists, supported, because of their mistakes, by all the anti-Iskrists and the "Marsh", became the *minority of the Congress* (24 against 9+10+1, or, 24 against 20). At the election of the central bodies it was decided to choose three persons to the Editorial Board of the Central Organ and three to the Central Committee. Out of the six members who constituted the old Editorial Board of *Iskra*—Plekhanov, Axelrod, Zasulich, Starover, Lenin, and Martov—there were elected Plekhanov, Lenin, and Martov. The intention was that the Central Committee should consist of two elected from the majority and one from the minority.

Martov refused to take his seat on the Editorial Board without the three "excluded" (non-elected) comrades, and the entire minority refused to participate in the election of a Central Committee. No one ever disputed or disputes now the validity of the elections, but after the Congress the Minority refused to work under the leadership of the centres elected by the Congress.

This boycott continued for three months, from the end of August to the end of November 1903. *Iskra* (six issues, Nos. 46-51) was edited by Plekhanov and Lenin alone. The Minority formed a secret organisation within the Party (a *fact* now corroborated *in the press* by the Minority followers themselves and denied *by no one* at the present time). The overwhelming majority of the Russian committees (12 of the 14 that had managed to go on record at the time) condemned this disruptive boycott.

But Plekhanov, following the turbulent congress of the League Abroad⁵² (=the Party organisation abroad), which took place *in the last days of October* 1903, decided

to give way to the Minority, declaring before the whole Party in the article "What Should Not Be Done" (*Iskra*, No. 52, November 1903) that for the sake of avoiding a split one must at times make concessions even to those who lean in error towards *revisionism* and act as *anarcho-individualists* (the underlined expressions are employed by Plekhanov literally in his article "What Should Not Be Done"). Lenin withdrew from the Editorial Board, not wishing to go against the decisions of the Congress. Plekhanov then co-opted all the four former editors. The Russian committees declared that they would wait and see what line the new *Iskra* would take and whether the Mensheviks had really joined the Editorial Board with peaceful intentions.

Precisely what the Bolsheviks had predicted came to pass. The old-*Iskra* line was not retained, nor was peace brought into the Party by the new, Menshevik Editorial Board. The *Iskra* line veered so sharply towards the old *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ism, which had been repudiated by the Second Congress, that *even* Trotsky, a prominent member of the Minority, author of the programmatic pamphlet *Our Political Tasks*, which appeared *under the editorship of the new "Iskra"*, stated literally: "*There is a gulf between the old 'Iskra' and the new 'Iskra'.*" We confine ourselves to this declaration, made by one of our opponents, in order not to have to go into lengthy explanations concerning the instability of *Iskra* on questions of principle.

On the other hand, "the secret organisation of the Minority" was not disbanded, but continued its boycott of the Central Committee. This covert split of the Party into an open and a secret organisation was an intolerable hindrance to the work. An overwhelming majority of the Russian committees that took a position on the crisis emphatically condemned both the line of the new *Iskra* and the disorganising behaviour of the Minority. A general clamour was raised on all sides for the immediate summoning of a Third Congress, to find some way out of the intolerable situation.

Under our Party Rules, a special congress may be called only on the demand of organisations commanding in the ag-

gregate at least one half of the total votes (regular congresses are called, "as far as possible", every two years). *This half had been mustered already.* But here the C.C. played the Majority false by taking advantage of the fact that several of its members belonging to the Majority had been arrested. Under the pretext of "reconciliation", the members of the C.C. who had escaped arrest *made a deal with the secret organisation of the Minority* and declared that the organisation had been dissolved; at the same time, in spite of the written declarations of the C.C. and behind the back of the Party, *three Mensheviks were co-opted into the C.C.* This co-optation took place in November or December 1904. Thus, the Minority was fighting from August 1903 to November 1904, tearing the Party asunder, for the sake of co-opting three persons into the Central Organ and three into the C.C.

The spurious central institutions thus formed met the demand for another congress with silence or abuse.

Then the patience of the Russian committees gave out. They began to call their own private conferences. So far three such conferences have been held: (1) the Conference of the four Caucasian committees; (2) the Conference of three southern committees (Odessa, Nikolayev, and Ekaterinoslav); and (3) the Conference of six northern committees (St. Petersburg, Moscow, Tver, Riga, "the North"—i.e., Yaroslavl, Kostroma, and Vladimir—and, lastly, Nizhni-Novgorod). All these conferences declared for the "Majority", decided to support the publicists' group of the Majority (the group consisting of Lenin, Ryadovoi, Orlovsky, Galyorka,³³ Voinov,³⁴ and others), and elected *their own Bureau*. This Bureau was instructed by the third, viz., the Northern, conference to constitute itself as an *Organising Committee* and to convene a congress of the Russian committees, i.e., the Third Congress of the Party, without regard for the centres abroad that had split from the Party.

This is how things stood on January 1, 1905 (new style). The Bureau of Committees of the Majority has begun its work (conditions in our police-ridden country are such that the convening of the Congress will, of course, be delayed for a few months; the Second Congress was announced in December 1902, but was not convened until August 1903). The

publicists' group of the Majority founded *an organ of the Majority*, the newspaper *Vperyod*, published as a *weekly* since January 4 (N.S.), 1905. To date (February 3, 1905) four numbers have already appeared. The line of *Vperyod* is *the line of the old "Iskra"*. In the name of the old *Iskra*, *Vperyod* resolutely combats the new *Iskra*.

Hence, in actual fact, there are now two Russian Social-Democratic Labour Parties. One has the organ *Iskra*, "officially" called the Central Organ of the Party; it has the C.C., and four committees in Russia *out of twenty* (the other committees in Russia, apart from the twenty represented at the Second Congress, were organised later, and the validity of their confirmation is still in dispute). The other party has the organ *Vperyod*, the Bureau of Russian Committees of the Majority, fourteen committees in Russia (the thirteen above-named committees and the Voronezh Committee, and most likely also the committees of Saratov, the Urals, Tula, and Siberia*).

The *new-Iskrists* have on their side all the opponents of the old *Iskra*, all the *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists, and a large part of the intelligentsia on the fringe of the Party. The *Vperyod*-ists have on their side all who followed the old *Iskra* from conviction and on principle, as well as a large part of the class-conscious, advanced workers, and of the practical Party functionaries in Russia. Plekhanov, who was a Bolshevik at the Second Party Congress (August 1903) and at the Congress of the League (October 1903), but who has been fighting the "Majority" furiously since November 1903, declared publicly *on September 2, 1904* (this statement has appeared in print) that the forces on both sides were approximately equal.

We Bolsheviks maintain that we have on our side the majority of real Party workers active in Russia. We consider that the main cause of the split and the chief obstacle to unity is the disruptive behaviour of the Minority, which refused to bow to the decisions of the Second Congress and preferred to have a split rather than call the Third Congress.

At the present time the Mensheviks are splitting the lo-

* At least all the four last-named committees declared for the "Majority" after the Second Party Congress.

cal organisations everywhere in Russia. In St. Petersburg, for instance, they prevented the Committee from organising a demonstration on November 28 (see *Vperyod*, No. 1*). Now they have broken away in St. Petersburg as a separate group known as the "Group Attached to the Central Committee" and work against the local committee of the Party. Recently they organised in Odessa another such local ("Central Committee") group for fighting the Party Committee. The falsity of their position has made the Menshevik central institutions disorganise the local work of the Party, since these central bodies did not want to accept the decision of the Party committees that had elected them.

The differences in principle between *Vperyod* and new *Iskra* are essentially the same as those between the old *Iskra* and *Rabocheye Dyelo*. We consider these differences important, but, given the opportunity fully to defend our views, the views of the old *Iskra*, we would not consider these differences of themselves to be a bar to working together in one Party.

Published in 1905 as
a separate leaflet by the
Berne Promotion Group
of the R.S.D.L.P.

Published according to
the manuscript

* See pp. 35-39 of this volume.—*Ed.*

TREPOV IN THE SADDLE

Cruel reprisals against all the discontented have become the government's slogan since January 9. On Tuesday, Trepov, one of the most hated servitors of tsarism in the whole of Russia, notorious in Moscow for his brutality, his coarseness, and his participation in the Zubatovist attempts to demoralise the workers, was appointed Governor-General of St. Petersburg with dictatorial powers.

Arrests came thick and fast as from a horn of plenty. The first to be arrested were the members of the liberal delegation, which, late on Saturday evening, had gone to Witte and Svyatopolk-Mirsky to request the government to receive the workers' petition and not to order the troops to fire on the peaceful demonstration. It goes without saying that these requests proved of no avail. Witte referred the delegation to Svyatopolk-Mirsky; the latter refused to receive it. The Deputy-Minister of the Interior, Rydziewski, received the delegation very coldly and declared that it was not the government that had to be persuaded, but the workers, that the government was fully informed of everything that was going on, and that it had already made decisions which no requests could alter. It is interesting that at the meeting of the liberals which appointed this delegation the suggestion had even been made to dissuade the workers from marching to the Winter Palace, upon which a friend of Gapon's who was present at the meeting declared that this would be useless, since the workers' decision was irrevocable. (This information was reported by Mr. Dillon, correspondent of the *English Daily Telegraph*, and subsequently corroborated by other correspondents.)

The members of the delegation—Gessen, Arsenyev, Kareyev, Peshekhonov, Myakotin, Semevsky, Kedrin, Shnitnikov, Ivanchin-Pisarev, and Gorky (who was arrested in Riga and brought to St. Petersburg)—were held in custody on the ridiculous charge that they intended to organise a “provisional government of Russia” on the day after the revolution. Such a charge, of course, is bound to collapse of itself. A number of the arrested men (Arsenyev, Kedrin, and Shnitnikov) have been released. A vigorous campaign in behalf of Gorky has been started in educated bourgeois circles abroad, and a petition to the tsar for his release was signed by many prominent German scientists and writers. These have now been joined by scientists and men of letters in Austria, France, and Italy.

On Friday evening, four members of the staff of the newspaper *Nasha Zhizn* were arrested: Prokopovich and his wife, Khizhnyakov, and Yakovlev (Bogucharsky). Of the staff of the newspaper *Nashi Dni*,⁵⁶ Ganeiser was arrested on Saturday morning. The police are trying very hard to intercept the funds sent from abroad for the strikers or for the widows and orphans of those killed in the massacre. People are being arrested *en masse*. The warrant for Bogucharsky's arrest was numbered 53 and for Khizhnyakov 109. On Saturday the offices of both mentioned papers were raided and all manuscripts without exception were confiscated, including detailed accounts of the events of the entire week, accounts written and signed by reliable eyewitnesses who had noted down all they had seen for the edification of future generations. None of this material will ever see the light of day now.

On Wednesday the number of arrests was so considerable that the prisoners had to be placed two and three in a cell. In the case of workers, the new dictator is casting all ceremony aside. Since Thursday they have been rounded up in batches and hustled back to their home towns and villages. There they will, of course, spread the story of the events of January 9 and advocate struggle against the autocracy.

Trepov is falling back on his old Moscow tactics of ensnaring the working-class masses with economic sops.

Employers are conferring with the Minister of Finance to devise various concessions to the workers; there is talk of

the nine-hour day. On Tuesday the Minister of Finance received a delegation of workers, promised economic reforms, and warned against political agitation.

The police are trying their hardest to sow distrust and enmity between the general public and the workers. Wednesday's reports in foreign newspapers state most definitely that the police are trying to terrorise the population of St. Petersburg with lurid accounts of robberies and other atrocious deeds alleged to have been committed by the strikers. Deputy-Minister of the Interior Rydziewski himself assured a visitor on Tuesday that the strikers were out to loot, burn, destroy, and kill. Wherever they have been able, the strikers—at least their class-conscious leaders—have branded this as slander. *The police themselves sent out agents-provocateurs and house janitors to smash windows, burn news-stands, and loot shops*, in order to terrorise the population. The workers, in fact, behaved so peacefully that they roused the wonder of the foreign press correspondents who had witnessed the horrors of January 9.

The police agents are now busy with a new "workers' organisation". They pick suitable elements from among the workers, supply them with money, set them on students and writers, and praise "the true public-spirited policy of Our Father the Tsar". It is not difficult to find among two or three hundred thousand uneducated workers, crushed in spirit by starvation, a few thousand who will nibble at this bait. These will be "organised", they will be made to curse "the liberal frauds" and to declare loudly that they were fooled last Sunday. Then this scum of the working class will appoint a delegation which will "humbly beseech the tsar to allow them to fall at his feet and repent them of the crimes they committed last Sunday". "According to my information," continues the correspondent, "this is precisely what the police are now engaged in arranging. After they have put the finishing touches to this organisation, His Majesty will most graciously deign to receive the delegation in the Manège, which will be specially prepared for this occasion. He will make a moving speech professing His fatherly concern for the workers and His anxiety that measures be taken to improve their condition."

P.S. These lines were already set up in type when telegrams arrived confirming the predictions of the English correspondent. At his residence in Tsarskoye Selo the tsar received a delegation of thirty-four workers hand-picked by the police, and he delivered a speech reeking with official hypocrisy about the government's paternal solicitude and about the forgiveness it held out to the offending workers. Of course, this ghastly farce will not deceive the Russian proletariat. The proletariat will never forget Bloody Sunday. It will yet speak to the tsar in a different strain.

Vperyod, No. 5,
February 7 (January 25), 1905

Published according to
the text in *Vperyod*

ST. PETERSBURG AFTER JANUARY 9

On Monday, January 10, St. Petersburg looked like a city just conquered by an enemy. Cossack patrols kept riding through the streets. Here and there stood excited groups of workers. In the evening many of the streets were plunged in darkness. There was no electricity or gas. The aristocratic houses were guarded by groups of janitors. Blazing news-stands threw a lurid light on knots of people.

In Nevsky Prospekt there were clashes between the people and the military. Shots were again fired at the crowd. Three volleys were fired outside the Anichkov Palace. The police shut the fire-arms shops and removed all weapons to the cellars, taking apparently all possible measures to prevent the workers from arming. The officials in the government offices were particularly alarmed; they feared fires and explosions and fled from St. Petersburg in a panic.

The barricades which the troops had captured on Sunday on Vasilyevsky Island were thrown up again on Monday and were recaptured by the soldiers.

There were no newspapers. The schools were closed. At numerous private meetings the workers discussed the events and measures of resistance. Crowds of sympathisers, especially students, besieged the hospitals.

The workers of Kolpino, twenty to thirty thousand strong, were said to have marched out to Tsarskoye Selo on Tuesday morning with a petition. The garrison of Tsarskoye Selo sent out a regiment of infantry and a field battery to intercept them. A clash occurred within five versts of Kolpino; the troops fired and finally repulsed and scattered the workers at 4 p. m. There were many killed and wounded. The workers twice attacked the Tsarskoye Selo railway,

but were repulsed. The rails were pulled up for a distance of seven versts and no trains ran in the morning.

The government buried the victims of Bloody Vladimir Sunday at night, in secret. The relatives and friends of the slain were deliberately misled, so that no demonstrations would be held at the burials. Corpses were taken to the Preobrazhensky Cemetery by the car-load. In some places the crowd nevertheless attempted, despite all police precautions, to hold demonstrations in honour of the fallen fighters for liberty.

Feeling against the army among the population ran high. The foreign newspapers, on the basis of accounts by eyewitnesses, report that on Tuesday, January 11, the Cossacks stopped a horse tram full of workers in Bolshoi Prospekt. One of the workers had shouted at the Cossacks, "Butchers!" The Cossacks stopped the tram, made all the passengers get out and beat them with the flats of their swords. One of the men was wounded. The tenants of nearby houses opened their windows and shouted at the Cossacks, "Murderers! Bandits!" Thursday's telegrams reported that during this incident a woman passenger was also driven out of the tram by the Cossacks. In her fright she dropped her child, which was trampled to death by the Cossacks' horses (*The Times*). Such victories of our troops over the workers are truly Pyrrhic victories.

THE FIRST LESSONS

The first wave of the revolutionary storm is receding. We are on the eve of an inescapable, inevitable second wave. The proletarian movement is spreading wider and has now reached the remotest outlying regions of the country. Unrest and discontent have seized the most diverse sections of society, even the most backward. Commerce and industry are paralysed, schools are closed, and the Zemstvo employees, following the example of the workers, have gone on strike. In the lulls between the mass actions, individual terrorist acts are, as usual, becoming more frequent: the attempt on the life of the Odessa Chief of Police, the assassination in the Caucasus, the assassination of the Senate Procurator in Helsingfors. The government is veering from the policy of the bloody knout to a policy of promises. It tries to fool at least part of the workers with the tsar's farcical reception of a delegation.* It tries to divert public attention with war news, and it orders Kuropatkin to start an offensive on the Hunho. On January 9 the massacre in St. Petersburg took place; the 12th saw the launching of the offensive, from the military point of view absolutely senseless, which ended in another serious defeat of the tsar's generals. The Russians were repulsed with casualties, which even according to the *Novoye Vremya* correspondent amounted to 13,000 men, or about twice as many as the Japanese. There is the same corruption and demoralisation in the handling of military affairs in Manchuria that there is in St. Petersburg. In the foreign press, dispatches confirming and denying Kuropatkin's quarrel with Grippenbergh alternate

* See pp. 134-35 of this volume.—*Ed.*

with dispatches confirming and denying the news that the Grand Ducal party is alive to the danger which the war is creating for the autocracy and wants peace as quickly as possible.

Small wonder that under such circumstances even the most sober bourgeois papers of Europe never stop talking of a revolution in Russia. The revolution is growing and maturing with a rapidity unknown before January 9. Whether the next wave will surge up tomorrow, the day after, or months hence, depends on quite a number of unpredictable circumstances. All the more urgent, therefore, is the task of summing up the revolutionary events and drawing from them the lessons that may stand us in good stead much sooner than some are inclined to expect.

To evaluate correctly the revolutionary events we should have to make a general survey of the most recent history of our working-class movement. Nearly twenty years ago, in 1885, the first big workers' strikes took place in the central manufacturing district, at the Morozov Mills and elsewhere. At that time Katkov wrote that the labour question had emerged in Russia. With what astonishing speed the proletariat has developed, passing from economic struggles to political demonstrations, from demonstrations to the revolutionary onset! Let us recall the chief milestones along the road traversed. 1885—widespread strikes, in which an insignificant number of socialists participated, acting entirely individually, not united in any organisations. Public sentiment over the strikes compelled Katkov, that faithful watchdog of the autocracy, to speak, in reference to the trial, about a "one-hundred-and-one gun salute in honour of the labour question which has emerged in Russia". The government made economic concessions. 1891—participation of the St. Petersburg workers in the demonstration at Shelgunov's funeral⁵⁶; political speeches at the St. Petersburg May Day rally. We had here a Social-Democratic demonstration of the advanced workers in the absence of a mass movement. 1896—the St. Petersburg strike involving scores of thousands of workers. A mass movement and the beginnings of street agitation, this time with the participation of an entire Social-Democratic organisation. Small as this almost exclusively student organisation may have been in compar-

ison with our present-day party, its class-conscious, systematic, Social-Democratic intervention and leadership gave this movement tremendous scope and significance, as compared with the Morozov strike. Again the government made economic concessions. A firm basis was achieved for a strike movement throughout Russia. The revolutionary intelligentsia turned Social-Democrat *en masse*. The Social-Democratic Party was founded. 1901—the workers came to the aid of the students. A demonstration movement set in. The proletariat carried its rallying call, “Down with the Autocracy!”, into the streets. The radical intelligentsia definitely broke up into three parts—liberal, revolutionary-bourgeois, and Social-Democratic. The participation of revolutionary Social-Democratic organisations in the demonstrations became more and more widespread, active, and direct. 1902—the huge Rostov strike developed into an impressive demonstration. The political movement of the proletariat was no longer an adjunct of the movement of the intellectuals, of the students, but grew directly out of the strike. The participation of organised revolutionary Social-Democrats became still more active. The proletariat won for itself and for the revolutionary Social-Democrats of *its* committee the right to hold mass meetings in the streets. For the first time the proletariat stood as a class against all other classes and against the tsarist government. 1903—again strikes merged with political demonstrations, but now on a still broader basis. The strikes involved an entire district and more than a hundred thousand workers; in a number of cities political mass meetings were repeatedly held in the course of the strikes. There was a feeling of being on the eve of barricades (the opinion which the local Social-Democrats expressed on the movement in Kiev in 1903⁵⁷). But the eve proved rather protracted, teaching us, as it were, that it takes powerful classes sometimes months and years to gather strength; putting, as it were, the sceptical intellectual adherents of Social-Democracy to the test. And sure enough, the intellectualist wing of our Party, the new-Iskrists or, what amounts to the same thing, the new-*Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists, have already begun to seek “higher types” of demonstrations, in the form of agreements between the workers and the Zemstvo people not to create panic fear.

With the lack of principle characteristic of all opportunists, the new-Iskrists have now talked themselves into the preposterous, incredibly preposterous, thesis that in the political arena there are two (!) forces: the bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie (see the *Iskra* editors' *second* letter in connection with the Zemstvo campaign). The opportunists of the new *Iskra*, these believers in *carpe diem*, have forgotten that the proletariat constitutes an independent force! Came the year 1905, and January 9 once again showed up all such backsliding types of the intelligentsia brood. The proletarian movement at once rose to a higher plane. The general strike rallied at least a million workers all over Russia. The political demands of the Social-Democrats found their way even to the sections of the working class that still believed in the tsar. The proletariat broke down the framework of the police-sponsored Zubatov movement, and virtually the entire membership of the legal workers' society founded for the purpose of combating the revolution took the path of revolution together with Gapon. Strikes and demonstrations began to develop into an *uprising* before our very eyes. The participation of organised revolutionary Social-Democracy was incomparably more in evidence than in the previous stages of the movement; yet it was still weak, weak in comparison with the overwhelming demand of the active proletarian masses for Social-Democratic leadership.

Altogether, the two movements, strikes and demonstrations, combining in various forms and on various occasions, grew in breadth and in depth, became more and more revolutionary, came ever more closer in practice to the general armed uprising of the people, of which revolutionary Social-Democracy had long spoken. We drew this conclusion from the events of January 9 in Nos. 4* and 5 of *Vperyod*. The St. Petersburg workers drew this conclusion for themselves, forthwith and directly. On January 10 they forced their way into a legal printing office, set up the following leaflet sent to us by the St. Petersburg comrades, printed it in over 10,000 copies, and distributed it throughout St. Petersburg. The text of this remarkable leaflet follows.**

* See pp. 98-100 of this volume — *Ed.*

** See p. 154 of this volume. — *Ed.*

This appeal needs no comment. The initiative of the revolutionary proletariat found full expression here. The call of the St. Petersburg workers was not answered as quickly as they wished; it will have to be repeated time and again; the attempts to carry it out will more than once result in failure. But the tremendous significance of the fact that the task has been set by the workers themselves is indisputable. The gain made by the revolutionary movement, which has brought about a realisation of the practical urgency of this task and made it an essential issue of every popular movement, is a gain that nothing can now take away from the proletariat.

It is worth dwelling on the history of the idea of insurrection. The new *Iskra* has given us so many nebulous platitudes on this question, beginning with the famous leader in issue No. 62, it has presented us with so many muddled opportunist ideas, entirely worthy of our old acquaintance Martynov, that the precise reproduction of the old formulation of the question is of particular importance. In any case, it is impossible to keep track of all the platitudes and muddled ideas of the new *Iskra*. It is much wiser to have the old *Iskra* more often in mind and enlarge more concretely upon its old constructive slogans.

At the end of Lenin's pamphlet *What Is To Be Done?*, on p. 136,* the slogan of a *general armed uprising of the people* was advanced. The following was said on this subject at the very beginning of 1902, that is, three years ago: "Picture to yourselves a popular uprising. Probably everyone will now agree that we must think of this uprising and prepare for it...."***

Written at the beginning
of February 1905

Published according to
the manuscript

* See present edition, Vol. 5, p. 515.—*Ed.*

** Here the manuscript breaks off.—*Ed.*

A LETTER TO A. A. BOGDANOV AND S. I. GUSEV

February 11, 1905

I wired my consent to your changes yesterday, although I emphatically do not agree with what I could gather from your letter. But I am so sick of this procrastination, and your questions seemed such a mockery, that I just gave it up, thinking, If only they did something! If only they gave notice of the Congress, *any kind of notice*, so long as they *gave* it, instead of just talking about it. You will be surprised at my use of the word mockery. But just stop and think: two months ago I sent my draft to *all* members of the Bureau.* Not one of them is interested in it or finds it necessary to discuss it. And now—by wire.... A nice business: we talk of organisation, of centralism, while actually there is such disunity, such amateurism among even the closest comrades in the centre, that one feels like chucking it all in disgust. Just look at the Bundists: they do not prate about centralism, but *every one* of them writes to the centre weekly and contact is thus *actually* maintained. You only have to pick up their *Posledniye Izvestia*** to see this contact. We, however, here are issuing the sixth number of *Vperyod*, yet one of our editors (Rakhmetov) has not written a single line, either about or for *Vperyod*. Our people “talk” of extensive literary connections in St. Petersburg and in Moscow, and of the Majority’s young forces, while we here, *two months* after the issuance of the call for collaboration (the announcement of *Vperyod* and a letter in connection with it), have seen or heard nothing from them. The Russian committees

* See present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 540-42.—*Ed.*** *The Latest News.*—*Ed.*

(Caucasus, Nizhni-Novgorod, not to speak of the Volga region or the South) consider the Bureau a "myth", and with perfect justification. We did "hear" from strangers about some sort of alliance between the St. Petersburg Committee of the Majority and a group of Mensheviks, but from our own people not a word. We refuse to believe that Bolsheviks could have taken such an imbecilic, suicidal step. We did "hear" from strangers about a conference of Social-Democrats and the formation of a "bloc", but from our own people *not a word*, although there are rumours that this is a *fait accompli*. Evidently, the members of the Majority are anxious to be imposed upon again.

Our only strength lies in utter frankness, in solidarity, and in determined assault. But people, it seems, have gone soft now that we have a "revolution"! At a time when organisation is needed a hundred times more than ever before they sell out to the disrupters. It is evident from the proposed changes in the draft of the declaration and Congress call (set forth in the letter so vaguely as to be almost unintelligible) that "loyalty" has been put on a pedestal. Papasha* actually uses that word, adding that if the centres are not mentioned, no one will come to the Congress! Well, gentlemen, I can wager that if *this* is the way you are going to act, you will never have a congress and never escape from under the thumb of the Bonapartists of the Central Organ and the Central Committee. To call a congress *against* the central bodies, in which lack of confidence has been expressed, to call this Congress in the name of a *revolutionary* bureau (which, if we are to pay slavish obeisance to the loyal Party Rules, is non-existent and fictitious), and to recognise the *unqualified* right of the nine Bonapartists, the League (ha! ha!), and the Bonapartist creatures (the freshly hatched committees) to attend that Congress, means to make ourselves ridiculous and to lose all right to respect. The centres may and should be invited, but to accord them voting status is, I repeat, madness. The centres, of course, will not come to *our* Congress anyway; but why give them another chance to spit in our faces? Why this hypocrisy, this game of hide-and-seek? It is a positive shame! We bring *the split* into the open,

* See Note 22.—Ed.

we call the *Vperyod*-ists to a congress, we want to organise a *Vperyod*-ist party, and we break immediately *any and all* connections with the disorganisers—and yet we are having loyalty dinned into our ears, we are asked to act as though a joint congress of *Iskra* and *Vperyod* were possible. What a farce! The very first day, the very first hour of the Congress (if it does take place) will beyond doubt ring down the curtain on this farce; but until the Congress meets such deceit can do us untold harm.

Really, I sometimes think that nine-tenths of the Bolsheviks are actually formalists. Either we shall rally all who are out to fight into a really iron-strong organisation and with this small but strong party quash that sprawling monster, the new-*Iskra* motley elements, or we shall prove by our conduct that we deserve to go under for being contemptible formalists. How is it that people do not understand that *prior to the Bureau and prior to "Vperyod"* we did all we could to save loyalty, to save unity, to save the formal, i.e., higher methods of settling the conflict?! But now, *after the Bureau, after "Vperyod"*, the split is a fact. And when the split had become a fact it became evident that *materially we were very much weaker*. We have yet to convert our moral strength into material strength. The Mensheviks have more money, more literature, more transportation facilities, more agents, more "names", and a larger staff of contributors. It would be unpardonable childishness not to see that. And if we do not wish to present to the world the repulsive spectacle of a dried-up and anaemic old maid, proud of her barren moral purity, then we must understand that we need war and a battle organisation. Only after a long battle, and only with the aid of an excellent organisation can we turn our moral strength into material strength.

We need funds. The plan to hold the Congress *in London* is sublimely ridiculous, for it would cost twice as much. We cannot suspend publication of *Vperyod*, which is what a long absence would mean. The Congress must be a simple affair, brief, and small in attendance. This is a congress for the organisation of the battle. Clearly, you are cherishing illusions in this respect.

We need people to work on *Vperyod*. There are not enough of us. If we do not get two or three extra people from Russia

as permanent contributors, there is no sense in continuing to prate about a struggle against *Iskra*. Pamphlets and leaflets are needed, and needed desperately.

We need young forces. I am for shooting on the spot anyone who presumes to say that there are no people to be had. The people in Russia are legion; all we have to do is to recruit young people more widely and boldly, more boldly and widely, and again more widely and again more boldly, *without fearing them*. This is a time of war. The youth—the students, and still more so the young workers—will decide the issue of the whole struggle. Get rid of all the old habits of immobility, of respect for rank, and so on. Form *hundreds* of circles of *Vperyod*-ists from among the youth and encourage them to work at full blast. Enlarge the Committee *threefold* by accepting young people into it, set up half a dozen or a dozen subcommittees, “co-opt” any and every honest and energetic person. Allow every subcommittee to write and publish leaflets without any red tape (there is no harm if they do make a mistake; we on *Vperyod* will “gently” correct them). We must, with desperate speed, unite all people with revolutionary initiative and set them to work. Do not fear their lack of training, do not tremble at their inexperience and lack of development. In the first place, if you fail to organise them and spur them on to action, they will follow the Mensheviks and the Gapon, and this very inexperience of theirs will cause five times more harm. In the second place, events themselves will teach them *in our spirit*. Events are already teaching everyone precisely in the *Vperyod* spirit.

Only you must be sure to organise, organise, and organise *hundreds* of circles, completely pushing into the background the customary, well-meant committee (hierarchical) stupidities. This is a time of war. Either you create *new*, young, fresh, energetic battle organisations everywhere for revolutionary Social-Democratic work of all varieties among all strata, or you will go under, wearing the aureole of “committee” bureaucrats.

I shall write of this in *Vperyod** and speak of it at the Congress. I am writing to you in one more *endeavour* to evoke

an exchange of ideas, to call upon you *to bring* a dozen *young, fresh* workers' (and other) circles *into direct contact* with the Editorial Board, although ... although between ourselves be it said, I do not cherish the slightest hope that these daring ideas will be fulfilled, unless, perhaps, two months from now you will ask me to wire whether I agree to such-and-such changes in the "plan".... I reply in advance that I agree to everything. Good-bye until the Congress.

Lenin

P.S. You must make it your aim to revolutionise the delivery of *Vperyod* into Russia. Carry on widespread propaganda for subscriptions from St. Petersburg. Let students and especially *workers* subscribe for scores and hundreds of copies to be sent to their own addresses. It is absurd to have fears on this score in times like these. The police can never intercept all the copies. Half the number or a third will arrive, and that amounts to very much. Suggest this idea to *any* youth circle, and it will find hundreds of ways of its own to make connections abroad. Distribute addresses more widely, as widely as possible, for the transmission of letters to *Vperyod*.

Published according to
the manuscript

TWO TACTICS

From the very beginning of the mass working-class movement in Russia, i.e., approximately for the past ten years, profound differences have existed among Social-Democrats on questions of tactics. As we know, it was differences of this kind that gave rise, in the late nineties, to the trend of Economism, which led to the split into an opportunist (*Rabocheye Dyelo*) wing and into a revolutionary (old-*Iskra*) wing of the Party. Russian Social-Democratic opportunism, however, differed from that of Western Europe in certain peculiar features. It strikingly reflected the point of view, or rather the absence of any independent point of view, of the intellectualist wing of the Party, which was carried away both by the current catchwords of Bernsteinism and by the forms and immediate results of the pure-and-simple labour movement. This infatuation led to wholesale treachery on the part of the legal Marxists, who went over to liberalism, and to the creation by Social-Democrats of the famous "tactics-as-process" theory, which firmly attached to our opportunists the label of "tail-enders". They trailed helplessly behind events, plunged from one extreme to another, and in all cases reduced the scope of activity of the revolutionary proletariat and its faith in its own strength, all of which was usually done on the pretext of raising the independent activity of the proletariat. Strange, but true. No one talked so much about the independent activity of the workers, and no one did so much by his propaganda to narrow, curtail, and diminish that activity as did the *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists.

"Talk less about 'raising the activity of the working masses'," the class-conscious, advanced workers said to their zealous but misguided advisers. "We are far more active than

you think, and we are quite able to support, by open street fighting, even demands that do not promise any 'tangible results' whatever. It is not for you to 'raise' our activity, because activity is precisely the thing you yourselves lack. Bow less in subservience to spontaneity, and think more about raising your own activity, gentlemen!" This is how the attitude of the revolutionary workers towards the opportunist intellectuals had to be characterised. (*What Is To Be Done?*, p. 55.)*)

The two steps back which the new *Iskra* took towards *Rabocheye Dyelo* revived this attitude. Once again the columns of *Iskra* pour forth the preachings of tail-ism under cover of the same nauseating vows: Verily, O Lord, I do profess and believe in the independent activity of the proletariat. It was in the name of the independent activity of the proletariat that Axelrod, Martynov, Martov, and Lieber (the Bundist) defended at the Congress the right of professors and students to become members of the Party without joining any Party organisation. It was in the name of the independent activity of the proletariat that the "organisation-as-process" theory was invented, a theory that justified disorganisation and glorified the anarchism of the intellectuals. It was in the name of the independent activity of the proletariat that the no less famous "higher-type-of-demonstration" theory was invented, in the form of an *agreement* between a workers' delegation, which had been passed through the sieve of a three-stage system of elections, and the *Zemstvo men* for a peaceful demonstration that was to create no panic fear. It was in the name of the independent activity of the proletariat that the idea of the armed uprising was perverted and vulgarised, debased and confused.

In view of its vast practical importance, we should like to draw the reader's attention to this question. The development of the working-class movement played a cruel joke on the wise men of the new *Iskra*. They circulated a letter in Russia, which, in the name of "the process of the systematic development of the class-consciousness and independent activity of the proletariat", recommended, as a higher type of demonstration, "that the workers' petitions be posted to

* See present edition, Vol. 5, p. 417.—Ed.

the homes of the municipal councillors and a considerable number of copies scattered in the Zemstvo Assembly Hall"; they sent a second letter to Russia, conveying the most sensational discovery that at the present "historical moment the political stage is fully occupied [!] by the conflict between the organised bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy" and that "every [mark well!] revolutionary movement of the lower strata has only one [!] objective meaning, to support the slogans of that one of the two [!!] forces which is interested in breaking down the present regime" (the democratic intelligentsia was declared to be "a force"); hardly had the first letter been circulated and the second letter reached Russia, hardly had the class-conscious workers had time to read these marvellous missives and to have a good laugh at them, when the events of the real struggle of the proletariat promptly swept all this political rubbish of the new-*Iskra* publicists on to the waste heap. The proletariat showed that there is a third *force* (actually, of course, not third, but, in sequence, second and in fighting ability first), which is not merely interested in breaking down the autocratic regime, but is *ready to start on the actual job of breaking it down*. Since the Ninth of January, the working-class movement *has been developing* before our very eyes into the popular uprising.

Let us see how this transition to the uprising was evaluated by the Social-Democrats, who had discussed it in advance as a question of tactics, and how the workers themselves began to settle this question in practice.

Three years ago the following was said on insurrection as a slogan that defines our immediate, practical tasks: "Picture to yourselves a popular uprising. Probably everyone will now agree that we must think of this uprising and prepare for it. But how? Surely the Central Committee cannot appoint agents to all localities for the purpose of preparing the uprising! Even if we had a Central Committee, it could achieve absolutely nothing by such appointments under present-day Russian conditions. But a network of agents that would form in the course of establishing and distributing the common newspaper would not have to 'sit about and wait' for the call to insurrection, but could carry on such regular activity as would guarantee the highest probability of success in the event of an insurrection. Such activ-

ity would strengthen our connections with the broadest masses of the workers and with all strata that are discontented with the autocracy, which is of such importance for an uprising. Precisely such activity would serve to cultivate the ability to estimate correctly the general political situation and, consequently, the ability to select the proper moment for the uprising. Precisely such activity would train *all* local organisations to respond simultaneously to the same political questions, incidents, and events that agitate the whole of Russia and to react to these 'incidents' in the most vigorous, uniform, and expedient manner possible; for the uprising is in essence the most vigorous, most uniform, and most expedient 'answer' of the entire people to the government. And lastly, it is precisely such activity that would train all revolutionary organisations throughout Russia to maintain the most continuous, and at the same time the most secret, contacts with one another, thus creating *real* Party unity; for without such contacts it will be impossible collectively to discuss the plan for the uprising and to take the necessary preparatory measures on the eve, measures that must be kept in the strictest secrecy.

"In a word, the 'plan for an all-Russian political newspaper', far from representing the fruits of the labour of arm-chair workers, infected with dogmatism and bookishness (as it seemed to those who gave but little thought to it), is the most practical plan *for immediate and all-round preparation of the uprising, with, at the same time, no loss of sight for a moment of the pressing day-to-day work.*" (*What Is To Be Done?**)

The concluding words, which we have underlined, give a clear answer to the question how the revolutionary Social-Democrats envisaged the work of preparing the uprising. But clear as this answer is, the old tail-ist tactics could not fail to assert themselves on this point also. Quite recently Martynov published a pamphlet entitled *Two Dictatorships*, which has been strongly recommended by the new *Iskra* (No. 84). The author is stirred to the depths of his *Rabocheye Dyelo* soul with indignation at the fact that Lenin could bring himself to speak of "preparing, *timing*, and

* See present edition, Vol. 5, p. 516.—Ed.

carrying out the general armed uprising of the people". The stern Martynov smites the enemy with the statement: "On the basis of historical experience and a scientific analysis of the dynamics of social forces, international Social-Democracy has always recognised that only palace revolutions and pronunciamientos can be *timed* in advance and carried out successfully according to a previously prepared plan, for the very reason that they are not popular revolutions, i.e., revolutions in social relations, but only reshufflings among the ruling cliques. Social-Democracy has always and everywhere recognised that a people's revolution cannot be *timed* in advance, that it is not prepared artificially, but that it comes about of itself."

Perhaps, having read this tirade, the reader will say that obviously Martynov is "anything but" a serious opponent and that it would be absurd to take him seriously. We would quite agree with the reader. We would even say to such a reader that no greater evil on earth could befall us than to have to take all the theories and all the arguments of our new-*Iskra* people seriously. The only trouble is that this nonsense appears also in the editorials of *Iskra* (No. 62). Worse still, there are people in the Party, by no means few, who stuff their heads with this nonsense. And so we have to discuss non-serious matters, just as we have to discuss the "theory" of Rosa Luxemburg, who discovered the "organisation-as-process". We are obliged to explain to Martynov that uprising must not be confused with people's revolution. We have to keep explaining that profound allusions to a revolution in social relations when what is at issue is the practical question of the ways of overthrowing Russian autocracy are worthy only of a Kifa Mokiyeovich." This revolution began in Russia with the abolition of serfdom, and it is the backwardness of our political superstructure as compared with the accomplished revolution in social relations that makes the collapse of the superstructure inevitable; an immediate collapse *as the result of a single blow* is quite possible, since "the people's revolution" in Russia has already dealt tsarism a hundred blows, and whether the hundred and first or the hundred and tenth will finish it off is really a matter of conjecture. Only opportunist intellectuals, who try to impute their own philistine ways to the proletarians, can

flaunt their high school knowledge of a "revolution in social relations" at a time when practical ways are being discussed for delivering one of the blows in the second hundred. Only the opportunists of the new *Iskra* can raise hysterical clamours about a sinister "Jacobin" plan, the keynote of which, as we have seen, is all-round mass agitation by means of a political newspaper.

A people's revolution, true, cannot be timed. We cannot but praise Martynov and the writer of the leader in *Iskra*, No. 62, for knowing this truth ("what thought of preparing the uprising can there possibly be in our Party?" asked Martynov's loyal associate, or disciple, in that article, warring on the "utopians"). But if we have really prepared an uprising, and if a popular uprising is realisable by virtue of the revolutions in social relations *that have already taken place*, then it is quite possible to time the uprising. We shall attempt to clarify the point for the new-*Iskra* followers by a simple example. Can the working-class movement be timed? No, it cannot; for that movement is made up of thousands of separate acts arising from a revolution in social relations. Can a strike be timed? It can, despite the fact—just imagine, Comrade Martynov—*despite* the fact that every strike is the result of a revolution in social relations. When can a strike be timed? When the organisation or group calling it has influence among the *masses* of the workers involved and is able correctly to gauge the moment when discontent and resentment among them are mounting. Do you see the point now, Comrade Martynov and Comrade "leader-ist" of *Iskra*, No. 62? If you do, then please take the trouble to compare an uprising with a people's revolution. "A people's revolution cannot be timed in advance." An uprising can be, if those preparing it have influence among the masses and can correctly estimate the situation.

Fortunately, the initiative of the advanced workers happens to be far ahead of the tail-ist philosophy of the new *Iskra*. While the latter is squeezing itself dry for theories to prove that an uprising cannot be timed by those who have prepared for it and have organised the vanguard of the revolutionary class, events show that those who have not prepared may time, indeed, are sometimes compelled to time, an uprising.

Here is a leaflet sent to us by a St. Petersburg comrade. It was set up, printed, and distributed in more than 10,000 copies by the workers themselves, who had seized a legal printing-press in St. Petersburg on January 10.

"Workers of All Countries, Unite!

"Citizens! Yesterday you witnessed the brutality of the autocratic government. You saw blood flowing in the streets. You saw hundreds of fighters for the working-class cause lying dead; you saw death, you heard the groans of wounded women and defenceless children. The blood and brains of workers bespattered the roadways that workers' hands had laid. Who directed the troops, the rifles, and the bullets against the workers' breasts?

"The tsar, the grand dukes, the Ministers, the generals, and the scoundrels at Court.

"They are the murderers! Death to them! To arms, comrades, seize the arsenals, the munitions depots, and armourers' shops. Break down the prison walls, comrades, and release the fighters for freedom. Smash up the gendarme and police stations and all government institutions. Let us overthrow the tsarist government and establish our own. Long live the revolution! Long live the Constituent Assembly of People's Representatives!

"Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party."

The call to insurrection issued by this handful of advanced enterprising workers did not meet with success. Several unsuccessful calls to insurrection, or several unsuccessful "timings" of insurrection would not surprise or discourage us. We leave it to the new *Iskra* to hold forth in this connection on the necessity of a "revolution in social relations" and grandiloquently to condemn the "utopianism" of the workers who exclaimed, "Let us establish our own government!" Only hopeless pedants or muddle-heads would regard this watchword as the central point of such an appeal. What is important for us to note and emphasise is the remarkably bold and practical manner in which the problem now squarely confronting us was posed.

The call of the St. Petersburg workers was not answered and could not have been answered as quickly as they wished. This call will be repeated time and again, and the attempts at an uprising may result in more failures. But the very fact

that the workers themselves have raised this issue is of tremendous significance. The gain which the working-class movement has made in bringing home the practical urgency of this problem and in moving it closer to the forefront of any popular unrest is a gain that nothing can take away from the proletariat.

As much as three years ago the Social-Democrats had on general grounds advanced the slogan of preparing the uprising. The independent activity of the proletariat arrived at the same slogan as a result of the direct lessons taught by the civil war. There are two kinds of independent activity. There is the independent activity of a proletariat possessed of revolutionary initiative, and there is the independent activity of a proletariat that is undeveloped and is held in leading-strings; there is a consciously Social-Democratic independent activity, and there is a Zubatovist independent activity. And there are Social-Democrats who to this day contemplate with reverence the second kind of independent activity, who believe that they can evade a direct reply to the pressing questions of the day by repeating the word "class" over and over again. We need but take No. 84 of *Iskra*. "Why," asks its "leader-ist", bearing down on us with a triumphant air, "why was it not the narrow organisation of professional revolutionaries, but the Workers' Assembly that set this avalanche in motion [January 9]? *Because this Assembly was a really [mark this!] broad organisation based on the independent activity of the working-class masses.*" If the author of this classical phrase were not an admirer of Martynov, he might have understood that the Assembly rendered a service to the movement of the revolutionary proletariat only when and to the extent that it passed from Zubatovist independent activity to Social-Democratic independent activity (after which it immediately ceased to exist as a legally functioning organisation).

Had the new-Iskrists, or the new-*Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists not been tail-enders, they would have realised that it was the Ninth of January that justified those who had said that "...in the long run the legalisation of the working-class movement will be to our advantage, and not to that of the Zubatovs" (*What Is To Be Done?**). It was the Ninth of January

* See present edition, Vol. 5, p. 455.—*Ed.*

that proved again and again the importance of the task formulated in that pamphlet: "...we must prepare reapers, both to cut down the tares of today [paralyse today's corrupting influence of the Zubatov movement] *and to reap the wheat of tomorrow*" (give a revolutionary lead to the movement that has advanced a step with the aid of legalisation). The Simple Simons of the new *Iskra*, however, use the bountiful wheat harvest as a pretext for minimising the importance of a strong organisation of revolutionary reapers.

It would be criminal, the new-*Iskra* leader-writer continues, "to attack the revolution in the rear". What this sentence means, God only knows. As to its bearing on the general opportunist complexion of *Iskra*, we shall probably deal with the point on another occasion. Here it will suffice to indicate that this sentence can have but one true political meaning, namely, that the author grovels in the dust before the rear of the revolution and disdainfully turns up his nose at the "narrow" and "Jacobin" van of the revolution.

The more the new *Iskra* displays its Martynovist zeal, the clearer becomes the contrast between the tactics of tailism and the tactics of revolutionary Social-Democracy. We pointed out in the first issue of *Vperyod** that an uprising must connect itself with one of the spontaneous movements. Consequently, we do not in the least forget the importance of "guarding the rear", to employ a military term. In *Vperyod*, No. 4,** we referred to the correct tactics of the St. Petersburg Committee members, who from the outset directed all their efforts towards supporting and developing the revolutionary elements in the spontaneous movement, while at the same time maintaining an attitude of reserve and distrust towards the shady, Zubatov rear of that movement. We shall conclude now with a piece of advice, which no doubt we shall have to repeat more than once to the new-Iskrists: Do not minimise the tasks of the revolution's vanguard, do not forget our obligation to support this vanguard by our *organised* independent activity. Use fewer

* See p. 28 of this volume.—*Ed.*

** See p. 106 of this volume.—*Ed.*

platitudes about the development of the independent activity of the workers—the workers display no end of independent revolutionary activity which you do not notice!—but see to it rather that you do not demoralise undeveloped workers by your own tail-ism.

Vperyod, No. 6,
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A MILITANT AGREEMENT FOR THE UPRISING

Revolutsionnaya Rossiya, No. 58, says: "May the spirit of fighting unity now at long last pervade the ranks of the revolutionary socialist groups, which are torn by fratricidal animosity, and may it revive the consciousness of socialist solidarity which has been so criminally sapped.... Let us spare the revolutionary forces as much as we can and increase their effectiveness by means of a concerted attack!"

We have often had occasion to protest against the tyranny of the phrase among the Socialists-Revolutionaries, and we must do so again. Why these frightful words, gentlemen, about "fratricidal animosity" and so forth? Are they worthy of a revolutionary? Now of all times, when the real fight is on, when blood is flowing—the blood of which *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* speaks in such flamboyant terms, these grotesque exaggerations about "fratricidal animosity" ring falser than ever. Spare the forces, say you? But surely this is done by a united, welded organisation which is at one on questions of principle, and not by lumping together heterogeneous elements. Strength is not spared but wasted by such barren attempts at lumping. To achieve a "fighting unity" in deed and not merely in word, we must know clearly, definitely, and *from experience* exactly wherein and to what extent we *can* be united. *Without* this, all talk of fighting unity will be mere words, words, words; *this* knowledge, incidentally, comes from the very controversy, struggle, and animosity of which you speak in such "frightful" terms. Would it really be better if we hushed up the differences that divide vast sections of Russian public opinion and Russian socialist thought? Was it only the "cult of discord" that provoked the bitter struggle between Narodism,

that nebulous ideology of the democratic bourgeoisie woven of socialistic dreams, and Marxism, the ideology of the proletariat? Nonsense, gentlemen; you only make yourselves ridiculous by saying such things, by continuing to regard as an "insult" the Marxist view that Narodism and your "social-revolutionism" are essentially bourgeois-democratic. We shall inevitably argue, differ, and quarrel also in the future revolutionary committees in Russia, but surely we must learn from history. We must not have unexpected, unintelligible, and muddled disputes at a time when action is called for; we must be prepared to argue on fundamental issues, to know the points of departure of each trend, to anticipate possible unity or possible antagonism. The history of revolutionary epochs provides many, all too many, instances of tremendous harm caused by hasty and half-baked experiments in "fighting unity" that sought to lump together the most heterogeneous elements in the committees of the revolutionary people, but managed thereby to achieve *mutual friction and bitter disappointment*.

We want to profit by this lesson of history. Marxism, which to you seems a narrow dogma, is to us the quintessence of this historical lesson and guidance. We see in the *independent*, uncompromisingly Marxist party of the revolutionary proletariat the sole pledge of socialism's victory and the road to victory that is most free from vacillations. We shall never, therefore, not even at the most revolutionary moments, forego the complete independence of the Social-Democratic Party or the complete intransigence of our ideology.

You believe this *rules out* fighting unity? You are mistaken. You can see from the resolution of our Second Congress that we do not renounce agreements for the struggle and in the struggle. In *Vperyod*, No. 4, we stressed the fact that the beginning of the revolution in Russia undoubtedly brings closer the moment when such agreements can be practically implemented.* A joint struggle of the revolutionary Social-Democrats and the revolutionary elements of the democratic movement is inevitable and indispensable in the era of the fall of the autocracy. We think that we should serve

* See pp. 99-100 of this volume.—Ed.

the cause of future militant agreements better if, instead of indulging in bitter recriminations, we sanely and coolly weighed the conditions under which they would become possible and the likely limits of their "jurisdiction", if one may use the term. We began this work in *Vperyod*, No. 3, in which we undertook a study of the progress of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party from Narodism to Marxism.*

"The masses took to arms themselves," *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* wrote in connection with the Ninth of January. "Sooner or later, without doubt, the question of arming the masses will be decided." "That is when the fusion between terrorism and the mass movement, to which we are striving by word and deed in accordance with the entire spirit of our Party tactics, will be manifested and realised in the most striking manner." (We would remark parenthetically that we would gladly put a question mark after the word "deed"; but let us proceed with the quotation.) "Not so long ago, before our own eyes, these two factors of the movement were separate, and this separateness deprived them of their full force."

What is true is true! Exactly! Intelligentsia terrorism and the mass movement of the working class *were separate, and this separateness deprived them of their full force*. That is precisely what the revolutionary Social-Democrats have been saying all along. For this very reason they have always been opposed to terrorism and to all the vacillations towards terrorism which members of the intellectualist wing of our Party have often displayed.** For this reason precisely the old *Iskra* took a position against terrorism when it wrote in issue No. 48: "The terrorist struggle of the *old type* was the riskiest form of revolutionary struggle, and those who engaged in it had the reputation of being resolute, self-sacrificing people.... Now, however, when demonstrations develop into acts of open resistance to the government, ... the old terrorism ceases to be an exceptionally daring method of struggle.... Heroism has now come out into the open; the

* See pp. 83-89 of this volume.—*Ed.*

** Krichevsky in *Rabocheye Dyelo*, No. 10. Martov and Zasulich concerning the shot fired by Lekert. The new-Iskrists generally in a leaflet in connection with the assassination of Plehve.⁵⁹

true heroes of our time are now the revolutionaries who lead the popular masses, which are rising against their oppressors.... The terrorism of the great French Revolution ... began on July 14, 1789, with the storming of the Bastille. Its strength was the strength of the revolutionary movement of the people.... *That* terrorism was due, not to disappointment in the strength of the mass movement, but, on the contrary, to unshakable faith in its strength.... The history of *that* terrorism is exceedingly instructive for the Russian revolutionary.”*

Yes, a thousand times yes! The history of *that* terrorism is instructive in the extreme. Instructive, too, are the quoted passages from *Iskra*, which refer to an epoch of eighteen months ago. These quotations show us, in their full stature, the ideas which even the Socialists-Revolutionaries, under the influence of the revolutionary lessons, would like to arrive at. They remind us of the importance of *faith* in the mass movement; they remind us of revolutionary tenacity, which comes only from high principles and which alone can safeguard us against the “disappointments” induced by a prolonged *apparent* standstill of the movement. Now, after the Ninth of January, there can be no question, on the face of it, of any “disappointments” in the mass movement. But only on the face of it. We should distinguish between the momentary “attraction” evoked by a striking display of mass heroism and the steadfast, reasoned convictions that link inseparably the entire activity of the Party with the movement of the masses, owing to the paramount importance which is attached to the principle of the class struggle. We should bear in mind that the revolutionary movement, however high its level since the Ninth of January, still has many stages to pass through before our socialist and democratic parties will be reconstructed on a new basis in a free Russia. And through all these stages, through all the vicissitudes of the struggle, we must maintain the ties between Social-Democracy and the class struggle of the prole-

* This article in *Iskra*, written by Plekhanov, dates back to the time when *Iskra* (Nos. 46-51) was edited by Plekhanov and Lenin. Plekhanov had at that time not begun to contemplate the new line of notorious compliance to opportunism.

tariat unbroken, and we must see to it that they are continuously strengthened and made more secure.

It seems to us, therefore, a gross exaggeration for *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* to assert that "the pioneers of the armed struggle were swallowed up in the ranks of the roused masses...." This is the desirable future rather than the reality of the moment. The assassination of Sergei in Moscow on February 17 (4),⁹⁰ which has been reported by telegraph this very day, is obviously an act of terrorism of the old type. The pioneers of the armed struggle have *not yet* been swallowed up in the ranks of the roused masses. Pioneers with bombs evidently lay in wait for Sergei in Moscow while the masses (in St. Petersburg), without pioneers, without arms, without revolutionary officers, and without a revolutionary staff "flung themselves in implacable fury upon bristling bayonets", as this same *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya* expresses it. The separateness of which we spoke above *still exists*, and the individual intellectualist terror shows all the more strikingly its inadequacy in face of the growing realisation that "the masses have risen to the stature of individual heroes, that mass heroism has been awakened in them" (*Revolutsionnaya Rossiya*, No. 58). The pioneers should submerge among the masses *in actual fact*, that is, exert their selfless energies in real inseparable connection with the insurgent masses, and proceed with them in the literal, not figurative, symbolical, sense of the word. That this is essential can hardly be open to doubt now. That it is possible has been proved by the Ninth of January and by the deep unrest which is still smouldering among the working-class masses. The fact that this is a new, higher, and more difficult task in comparison with the preceding ones cannot and should not stop us from meeting it at once in a practical way.

Fighting unity between the Social-Democratic Party and the revolutionary-democratic party—the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, might be one way of facilitating the solution of this problem. Such unity will be all the more practicable, the sooner the pioneers of the armed struggle are "swallowed up" in the ranks of the insurgent masses, the more firmly the Socialists-Revolutionaries follow the path which they themselves have charted in the words, "May

these beginnings of fusion between revolutionary terrorism and the mass movement grow and strengthen, may the masses act as quickly as possible, armed cap-à-pie with terrorist methods of struggle!" With a view to bringing about speedily such a fighting unity, we take pleasure in publishing the following letter which we have received from Georgi Gapon:

"An Open Letter to the Socialist Parties of Russia.

"The bloody January days in St. Petersburg and the rest of Russia have brought the oppressed working class face to face with the autocratic regime, headed by the blood-thirsty tsar. The great Russian revolution has begun. All to whom the people's freedom is really dear must either win or die. Realising the importance of the present historic moment, considering the present state of affairs, and being above all a revolutionary and a man of action, I call upon all the socialist parties of Russia to enter immediately into an agreement among themselves and to proceed to the armed uprising against tsarism. All the forces of every party should be mobilised. All should have a single technical plan of action. Bombs and dynamite, individual and mass terror—everything that can help the popular uprising. The immediate aim is the overthrow of the autocracy, a provisional revolutionary government which will at once amnesty all fighters for political and religious liberties, at once arm the people, and at once convoke a Constituent Assembly on the basis of universal, equal, and direct suffrage by secret ballot. To the task, comrades! Onward to the fight! Let us repeat the slogan of the St. Petersburg workers on the Ninth of January—Freedom or Death! Delay and disorder now are a crime against the people, whose interests you are defending. Having given all of myself to the service of the people, from whom I myself am sprung (the son of a peasant), and having thrown in my lot irrevocably with the struggle against the oppressors and exploiters of the working class, I shall naturally be heart and soul with those who will undertake the real business of actually liberating the proletariat and all the toiling masses from the capitalist yoke and political slavery.

"Georgi Gapon."

On our part, we consider it necessary to state our view of this letter as clearly and as definitely as possible. We consider that the "agreement" it proposes is possible, useful, and essential. We welcome the fact that Gapon speaks explicitly of an "agreement", since only through the preservation of complete independence by each separate party on points of principle and organisation can the efforts at a fighting unity of these parties rest on hope. We must be very careful, in making these endeavours, not to spoil things by vainly trying to lump together heterogeneous elements.

We shall inevitably have to *getrennt marschieren* (march separately), but we can *vereint schlagen* (strike together) more than once and particularly now. It would be desirable, from our point of view, to have this agreement embrace the *revolutionary* as well as the socialist parties, for there is nothing socialistic in the immediate aim of the struggle, and we must not confound or allow anyone ever to confound the immediate democratic aims with our ultimate aims of socialist revolution. It would be desirable, and from our point of view *essential*, for the agreement that, instead of a general call for "*individual* and mass terror", it should be stated openly and definitely that this joint action pursues the aim of a direct and actual *fusion* between terrorism and the uprising of the masses. True, by adding the words "everything that can help the popular uprising", Gapon clearly indicates his desire to make even individual terror subservient to this aim; but this desire, which suggests the idea that we noted in *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya*, No. 58, should be expressed more definitely and embodied in absolutely unequivocal practical decisions. We should like, finally, to point out, regardless of the realisability of the proposed agreement, that Gapon's extra-party stand seems to us to be another negative factor. Obviously, with so rapid a conversion from faith in the tsar and petitioning of the tsar to revolutionary aims, Gapon was not able to evolve for himself immediately a clear revolutionary outlook. This is inevitable, and the faster and broader the revolution develops, the more often will this kind of thing occur. Nevertheless, complete clarity and definiteness in the relations between parties, trends, and shades are absolutely necessary if a temporary agreement among them is to be in any way successful. Clarity and definiteness will be needed at every practical step; they will be the pre-condition for definiteness and the absence of vacillation in the real, *practical* work. The beginning of the revolution in Russia will probably lead to the emergence upon the political arena of many people and perhaps trends representing the view that the slogan "revolution" is, for "men of action", a quite adequate definition of their aims and their methods of operation. Nothing could be more fallacious than this opinion. The extra-party position, which seems higher, or more con-

venient, or more "diplomatic", is in actual fact *more vague*, more obscure, and inevitably fraught with inconsistencies and vacillations in practical activity. In the interests of the revolution our ideal should by no means be that all parties, all trends and shades of opinion fuse in a revolutionary chaos. On the contrary, the growth and spread of the revolutionary movement, its constantly deeper penetration among the various classes and strata of the people, will inevitably give rise (all to the good) to constantly newer trends and shades. Only full clarity and definiteness in their mutual relations and in their attitude towards the position of the revolutionary proletariat can guarantee maximum success for the revolutionary movement. Only full clarity in mutual relations can guarantee the success of an agreement to achieve a common immediate aim.

This immediate aim is *outlined* quite correctly, in our opinion, in Gapon's letter, namely: (1) the overthrow of the autocracy; (2) a provisional revolutionary government; (3) the immediate amnesty to all fighters for political and religious liberties, including, of course, the right to strike, etc.; (4) the immediate arming of the people; and (5) the immediate convocation of an All-Russian Constituent Assembly on the basis of universal, equal, and direct suffrage by secret ballot. The immediate translation into life by the revolutionary government of complete equality for all citizens and complete political freedom during elections is, of course, taken for granted by Gapon; but this might have been stated explicitly. It would be advisable also to include in the general policy of the provisional government the establishment everywhere of revolutionary peasant committees for the purpose of supporting the democratic revolution and putting into effect its various measures. The success of the revolution depends largely on the revolutionary activity of the peasantry itself, and the various socialist and revolutionary-democratic parties would probably agree on a slogan such as we have suggested.

It is to be hoped that Gapon, whose evolution from views shared by a politically unconscious people to revolutionary views proceeds from such profound personal experiences, will achieve the clear revolutionary outlook that is essential for a man of politics. It is to be hoped that

his appeal for a militant agreement for the uprising will meet with success, and that the revolutionary proletariat, side by side with the revolutionary democrats, will strike at the autocracy and overthrow it all the more quickly and surely, and with the least sacrifices.

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SHOULD WE ORGANISE THE REVOLUTION?

It happened a long, long time ago, more than a year ago. According to the testimony of the not unknown German Social-Democrat, Parvus, "fundamental differences" had arisen in the Russian Party. It had become the primary political task of the party of the proletariat to combat the extremes of centralism, the idea of "giving orders" to the workers from some obscure Geneva and the over-estimation of the idea of an organisation of agitators, of an organisation of leaders. Such was the deep, firm, and unshakable conviction of the Menshevik Parvus, expressed in his weekly German news-sheet *Aus der Weltpolitik* for November 30, 1903.

It was pointed out at the time to the estimable Parvus (see Lenin's letter to the editors of *Iskra*, December 1903*) that he was the victim of a piece of scandal-mongering, that what he took for fundamental differences were at bottom mere squabbles, and that the shift in the new *Iskra*'s ideas, which was becoming noticeable, was a shift towards opportunism. Parvus fell silent, but his "ideas" on over-estimating the importance of an organisation of leaders were taken up and worked to death by the new-Iskrists.

Fourteen months went by. The disruptive work of the Mensheviks within the Party and the opportunist nature of their propaganda became perfectly clear. January 9, 1905, fully revealed the vast reserve of revolutionary energy possessed by the proletariat, as well as the utter inadequacy of Social-Democratic organisation. Parvus came to his senses. He wrote an article in *Iskra*, No. 85, which, in fact, was a *volte-face* from the new ideas of the opportunist

new *Iskra* to the ideas of the revolutionary old *Iskra*. "There was a hero," Parvus exclaims, referring to Gapon, "but no political leader, no programme of action, no organisation.... The lack of organisation produced tragic results.... The masses are disunited, everything is without plan, there is no coalescing centre, no guiding programme of action..... The movement has declined for lack of a coalescing and guiding organisation." And Parvus proposes the slogan which we suggested in issue No. 6 of *Vperyod*—"Organise the Revolution!"* The lessons of the revolution have convinced Parvus that "under present political conditions we cannot organise the hundreds of thousands" (the reference is to the masses ready for revolt). "But," he says, repeating with good reason an idea expressed long ago in *What Is To Be Done?*, "we can create an organisation that would serve as a combining ferment, and, at the moment of revolution, rally the hundreds of thousands to its side. We must organise workers' circles which shall have a clearly defined task, namely, to prepare the masses for the uprising, to rally them to our side at the time of the uprising, and to launch the uprising when the slogan is issued."

At last! we exclaimed with relief, when we came across these old truths buried amid the rubbish of the new *Iskra*. At last the revolutionary instinct of a functionary of the proletarian party has prevailed, if only temporarily, over *Rabocheye Dyelo* opportunism. At last we hear the voice of a Social-Democrat who does not cringe before the revolution's rearguard but fearlessly points to the need for supporting the van of the revolution.

The new-Iskrists, of course, could not agree with Parvus. "We do not share all the views expressed by Comrade Parvus," says the editors' note.

We should say not! Catch them "sharing" views which hit out at all the opportunist nonsense they have been spewing for the last eighteen months!

"Organise the Revolution!" But have we not our wise Comrade Martynov, who knows that a revolution is caused by a complete change in social relations, that a revolution cannot be timed? Martynov will point out to Parvus

* See pp. 148-57 of this volume.—Ed.

his mistake and prove that even if the latter had in mind the organisation of the vanguard of the revolution, it is nevertheless a "narrow" and noxious "Jacobin" idea. Besides, our wise Martynov has a Tryapichkin⁶¹ on a string in the shape of Martov, who is capable of rendering his teacher more profound and who can well substitute the slogan "*Unleash the Revolution!*" for the slogan "Organise the Revolution!" (see No. 85; the author's italics).

Yes, dear reader, this is the slogan we are given in *Iskra's* leading article. These days, apparently, it is enough to "unleash" one's tongue for a free chatter-process, or for the process of chatter, in order to be able to write leading articles. The opportunist invariably requires slogans that, on closer scrutiny, are found to be nothing but high-sounding phrases, nothing but decadent word-jugglery.

"Organise, and again organise!" Parvus urges, for all the world as if he had turned Bolshevik. He does not understand, poor fellow, that organisation is a *process* (*Iskra*, No. 85, as well as all the previous numbers of the new *Iskra*, particularly the magnificent *feuilletons* of the magnificent Rosa). He does not know, poor devil, that according to the whole spirit of dialectical materialism, tactics are as much a process as organisation is. Like a "conspirator" he runs about with his organisation-as-plan. Like a "utopian", he imagines that one can simply up and organise the thing offhand at some, God forbid, Second or Third Congress.

The "Jacobin" Pillars of Hercules this Parvus talks himself up to! "To launch the uprising when the slogan is issued"—imagine that! It is even worse than the idea of "timing" the uprising, which has been exploded by our redoubtable Martynov. Really, Parvus ought to take a lesson or two from Martynov. He should read *Iskra*, No. 62; the leading article will tell him of the harmful "*utopian*" ideas about preparing the insurrection, which were spread so prematurely in our Party in 1902 and 1904. He should read Axelrod's foreword to "A Worker's" pamphlet to learn what "a deep-seated, harmful canker [*sic!*], downright destructive to the Party", Social-Democracy is threatened with on the part of people who "pin all their hopes on spontaneous revolts of the most backward, least class-conscious, and positively uncivilised [*!!*] elements of the masses".

Parvus admits that it is impossible at present to organise the hundreds of thousands, and he considers it our primary task "to create an organisation that would serve as a combining ferment". How can the new-Iskristis help squirming when such things appear in the columns of their paper? Obviously, an organisation that will serve as a combining ferment is simply an organisation of professional revolutionaries, at the mere mention of which our new-Iskristis go off into a swoon.

We are grateful indeed to *Iskra* for its leading article, which it has printed alongside Parvus's. How marked is the contrast between this empty, muddled phrase-mongering of the tail-ender and the clear, distinct, forthright, and bold revolutionary slogans of the old *Iskra*. Is it not sheer bombast to say that "the policy of confidence is quitting the stage *never again* to fool Russia or Europe"? As a matter of fact, any issue of a European bourgeois newspaper shows that this fooling is still being carried on with success. "Moderate Russian liberalism has been dealt its death-blow." It is childish political naïveté to believe liberalism dead when it is merely trying to be "politic" and to lie low. Liberalism is very much alive, it has taken on a new lease of life. Indeed, it is now on the threshold of power. The reason it is lying low is that it wants to make its bid for power at the right moment with the greatest certainty of success and the least risk. For this reason it is so assiduously making up to the working class. One must be hopelessly short-sighted to take this flirtation (a hundred times more dangerous for being practised at the moment) seriously and to declare boastfully that "the proletariat—the liberator of the country, the proletariat—the vanguard of the whole nation, has now had its *heroic role recognised* by the public opinion of the progressive elements of the liberal-democratic bourgeoisie." Gentlemen of the new *Iskra*, when will you understand that the liberal bourgeoisie acknowledges the proletariat as hero *for the very reason* that this proletariat, though dealing a blow at tsarism, is not yet strong enough, not yet Social-Democratic enough, to *win* for itself the kind of freedom *it* wants. When will you understand that what we must do is not to boast about the present bowing and scraping of the liberals, but to warn the proletariat

against it and show up what lies behind it. You do not see that? Then look at what the *industrialists, merchants, and stockbrokers are saying* about the necessity of a constitution. How plainly these declarations speak of the death of moderate liberalism! The liberal windbags prate about the heroism of the proletarians, while the industrialists weightily and imperiously demand a skimpy constitution—that is how matters stand, dear “leaders”!*

But nothing can compare with *Iskra's* arguments on the question of arming. “The work of arming the proletariat and systematically building up the organisation which shall guarantee that the people’s attack upon the government shall take place simultaneously everywhere” is declared to be a “technical” (!) job. And we, of course, are above such trivialities as technique, we go to the root of things. “Important though they are (the ‘technical’ jobs), *it is not upon them that our efforts should be concentrated* in preparing the masses for revolt.... All the efforts of the underground organisations will count for nothing if they fail to arm the people with the one indispensable weapon—*a sense of the burning necessity to attack the autocracy and to arm for the purpose.* It is *on propaganda among the masses to arm themselves for the purpose of revolt* that we should concentrate our efforts.” (The italics in the last two passages are the author’s.)

This is indeed a profound way of stating the issue, nothing like the narrow-minded Parvus, who almost reached the point of “Jacobinism”. The crux of the matter is not in the work of arming or in the systematic building up of the organisation, but in arming the people with a sense of the burning necessity to arm. What a painful feeling of

* The above lines had been written when we received from the liberal camp the following information, which is not without interest. The St. Petersburg special correspondent of the German bourgeois-democratic newspaper *Frankfurter Zeitung* (February 17, 1905) quotes a *liberal St. Petersburg journalist* on the political situation: “The liberals would be fools to let a moment like the present slip by. The liberals now hold all the trumps, for *they have succeeded in hitching the workers to their cart*, whereas the government has no one, since the bureaucracy does not give anyone a chance to get ahead.” What sublime simplicity must be reigning in the new *Iskra* for them to be writing about the death of liberalism at such a moment!

shame for Social-Democracy comes upon one at the sight of these philistine platitudes, which seek to drag our movement back! To arm the people with a sense of the burning necessity to arm is the constant, common duty of the Social-Democrats always and everywhere, and it can be applied equally to Japan as it can to England, to Germany as it can to Italy. Wherever there are oppressed classes struggling against exploitation, the doctrine of the socialists, from the very start, and in the first place, arms them with a sense of the burning necessity to arm, and this "*necessity*" is present when the labour movement *begins*. Social-Democracy has only to make this burning necessity a conscious one, to bring home to those who are conscious of it the need for organisation and planned action, the need for considering the whole political situation. Dear Editor of *Iskra*! Please drop in at any meeting of German workers and see the hatred towards, let us say, the police, that burns in the faces there; what bitter sarcasms and clenched fists you will hear and see there! What is the force that holds in check this burning necessity to mete out summary justice to the bourgeoisie and its servitors who ill-use the people? It is the force of organisation and discipline, the force of consciousness, the consciousness that individual acts of assassination are absurd, that the hour for the serious revolutionary struggle of the people has not yet struck, that the political situation is not ripe for it. That is why, under such circumstances, no socialist will ever bid the people arm, but he will always make it his duty (otherwise he is no socialist, but a mere windbag) to arm them with a sense of the burning necessity to arm and attack the enemy. However, the conditions in Russia today differ from these everyday conditions of work; therefore, the revolutionary Social-Democrats, who until now have never issued a call to arms but have always equipped the workers with a sense of the burning necessity to arm—therefore, the revolutionary Social-Democrats, following the initiative of the revolutionary workers, have *now* issued the slogan, *To arms*! At such a time, when this slogan has at last been issued, *Iskra* delivers itself of the statement that the main thing is not arming, but the burning necessity to arm. What is this but sterile intellectualist logic-chopping and hopeless Tryapichkin-ism? Are not these people dragging

the Party back, away from the pressing tasks of the revolutionary vanguard to the contemplation of the proletariat's "posterior"? This unbelievable vulgarisation of our tasks is due not to the individual qualities of one or other Tryapichkin, but to their entire position, which has been so inimitably formulated in the catchwords organisation-as-process and tactics-as-process. Such a position in itself necessarily condemns a man to fear all definite slogans, to shy at all "plans", to back away from bold revolutionary initiative, to philosophise and chew the cud, to be in fear of running too far ahead—and this at a time when we Social-Democrats are obviously lagging behind the proletariat in revolutionary activity. Truly the dead are clutching at the living; the dead theories of *Rabocheye Dyelo* lie like a dead hand upon the new *Iskra* too.

Let us consider *Iskra's* arguments regarding "the politically leading role of Social-Democracy as the vanguard of the class destined to emancipate the nation". "We can neither attain that role," we are told, "nor firmly establish our title to it even if we take over full control of the technical organisation and conduct of the uprising." Think of it! We cannot attain the role of vanguard even if we succeed in taking full control of the conduct of the uprising! And these people presume to speak of vanguard! They *fear* history will impose upon them the leading role in the democratic revolution, and they are *terrified* at the thought of having "to conduct the uprising". The thought lurks at the back of their minds—only they do not yet dare to voice it outright in the columns of *Iskra*—that the Social-Democratic organisation *must not* "conduct the uprising", that it must not strive to take full control over the revolutionary transition to the democratic republic. They scent in this, these incorrigible Girondists of socialism, monstrous Jacobinism.⁶² They do not understand that the harder we strive to take full control of the conduct of the uprising, the greater will our share in the undertaking be, and that the greater this share is, the less will the influence of the anti-proletarian or non-proletarian democrats be. They are determined to be at the tail-end; they have even invented a philosophy of their own to prove that the tail-end is the right place for them. Martynov has actually begun to expound this philos-

ophy, and tomorrow, no doubt, he will dot the *i*'s in the columns of *Iskra*.

Let us try to follow the argument step by step:

"The class-conscious proletariat, governed by the logic of the spontaneous process of historical development, will utilise for its own purposes all the elements of organisation, all the elements of ferment which the eve of the revolution creates...."

Fine! But to utilise *all* elements means to assume *full* leadership. *Iskra* defeats its own purpose and, realising this, hastens to add:

"...wholly undismayed by the fact that all these elements rob it of a share in the technical leadership of the revolution itself and thus involuntarily help to carry our demands to the most backward sections of the masses."

Can you make anything of this, dear reader? To utilise *all* elements, *undismayed* by the fact that they rob us of a share in the *leadership*?! But, hold on, gentlemen, if *we* really utilise all elements, if it is really *our* demands that are adopted by those we utilise, then they do not *rob* us of the leadership, but *accept* our leadership. If, on the other hand, *all* these elements really rob us of the leadership (and of course not only "technical" leadership, because to separate the "technical" side of a revolution from its political side is sheer nonsense), then it is not we who utilise them, but they us.

"We should be only too glad if, following the priest who popularised among the masses our demand for the separation of the Church from the State, if, following the monarchist workers' society which arranged the popular procession to the Winter Palace, the Russian revolution would find itself the richer by a general, who would be the first to lead the masses in the last fight against the tsar's troops, or by a government official who would be the first to proclaim the formal overthrow of the rule of the tsars."

Yes, we too should be glad of it, but we should not want a feeling of joy over pleasant *prospects* to overshadow our sense of logic. What is meant by the *Russian revolution* finding itself the richer by a priest or a general? What is meant is that the priest or the general will become an adher-

ent or leader of the revolution. These "tyros" may be fully or not quite fully conscious adherents of the revolution. In the latter event (which is the more probable with tyros) we must deplore, not welcome, their lack of consciousness and *do our utmost to cure and fill this lack*. As long as we leave this undone, as long as the masses follow a leader who is lacking in consciousness, we have to admit that it is not the Social-Democrats who utilise these elements, but vice versa. Yesterday's priest, general, or government official who becomes an adherent of the revolution, may be a prejudice-ridden bourgeois democrat, and insofar as the workers will follow *him* the bourgeois democrats will be "utilising" the workers. Is this clear to you, gentlemen of the new *Iskra*? If it is, then why do you *fear* the assumption of leadership by the fully conscious (*that is*, Social-Democratic) adherents of the revolution? Why do you fear lest a Social-Democratic officer (I purposely select an analogous example) and member of the Social-Democratic organisation assume, "completely take over", the functions and tasks of your hypothetical general at the initiative and on the instructions of that organisation?

To return to Parvus. He concludes his excellent article with the excellent advice to get rid of the disorganisers by "throwing them overboard". To get rid of the disorganisers is, as the items in our Party News column show," the most impassioned and emphatic slogan of the majority of the Russian Social-Democrats. Precisely, Comrade Parvus, they must be "thrown overboard" in the most ruthless fashion, and the throwing must start with those heroes of the Social-Democratic press who have been sanctioning disruption by their organisation-as-process and organisation-as-tendency "theories". The thing is not merely to talk of it, but to *do* it. We must convene immediately a congress of all Party workers who wish to organise the Party. We must not confine ourselves to persuasion and to appeals, but must put a direct and inexorable ultimatum to all who hesitate, to all who waver, vacillate, and doubt: "Make your choice!" From the first issue of our newspaper we have sounded that ultimatum on behalf of the Editorial Board of *Vperyod*, on behalf of the mass of Russian Party workers who have been driven to intense exasperation by the

disorganisers. Make haste, then, and throw them overboard, comrades, and let us settle down to the work of organisation with a hearty good will. Better a hundred revolutionary Social-Democrats who have accepted organisation-as-plan than a thousand intellectuals of the Tryapichkin tribe who prattle about organisation-as-process.

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THE CONVENING OF THE THIRD PARTY CONGRESS

The Editorial Board of *Vperyod* can only state that it is completely in sympathy with the initiative of the Russian Bureau. At last an energetic step has been made towards a way out of the situation created by the Bonapartists abroad," and a way out along *Party* lines! In our Party News column we publish reports showing the alacrity with which the committees are responding to the call issued by the Bureau. May their example be followed by *each* and *every* group and organisation, as well as by individuals who consider themselves members of the R.S.D.L.P. or who at least stand close to it in their views and sympathies. The Third Congress is the *first* to be convened under conditions whereby its composition (as set forth in the Party Rules), its proceedings, and the basis of participation are known beforehand. Let all comrades then make the most of these conditions! Let them not forget that our Party Rules guarantee to everybody an opportunity to appeal to the Congress. (See Clause 10: "Every Party member, as well as *any person having any dealings with the Party*, has the right to demand that any statement he may submit to the Central Committee, to the Editorial Board of the Central Organ, or to a *Party Congress* be delivered in the original.") Let everyone take advantage of this opportunity *immediately*. The Editorial Board of *Vperyod* undertakes to deliver such statements to the Russian Bureau, which has now been constituted as the Organising Committee of the Congress. The right to vote at the Congress is restricted to representatives of committees and of other qualified Party organisations as defined by the Rules. But the Congress itself may extend to everyone the right of

participation with *consultative* voice, while the Organising Committee may grant this right to delegates from Party organisations not possessing full-rights status. (Clause 3, Note 2, of the Party Rules: "The Central Committee is authorised to invite to a congress, with consultative voice, delegates from organisations which do not fulfil the conditions stipulated in Note 1," viz., organisations whose qualification has not been confirmed a year prior to the Congress.

It goes without saying that when the Organising Committee is instructed by the majority of the committees to convene a congress against the will of the Bonapartist Central Committee and Council, it takes over all the rights of the C. C. with regard to such convocation.)

The Editorial Board of *Vperyod* proposes to the Congress the following tentative *agenda*: (1) Constitution of the Congress (standing orders, report of the Organising Committee, examination of credentials). (2) Delegates' reports. (3) The Party crisis.* (4) Organisational question. (5) Attitude towards insurrection. (6) Agreement with the revolutionary democrats for purposes of the insurrection. (7) Attitude towards the liberals. (8) Work among the peasantry and support of the revolutionary peasant movement. (9) Work among the troops. (10) Improvement of propaganda and agitation. (11) Election of officers.

The active participation of all Party members in drafting and preparing reports and resolutions on these and other major questions (as well as in the collection of material for reports) is absolutely essential for the success of the Congress. We call upon all adherents of the Party principle to start on this work *at once*. *Everyone* who has been involved in one way or other in the trials and tribulations of the Party crisis can help the Congress by a brief statement of his experiences and his view of the way out. *Everyone* who has worked in any Party or Party-connected organisation can give

* Bebel wrote to Lenin offering his services as arbitrator between the supporters of *Iskra* and the supporters of *Vperyod*. Lenin replied that neither he nor any other *Vperyod* supporters within his knowledge had the right to take any action binding upon the whole Party, and that Bebel's proposal would, therefore, have to be submitted to the Party Congress that was being called by the Russian Bureau. We think the Congress could include this proposal in the item "Party crisis".

invaluable information, based on personal experience, for solving various aspects of the organisational question. (The contributions might cover such points as time and place of the activity; membership of the particular organisation—number of workers and number of intellectuals; the relations between them; whether written rules are needed, and which; whether there should be any fixed rules—and if so, to what extent—governing the limits of autonomy and of the division of labour of the groups belonging to the Party or connected with it, co-optation and expulsion of members; the elective principle; the attitude of the committees to the groups of propagandists, agitators, and organisers, to the district circles and factory circles, to the publicists' committees, technical committees, etc., etc.)

The *Vperyod* Editorial Board has already received some material on work among the peasants and the soldiers. We know of one group which is working systematically on a summary of the experience acquired by its members in the field of propaganda, agitation, and organisation, and is preparing a report for the Congress. We have been promised the report of a comrade who helped to organise *hundreds* of workers for armed resistance in the event of an anti-jewish pogrom in a certain large city, and a report on the question of street fighting from another comrade who has made a study of military science. It is of the highest importance that the greatest possible number of comrades undertake such and similar work *at once*.

The Party crisis has been clarified in our literature down to the minutest detail. The discussion of this question cannot and should not take up much time. The keynote of the Congress should be the *new questions* of organisation and tactics, which are being brought to the fore by the new gigantic upswing in our revolutionary movement. In the solution of these questions the collective experience of *all* Social-Democrats who have been in any way active in the movement will be of inestimable value. But we must gather this experience as soon as possible and make it available for discussion at the Congress.

To work, then, comrades! Let everyone who has the interests of the Social-Democratic working-class movement at heart bestir himself at once to give the Congress his active

aid. Then the Party will quickly emerge from this period of temporary abasement and enfeeblement on to the path of most active participation in the great Russian revolution, the path leading to victory over the accursed enemy of the Russian people!

Vperyod, No. 8,
February 28 (15), 1905

Published according to
the text in *Vperyod*

FROM THE NEW-ISKRA CAMP

In the leading article of *Iskra*, No. 87, Plekhanov, deferring suavely to Martov, successfully applies the tactics of *killing with kindness**. Though playing up to the author of the leading article in issue No. 85, Plekhanov, *in substance, wholly refutes him* and subscribes to the very views which *Vperyod* has always maintained. Congratulations! Only bear in mind your kinship with Martynov, most honourable dialectician. Get him to tell you about the awful and disastrous fate that lies in store for you, if, upon having "*prepared the victory*" (slogan in issue No. 87), you achieved it! Get him to tell you of the grave danger involved in "the seizure of power", in "participation in the provisional government", and in "the revolutionary dictatorship". Poor Plekhanov, it will take him a long time to extricate himself from the mess in which the pamphlets of Trotsky, Martynov, "A Worker", and Axelrod, approved by the entire (?) Editorial Board have entangled him! In the supplement to *Iskra*, No. 86, Popov *admits to being the author of the letter published in Lenin's "Statement"*. Which but needed proof! The systematic deception of the Party by the gentlemen of the Minority has been proved. As we predicted, these gentlemen are trying to get out of it by drawing a red herring across the reader's track in the form of the question whether Lenin had the right to confiscate a letter that exposed the Bonapartists. Martov and Popov, so distinguished for their moral sensitivity, are yelling about theft, spying, and so on. Scold away, gentlemen, to your hearts' content. Lacking arguments, what else is left for you to do?

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* The words "kill with kindness" are in English in the original.—*Ed.*

A LETTER TO THE ORGANISATIONS IN RUSSIA

February 28, 1905

Dear Comrades,

We have just received the news that St. Petersburg, Tula, Moscow, the North, Nizhni-Novgorod, the Caucasus, and Odessa have declared for the Congress, and other places will, of course, follow suit. The Central Committee is said to have gone on record for the Congress. Naturally, no one will believe the C.C. now. Everyone says it may as well come to the Congress, since everyone has been invited, but it is the Bureau and the Bureau alone that is convening the Congress. There is hardly any need to ask why there is not a grain of confidence left in the C.C. (even the few completely isolated voices raised in its favour were immediately retracted). Everybody understands that the C.C. is only deceiving people and playing the diplomat.

It is extremely important that preparations for the Congress be started immediately and that zealous efforts be made to enlist the co-operation of all circles, including district, propaganda, and factory circles, in short, all, especially workers', circles. We speak of this also in *Vperyod*, No. 8,* (out today). It would be very useful to have workers attend the Congress. (In our opinion admittance on a consultative voice basis should be accorded as liberally as possible. Thus, it is only a question of funds. Spread your agitation wider. We are convinced that it is possible to find workers who will collect from 150 to 200 rubles to cover the expenses of a delegate; special donors for the same purpose can also be

* See pp.177-80 of this volume.—Ed.

found among the intellectuals.) Important questions will be discussed at the Congress: organisation, the attitude towards the periphery organisations, the insurrection, arming of the workers (installation of dynamite workshops), agreement with the Socialists-Revolutionaries for an uprising, support of the revolutionary peasant movement, and many other issues. Reports on work among the troops and the peasantry are of the utmost importance. Make the widest possible use of contacts with officers, students, and so on for the Congress. The Congress will be asked to substitute Lenin's formulation of Clause 1 of the Rules for Martov's, and to extend the rights of *Party* and *Party-connected* organisations. This will cover many elements of revolutionary democracy. Let each and every one prepare most actively for the Congress.

Hearty greetings,
Lenin

St. Petersburg has begun to send us copies of the minutes of workers' meetings held in various districts. An example worth imitating. It is our earnest request that the workers themselves write, and keep on writing, to *Vperyod*.

Published according to
the manuscript

GENERAL PLAN OF THE THIRD CONGRESS DECISIONS

Resolutions:

1. (a) Real object of the Minority: composition of the centres.
(b) Non-compliance with Congress decisions.
(c) Split before the League Congress: formation of a secret organisation.
(d) Dishonesty of this act and all resultant disorganisation.
(e) The shame of trying to justify disruptive activities by theories concerning organisation-as-process, organisation-as-tendency, by hypocritical cries about bureaucratism, formalism, etc.
(f) Enormous harm done to the constructive work in Russia by their disorganisation.
(g) Necessity of complete dissociation from the disorganisers.
(h) Authorisation to the centres to issue a pamphlet briefly setting forth the causes and the history of the split, and notification to international Social-Democracy.
2. (a) It is necessary to have expressions of opinion on the so-called conciliationist tendency.
(b) Its only honest non-hypocritical representative was Plekhanov, when he wrote No. 52 of *Iskra*.
(c) Congress acknowledges the correctness of Plekhanov's stand at the Second Congress of the Party and at the Congress of the League, and the sincerity of his desire for peace through co-optation.
(d) Unfortunately, Plekhanov failed to maintain his position on concessions towards the revisionists and individualist anarchists; the attempts on his part at justification *in principle* are obviously wrong and are only likely to create confusion in people's minds and introduce an element of artfulness in inner-Party relations.

(e) The so-called conciliators are nothing but hypocritical Mensheviks. No *independent* platform of conciliation exists other than Plekhanov's, and that, too, he has now rejected (personal concessions, but *disputes* on points of principle with the revisionists and anarcho-individualists).

3. (a) The Congress recognises differences on points of principle between our position and that of the new-Iskrists.

(b) The new-Iskrists' utter instability on points of principle goes back to the Second Congress, where they first wholly opposed the opportunist wing and ended up (albeit against their own will and consciousness) by turning towards it.

(c) After the Second Congress the opportunist tendency became still more pronounced; in the organisation itself systematic petty betrayals were justified. The blunting of such a weapon of the proletarian class struggle as organisation. Distortion of Marxism to the extent of justifying and extolling disorganisation and intellectualist anarchism.

(d) In regard to questions of the general line of its policy, *Iskra* should have admitted the "gulf between the new *Iskra* and the old *Iskra*". A shift towards tail-ism.

(e) In tactics this was expressed in the attitude towards the liberals. The Zemstvo campaign.

(f) " " " " " " " " towards the insurrection.

(g) " " " " " " " " Attempts to drag back and confuse. towards arming.

(h) " " " " " " " " towards demoralisation of the backward workers with the slogan "independent activity of the workers", etc.

(i) On the whole, the new-Iskrists=an opportunist wing of the Party.

Basically ill-assorted elements in their camp.

{ Organisation-as-process Party and class Liberals and Zemstvo campaign Insurrection Arming Revolutionary dicta- torship	}	Instability on questions of principle (Second Congress).
		Shift towards opportunist <i>Rabocheye Dyelo</i> (a gulf).
		Their approval by party-fringe intellectuals and open opportunists <i>à la</i> Struve.
		Necessity of struggle for the line of the old <i>Iskra</i> .

4. (a) Insincere nature of the cries about a party of the intelligentsia. Utilised by the liberals. New-Iskrists themselves have disavowed it.

(b) Demagogic nature of propaganda among the workers. The "elective principle", its necessity under *free* political conditions, its impossibility on a *wide* scale in Russia.

(c) Empty words about "independent activity of the workers" serving as a screen for tail-ism; they promise organisationally *the impossible*, use cheap methods to decry "bureaucratism", "formalism", etc., but give nothing; they fail to notice the *revolutionary* independent activity of the workers and hang about the lowest and most backward strata of the movement.

(d) Warn the workers. Class-conscious workers should know and bear in mind the analogous methods of the *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists; they should know and bear in mind the position of the old *Iskra*, namely, the importance for the working-class masses to advance from their midst class-conscious, Social-Democratic workers, worker-revolutionaries, our Bebels, and the necessity to *organise* every district, every factory, etc.

(e) Only the full consciousness of the advanced workers, the complete elimination of all distinctions between intellectuals and workers within Social-Democracy, can guarantee a *Social-Democratic* class party of the proletariat.

5. (a) Necessity of immediately preparing for the uprising.

(b) " " creating an organisation or organisations of a fighting character.

+7. (c) Necessity of increasing the number of organisations generally: organising the revolution.

(d) Terrorism must be merged in actual practice with the movement of the masses.

(e) Aim of the insurrection: provisional revolutionary government, arming of the people, Constituent Assembly, revolutionary peasant committees.

(f) Tasks of Social-Democrats in wielding power: full implementation of the whole democratic programme, independent organisation and organisations of the working class, the striving to develop the revolutionary independent activity of the proletariat and the rural poor, steadfast safeguarding of the class programme and point of view, and a critical attitude towards the illusions of revolutionary democracy.

or 7: { (g) These (preceding) conditions determine also the militant agreement between Social-Democracy and revolutionary democracy for the insurrection.
(h) By revolutionary democracy is meant the consistent and firm democratic currents that accept the *whole* democratic programme of Social-Democracy, do not hold back from any revolutionary measures, but lack the clear Social-Democratic classconsciousness.

9. (a) Starover's resolution¹⁵ is wrong in principle: the crux of the matter is not in declarations but in struggle, in the common struggle.

(b) The declarations and slogans of the liberals and liberal democrats do not inspire confidence (Struve).

(c) The arbitrary and false interpretation of these groups as democratic intelligentsia. Agreement with a *force*, but the intelligentsia is not a force. Starover has this muddled.

(d) On the order of the day an agreement not on the condition of declarations, but on the condition of *participation* in the uprising, not with the liberal democrats, but with the *revolutionary* democrats.

10. (a) Agreement with the Zemstvo men violates even the conditions of Starover's resolution.

(b) As to not frightening the liberals, that is irrelevant and inopportune. Impossibility of justifying this by the danger of anarchism.

(c) The reactionary meaning of the slogans about "a higher type of demonstrations".

(d) The impressionist opportunism of the new *Iskra*.

(e) Abuse of words about "class independent activity" and systematic development of the class.

(f) To publish their first letter for the edification of the young Party members.

N.B.:

11. (a) Most important at the present time: together with the peasant bourgeoisie against the landlords,

(b) to stress the democratic aspects, together with the rural proletariat against the bourgeoisie.

(c) not to overlook for a single moment the *socialist* (the *entire* socialist) programme,

(d) to maintain steadfastly the standpoint of the proletariat generally and of the *rural proletariat* in particular.

12. { (e) To support the *revolutionary* movement of both the rural proletariat and the peasant bourgeoisie against the landlords, down to the complete expropriation of the landlords' lands, without, however, in any way indulging the illusions of petty-bourgeois socialism by action or inaction, but struggling vigorously against monarchist and Caesarist speculations on the reactionary elements of the peasant bourgeoisie.

13. (a) Importance of work among the soldiers:

(b) Leaflets.

(c) Military organisation, its elements? Special military organisation may be useful *je nachdem*.*

(d)**

14. (a) To take the *programme* as a basis....

(b) Travelling groups.

(c) Lectures and agitational speeches.

* Depending on circumstances.—*Ed.*

** Point "d" was not written. Paragraph 13 has a question mark across it.—*Ed.*

* * *

In the basic resolution against the new-Iskrists it is important to note the following:

(a) The negation or belittlement of the idea of a strong organisation of the class-conscious proletariat and its vanguard, the Social-Democratic Labour Party, tends to convert the working-class movement into the tailpiece of the bourgeois-democratic movement.

(b) This is the end-result of the demagogic belittlement of the role of the class-conscious Social-Democratic influence on the spontaneous movement of the proletariat and the theoretical vulgarisation of Marxism through an interpretation that acts as a drag on revolutionary initiative and the progressive tasks of Social-Democracy.

This is the end-result, too, of the idea of contraposing the technical and the political leadership of the revolution and—
and—*

Written in February 1905

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in *Lenin Miscellany V*

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the manuscript

* At this point the manuscript breaks off.—*Ed.*

**DRAFT RESOLUTIONS
FOR THE THIRD CONGRESS
OF THE R.S.D.L.P.**

Written in February 1905

**Published according to
the manuscript**

RESOLUTION ON THE DISRUPTIVE BEHAVIOUR OF THE MENSHEVIKS, OR NEW-ISKRISTS

The Congress deems it necessary to place definitely on record the conclusively proved facts concerning the behaviour of the Mensheviks, or new-Iskrists, after the Second Party Congress. Without even attempting to question the validity of the decisions adopted by, and the elections held at, this Congress, they have shamelessly flouted its decisions. Immediately after the Congress they boycotted the central bodies it set up, and formed within the Party, and behind its back, a separate organisation. The aim of this organisation was to foist on the Editorial Board of the Central Organ and on the Central Committee of the Party the six candidates who had been turned down by the Congress. To attain this end, in opposition to the will and the interests of the Party, the Mensheviks everywhere disorganised the Party's constructive work. Everywhere they secretly split the Party and demoralised the comradely relations among the Social-Democrats; they turned the Central Organ of the Party into an organ of gossip and squabbles, heaping vulgar abuse on the Party committees that had elected the central bodies and demanded from them an accounting; they reduced the Party Council to a mere instrument of factional feuds and had no scruples about falsifying the voice of the Party which demanded the Third Congress.

The Congress most emphatically condemns this disruptive conduct and warns all Party-conscious Social-Democrats against the notorious organisation-as-process theory which has been used to justify disorganisation and which has debased the theory of revolutionary Marxism in an unheard-of manner.

The Congress affirms that the adherents of the Party Majority, in drawing up resolutions against the disorganisers and in demanding the Third Congress, have exhausted all the resources of honest, comradely struggle against fellow-members of the Party. Now that the centres set up by the Party have definitely cast off all responsibility to the Party, the Congress is compelled to consider them beyond the pale of the Party. The Congress declares that adherents of the Party principle have no alternative but to work separately from, and independently of, these disorganisers. The Congress therefore resolves that followers of the Minority, or new-Iskristists, may not be admitted to membership in any organisation of our Party.

The Congress instructs the Central Committee of the Party to issue a small pamphlet in explanation of this resolution, for the information of Russian and international Social-Democracy.

2

RESOLUTION ON PLEKHANOV'S CONDUCT DURING THE PARTY CRISIS

The Congress admits the correctness of Plekhanov's position at the Second Party Congress and at the Congress of the League Abroad on the questions of programme, tactics, and organisation. The Congress acknowledges that after the League Congress Plekhanov, in order to restore peace within the Party and heal the split caused by the Mensheviks, proposed a policy of concessions to people whom he had aptly characterised before the whole Party as revisionists and anarcho-individualists (*Iskra*, No. 52, November 7, 1903). The Congress expresses deep regret that Plekhanov did not maintain this position; that, against the will of the Party, he began to apply the most shameless methods to secure satisfaction of all the demands of the Mensheviks; that, to justify the Mensheviks, he lowered himself to the point of defending their stand, which he himself had declared to be incorrect in principle, and of inventing the most fantastic differences with the Party Majority.

The Congress emphatically condemns such crafty practices in dealing with fellow-members of the Party; for such a pol-

icy, no matter by what humane motives in respect to certain individuals it may be prompted, cannot but have a demoralising effect on the Party.

3

RESOLUTION ON THE THEORETICAL POSITION
OF THE NEW-ISKRISTS

• The Congress considers it of imperative necessity to combat the theoretical position of the Mensheviks, or new-Iskrists, who have deviated from revolutionary Social-Democracy towards opportunism. This had become evident at the Second Congress of the Party, from certain lines of argument, as well as from the very membership of the Minority, composed as it was of the opponents of the old *Iskra* and the elements least stable in point of principle. After the Second Congress this shift of the Mensheviks towards *Rabocheye Dyelo* opportunism became so obvious that they themselves admitted the existence of a gulf between the old *Iskra* and the new *Iskra*. Indeed, on several questions the new *Iskra* has put forward slogans and theories which are definitely false and which obscure the class-consciousness of the proletariat. One such is the organisation-as-process theory, which reduces Marxism to an apologia for disorganisation and intellectualist anarchism. Another is the reversion to the false ideas concerning the relation of Party to class, which lower the tasks of the Party as vanguard, leader, and organiser of the class. Equally erroneous and reactionary were the points advanced by the new *Iskra*, in disagreement with the old *Iskra*, on such questions as the attitude towards the liberals and the plans for a Zemstvo campaign, on the preparation of the uprising and the alleged utopianism of the ideas of timing and carrying through the uprising, on the arming of the masses and their technical and organisational leadership in time of revolution, on the impossibility and undesirability of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie in the period of the overthrow of the autocracy, etc. The views expressed on these questions tend to set the Party back, not only in the field of theory, but in actual practice, and they are particularly harmful and disastrous to the Party of the revolutionary proletariat in the present revolutionary situation prevailing in

Russia. The Congress therefore instructs all Party members to explain the falseness of these views in their agitation and propaganda.

4

RESOLUTION ON THE RELATIONS BETWEEN WORKERS
AND INTELLECTUALS IN THE SOCIAL-
DEMOCRATIC PARTY

The Congress strongly condemns the policy pursued by the new-Iskrists of sowing distrust and animosity between workers and intellectuals within the Social-Democratic organisations. The Congress reminds all class-conscious workers that a few years ago similar methods of struggle were used by the *Rabocheye Dyelo* wing of the Party and that at that time they repudiated such methods. The empty phrases thrown about by the new-Iskrists concerning the independent activity of the workers and the elective principle are not accompanied by any real improvement in the work of our organisations and they demagogically promise the unattainable. Under conditions of political freedom, our Party can and will be built entirely on the elective principle. Under the autocracy this is impracticable for the collective thousands of workers that make up the Party.

The Congress once more calls attention to the task of the consistent adherents of the Social-Democratic Labour Party, namely, to strengthen with all their might the ties between this Party and the masses of the working class, by raising ever broader masses of proletarians and semi-proletarians to full Social-Democratic consciousness, by stimulating their revolutionary and Social-Democratic initiative, and by taking care that the working-class masses advance from their own midst the maximum number of workers fully capable of leading the movement and all the Party organisations.

The Congress, on behalf of the Party, repeats the advice of the revolutionary Social-Democrats: to form as many workers' organisations belonging to our Party as possible; to strive to bring those workers' organisations that do not wish to enter the Party, or have no opportunity for so doing, at least into association with the Party; and to make efforts to get the greatest possible number of class-conscious Social-Democratic workers on the Party committees.

MODIFICATION OF THE CLAUSE IN THE RULES CONCERNING THE CENTRES

A good many of the comrades working in Russia, including the Bureau of Committees of the Majority, are going on record for a *single centre in Russia*.

What would such a reform actually mean? The idea unmistakably implied in this tendency is that comrades active in Russia should predominate in the one centre. Its realisation depends entirely upon the will of the Congress, which will elect the members of the centre. Consequently, there is nothing to discuss or to talk about on this point.

But, to go further, what will be the relation of the Central Organ to the Central Committee? The Central Organ, we are told, is to be a commission appointed by the C.C. One (or two) members of the Editorial Board of the Central Organ may (say these comrades) sit on the C.C. as part of it, a *minor* part. There arises the question in what way this foreign section of the C.C. will participate in its work. The idea that real *participation* in the work of the C.C. can be achieved "by correspondence" is obviously utopian and could not be suggested seriously. It is only with great difficulty, at the cost of tremendous effort, trouble, quarrelling, and vexation, that those working abroad can obtain the scantiest information *post factum*, so that one can only speak of "taking part in deciding things" from abroad through sheer hypocrisy or in order to "sound important".

And so, the choice must be made: either the C.C. members (or, correspondingly, member) residing abroad secure provision *in the Party Rules* (other "agreements" being invalid) for the *entire* C.C. to meet abroad periodically, in *which* case this supreme centre will, *in actual fact*, be identical

with the present Party Council, i.e., it will become a body that meets three, four, or five times a year and gives only *general direction* to the work; *or else* for the C.C. to meet in Russia and settle all business *there, without* its component from abroad. In this case the latter is but nominally listed, *avowedly fictitiously*, as a member of the C.C. *Actually*, he can have *no say* in deciding general questions. Under such circumstances it is open to doubt whether any people will be found to fill this "post" (or shall we say sinecure?) of "members from abroad" on the C.C.!

Another (and the last possible) assumption: the C.C. to consist *entirely* of comrades who work in Russia and to constitute a single centre. Only such a central body will *really* be a single Russian centre. For work abroad it establishes an agency. *In actual practice*, however, this agency will exist as an independent centre. To take the case of the editors of the Central Organ. Clearly we shall need a *full Board* here, that will only *by a long drawn-out process* take shape, form a team, and pull together. (It took the people in Russia *eighteen months* of hard effort to build up a *new* Central Organ after the Second Congress, and that notwithstanding the intense concern shown throughout Russia for solving the grave *general Party* crisis.) In practice this Board will issue the *weekly organ* independently. *At best* the C.C. in Russia will show its interest in the way the publication is managed by calling a "conference" once in six months (or once in eighteen months)—in what way will such a "conference" differ from the "Council"?—or by a "letter" from an *individual* member of the C.C. In practice this foreign Board will conduct agitation and train functionaries abroad (lectures, meetings) among *hundreds* of Party members. The C.C. will be *physically* unable *actually* to direct this work, *actually* to manage this work of the foreign Board. It will be physically unable to *participate* in this work, except through *rare* conferences with the persons conducting it. Here again—in what way will these conferences differ from the Council?

To sum up: in actual fact, in practice, a "single" Centre will either be a *myth*, or it will merely boil down, positively and inevitably, to the present system of what is scornfully called "the Triple Centre". In actual fact, in practice, differences in geographic and political conditions, as well as

differences in the character of the work, inevitably and unavoidably necessitate, and will continue to necessitate (until the fall of the autocracy), two centres in our Party, united only *from time to time* by "*conferences*", which *actually* will always play the role of supreme or highest "Council" of the Party.

It is quite understandable that the reaction against the people abroad should have evoked from those in Russia the general outcry: Down with the people abroad! Down with two centres! This reaction is legitimate and *laudable*; for it indicates the tremendous growth of the Party's strength and of Party consciousness since the Second Congress. This reaction is undeniably a step forward by our Party. But we must not be misled by the fascination of words; we must not elevate to a "system" the *mood* of the moment, the passing "resentment" against the "fellows abroad". No Party system can be built on anger. Nothing is easier than to lay down the short and simple rule of "one centre". But such a decision would bring us no nearer to the solution of the intricate problem of finding methods for uniting actually (not merely on paper) the diverse functions of the work in Russia and abroad.

Written in February 1905

Published according to
the manuscript

QUESTIONNAIRE

FOR THE THIRD CONGRESS OF THE PARTY

In view of the convocation of the Third Congress of the Party some comrades, practical workers, have asked us to publish the following statement. It would be most desirable at the forthcoming debate on the organisational question at the Congress if the counsels and opinions of the greatest possible number of comrades who have been working in Russia were most carefully considered and discussed. Therefore, let *every* such person express his opinion and submit his answers to the following questions. The Editorial Board of *Vperyod* will collect them and refer them to the Congress, so that every delegate will be able to benefit from the collective experience of the mass of his comrades. The main questions requiring to be clarified with a view to the redrafting of the Rules and the formulation of the resolutions of the Congress are approximately as follows: (1) Place, time and duration of work? (2) Worked as member of a committee, or committee body, if so, of which? Of factory circle, etc.? (3) What was the membership of each of the committees or committee branches, organising groups, etc., as far as you know it? How many workers and how many intellectuals were there in each? (4) What was the normal practice of co-optation to the committee from the periphery? Could you give the average duration of work in the periphery? Are there any instances of dissatisfaction arising from co-optation, etc.? In your answers a clear line should be drawn between the periods before and after the Second Congress. Detailed information on the period *before* the Second Congress is particularly desirable. (5) How many Party organi-

sations, groups, circles, etc., were there *altogether* in the area where you worked? List each group, the number of members, functions, etc. (6) Were there any groups (organisations, circles, etc.) that were not considered Party groups, but were close to the Party? (7) How did the periphery (and the various kinds of periphery circles) and the committee maintain contact? Did these forms of contact satisfy the members? (8) Do you consider it possible and desirable to introduce the elective principle? If not, why not? If you do, then in what manner? Please state explicitly to what groups the right of election ought to be applied. (9) Do you consider the separation of the committees (groups, circles, organisations, etc.) into committees of intellectuals and committees of workers to be advisable? If not, why not? If you do, please indicate what form of separation is desirable. (10) Did the committee elect a central, directing group? If it did, how? How often was it controlled? Were you satisfied with its inauguration? (11) Do you consider it useful and possible for the local organisations to have written Rules? (12) Do you consider it useful to include any regulations concerning the local organisations (committees and others) in the Party Rules? If you do, please mention what regulations. (13) Do you consider it desirable for the Party Rules to define the exact rights of the Central Committee in the matter of including (and excluding) members from the committees and other organisations? What should be the precise rights of the Central Committee? (14) Is it desirable to protect the autonomy of the local committees by introducing special regulations, and if so, what regulations? (15) How often did the committee, or the group, circle, etc., of which you were a member meet? If possible, list all the meetings held during the period of your work. If not, give a rough estimate. Were there any inconveniences in the holding of frequent meetings? What, in your experience, is the average number of possible and necessary meetings per month and how large should the number of participants be?

Written in February 1905

Published according to
the manuscript

**PREFACE TO THE PAMPHLET
*MEMORANDUM OF POLICE DEPARTMENT
SUPERINTENDENT LOPUKHIN***

There can be too much of a good thing, or so Mr. Lopukhin seems to say in his memorandum. A good thing from the point of view of the police is the "temporary" Security Regulations, which, since 1881, have been one of the most stable fundamental laws of the Russian Empire. The police are given all kinds of rights and powers to "keep the populace in hand", according to the apt expression of the memorandum, which is all the more striking the more often one stumbles over the incredibly ponderous and clumsy official turns of speech in which the memorandum is written. Yes, the police have lived in clover under these "Regulations", but their "good" features have spoiled them. That is one aspect of the matter. Another is the fact that the emergency measures of suppression, which may have seemed extraordinary twenty-five years ago, have since become so ordinary that the population has adjusted itself to them, so to speak. The repressive significance of these emergency measures has weakened, just as a new spring weakens from long and excessive use. The game is not worth the candle, Mr. Lopukhin, Superintendent of the Police Department, implies in his memorandum, which is written in a curiously melancholy and dismal tone.

How gratifying to a Social-Democrat is this dismal tone, this dry, business-like, yet nonetheless devastating criticism by a police official of Russia's fundamental police law. Gone are the palmy days of policedom! Gone are the sixties, when the very existence of a revolutionary party was unthought of. Gone are the seventies, when the strength of such a party,

whose existence was an undoubted and terrifying fact, was "only equal to individual acts of violence, but not to a political revolution". In those days, when "underground agitation found support only among individual persons or circles", the newly invented spring could still produce some effect. But how slack this spring has now become, "in the present state of society, when dissatisfaction with the existing order of things and a strong opposition movement are becoming so widespread in Russia"! How absurd and meaningless these emergency security measures proved to be when they had to be, actually *had to be*, applied in thousands of cases "against workers for engaging in strikes of a peaceful nature and purely economic in motive", when even cobblestones had to be classed as dangerous political weapons!

In his despair, poor Lopukhin resorts to a double exclamation mark, which invites Messieurs the Ministers to join him in laughing at the absurd consequences to which the Security Regulations have led. Everything in these Regulations has proved useless ever since the revolutionary movement really penetrated among the people and became inseparably bound up with the class movement of the working masses—everything, from the rules requiring the registration of passports to the military tribunals. Even the "institution of house janitors", that blessed godsend to the police, is scathingly criticised by the *Polizei*-Minister, who accuses it of having an enervating effect on the preventive activities of the police.

In truth, the complete bankruptcy of the police regime!

This bankruptcy is confirmed, apart from the assertions of such a highly competent person as the most honourable Mr. Lopukhin, by the entire course of development of the tsarist policy. When there was no really popular revolutionary movement, when the political struggle was not yet connected and integrated with the class struggle, simple police measures against individuals and study circles had their use. Against classes these measures proved ludicrously ineffective; by their very profusion they became a hindrance to the work of the police. The once awesome clauses of the Security Regulations have proved to be just miserable, petty, quibbling chicaneries, which tend to stir up discontent among the "plain people" who do not belong to the revolutionaries

rather than seriously to affect the revolutionaries themselves. Against the people's revolution, against the class struggle the police cannot be depended on; one must have the backing of the people, too, the support of classes. Such is the moral of Mr. Lopukhin's memorandum. And such is the moral which the autocratic government is drawing from practical experience. The springs of the police machinery have lost their snap; military force alone is now insufficient. One must stir up national hatred, race hatred; one must recruit "Black Hundreds"⁶⁶ from among the politically least developed sections of the urban (*and, following that, naturally, of the rural*) petty bourgeoisie; one must attempt to rally to the defence of the throne all reactionary elements among the population at large; one must turn the struggle of the police against study circles into a struggle of one part of the people against the other.

That is precisely what the government is now doing when it sets the Tatars against the Armenians in Baku; when it seeks to provoke new pogroms against the Jews; when it organises Black-Hundred gangs against the Zemstvo people, students, and rebellious Gymnasium youths; and when it appeals to the loyal nobles and to the conservative elements among the peasants. Ah, well! We Social-Democrats are not surprised at these tactics of the autocracy; nor shall we be frightened by them. We know that it will no longer help the government to stir up racial animosity since the workers have begun to organise armed resistance to the pogrom-bandits; and by relying on the exploiting sections of the petty bourgeoisie the government will only antagonise still broader masses of real proletarians. We have never expected any political or social revolutions to come from "convincing" the powers that be, or from educated persons turning to the paths of "virtue". We have always taught that it is the class struggle, the struggle of the exploited part of the people against the exploiters, that lies at the bottom of political transformations and *in the final analysis* determines the fate of all such transformations. By admitting the complete failure of the pettifogging police methods and passing over to the direct organisation of civil war, the government shows that *the final reckoning* is approaching. So much the better. It is launching the civil war. So much the better. We, too, are

for the civil war. If there is any sphere in which we feel particularly confident, it is here, in the war of the vast masses of the oppressed and the downtrodden, of the toiling millions who keep the whole of society going, against a handful of privileged parasites. Of course, by fanning racial antagonism and tribal hatred, the government may for a time arrest the development of the class struggle, but only for a short time and at the cost of a still greater expansion of the field of the new struggle, at the cost of a more bitter feeling among the people against the autocracy. This is proved by the consequences of the Baku pogrom, which deepened tenfold the revolutionary mood of all sections against tsarism. The government thought to frighten the people by the sight of bloodshed and the vast toll of street battles; but actually it is *dispelling the people's* fear of bloodshed, of a direct armed encounter. Actually, the government is furthering our cause, with agitation of a scope wider and more impressive than we could ever have dreamed of. *Vive le son du canon!* say we in the words of the French revolutionary song: "Hail the thunder of the cannon!" Hail the revolution! Hail the open war of the people against the tsarist government and its adherents!

Written in February-March 1905

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in the pamphlet *Memorandum
of Police Department
Superintendent Lopukhin*
Published by Vperyod, Geneva
Signed: N. LENIN

Published according to
the text of the pamphlet

PLAN OF A LECTURE ON THE COMMUNE⁶⁷

1. Historical outline of the Commune.

France under Napoleon III. Foundations of imperialism: the bourgeoisie no longer, the proletariat not yet....⁶⁸

Adventurism of Napoleon III. Need for pomp, wars.

2. Growth of proletariat after June 1848. *Internationale Arbeiterassoziation*,* 1864. Its persecution by Napoleon III.

Protest of the French workers against war (July 12, Paris Section of the International, S.** 16) and of the German workers (Brunswick workers' meeting, July 16, Chemnitz, Berlin Section of International, S. 18).⁶⁹

3. Sedan: September 2, 1870, and proclamation of republic on *September 4, 1870*. Artful liberals seize power.

Liberal lawyers and double-faced monarchists: *Thiers*.

4. Government of national defence=government of national betrayal. Trochu: "plan" for defending Paris. Comedy of defence. Heroism of the Paris workers. *Capitulation* on January 28, 1871.

5. Bismarck imposes conditions for convocation of the National Assembly *in eight days* (S. 34) to decide question of war and peace. Thiers' intrigues with the monarchists.

Chamber of Country Gentry (*ruraux*). *National Assembly* at *Bordeaux*: 630 members=30 Bonapartists+200 republicans (100 moderates and 100 radicals)+400 monarchists (200 Orleanists+200 Legitimists).

Thiers' talk with Falloux.

6. Paris provoked: appointment of monarchist ambassadors: "30 sou" pay cut for soldiers of the National Guard;

* International Working Men's Association.—*Ed.*

** *Sette*—page.—*Ed.*

in Paris Prefect of the Police Valentin, Commander of the National Guard d'Aurelle de Paladines, and others (Trepov and Vasilchikov!)⁷⁰; National Assembly moved to Versailles; suppression of republican newspapers and so on. Making the poor pay for the war. (S. 35) Armed Paris workers and—a monarchist assembly. Conflict inevitable.

7. Marx's warning*: second address of General Council of the International, September 9, 1870: "They must not allow themselves to be swayed by the national memories of 1792"; to proceed with "the organisation of their own class"; not to set itself the aim of overthrowing the government ("a desperate folly"): S. 25. Eugène Dupont, Secretary of the International (General Council) for France, wrote the same on September 7, 1870 (Weill, 134).⁷¹

8. Last act of provocation. Seizure of the guns from the National Guard, March 18, 1871. Thiers' fraudulent pretexts. Attempt fails. Central Committee of National Guard proclaims the Commune. *Civil war begun* between Paris Commune and Versailles Government.

9. Trends in the Commune: (a) *Blanquists*. In November 1880 Blanqui in *Ni Dieu ni maître*** condemns the theory of the class struggle and the separation of the interests of the proletariat and those of the nation. (Weill, 229) (draws no line between the workers and the revolutionary bourgeoisie). (b) *Proudhonists* (Mutualists) "organisation of barter and credit".

Revolutionary instinct of the working class asserts itself despite fallacious theories.

10. *Political measures of the Commune:*

- (1) Abolition of the standing army.
- (2) Abolition of the bureaucracy (a) Electivity of all officials; (b) Salary not > 6,000 fr.
- (3) Separation of Church from State
- (4) Introduction of free tuition

Minimum Programme

Commune and peasants. In three months it would all be different! (S. 49-50).***

* *Contra Blanqui*, who founded *Patrie en danger* (*The Fatherland in Danger*.—Ed.) in 1870 (N.B.).

** *Neither God nor Master*.—Ed.

*** Baring of "secrets": tricks of Trochu, "goings on" in the monasteries (S. 54). *Very little has yet been done!*

Commune and International. Franckel, the Poles (banner of world republic).

11. *Economic measures of the Commune.*

- (1) Ban on night-work for bakers.
- (2) Ban on fines.
- (3) Registration of abandoned factories, their transfer to workers' associations with compensation on basis of decision by arbitration committees. (S. 54.)

N.B. Did not take over the bank. Eight-hour day did not go through. Weill, 142.

- (4) Halt to foreclosures of mortgages. Deferment of payments (of rent).

12. Crash. Deficiencies of organisation. Defensive attitude. Thiers-Bismarck deal {role of Bismarck=hired assassin}. *Bloody week, May 21-28, 1871.*

Its horrors, exile, etc. Slanders (S. 65-66).

Women and children....

P. 487: 20,000 killed in streets, 3,000 died in prisons, etc. Military tribunals: until January 1, 1875—13,700 persons sentenced (80 women, 60 children), exile, prison.⁷²

13. Lessons: Bourgeoisie will *stop at nothing*. Today liberals, radicals, republicans, tomorrow betrayal, shootings.

Independent organisation of the proletariat—class struggle—civil war.

In the present movement we all stand on the shoulders of the Commune.

Written in February-March 1905

Published according to
the manuscript

Hobas andersoni n. sp. n. cat. n.

NEW TASKS AND NEW FORCES

The development of a mass working-class movement in Russia in connection with the development of Social-Democracy is marked by three notable transitions. The first was the transition from narrow propagandist circles to wide economic agitation among the masses; the second was the transition to political agitation on a large scale and to open street demonstrations; the third was the transition to actual civil war, to direct revolutionary struggle, to the armed popular uprising. Each of these transitions was prepared, on the one hand, by socialist thought working mainly in one direction, and on the other, by the profound changes that had taken place in the conditions of life and in the whole mentality of the working class, as well as by the fact that increasingly wider strata of the working class were roused to more conscious and active struggle. Sometimes these changes took place imperceptibly, the proletariat rallying its forces behind the scenes in an unsensational way, so that the intellectuals often doubted the lasting quality and the vital power of the mass movement. There would then be a turning-point, and the whole revolutionary movement would, suddenly, as it were, rise to a new and higher stage. The proletariat and its vanguard, Social-Democracy, would be confronted with new *practical* tasks, to deal with which, new forces would spring up, seemingly out of the ground, forces whose existence no one had suspected shortly before the turning-point. But all this did not take place at once, without vacillations, without a struggle of currents within the Social-Democratic movement, without relapses to outworn views long since thought dead and buried.

Social-Democracy in Russia is once again passing through such a period of vacillation. There was a time when political agitation had to break its way through opportunist theories, when it was feared that we would not be equal to the new tasks, when excessive repetition of the adjective "class", or a tail-ender's interpretation of the Party's attitude to the class, was used to justify the fact that the Social-Democrats lagged behind the demands of the proletariat. The course of the movement has swept aside all these short-sighted fears and backward views. The new upsurge now is attended once more, although in a somewhat different form, by a struggle against obsolete circles and tendencies. The *Rabocheye Deyelo*-ists have come to life again in the new-Iskrists. To adapt our tactics and our organisation to the new tasks, we have to overcome the resistance of opportunist theories of "a higher type of demonstration" (the plan of the Zemstvo campaign), or of the "organisation-as-process"; we have to combat the reactionary fear of "timing" the uprising, or the fear of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. Once again, excessive (and very often foolish) repetition of the word "class" and belittlement of the Party's tasks in regard to the class are used to justify the fact that Social-Democracy is lagging behind the urgent needs of the proletariat. The slogan "workers' independent activity" is again being misused by people who worship the lower forms of activity and ignore the higher forms of really Social-Democratic independent activity, the really revolutionary initiative of the proletariat itself.

There is not the slightest doubt that the movement, in its course, will once again sweep aside these survivals of obsolete and lifeless views. Such sweeping aside, however, should not be reduced to mere rejection of the old errors, but, what is incomparably more important, it should take the form of constructive revolutionary work towards fulfilling the new tasks, towards attracting into our Party and utilising the new forces that are now coming into the revolutionary field in such vast masses. It is these questions of constructive revolutionary work that should be the main subject in the deliberations of the forthcoming Third Congress; upon these questions all our Party members should concentrate in their local and general work. As to the new

tasks that confront us, of this we have spoken in general terms on more than one occasion. They are: to extend our agitation to new strata of the urban and rural poor; to build up a broader, more flexible, and stronger organisation; to prepare the uprising and to arm the people; and, to these ends, to conclude agreements with the revolutionary democrats. That new forces have arisen for the fulfilment of these tasks is eloquently borne out by the reports of general strikes all over Russia, of the strikes and the revolutionary mood among the youth, among the democratic intelligentsia generally, and even among many sections of the bourgeoisie. The existence of these tremendous fresh forces and the positive assurance that only a small portion of the whole vast stock of inflammable material among the working class and the peasantry has so far been affected by the present unprecedented revolutionary ferment in Russia are a reliable pledge that the new tasks can and will be unfailingly fulfilled. The practical question confronting us now is, first, *how* to utilise, direct, unite, and organise these new forces; *how* to focus Social-Democratic work on the new, higher tasks of the day without for a moment forgetting the old, ordinary run of tasks that confront us, and will continue to confront us, so long as the world of capitalist exploitation continues to exist.

To indicate several methods for dealing with this practical question we shall begin with an individual, but to our mind very characteristic, instance. A short time ago, on the very eve of the outbreak of the revolution, the liberal-bourgeois *Osvobozhdeniye* (No. 63) touched on the question of the organisational work of the Social-Democrats. Closely following the struggle between the two trends in Social-Democracy, *Osvobozhdeniye* lost no opportunity again and again to take advantage of the new *Iskra*'s reversion to Economism, in order to emphasise (in connection with the demagogic pamphlet by "A Worker") its own profound sympathy with the principles of Economism. This liberal publication correctly pointed out that the pamphlet (see *Vperyod*, No. 2, on the subject*) implies inevitable negation, or belittlement, of the role of revolutionary Social-Democracy. Referring to

* See pp. 56-62 of this volume.—Ed.

"A Worker's" absolutely incorrect assertions that since the victory of the orthodox Marxists the economic struggle has been ignored, *Osvobozhdeniye* says:

"The illusion of present-day Russian Social-Democracy lies in its fear of educational work, of legal ways, of Economism, of so-called non-political forms of the labour movement, and in its failure to understand that only educational work, legal and non-political forms, can create a sufficiently strong and broad foundation for a working-class movement that will really be worthy of the name revolutionary." *Osvobozhdeniye* urges its adherents "to take upon themselves the initiative in building a trade union movement", not in opposition to Social-Democracy, but hand in hand with it; and it draws a parallel between this situation and that which prevailed in the German labour movement during the operation of the Exceptional Law Against the Socialists.⁷⁸

This is not the place to deal with this analogy, a totally erroneous one. In the first place, it is necessary to reassert the truth about the attitude of the Social-Democrats towards the legal forms of the working-class movement. "The legalisation of non-socialist and non-political labour unions in Russia has begun," we wrote in 1902 in *What Is To Be Done?** "Henceforth, we cannot but reckon with this tendency." How shall we reckon with it?—the question is raised there and answered by a reference to the need of exposing, not only the Zubatov theories, but also all liberal harmony speeches about "class collaboration". (In inviting the collaboration of the Social-Democrats, *Osvobozhdeniye* fully acknowledges the first task, but ignores the second.) "Doing this," the pamphlet goes on to say, "does not at all mean forgetting that in the long run the legalisation of the working-class movement will be to our advantage, and not to that of the Zubatovs." In exposing Zubatovism and liberalism at legal meetings we are separating the tares from the wheat. "By the wheat we mean attracting the attention of ever larger numbers, including the most backward sections, of the workers to social and political questions, and freeing ourselves, the revolutionaries, from functions that are essentially legal (the distribution of legal books, mutual aid,

* See present edition, Vol. 5, p. 455.—*Ed.*

etc.), the development of which will inevitably provide us with an increasing quantity of material for agitation."

It follows clearly from this that if anyone is suffering from an "*illusion*" with regard to the question of "*fearing*" the legal forms of the movement, it is *Osvobozhdeniye*. Far from fearing these forms, the revolutionary Social-Democrats clearly point to the existence within them of *tares* as well as *wheat*. *Osvobozhdeniye's* arguments, consequently, only cover up the liberals' real (and founded) *fear* that revolutionary Social-Democracy will expose the *class essence of liberalism*.

But what interests us most, from the point of view of present-day tasks, is the question of relieving the revolutionaries of some of their functions. The very fact that we are now experiencing the beginning of the revolution makes this a particularly topical and widely significant question. "The more energetically we carry on our revolutionary struggle, the more the government will be compelled to legalise part of the trade union work, thereby relieving us of part of our burden," we said in *What Is To Be Done?** But the energetic revolutionary struggle relieves us of "part of our burden" in many other ways besides this. The present situation has done more than merely "legalise" much of what was formerly banned. It has widened the movement to such an extent that, regardless of government legalisation, many things that were considered and actually were within reach only of revolutionaries have now entered the sphere of practice, have become customary and accessible to the masses. The whole course of Social-Democracy's historical development is characterised by the fact that in face of all obstacles it has been winning for itself increased freedom of action, despite tsarist laws and police measures. The revolutionary proletariat surrounds itself, as it were, with a certain atmosphere, unthinkable for the government, of sympathy and support both within the working class and within other classes (which, of course, agree with only a small part of the demands of the working-class democrats). In the initial stages of the movement a Social-Democrat had to carry on a great deal of what almost amounted to cultural work, or to concentrate

See present edition, Vol 5, p. 491.—*Ed.*

almost exclusively on economic agitation. Now these functions, one after another, are passing into the hands of new forces, of wider sections that are being enlisted in the movement. The revolutionary organisations have concentrated more and more on carrying out the function of real *political* leadership, the function of drawing *Social-Democratic* conclusions from the workers' protest and the popular discontent. In the beginning we had to teach the workers the ABC, both in the literal and in the figurative senses. Now the standard of political literacy has risen so gigantically that we can and should concentrate all our efforts on the more direct Social-Democratic objectives aimed at giving an organised direction to the revolutionary stream. Now the liberals and the legal press are doing a great deal of the "preparatory" work upon which we have hitherto had to expend so much effort. Now the open propaganda of democratic ideas and demands, no longer persecuted by the weakened government, has spread so widely that we must learn to adjust ourselves to this entirely new scope of the movement. Naturally, in this preparatory work there are both tares and wheat. Naturally, Social-Democrats will now have to pay greater attention to combating the influence of the bourgeois democrats on the workers. But this very work will have much more real Social-Democratic content than our former activity, which aimed mainly at rousing the politically unconscious masses.

The more the popular movement spreads, the more clearly will the true nature of the different classes stand revealed and the more pressing will the *Party's* task be in leading the class, in becoming its organiser, instead of dragging at the tail-end of events. The more the revolutionary independent activity of all kinds develops everywhere, the more obvious will be the hollowness and inanity of the *Rabocheye Dyelo* catchwords, so eagerly taken up by the new-Iskrists, about independent activity in general, the more significant will become the meaning of *Social-Democratic* independent activity, and the greater will be the demands which events make on our *revolutionary initiative*. The wider the new streams of the social movement become, the greater becomes the importance of a strong Social-Democratic organisation capable of creating new channels for these streams. The

more the democratic propaganda and agitation conducted independently of us works to our advantage, the greater becomes the importance of an organised Social-Democratic leadership to safeguard the independence of the working class from the bourgeois democrats.

A revolutionary epoch is to the Social-Democrats what war-time is to an army. We must broaden the cadres of our army, we must advance them from peace strength to war strength, we must mobilise the reservists, recall the furloughed, and form new auxiliary corps, units, and services. We must not forget that in war we necessarily and inevitably have to put up with less trained replacements, very often to replace officers with rank-and-file soldiers, and to speed up and simplify the promotion of soldiers to officers' rank.

To drop metaphor, we must considerably increase the membership of all Party and Party-connected organisations in order to be able to keep up to some extent with the stream of popular revolutionary energy which has been a hundred-fold strengthened. This, it goes without saying, does not mean that consistent training and systematic instruction in the Marxist truths are to be left in the shade. We must, however, remember that at the present time far greater significance in the matter of training and education attaches to the military operations, which *teach* the untrained precisely and entirely in *our* sense. We must remember that our "doctrinaire" faithfulness to Marxism is now being reinforced by the march of revolutionary events, which is everywhere furnishing *object lessons to the masses* and that all these lessons confirm precisely our dogma. Hence, we do not speak about abandoning the dogma, or relaxing our distrustful and suspicious attitude towards the woolly intellectuals and the arid-minded revolutionaries. Quite the contrary. We speak about new methods of teaching dogma, which it would be unpardonable for a Social-Democrat to forget. We speak of the importance for our day of using the object lessons of the great revolutionary events in order to convey—not to study circles, as in the past, but to the masses—our old, "dogmatic" lessons that, for example, it is necessary in practice to combine terror with the uprising of the masses, or that behind the liberalism of the educated Russian society one must be able to discern the class interests of our

bourgeoisie (cf. our polemics with the Socialists-Revolutionaries on this question in *Vperyod*, No. 3*).

Thus, it is not a question of relaxing our Social-Democratic exactingness and our orthodox intransigence, but of strengthening both in *new* ways, by new methods of training. In war-time, recruits should get their training lessons directly from military operations. So tackle the new methods of training more boldly, comrades! Forward, and organise more and more squads, send them into battle, recruit more young workers, extend the normal framework of all Party organisations, from committees to factory groups, craft unions, and student circles! Remember that every moment of delay in this task will play into the hands of the enemies of Social-Democracy; for the new streams are seeking an immediate outlet, and if they do not find a Social-Democratic channel they will rush into a non-Social-Democratic channel. Remember that every practical step in the revolutionary movement will decidedly, inevitably give the young recruits a lesson in Social-Democratic science; for this science is based on an objectively correct estimation of the forces and tendencies of the various classes, while the revolution itself is nothing but the break-up of old superstructures and the independent action of the various classes, each striving to erect the new superstructure in its own way. But do not debase our revolutionary science to the level of mere book dogma, do not vulgarise it with wretched phrases about tactics-as-process and organisation-as-process, with phrases that seek to justify confusion, vacillation, and lack of initiative. Give more scope to all the diverse kinds of enterprise on the part of the most varied groups and circles, bearing in mind that, apart from our counsel and regardless of it, the relentless exigencies of the march of revolutionary events will keep them upon the correct course. It is an old maxim that in politics one often has to learn from the enemy. And at revolutionary moments the enemy always forces correct conclusions upon us in a particularly instructive and speedy manner.

To sum up, we must reckon with the growing movement, which has increased a hundredfold, with the new tempo of

* See pp. 83-89 of this volume.—*Ed.*

the work, with the freer atmosphere and the wider field of activity. The work must be given an entirely different scope. Methods of training should be refocussed from peaceful instruction to military operations. Young fighters should be recruited more boldly, widely, and rapidly into the ranks *of all and every kind* of our organisations. *Hundreds* of new organisations should be set up for the purpose without a moment's delay. Yes, hundreds; this is no hyperbole, and let no one tell me that it is "too late" now to tackle such a broad organisational job. No, it is never too late to organise. We must use the freedom we are getting by law and the freedom we are taking despite the law to strengthen and multiply the number of Party organisations of all varieties. Whatever the course or the outcome of the revolution may be, however early it may be checked by one or other circumstance, all its real gains will be rendered secure and reliable only insofar as the proletariat is organised.

The slogan "Organise!" which the adherents of the majority wanted to issue, fully formulated, at the Second Congress must now be put into effect immediately. If we fail to show bold initiative in setting up new organisations, we shall have to give up as groundless all pretensions to the role of vanguard. If we stop helplessly at the achieved boundaries, forms, and confines of the committees, groups, meetings, and circles, we shall merely prove our own incapacity. Thousands of circles are now springing up everywhere without our aid, without any definite programme or aim, simply under the impact of events. The Social-Democrats must make it their task to establish and strengthen direct contacts with the greatest possible number of these circles, to assist them, to give them the benefit of their own knowledge and experience, to stimulate them with their own revolutionary initiative. Let all such circles, except those that are avowedly non-Social-Democratic, either directly join the Party or *align themselves with the Party*. In the latter event we must not demand that they accept our programme or that they necessarily enter into organisational relations with us. Their mood of protest and their sympathy for the cause of international revolutionary Social-Democracy in themselves suffice, provided the Social-Democrats work effectively among them, for these circles of *sympathisers* under the

impact of events to be transformed at first into democratic assistants and then into convinced members of the Social-Democratic working-class party.

There are masses of people, and we are short of people; this contradictory formula has long expressed the contradictions between the organisational life and the organisational needs of the Social-Democratic Party. Today this contradiction is more salient than ever before; we often hear from all sides passionate appeals for new forces, complaints about the shortage of forces in the organisations, while at the same time we have everywhere countless offers of service, a growth of young forces, especially among the working class. The practical organiser who complains of a shortage of people under such circumstances becomes the victim of the illusion from which Madame Roland suffered, when she wrote in 1793, at the peak of the Great French Revolution, that France had no men, that there were only dwarfs. People who talk in this manner do not see the wood for the trees; they admit that they are blinded by events, that it is not they, the revolutionaries, who control events in mind and deed, but events that control them and have overwhelmed them. Such organisers *had better retire* and leave the field clear for younger forces who often make up with verve what they lack in experience.

There is no dearth of people; never has revolutionary Russia had such a multitude of people as now. Never has a revolutionary class been so well off for temporary allies, conscious friends, and unconscious supporters as the Russian proletariat is today. There are masses of people; all we need do is get rid of tail-ist ideas and precepts, give full scope to initiative and enterprise, to "plans" and "undertakings", and thus show ourselves to be worthy representatives of the great revolutionary class. Then the proletariat of Russia will carry through *the whole great Russian revolution* as heroically as it has begun it.

OSVOBOZHDENIYE-ISTS AND NEW-ISKRISTS, MONARCHISTS AND GIRONDISTS

Osvobozhdeniye, No. 66, published a review of Martynov's pamphlet *Two Dictatorships* (approved and recommended by the editors of *Iskra*; see issue No. 84). As was to be expected, the liberal bourgeois does not conceal his sympathies with the opportunist wing of the Social-Democratic movement. *Osvobozhdeniye* regards Martynov's pamphlet, "like the work of Mr. Akimov", as "one of the most interesting contributions to Social-Democratic literature of the present day". Could a liberal have reacted in any other way to the preaching of tail-ism, which seeks to frighten the revolutionary class with the dire perspective of participation in the provisional government and the "revolutionary dictatorship" in a *democratic* revolution (which Martynov, in his fear of "Jacobinism" confounds with the socialist revolution!)? Is it merely a coincidence that *Osvobozhdeniye*, in the article "A Significant Turn", welcomed Plekhanov's ideas of making concessions to the revisionists? How is one to account for *Osvobozhdeniye's* assertion (No. 57) that "in fact, the Menshevists are now defending something more vital and essential than the Bolsheviks"? Is it not because "the only hope for the ideological vitality of Russian liberalism lies in the vitality of Social-Democratic opportunism" (see our publication *An Obliging Liberal**)? Was Mr. Struve right or wrong in contending that Trotsky's pamphlet *Our Political Tasks*, published under the editorship of "Iskra" (see issue No. 72) "is perfectly right in defending certain

* First published as a leaflet, Geneva, November 6, 1904. See present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 486-89.—*Ed.*

ideas with which readers of Social-Democratic literature have been familiar from the writings of Messrs. Akimov, Martynov, Krichevsky, and other so-called Economists" (*Osvobozhdeniye*, No. 57)? Had Martynov and Co. stopped to think of these questions, they might perhaps have been able to grasp the puzzling (how very, very puzzling!) ideas of the old *Iskra* about the similarity of the relations between the Jacobins and the Girondists, on the one hand, and between the revolutionary Social-Democrats and the opportunists, on the other. (This idea was first advanced, if we are not mistaken, in the leading article of *Iskra*, No. 2, written by Plekhanov.) Were the Girondists traitors to the cause of the Great French Revolution? They were not. But they were inconsistent, wavering, opportunist champions of that cause. *That is why* they were opposed by the Jacobins, who upheld the interests of the advanced class of the eighteenth century as consistently as the revolutionary Social-Democrats uphold the interests of the advanced class of the twentieth. That is why the downright betrayers of the cause of the great revolution, the monarchists, the clerical constitutionalists, etc., supported the Girondists and shielded them from the attacks of the Jacobins. Are you beginning to see light now, most honourable Girondist Martynov? Not yet? Well, we shall try to clarify the point further. Are the new-Iskrists traitors to the proletarian cause? No. But they are inconsistent, wavering, opportunist champions of the cause (and of the organisational and tactical principles illuminating the cause). That is why their position is opposed by the revolutionary Social-Democrats (by some directly and overtly, by others covertly, behind the closed doors of their editorial offices, with devices and ruses). That is why the new-Iskrists are ideologically supported and shielded by the *Osvobozhdeniye* crowd—the *down-right betrayers* of the proletarian cause. Are you beginning to see light' now, most honourable Girondist Martynov?

EVASIONS WITHOUT END

Iskra and the so-called Council are continuing their tactics of delay, of pretexts, and of evasion in the matter of convening the Congress. Plekhanov tries to take a formal stand by reiterating with an insistence worthy of a better cause that the Congress is convened by the Council and that therefore any congress not so convened is illegal. This argument is so one-sided and naively self-interested that one is strongly tempted "to give the hare a bit of the bear's ear"*—to give Plekhanov a medal for his meticulous observance of the Party Rules and Party laws! We would most humbly ask the very honourable advocate of the dialectic, that is, of the all-round approach: does the Council exist for the Party or the Party for the Council? Is the Council accountable to, and controllable by, the Party or is the Party accountable to the Council? Does discipline for the higher body eliminate discipline for the lower body? Will our vigilant limb of the law try to remember the arguments he used in this connection at the Second Congress of the Party?

The Council, according to our Rules, is duty bound to convene a congress when half the votes are cast for it. What is the Party to do when the Council shirks its duties? The Rules of the German Social-Democratic Party give a direct answer to this question, namely, the Congress in such an event is convened not by the supreme governing body of the Party, but by a special control committee independent of that body. Our Rules give no answer at all to that question

* The allusion is to I. A. Krylov's fable "The Hare at the Hunt". —
Ed.

Does this mean, we ask our friends of the new *Iskra*, that the problem is insoluble? Does it mean that should the Council shirk its Party responsibilities the Party would have to dissolve and be superseded by the Council? The Party for the Council—is that it?

We make bold to say that this is not so, that the Party itself is *obliged* to see to it that its Rules are observed by its functionaries, that “to see to it” does not only mean to criticise by word but to rectify by deed. He who is unable to demand *successfully* of his agents the discharge of their duties towards those who entrusted them is unworthy of the name of a politically free citizen. He who cannot demand *successfully* of his agents the discharge of their Party duties towards those who entrusted them is unworthy of the name of Party member. The Council is the agent of the committees. The committees *are in duty bound* to demand of this agent the discharge of its duties towards those who have entrusted it. This the committees can do *only* by electing their bureau for convening the Congress. And that is what the committees have done. That is what they were *obliged* to do, if they were conscious of their elementary Party obligations.

Will the honourable Comrade Plekhanov, perhaps, try to deny the correctness of this statement? Will he try to name *any* Social-Democratic party in the world whose members would have refrained from acting as our committees acted, when faced with the refusal of a given Party body to convene the Party Congress? We challenge you to try, Comrade Plekhanov.

Now let us proceed to the second factual question, whether our Council actually did shirk its Party duties in the matter of convening the Congress. This is no mere formal question, since apart from duty under the Rules there is still the duty...*

Written at the end of February-
beginning of March 1905

Published according to
the manuscript

* The manuscript breaks off here.—Ed.

WHOM ARE THEY TRYING TO FOOL?

In issue No. 89 of *Iskra*, just arrived, we find a decision of the "Party Council" dated March 8, 1905. As was to be expected, the "Council" abroad frets and fumes against the Party Congress which is being convened by the Party committees in Russia, declaring that "in acting the way they do, its participants place themselves outside the Party". We quite understand the resentment of the group abroad, from whom the Party working in Russia has long since moved away in actual fact and is now moving away also formally. We also understand that only under the spur of resentment and despair can people argue so illogically and "deviate from the truth" as maladroitly as does the Council. "According to the Party Rules," we are told, "the Congress can be convened only by the Council." Yes, except in those cases when the Council breaks these Rules and, instead of convening the Congress, as it is in duty bound to do, fraudulently evades the issue. Precisely such a "case" was proved long ago by the Party against the Council (see Orlovsky's *The Council Against the Party*, where he shows, among other things, that according to the "Council's" arithmetic, $16 \times 4 = 61!$). We are told further that on January 1, 1905, according to the unanimous decision of the Council (including Lenin's vote) there were 33 qualified organisations besides the centres. That is not true. The Party has long known, from that pamphlet, that on January 1, 1905, the number of such organisations was only 29. The Kuban and Kazan committees mentioned by *Iskra* were never approved by the Council, while the Polesye and North-Western committees were approved only as of April 1, 1905. This leaves 29 organisations (the committees of St. Petersburg, Moscow, Tver, the North,

Tula, Nizhni-Novgorod, Saratov, Ural-Ufa, Siberia, Don, Kharkov, Kiev, Odessa, Ekaterinoslav, Riga, Orel-Bryansk, Smolensk, Samara, Voronezh, the Caucasian Federation = 4 committees, Kursk, Astrakhan, Nikolayev, Crimea, the Mining and Metal District, and the League). The "Bureau of Committees of the Majority" maintains that it has been authorised by ten organisations, the Council further states. That is a lie. The Bureau was elected, as everyone knows, before January 1, 1905, at three conferences, by 13 committees (6 Northern, 3 Southern, and 4 Caucasian). After the Bureau announced the convening of the Congress, the Voronezh and Tula committees aligned themselves with it. So that up to January 1, 1905, out of the 28 qualified organisations in Russia, 15 declared for the Congress, in defiance of the Bonapartist centres. This does not include the qualified organisations (the Saratov, Siberian, and other committees) which long ago declared themselves generally in favour of the Congress (see Shakhov's pamphlet *The Struggle for the Congress*). How ludicrous and clumsy are the Council's attempts to deceive the uninformed public, which learns of what is happening, not from documents, but from gossip abroad, is strikingly illustrated in the following two reports. In the very interesting pamphlet *Report of the Geneva Meeting on September 2, 1904*, issued by the Minority, Dan admits that the majority of the Party committees broke off all comradely relations with *Iskra*, while Plekhanov, a bitter opponent of the Majority, was compelled to declare that the forces of the warring camps were approximately equal! (This is the opinion of a resident abroad, mark you.) In Lenin's *Statement**—which, far from being refuted by the Minority, was openly acknowledged by Popov—no less a person than an agent of the Central Committee admits that the Minority has only four committees in Russia, and that at a real Party congress the Editorial Board and the Council are certain to be removed from office. Once more: whom are you trying to fool, you heroes of co-optation? You are mortally afraid of the only real Party solution—the Congress—while at the same time you claim that your opponents are backed by a negligible fraction of the total number of organisations,

* See present edition, Vol. 7, p. 537.—*Ed.*

only about a quarter at the most! In your fury you fail to see that you are castigating no one but yourselves. Is Nicholas II, then, afraid of a Constituent Assembly because the enemies of tsarism constitute only a negligible fraction of the people?

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THE PROLETARIAT AND THE BOURGEOIS DEMOCRATS

We have pointed out the unpardonable short-sightedness of the new-Iskrists' view that moderate Russian liberalism has been dealt its death-blow* and that the vanguard role of the proletariat has been recognised by our democrats. On the contrary, the bourgeois democrats are striving more than ever now to gain control of the working-class movement; more harmful now than ever, therefore, is *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ism, which the new-Iskrists are attempting to revive. Here is an interesting leaflet which is being circulated in Russia and which offers valuable material on this question:

"The bourgeoisie has lately shown a tendency towards organisation; but what is still more significant is that the bourgeois democrats are turning to the workers. The democrats want to act as leaders of the proletariat's economic and political struggle. 'By conviction,' they say, 'we are, strictly speaking, Social-Democrats; but Social-Democracy, owing to Party dissensions, does not grasp the importance of the present moment and has failed to lead the working-class movement; this is where we want to step in.' We learn from what they have to say further that these new 'Social-Democrats at heart' have not worked out any programme of their own but merely intend to explain things to the workers and answer their inquiries. The literature is to meet the same needs and is by no means to bear a Party character. And so these 'clean Social-Democrats', dissatisfied with the tactics and the present behaviour of the Committee, have turned to the methods of 'lending ear to the masses', which history

* See p. 170 of this volume.—*Ed.*

has long ago rejected, to the methods of Economism of blessed memory. Considering themselves to be Social-Democrats and the true spokesmen of working-class aspirations, these gentlemen do not understand or do not want to understand that the working-class movement will achieve substantial results only if it is led by a united working-class party, if the proletariat is conscious of its class distinctness and realises that its real emancipation lies in its own hands and not in the hands of the bourgeois democrats, who are discrediting the actions of the workers' party. These 'strictly-speaking' Social-Democrats, alleged Marxists, ought to realise the demoralisation they are bringing among the working-class masses by seeking to prove that certain 'democrats' (but not Social-Democrats) consisting exclusively of bourgeois intellectuals are called upon to show the workers the way to freedom and socialism.

"The last point, though, they seem to have entirely forgotten in their absorption with politics of the day. Little by little they are carrying elements of opportunism into the working-class movement. The workers are not so keen now on founding a party of their own, relying as they do on the intelligentsia. Why, then, do these new friends of the working class allow and even encourage such things to happen? The 'democrats' themselves give a frank reply to this question. 'Our group used to work only among the intellectuals,' they say, 'but recent events have compelled us to turn to the workers.'

"The democratic milk-skimmers, who call themselves Social-Democrats in 'principle', began to give their gracious attention to the proletarian movement only after the masses had come out into the streets and the blood of thousands of workers had stained the pavements. Posing as the true friends of the working class, they pass by with a hypocritical mien the work of decades, work which has created and directed the revolutionary mood of the Russian proletariat and, at the cost of great sacrifices, brought into being the united Social-Democratic working-class party. Apparently, these modernistic Social-Democrats have learned only one thing from the whole of Marxist doctrine (and that only recently), namely, that only the power of the organised proletariat is capable of overthrowing autocratic tyranny and

winning political freedom, the benefit of which will be derived mainly by the bourgeoisie. The new friends of the proletariat are trying to saddle themselves upon the working-class movement and urge it on with the whip of immediate results, to the shout, 'Onward, to our freedom!' How apt the Russian proverb, God save us from our friends, from our enemies we shall save ourselves."

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THE PROLETARIAT AND THE PEASANTRY

The peasant uprisings have begun. Reports of peasants raiding landed estates and confiscating the landlords' grain and cattle are coming in from various provinces. The tsarist armies, routed by the Japanese in Manchuria, are taking their revenge on the defenceless people, making expeditions against the enemy at home, against the rural poor. The urban working-class movement is acquiring a new ally in the revolutionary peasantry. The attitude of the class-conscious vanguard of the proletariat, the Social-Democrats, towards the peasant movement is becoming a question of immediate practical significance and must be placed on the order of the day in all our Party organisations, in all speeches by propagandists and agitators.

The Social-Democrats have pointed out repeatedly that the peasant movement sets before them a twofold task. Unquestionably we must support this movement and spur it on, inasmuch as it is a revolutionary-democratic movement. At the same time we must unswervingly maintain our class proletarian point of view; we must organise the rural proletariat, like the urban proletariat and together with it, into an independent class party; we must explain to it that its interests are antagonistic to those of the bourgeois peasantry; we must call upon it to fight for the socialist revolution, and point out to it that liberation from oppression and poverty lies, not in turning several sections of the peasantry into petty bourgeois, but only in replacing the entire bourgeois system by the socialist system.

This twofold task of the Social-Democrats was often stressed in the old *Iskra*, beginning with issue No. 3,* i. e., even

* "The Workers' Party and the Peasantry". See present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 420-28.—*Ed.*

before the first peasant movement of 1902; it found expression in our Party programme; it was also repeated in our newspaper (issue No. 3*). Now, when it is particularly important to throw light on the practical aspects of this problem, it would be of interest to quote the remarks of Karl Kautsky, who published an article entitled "The Peasants and the Revolution in Russia" in the German Social-Democratic journal, *Die Neue Zeit*. As a Social-Democrat, Kautsky stoutly upholds the truth that the task facing our revolution *now* is not that of effecting the socialist revolution but that of removing the political obstacles to the development of the existing, capitalist, mode of production. He goes on to say: "On the question of the relations between peasant and landlord, the revolutionary urban movement should remain neutral. It has no reason to step in between the peasants and the landlord, to champion the latter against the former; its sympathies are wholly with the peasantry. But neither is it the task of the revolutionary urban movement to incite the peasants against the landlords, who in present-day Russia play an entirely different role from that, let us say, of the French feudal nobility in the days of the *ancien régime*. Besides, even if they wished to, the urban revolutionaries could have very little influence on the relations between the landlords and the peasants. That is a matter the landlords and the peasants must settle between themselves." For a correct understanding of Kautsky's remarks, which, taken out of context, might create no little misunderstanding, one must bear in mind also the following remark at the end of the article: "A victorious revolution would not have too much difficulty in using the large latifundia of the worst enemies of the revolution ... to improve the conditions of the proletarians and the peasants."

The reader who carefully compares these statements of Kautsky will easily recognise in them the Social-Democratic presentation of the question we have just outlined. Certain inaccuracies and unclarities in Kautsky's expressions can be accounted for by the cursory nature of his remarks and his insufficient acquaintance with the agrarian programme of Russian Social-Democracy. The crux of the matter is that

* See pp. 83-89 of this volume.—*Ed.*

the attitude of the revolutionary proletariat towards the antagonism between the peasants and the landlords cannot, in all the exigencies of the Russian revolution, remain the same in all cases and under all circumstances. Under certain circumstances, in certain situations, this attitude must be one not only of sympathy, but of direct support, and not merely support, but actual "incitement". Under other circumstances, the attitude can and should be neutral. Judging from what we have quoted, Kautsky has correctly grasped this double aspect of our task, in contrast, not only to our "Socialists-Revolutionaries", who are sunk completely in the vulgar illusions of revolutionary democracy, but also to many Social-Democrats, who, like Ryazanov or X,⁷⁴ have been seeking a "simple" solution of the problem, valid for all combinations. The fundamental error of such Social-Democrats (and of all Socialists-Revolutionaries) is that they do not adhere to the class viewpoint, and that, in seeking a universal solution of the problem in all its combinations, they forget the dual nature of the well-to-do and the middle peasant. They take into account, virtually, only two classes—either landlords and "peasant and working class", or proprietors and proletarians. Actually, however, there are three classes, all of which differ in their immediate and ultimate aims: the landlords, the well-to-do peasantry and partly the middle peasantry, and, finally, the proletariat. Actually, the task of the proletariat under these circumstances is necessarily twofold. The entire difficulty of a Social-Democratic agrarian programme and agrarian policy in Russia lies in defining, as clearly and precisely as possible, the conditions under which the proletariat must observe neutrality and the conditions under which support and "incitement" are necessary.

There can be only one solution to this problem: with the peasant bourgeoisie against all manner of serfdom and against the serf-owning landlords; with the urban proletariat against the peasant bourgeoisie and every other bourgeoisie—such is the "line" of the rural proletariat and of its ideologists, the Social-Democrats. In other words: to support the peasantry and urge it on even to the point of seizing any seigniorial "property", no matter how "sacred", *insofar as* this peasantry acts in a revolutionary-democratic

manner; to be wary of the peasantry, to organise separately from it, to be ready to combat it, *insofar as* this peasantry acts in a reactionary or anti-proletarian manner. Or, to put it still differently: aid to the peasant when his struggle with the landlord contributes to the development and strengthening of the democratic forces; neutrality towards the peasant when his struggle with the landlord is merely a matter of squaring accounts between two factions of the landowning class, a matter to which the proletariat and the democrats are indifferent.

Such an answer, of course, will not satisfy people who approach the peasant question without well thought-out theoretical views, who are intent on popular "revolutionary" slogans calculated for effect, and who do not understand the great and serious danger of revolutionary adventurism, particularly in the sphere of the peasant question. In regard to such people—of whom there are now a considerable number among us, such as the Socialists-Revolutionaries, with the development of the revolution and of the peasant movement promising an increase in their ranks—the Social-Democrats must firmly uphold the standpoint of the class struggle against every kind of revolutionary vagueness; they must contrapose to revolutionary phrase-mongering the sober estimate of the heterogeneous elements in the peasantry. Speaking practically and concretely, the following statement will bring us nearest the truth: All opponents of Social-Democracy on the agrarian question fail to take into consideration the fact that in European Russia proper there is an entire stratum of well-to-do peasants (one and a half to two million households out of a total of about ten million). This stratum controls no less than half of all the implements of production and all the property owned by the peasants. It cannot exist without employing seasonal and day labourers. It is certainly hostile to serfdom, to the landlords, and to the bureaucracy, and is capable of becoming democratic, but still more certain is its hostility to the rural proletariat. Any attempt in an agrarian programme or in an agrarian policy to tone down or ignore this class antagonism is a conscious or unconscious departure from the socialist point of view.

Between the rural proletariat and the peasant bourgeoisie lies the stratum of the middle peasantry, whose position

contains features to be found in both of these antipodes. The common features in the position of all these strata, of the peasantry as a whole, undoubtedly tend to make the entire peasant movement democratic, great as may be the evidences of non-class-consciousness and of reactionary sentiment in particular instances. It is our task never to depart from the class standpoint and to organise the closest possible union between the urban and the rural proletariat. It is our task to clarify for ourselves and for the people the *real* democratic and revolutionary content that lies in the general, albeit vague, striving towards "land and freedom". It is, therefore, our task to lend the most energetic support and impetus to this striving, while at the same time preparing the elements of socialist struggle in the countryside as well.

To determine clearly the practical attitude of the Social-Democratic working-class party towards the peasant movement, the Third Congress of our Party must adopt a resolution calling for support to that movement. The following is the draft of such a resolution formulating the above views, which have repeatedly been amplified in Social-Democratic literature; it must now be discussed in the widest possible circle of Party functionaries:

"The Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, as the party of the class-conscious proletariat, strives to bring about the complete emancipation of all working people from every kind of exploitation, and supports every revolutionary movement against the present social and political system. Therefore, the R.S.D.L.P. strongly supports the present-day peasant movement, among others, and stands for all revolutionary measures capable of improving the condition of the peasantry, not halting at the expropriation of the landed estates to this end. At the same time, as the class party of the proletariat, the R.S.D.L.P. works undeviatingly towards an independent class organisation of the rural proletarians, ever mindful of its obligation to make clear to them the antagonism of their interests to those of the peasant bourgeoisie, to bring them to understand that only the common struggle of the rural and the urban proletariat against the whole of bourgeois society can lead to the socialist revolution, which alone is capable of really freeing the mass of the rural poor from poverty and exploitation.

“As a practical slogan for agitation among the peasantry, and as a means of instilling the utmost political consciousness into this movement, the R.S.D.L.P. proposes the immediate formation of revolutionary peasant committees for all-round support of all democratic reforms and for their implementation in detail. In these committees as well the R.S.D.L.P. will strive for an independent organisation of the rural proletarians for the purpose of supporting the entire peasantry in all its revolutionary-democratic actions, on the one hand, and, on the other, of safeguarding the true interests of the rural proletariat in its struggle against the peasant bourgeoisie.”

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STREET FIGHTING ⁷⁵

(THE ADVICE OF A GENERAL OF THE COMMUNE)

Editors' foreword: The article presented below is a translation from the memoirs of Cluseret, a famous leader of the Paris Commune. As is evident from the short biographical sketch here given, Cluseret based his considerations chiefly, though not exclusively, on the experience of the Paris street uprisings. Moreover, he had in mind specifically a revolution of the proletariat against all propertied classes, whereas we in Russia are now experiencing a revolution which is largely a movement of the whole people against the government clique. It goes without saying, therefore, that Cluseret's original ideas should serve the Russian proletariat only as material for an independent analysis of the experience of the West-European comrades with a view to its adaptation to our own conditions. We believe it would be useful to acquaint the reader briefly with the author's life, which is not devoid of interest.

Gustave-Paul Cluseret was born in Paris on June 13, 1823. He studied at the Military School of Saint-Cyr, from which he graduated in 1843 as a second lieutenant. In 1848, with the rank of lieutenant, he took a very active part in suppressing the workers' revolt in Paris (the June Days). Within six hours he took eleven barricades and captured three banners. For this "heroic deed" he was awarded the Order of the Legion of Honour. In 1855, now a captain, he fought in the Crimean campaign, and then retired. He served under Garibaldi in Italy's war of liberation. In 1861 he went to America, where he fought in the Civil War against the slave states. He was raised to the rank of general and (after the victory at Cross Keys) was granted American citizenship. He then

returned to France. In 1868 he received a prison term for his articles in the newspaper *L'Art*. In Sainte-Pélagie prison he became connected with leaders of the International. His sharp military criticisms in the newspapers resulted in his deportation as an American citizen. Upon the proclamation of the Republic (September 4, 1870), he returned to Paris and took part in the attempts at a revolt in Lyons and in Marseilles. On April 3, 1871, he was appointed Minister of War of the Commune. On April 16, he was elected a member of the Commune. For surrendering Fort Issy he was dismissed by the Commune and arrested, but he was acquitted by a court of honour. After the amnesty of 1881 he returned to France and contributed to the newspapers *La Commune* and *La Marseillaise*. He was sentenced to two years' imprisonment for inciting the army to insubordination and fled from France. In the 1888 elections to the Chamber of Deputies he was a candidate of the Revolutionary Party. He waged a zealous campaign against parliamentarism and the "Clemencist" Radical Party. In 1889 he was elected to the Chamber of Deputies by the second *arrondissement* of Toulon. Belonged to the Socialist Labour group. Wrote a book *The Army and Democracy* (1869) and two volumes of *Memoirs* (1887) dealing with the Commune.

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THE FIRST STEP

Knock, and it shall be opened unto you, we said after reading the Party Council's resolution of March 10, 1905, in *Iskra*, No. 91. No sooner had the news of the Council's resolution of March 8, 1905, and our answer in issue No. 10 of *Vperyod** reached Russia, than we find ourselves confronted with a remarkable new change of front on the part of the Council, a change for which we can only congratulate our comrades of the new *Iskra* with all our heart and wish them to take a further step in the same direction. .

The Council's resolution of March 10 addresses itself to the participants at the Third Party Congress that is being convened by the Russian Bureau, proposing that the Congress accept the mediation of the German Party and of Bebel towards restoring Party unity, and expresses the Council's consent to send two representatives to the Congress for talks on implementing the idea of arbitration.

In taking this first step "*on the new path*", the Council, of course, could not help employing some of its old methods; it could not help repeating an untruth, the inherent absurdity of which we exposed in *Vperyod*, No. 10, namely, that the Congress, which is being called by a majority of the Russian committees, is not a Party Congress, but that "an insignificant group of Party members" wants "to force its decisions on the real majority of the Party". These ruses would be pathetic were they not so ridiculous, and we should not care to dwell on them again, all the more so since our attention now is naturally drawn to the new step taken by the

Council, which at last (at long last!) has realised the importance of the Party Congress as a means of resolving the Party crisis and has finally made the first, albeit feeble, timid, and inconsistent attempt—but still an attempt—to look at things simply, to call a spade a spade, and to essay a path, a “new path”, for restoring Party unity by means of direct talks between the two sections of the Party that arose after the Second Congress.

Excellent! It should have been done long ago. The party of the proletariat would have been spared many months of excruciating, senseless, drawn-out crisis and clandestine splitting. A slightly more serious and sincere desire to reckon openly and frankly with the will of the Party functionaries working in Russia would have helped Russian Social-Democracy out of its temporary state of disintegration a full year ago. Yes, a year ago, even sooner.

It was at the end of January 1904. The Party Council met for the first time to discuss the new situation in the Party and the Party crisis, with Plekhanov, Axelrod, Martov, Vasilyev,^{7a} and Lenin attending. The last two, members of the Central Committee and adherents of the Majority, saw clearly that the Party had *in fact* already been split by the Minority and that the *clandestine* character of the split brought an unspeakable corruption into the Party and demoralised it completely, in that it left one side free to employ the most reckless “brawling” methods, while the other side was in duty bound to abide by the general decisions. The *clandestine* split of the Party (in its moral and political significance and in its moral and political consequences) stands to an open split approximately in the same relation as clandestine adultery to open free love.

Thus, the above-mentioned Council members proposed a resolution (January 28, 1904), which was published in full by Shakhov (*The Struggle for the Congress*, p. 81), in which *the Bolsheviks*, although outnumbered by their opponents both on the Editorial Board and in the Council, the highest Party body, were the first to raise their voice for peace in the Party, in view of the crucial problems of the historic moment. The Bolsheviks drew there a clear line between the necessary and inevitable ideological struggle, on the one hand, and the “mean brawling”, disorganisation, petty

rivalry, boycott, etc., on the other. They asked the Party Council to call on all Party members to "sink their petty differences as quickly as possible and keep the ideological struggle once and for all within such limits as would not lead to breaches of the Rules and not hamper practical activities and constructive work". We have so many Party members with short memories who like to speak of the Party's independent activity, but prefer idle gossip to a study of the documents bearing on our Party split, that we urgently recommend to all comrades desiring to have an understanding of Party affairs that they take a look at page 81 of the pamphlet *The Struggle for the Congress*.

The Mensheviks, of course, rejected the resolution proposed by Lenin and Vasilyev and adopted (Plekhanov, Martov, and Axelrod) a resolution asking the Central Committee to "co-opt" the Mensheviks. Since the Central Committee had on November 26, 1903, agreed to co-opt *two* Mensheviks of its own choice, this resolution of the Council could only mean that *three* definite individuals were being forced upon the C.C. Now the entire Party knows from published documents (Lenin's *Statement**) that it was because of these "three" that differences on points of principle were invented and a "mean brawling" was engaged in *up to November 1904*. In reply to the resolution on co-optation, Lenin and Vasilyev submitted a dissenting report (Shakhov, p. 84), which likewise we recommend to the uninformed and the forgetful to read for their own edification. This report stated that these members of the C.C. "positively and emphatically fail to see any honest and right way out of the present Party dissensions, any way of stopping this impermissible struggle over the composition of the centres other than the immediate convocation of a Party congress".

The Mensheviks, of course, are sabotaging the Congress. No reminders that at the Congress compromises of all kinds are permissible, that otherwise the struggle will assume the same revolting form as clandestine and mercenary love, produce any effect on them. Incidentally, while such tactics may be natural and understandable in the case of the Mensheviks, seeing that they have decided not to be embarrassed

* See present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 529-39.—*Ed.*

by "mercenary love", in the case of the *conciliator* Plekhanov this is an enormous mistake, which has become obvious during the further progress of the crisis. Now anybody and everybody sees, and knows from the facts (namely, from the facts of Glebov⁷⁷ and Company's subsequent behaviour) that had Plekhanov voted in January 1904 for a Congress, the Congress would have been convened very quickly and *such an imposing conciliatory party would have been formed at the Congress* that it would have given *no* preponderance *whatever* to either the Majority or the Minority. We repeat, this is no mere conjecture, but a reflection that has been *definitely confirmed* by the subsequent course of events. But Plekhanov, too, preferred "mercenary love", viz., a clandestine split, to an attempt to talk things over directly and openly until a definite agreement would be achieved.

What do we see now? The Mensheviks have to accept, albeit timidly, inconsistently, and belatedly, the solution proposed by the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks stuck to their guns and succeeded in having the Congress called, rightly maintaining that if the two "better halves" are not destined to go on "cohabiting", they must part openly.

Better late than never, of course, and we heartily welcome even this timid step taken by the Council, its readiness to send two "representatives". But we absolutely object to the timidity and inconsistency of this move. Why do you want to send to the Congress only two representatives *from the Council abroad*, gentlemen? Why not representatives from *all* Party organisations? The members of the Russian Bureau of Committees of the Majority have, as you know, *invited* everybody to the Congress, and have specially sent registered letters to the Editorial Board, to the Council, and to the League. Why this strange and inexplicable contradiction? On the one hand, when it came to securing a *hypocritical* peace with the three knights-errant of the Central Committee (in deliberate violation of the will of the Committees of the Majority) you did not rest content with sending "two representatives" from the Council, but *canvassed all the committees and organisations of the Minority*, as was openly stated in issue No. 83 of *Iskra*. On the other hand, when it comes to securing *real* peace with the entire Party, you send for "direct talks" only two representatives, and those from the

Council abroad alone. Where are the Russian Mensheviks, with whom it is a hundred times more important for us to come to terms than with a coterie of *littérateurs*? Where are the *workers*, the members and spokesmen of the organisations—those very workers whom you incited against the Second Congress, and about whose independent activity you shouted so much? Where are Comrades Akimov and Brouckère, Makhov and Yegorov (or their friends and comrades-in-idea), who, quite consistently from their point of view, supported the Mensheviks without, however, compromising themselves, i.e., without taking part in the co-optation squabbles? Where are Comrade Krichevsky and the other former “Economists”, with whom you are supposed to have made peace, as Plekhanov and many others have asserted in the new *Iskra*? Where is Comrade Ryazanov, your solidarity with whom on many points we can also understand, but who nevertheless *refused to join the League, because it was a Menshevik organisation?*

Perhaps you will say that all these comrades have no credentials? But then you yourselves write a letter to the Congress “*waiving all formalities*”!

No, gentlemen, you will not satisfy us with half-measures, nor can you butter our parsnips with fine words. If you really want, speaking frankly and without “formalities”, to work together, in the ranks of a single organisation, then *come to the Congress, all of you*, and invite all the comrades who are divided from us *only* in matters of ideology and not of co-optation. Then reckon with the “good will of revolutionaries”, to which you so fatuously referred when trying to hide from the Congress, and which *alone* can positively and conclusively decide the fate of the *whole* Party represented at the Congress. Then look for mediators capable of influencing the “good will” of *all members of the Congress*. We shall heartily welcome every such mediator.

Knock, and it shall be opened unto you.... What we Bolsheviks have achieved by our open struggle is that we have come very close to a possibly direct and unequivocal way out of the crisis. We have succeeded in getting the Congress. We have succeeded in getting the Mensheviks to change over from the drill-sergeant methods of the Party Council that has been left without a party to a straightforward, open offer

of direct negotiations. Whether or not the Council will be sensible and honest enough to take the second step along the "new path", we are convinced in any case that we shall win the complete victory of the Party principle over circle narrowness.

Vperyod, No. 11,
March 23 (10), 1905

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ON THE HISTORY OF THE PARTY PROGRAMME⁷⁸

By insisting that the draft programme was *not* written by me, Plekhanov is the first to carry our disputes over the matter into the open in the form of insinuations, rebukes, and reproaches. Unfortunately, he does not expound these disputes, but confines himself to gossip—to a statement, which though it may be piquant, is vague and unverifiable. Therefore, to my colleague's article against Plekhanov I must add that I have documentary evidence concerning our disputes during the discussion of the draft programme and that I shall publish this evidence when occasion offers. The readers will then see: (1) that Plekhanov's assertion that our relations cooled on account of *What Is To Be Done?* is absolutely untrue; they cooled because the Board of six, in the dispute over the programme, split into two halves; (2) that I advocated the thesis of the displacement of small-scale industry by large-scale industry and had it included in the programme. Plekhanov sought to confine himself to a nebulous expression in the nature of the famous "more or less"; (3) that I advocated and secured the substitution of the term "proletariat" for that of "toiling and exploited masses" in the passage dealing with the class character of our Party; and (4) that Plekhanov, when my adherents and I among the six on the Board criticised him for the fact that in his draft the proletarian character of our Party had not been brought out with sufficient clarity, parried with the counter-charge that I understood the proletarian character of the Party the way Martynov does.

ON OUR AGRARIAN PROGRAMME

(A LETTER TO THE THIRD CONGRESS)

The new peasant movement, which is daily growing and gathering strength, is again forcing the question of our agrarian programme to the fore. The basic principle underlying this programme cannot, of course, give rise to differences of opinion and discussions. The party of the proletariat must support the movement of the peasantry. It will never defend the present system of landlordism against the revolutionary onset of the peasantry, but at the same time it will always strive to develop the class struggle in the countryside and to introduce political consciousness into this struggle. These principles, I believe, are shared by all Social-Democrats. Opinion is divided only when it comes to putting the principles into practice, when it comes to formulating them in a programme to meet the tasks of the moment.

Reality is the best arbiter of all theoretical differences, and I am confident that the rapid march of revolutionary events will eliminate also these differences on the agrarian question in the Social-Democratic movement. Hardly anyone will deny that it is not our business to indulge in project-mongering for all manner of land-reform schemes, or that we must strengthen the ties with the proletariat and *support* the peasant movement, without however losing sight of the possessive tendencies of the peasant proprietor—tendencies whose antagonism to the proletariat will be all the more rapidly and sharply revealed the more rapidly the revolution advances.

On the other hand, the present revolutionary moment plainly calls for a thoroughly definite and concrete slogan. The formation of *revolutionary peasant* committees must

become that slogan, and our Party's agrarian programme has quite correctly advanced it. There is a great amount of ignorance and backwardness in the peasant movement, and it would be extremely dangerous to cherish any illusions on that score. The ignorance of the peasant is revealed, first of all, in his failure to perceive the *political* aspect of the movement, to perceive, for instance, that without radical democratic changes in the *entire* political structure of the *entire state* it is absolutely impossible to make any lasting progress in the direction of extending the ownership of the land. The peasant needs land, and his revolutionary feeling, his instinctive, primitive sense of democracy *cannot* express itself otherwise than by laying hands on the landlords' land. No one will attempt to dispute this, of course. The Socialists-Revolutionaries let it go at that instead of analysing these vague aspirations of the peasantry from the class point of view. The Social-Democrats maintain, on the basis of such an analysis, that it is scarcely *possible* for the entire peasantry to go solid on any issue beyond the demand for the return of the cut-off lands,⁷⁹ for when the limits of such an agrarian reform are exceeded, the antagonism between the rural proletariat and the "enterprising muzhiks" will inevitably assert itself more sharply than ever. The Social-Democrats, of course, can have no objection to the insurgent muzhik's "dealing the landlord the final blow" and to his taking *all* his land away from him, but they cannot embark on adventurism in a proletarian programme, they cannot let the class struggle against the property-owners be obscured by roseate prospects of such changes in the landowning system (even though these changes may be democratic) as would merely reshuffle the classes or categories of property-owners.

Until now our programme contained the demand for the return of the cut-off lands, while the various commentaries on the programme pointed out that the cut-off lands are not a barrier, but "a door leading farther"* , and that the proletariat would gladly support the peasantry in this further advance, while having to keep a watchful eye on its temporary ally, the peasant proprietor, lest he

* *To the Rural Poor*, first published in pamphlet form, Geneva, May 1903. See present edition, Vol. 6, p. 420.—*Ed.*

show his proprietary teeth. Now, in face of the revolutionary events, the question naturally arises whether it would not be more appropriate to transfer *such* a statement of our tactics from the commentaries to the programme proper. After all, the programme is the official general Party expression of the views of Social-Democracy, whereas a commentary necessarily represents the more or less personal views of this or that Social-Democrat. Would it not, therefore, be wiser to put into the programme a more general statement of our policy on this question, and leave it to the commentaries to elaborate on specific measures and separate demands, as, for instance, the cut-off lands?

To clarify my idea, I shall state here how the corresponding place in our programme ought to be formulated: (The R.S.D.L.P. demands above all)... "(4) the formation of revolutionary peasant committees for the purpose of eliminating all remnants of the serf-owning system, transforming all rural relations in general along democratic lines, taking revolutionary measures to improve the lot of the peasantry, even to the extent of taking the land away from the landlords. Social-Democracy will back the peasantry in all its revolutionary-democratic undertakings, while at the same time defending the independent interests and the independent organisation of the rural proletariat."

The proposed formulation introduces into the programme what has hitherto usually been elaborated in the commentaries and transfers the cut-off lands from the programme to them. Such a change has the advantage of bringing out more clearly in the programme the specific, independent character of the proletarian position; and clarity on such an important issue outweighs all editorial inconveniences (such as the inclusion in the programme of an explanation usually placed in the commentaries, instead of a definite demand; we might mention, incidentally, that our programme contains such explanations: compare, for instance, the clause on combating reforms that tend to consolidate the tutelage of the police and the bureaucracy).⁹⁰ Another advantage is that the programme quashes once and for all the absurd idea alleging that the Social-Democrats tell the peasants they cannot and must not go beyond the cut-off lands. We must dispel this idea by a clear formulation in the programme, and not

confine ourselves to explaining it in the commentaries. The fact that no concrete methods for expropriating the land are mentioned in the proposed formulation may appear to be a defect. But is it, strictly speaking, a defect?

Social-Democrats who have written on the agrarian question have pointed out repeatedly how inappropriate it is for us to occupy ourselves with project-mongering in this connection, since the chief measure of an agrarian reform—nationalisation of the land—would, *in a police-ridden state*, necessarily be perverted and would serve only to obscure the class nature of the movement. Yet all other measures for transforming agrarian relations will, under the capitalist system, be only an approach to nationalisation; they will be only partial measures, only a few of the possible measures, i.e., measures to which Social-Democracy has no intention whatever of *restricting itself*. At the present time the Social-Democrats are against nationalisation, and even the Socialists-Revolutionaries, under the influence of our criticism, have become much more cautious on the subject (compare their draft programme with their former “*élan*”).

But the point is that the revolutionary movement leads us towards the democratic republic, which, with the abolition of the standing army, etc., constitutes one of our immediate demands.

In a democratic republic, with the people armed and with other measures of a like republican character realised, Social-Democracy cannot renounce nationalisation of the land and thereby tie their own hands on this issue. Thus, the defect in the formulation I propose is only an apparent one. In point of fact, this formulation provides a consistent class slogan for the present moment—indeed, an absolutely concrete slogan—while leaving ample scope for the “revolutionary-democratic” measures which may prove necessary or desirable in the event of a favourable development of our revolution. At the present time, as well as in the future, pending the complete victory of the peasant uprising, a revolutionary slogan must necessarily take into account the antagonism between *peasant and landlord*; and the cut-off lands clause quite correctly emphasised this circumstance. On the other hand, all and every “nationalisation”, “transfer of rents”,

"socialisation", etc., ignore and obscure this characteristic antagonism, and therein lies their defect.

At the same time, the formulation I propose widens the aims of the revolutionary peasant committees to include "transforming all rural relations in general along democratic lines". The peasant committees are presented as a slogan in our programme, which correctly characterises them as *peasant*, i.e., social-estate, in essence, since oppression of one social-estate by another can be destroyed only by the whole of the lower, oppressed estate. But is there any reason for confining the aims of these committees to agrarian reforms? Must *other* committees really be set up for other, e.g., administrative, reforms? The trouble with the peasants, as I have previously pointed out, is their utter failure to perceive the political aspect of the movement. If we could succeed, even in a few instances, in connecting the effective revolutionary measures taken by the peasantry to improve their position (confiscation of grain, of livestock, and of *land*) with the formation and activity of *peasant committees* and with the full sanctioning of these committees by the revolutionary parties (and, under especially favourable conditions, by a provisional revolutionary government), we could consider the struggle to win the peasants for the democratic republic as won. Unless the peasantry is thus won over, all its revolutionary steps will be very insecure, and all its gains will easily be wrested from it by the social classes in power.

Finally, in speaking of supporting "revolutionary-democratic" measures, the proposed formulation draws a clear line between the deceptive, pseudo-socialist *appearance* of such measures as the peasant seizure of land and their actual democratic content. To realise how important it is for a Social-Democrat to draw such a line, it suffices to recall the attitude of Marx and Engels towards the agrarian movement, for instance, in America (Marx in 1848 on Kriege,⁸¹ Engels in 1885 on Henry George⁸²). Today, of course, no one will attempt to *deny* the existence of a peasant war for land, of the land fever (in semi-feudal countries or in the colonies). We fully recognise its legitimacy and its progressiveness, but at the same time we reveal its democratic, i.e., *in the final analysis*, its bourgeois-democratic content. Therefore,

while endorsing this content, we, for our part, make special "reservations"; we point to the "independent" role of the *proletarian* democratic movement and to the specific aims of the Social-Democratic Party as a class party that is working for the socialist revolution.

These are the reasons that lead me to suggest that the comrades discuss my proposal at the forthcoming Congress and broaden the corresponding clause of the programme in the direction I propose.

Vperyol, No. 12,
March 29 (16), 1905
[signed] —

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WHAT THE BONAPARTISTS ARE UP TO

Geneva, March 29 (16)

We have just received the following report from Tver: "A periphery meeting held jointly with the Committee on March 9, and attended by a representative of the Central Committee, discussed the question of the attitude to the Third Party Congress which is being convened by the C.C. (appeal to the Party dated March 4, 1905). The resolution of the Tver Committee was read out: 'The Tver Committee welcomes the call of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. to prepare for the Third Party Congress (resolution of the C.C. dated March 4, 1905) and it has resolved at its meeting to participate in the Congress by sending a delegate. In view, however, of the statement made by the Tver Committee to a representative of the Organising Bureau about participating in the Congress organised by that Bureau, the Tver Committee feels obligated to point out that this statement was made in response to the Bureau representative's* assurance of the C.C. decision to make the Congress then in preparation a regular one.'"

The periphery meeting did not support the resolution of the Tver Committee. The following resolution was adopted

* The representative of the Bureau of Committees of the Majority, who made the report on the Third Congress at a meeting of the Tver Committee and the periphery in February, informs us that this assertion of the Tver Committee is "inaccurate". "I told them", he declares, "according to the *direct statement* of C.C. member Nikitich,⁸³ that the C.C. *had intended* to announce the Third Congress, thus making the Congress convened by the Bureau a regular congress by agreement, but that it *had not had time* for various reasons to enter into official negotiations with the Bureau on the question."

by a majority of seven votes to one with one abstention: "Having at last received the call of the Central Committee to prepare for the immediate convocation of the Third Congress, and welcoming this act of the C.C., we declare that we have already decided to take part in the *Party* Congress that is being convened by the Organising Bureau. We consider it possible to avail ourselves of the offer made by the C.C. in its appeal 'To the Party' dated March 4 only on the condition that a formal agreement is reached between the C.C. and the Organising Bureau" (6 for, 3 against). To note the mood of the other three comrades, who voted in the negative, I cite the other resolution, offered by two of the comrades who thus voted: "The local organisation welcomes the decision of the Central Committee to convene a Third Party Congress and strongly urges it and the Organising Bureau to come to an agreement between themselves. Should an agreement not eventuate, the local organisation leaves itself a free hand."

It follows from this report that: (1) the Tver Committee, together with the periphery, had declared, according to the Committee's own admission, its consent to participate in the Congress organised by the Bureau of Committees of the Majority; (2) subsequently, the Tver Committee, under the influence of the C.C.'s new promises to convene the Third Congress, withdrew its consent. The periphery, however, did not support the Committee and did not decline to participate in the Congress which the Bureau had called; (3) the C.C.'s new promises to convene the Third Congress were given in the appeal "To the Party, dated March 4, 1905", which has so far remained unpublished and is unknown to us.

To appraise the behaviour of our famous C.C. at its true worth, we would remind our comrades, first, of the Party Rules, and secondly, of certain facts. According to the Rules a congress is convened by the *Council*, and not by the Central Committee. Consequently, the C.C. is giving promises it cannot live up to. It promises to do what, under the Rules, it cannot do. The C.C. promises or proposes, but the Council disposes. As for those members of the Party who are naïve enough to lend an ear to the C.C.'s promises and are unfamiliar with the Rules, they find themselves in the position of dupes. How the Council "disposes" the facts reveal. In its resolution of March 8 (new style) the Council declares

(*Iskra*, No. 89) that “with the assent of the majority of the Party workers” (perhaps including the Tver Committee?) “it considers it inexpedient to convene the Party Congress at such a moment”. Can anything be clearer? Does this not show that the Council, time and again, is shamelessly deceiving the Party, since it never did have the “assent” of the “majority of Party workers”?

Further, on March 10 (N.S.), that is, two days later, the Council adopted another resolution (*Iskra*, No. 91) agreeing to send two representatives to the Congress convened by the Russian Bureau of Committees of the Majority, *but saying not a word about agreeing to the convening of the Congress*.

We would add that the Council not only takes a position officially against the “expediency” of convening the Congress but *rigs the votes to the Congress* by increasing the number of allegedly qualified committees and refusing to inform the Party which new committees it considers to be accredited and when they were accredited. In the resolution of the Council of March 8 (discussed in *Vperyod*, No. 10*), the committees considered qualified as of January 1, 1905, were those of Polesye, the North-West, Kuban, and Kazan, whereas the last two committees were not accredited at all by the C.C. and the former will not be qualified until April 1, 1905.

We ask the Party members who wish to be real and not just registered members whether they are going to stand for this game. The Council rigs the votes and declares against the Congress, while the C.C. gives “promises” as regards the Congress, taking advantage of the naïveté of people who do not know that according to the Rules these promises *can have no formal weight*. Do not the facts *wholly* confirm what we wrote on February 28 (15) in *Vperyod*, No. 8, at the first reports of the C.C.’s “assent” to the Congress? We would remark that *a month has passed* since then, that *Iskra* has since issued Nos. 88, 89, 90, 91, and 92 (dated March 10, O.S.) without saying a word on this “ticklish” question of the C.C.’s “assent” to the Congress. We can only repeat what we said in *Vperyod*, No. 8:

“We have just received a report that can be interpreted to mean that the Central Committee agrees to an immediate congress. We can

* See pp 225-27 of this volume.—*Ed.*

in no way vouch for the authenticity of the report at the present moment, but we consider it probable. The C.C. has campaigned against the Congress for many months; it has cashiered the organisations and boycotted and disorganised the committees that have declared for the Congress. These tactics have failed. Now, following the rule 'expediency is everything, formality is nothing', the C.C., for the sake of 'expediency' (*that is, for the sake of preventing the Congress*) is prepared formally to declare a hundred times if need be that it is for the immediate convocation of the Congress. We hope that neither the Bureau nor the local committees will let themselves be deceived by the subterfuges of the Party's 'Shidlovsky Commission'." ⁸⁴

P.S. Geneva, March 30 (17). We are obliged to keep a regular diary of the C.C.'s subterfuges. We have received the following letter of the C.C. to the Bureau of Committees of the Majority:

"The Central Committee decided on March 4 to call upon the committees of the Party to prepare for the Third Congress of the Party and on its part has decided to take steps to convene the Congress at the earliest possible date.

"Since the success of an *all-Party* congress and its speedy convocation depend on the unanimous collaboration of the utmost possible number of all comrades and organisations that are declaring *now* for the Congress, the C.C. proposes to the Organising Bureau of Committees of the so-called 'Majority' to enter into an agreement on this matter and work together towards convening the Congress speedily and towards ensuring the fullest possible representation of the *entire* Party. March 6, 1905. C.C., R.S.D.L.P."

Infinite indeed is the long-suffering patience of the Russian committees and their credulity! Why does not the C.C. publish its appeal of March 4? Why does it mouth mendacious phrases about an "agreement" with the Bureau? The Bureau invited *everyone* to the Congress without exception, the *entire Party*; it did so over a month ago openly and publicly. The Bureau answered the C.C. long since that *no delays* were now *possible*. Everyone who wants an *all-Party congress* not merely in words is invited; it's as clear as that. Besides, what sense would there be in an agreement between the Bureau and the C.C., when it is not the C.C. that convenes the Congress under the Rules but the Council, which has gone on record against the Congress?

It is to be hoped that *everyone* now will see through the double game which the Council and the C.C. are playing. The Bureau, we are sure, will not retreat a single step from its work of convening the Congress upon the date it has *set* for it and of which it has *notified the C.C.*

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A REVOLUTION OF THE 1789 OR THE 1848 TYPE?

An important question in connection with the Russian revolution is the following:

I. Will it go on to the *complete* overthrow of the tsarist government and the establishment of a republic?

II. Or will it limit itself to a curtailment of tsarist power, to a monarchist constitution?

In other words, are we to have a revolution of the 1789 type or of the 1848 type?* (We say *type* in order to dispose of the preposterous idea that there can be any repetition of the irrevocably vanished social, political, and international situations of 1789 and 1848.)

That a Social-Democrat must want and *work for* the former, of this there can hardly be any doubt.

Yet Martynov's way of stating the issue reduces itself wholly to a tail-ender's desire for a more modest revolution. In type II the "danger", so frightening to the Martynovs, of the proletariat and the peasantry seizing power is entirely eliminated. In this case Social-Democracy will unavoidably remain "in opposition"—*even to the revolution*; this indeed is what Martynov wants—to remain in opposition even to the revolution.

The question is, which type is the more probable?

In favour of type I we have: (1) An immeasurably greater store of resentment and revolutionary feeling among the lower classes in Russia than there was in the Germany of 1848. With us the change is *sharper*; with us there have been

* N.B. Some might add here "or of the 1871 type"? This question must be considered as a probable *objection* raised against us by many non-Social-Democrats.

no intermediate stages between autocracy and political freedom (the Zemstvo does not count); with us despotism is Asiatically virginal. (2) With us a disastrous war increases the likelihood of a *severe* collapse, for it has involved the tsarist government completely. (3) With us the international situation is more favourable, for proletarian Europe will make it impossible for the crowned heads of Europe to help the Russian monarchy. (4) With us the development of class-conscious revolutionary parties, their literature and organisation, is on a much higher level than it was in 1789, 1848, or 1871. (5) With us the various nationalities oppressed by tsarism, such as the Poles and Finns, provide a powerful impulse to the attack on the autocracy. (6) With us the peasantry is in particularly sorry plight; it is incredibly impoverished and has absolutely nothing to lose.

Of course, all these considerations are by far not absolute. Others may be contraposed to them: (1) We have very few survivals of feudalism. (2) The government is more experienced and has greater facilities for detecting the danger of revolution. (3) The spontaneity of a revolutionary outburst is complicated by the war, which creates problems that have no bearing on the revolution. The war demonstrates the weakness of the Russian revolutionary classes, which would not have had the strength to rise without it (cf. Karl Kautsky in *The Social Revolution*). (4) Other countries provide no stimulus to a revolution in ours. (5) The national movements towards the dismemberment of Russia are likely to tear the bulk of the Russian big and petty bourgeoisie away from our revolution. (6) The antagonism between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie with us is much deeper than it was in 1789, 1848, or 1871; hence, the bourgeoisie will be more fearful of the *proletarian* revolution and will throw itself more readily into the arms of reaction.

Only history, of course, can weigh these pros and cons in the balances. Our task as Social-Democrats is to *drive* the bourgeois revolution onward as far as it will go, without ever losing sight of our *main* task—the independent organisation of the proletariat.

This is where Martynov gets muddled. The complete revolution means seizure of power by the proletariat and the poor peasantry. *These classes*, once in power, *cannot* but

strive for the *socialist* revolution. *Ergo*, seizure of power, from being at first a step in the *democratic* revolution, will, by force of circumstances, and against the will (and sometimes without the awareness) of its participants, *pass into* the socialist revolution. *And here failure is inevitable*. If attempts at the socialist revolution are bound to end in failure, we must (like Marx in 1871, when he foresaw the inevitable failure of the insurrection in Paris) *advise* the proletariat *not to rise*, but to wait and organise, *reculer pour mieux sauter*.*

Such, in substance, is Martynov's *idea* (and that of the new *Ishra*, too), had he been able to reason it out to its logical end.

Written in March-April 1905

Published according to
the manuscript

To step back, the better to leap.—*Ed.*

TO THE PARTY

Comrades, you all know what a distressing crisis our Party has been passing through these past eighteen months and more. Ever since the Second Party Congress, owing to a series of deplorable circumstances, the central bodies of our Party abroad—the Editorial Board of the Central Organ and the Council—have come under the control of the adherents of the Party Congress Minority. The dissatisfaction among our Party workers continued to grow and developed into a concealed, intense struggle, which seriously hampered the entire activity of Social-Democracy and impaired the prestige of the proletarian party. Seeing the harm this secret split was causing, the Party committees began to demand the convening of the Third Congress as the only party way out of the crisis. The struggle for the Congress has been the vitalising breath of the Party activities since the spring of 1904. The Party Council abroad opposed the idea of the Congress in every way it could. The Central Committee sought to meet the demands of the Minority in the matter of co-optation in the hope thereby to restore peace within the Party. But this hope was dashed. Instead of peace being restored, the struggle was intensified.

The ensuing great events in the development of the working-class movement and the revolution in Russia, the events of January 9 and its aftereffects, created a new situation which taxed the Party's powers and energies still more. For the overwhelming majority of the Party workers in Russia the Congress became a pressing need. The resistance of the Council abroad resulted in the election by a number of committees in Russia of a special Bureau for convening the Party Congress. Under the circumstances the C.C.

deemed it its party duty to join the Bureau of Committees of the Majority for the immediate convening of the Party Congress.

The need for the Congress, even from a narrow formal point of view, is borne out by the following. The members of the Party learned from issue No. 89 of *Iskra* that, apart from the central bodies, the Party Council considered 33 organisations qualified. Consequently, even on this count (disputed by a large number of Party workers, who set the number of Party organisations at 31) 38 votes were required to make the convocation of the Congress obligatory ($33 \times 2 = 66$; $66 + 9 = 75$; $75 : 2 = 37\frac{1}{2}$).

The thirteen committees that elected the Bureau of Committees of the Majority have long since declared for the Congress. The 13 have been joined by the committees of the Urals, Tula, Voronezh, Samara, the North-West, Smolensk, Kharkov, and Kazan, i.e., by 8 committees. These 21 committees, together with the four votes of the C.C. (two votes of the C.C. itself and two of its delegates on the Council), give $42 + 4 = 46$ votes.

Written at the end of March-
beginning of April 1905

Published according to
the manuscript

THE SECOND STEP

In issue No. 11 of *Vperyod* we hailed the first step of the Party Council which was left without a party.* We asked ourselves whether the Council would have the sense and honesty to make the second step along its new path. Now we have just received news from Russia that *the Central Committee has made the second step*. We are able to publish immediately the following documents in the case.

1) Appeal of the Central Committee to the Party of March 4, 1905.

To the Party

Comrades, the revolution in Russia has begun! Its prelude has proved in the most incontrovertible manner that the principal force deciding its outcome is the urban proletariat. However, in the matter of speeding the issue of the revolution, of bringing system into the revolutionary struggle of the masses, and, especially, of turning the results of the revolution to the fullest account in favour of the proletariat, a great deal depends on the actual state of our Party's forces and its organisation. History has imposed upon our Party the political and moral responsibility towards the Russian proletariat, towards our whole nation, and, lastly, towards the proletariat the world over. In its present state our Party is not capable of fulfilling its obligations to the extent necessary and possible, considering the potential strength of Russian Social-Democracy. The C.C. deems it untimely and useless at the present juncture to prove, chapter and verse, whether and to what extent certain prominent Party members, influential groups, and entire Party bodies were guided in their inner-Party activities by profound political motives or by intellectualist politicking; in short, without trying to apportion the blame for the deep-going disorganisation of the Party, the C.C., fully realising the weight of the responsibility that rests upon it, declares before the whole Party that it has firmly decided to do everything in its power to ensure necessary unity in the Party and prevent a final split. The development of the revolution cou-

* See pp. 239-44 of this volume.—Ed.

fronts Russian Social-Democracy almost daily with new problems. Many of these issues have barely been touched upon by our tactics, which were evolved chiefly for "peace-time" use. Others have no precedent whatever in former Party practice, since they have arisen from new causes which never existed before. Party literature, of course, is a help, but its answers do not always satisfy local workers as regards adequacy, unity, and generally recognised competence. Quite recently a considerable number of committees, which united after private meetings, have adopted a policy of distrust towards the central bodies of the Party, existing by virtue of the Party Rules adopted at the Second Congress of the Party, and have carried this policy to the extent of forming their own organ and their own centre, and are at present engaged in convening their own congress. Finally, the time set by the Party Rules for convening the Third regular Congress falls due this summer.

Under the circumstances the C.C. considers that the only and final means of avoiding a split is *the convening of the all-Party Congress in the very near future.*

Convinced that the useful results of the Congress, in the sense both of dealing with the vital tasks that the present political situation has put before our Party and of achieving real, lasting unity in the Party, will depend entirely on the broad and full representation of all the important and influential currents at the Congress, the C.C., in pursuance of the Rules, has decided, in the interests of fuller representation, to make wide use of its right to invite to the Congress comrades with consultative voice. In view of the fact that the dissensions which have been rending the Party have led in some places to a complete break-away of major groups from the committees, and in others to sharp antagonism between committees and peripheries, the C.C. invites the following bodies to send their own delegates to the Congress with consultative voice: (1) all groups that broke away from the committees prior to March 1, 1905; (2) all peripheries of large industrial centres in which there are 20,000 workers or over in the area of the committee's activity and where over half the periphery members vote no confidence in the local committee on the question of the election of a delegate to the Congress.

Note. The C.C. proposes that for this purpose only those comrades shall be considered members of the periphery who belong to a committee organisation and engage in active revolutionary work under the direction and control of the committee, such as propaganda, agitation, organisation, and the writing, printing, and distribution of literature. Moreover, since the all-Party Congress, according to the Rules, is convened by the Party Council, the C.C., while calling upon the local committees to declare for the Third Congress as the only means now of ensuring Party unity, will, for its part, support its decision for the immediate convocation of the Congress through its representatives on the Party Council, and will straight away take a number of practical preparatory steps. In addition, the C.C. declares that it will do everything in its power to enlist to the business of convening the Congress the "Organising Bureau" set up for that purpose on the initiative of several of the committees; the preparatory work of this Bureau may help to speed and facilitate the convening of the Congress.

Note. The details of enlisting the services of the "Organising Bureau" of Committees of the so-called "Majority" for the work of convening the Congress should be worked out by mutual agreement. Viewing the *immediate* convocation of the all-Party Congress as the last means of avoiding a split and creating real unity of the Party, which alone can give us the necessary strength to tackle the great tasks confronting Russian Social-Democracy, the Central Committee calls upon all members of the Party to make the most energetic preparations for the *Congress* which must *urgently* be held.

Central Committee, R.S.D.L.P.

March 4, 1905

2) A letter of the C.C. to the Bureau of Committees of the Majority, dated March 6, 1905.

On March 4 the Central Committee decided to call upon the committees of the Party to prepare for the Third Congress, and for its part it decided to take steps for convening the Congress at the earliest possible date.

Since the success of the *all-Party* Congress and its convocation at the earliest possible date depend on the co-operation of all the comrades and organisations *now* declaring for the Congress, the C.C. proposes to the Organising Bureau of Committees of the so-called "Majority" to enter into an agreement on this matter and work together for convening the Congress at the earliest and for ensuring the fullest possible representation at the Congress of the *whole* Party.

Central Committee, R.S.D.L.P.

March 6, 1905

3) Joint appeal to the Party by the C.C. and the Bureau of Committees of the Majority, dated March 12, 1905.

T o t h e P a r t y

The Central Committee and the Bureau of Committees of the Majority have taken upon themselves the initiative for convening the Third Congress of the Party and notify all Party organisations that, proceeding from the urgent need for immediately holding the Third Party Congress to establish the general line of Party tactics and the Party's organisational unity, they have come to an agreement for the joint organisation of the Congress on the following basis:

1) The Congress is to be convened on the basis of the programmes set forth in the declarations of the Central Committee and the Bureau of Committees of the Majority; these programmes provide for the following agenda:

(a) Constitution of the Congress; (b) questions of Party tactics; (c) questions of Party organisation: (1) organisation of the centres, (2) organisation of the committees, (3) relations between the various Party bodies and their divisions; (d) reports; (e) elections.

2) All Party organisations having the right to participate with a vote under the Rules of the Second Congress are invited to the Congress (viz., the four Caucasian committees, the Moscow, St. Petersburg, Tver, Tula, Nizhni-Novgorod, Northern, Kiev, Odessa, Ekaterinoslav, Kharkov, Don Region, Voronezh, Nikolayev, Saratov, Samara, North-Western, Polesye, and the Astrakhan committees, and the League; the Donets, Crimean, Ural, and Siberian leagues) *; all the rest are invited to participate with consultative voice.

3) The organising work in connection with the convening of the Third Party Congress so far carried out by the Bureau of Committees of the Majority is herewith endorsed.

4) All further work in connection with convening the Congress is to be carried out jointly by the Bureau of Committees of the Majority and the Central Committee, which form an Organising Committee.

5) The resolution of the Party Council against convening the Third Party Congress published in *Iskra*, No. 89, is not accepted by the Central Committee and the Bureau of Committees of the Majority as grounds for suspending work on organising the Congress

March 12, 1905

The agreement between the Central Committee and the Bureau of Committees of the Majority of March 12, 1905, is for the time being not to be made public.

* * *

We can thus celebrate a complete moral victory. Russia has gained the upper hand over the "foreigners". The Party spirit has triumphed over circle parochialism. At the last minute the Central Committee saw that the Congress which was being convened by the Bureau of Committees of the Majority was a real Party congress and joined it. The Central Committee at the eleventh hour had courage enough to abandon its anti-Party policy and to defy the Council abroad. According to the Rules of our Party the Congress is convened by the Council and not by the Central Committee. Consequently, legally speaking, no statements or agreements on this question by the Central Committee are valid. But when the Council violated the Rules and avoided rendering an account to a congress, it was the duty and not only the right of the committees to take the initiative in convening

* With reference to the Riga, Smolensk, Kursk, Orel-Bryansk, Kazan, Kremenchug, Elisavetgrad, and Kuban committees, see Point 3 of the agreement between the Central Committee and the Bureau of Committees of the Majority.

the Congress; and the Central Committee, by recognising the Bureau elected by the committees, refused to follow the unfortunate example of the Party Council which was left without a party.

We cannot at the moment express any opinion on the concrete questions of the agreement between the Central Committee and the Bureau of Committees of the Majority. All these questions, as well as the question of the agenda, the constitution of the Congress, etc., will, of course, be decided by the Congress itself. We shall therefore confine ourselves merely to wishing the Congress success and appealing to all comrades to apply themselves immediately and with the utmost energy to all the necessary preparations for the Congress. It is left for us in conclusion to repeat what we said in *Vperyod*, No. 11, namely, that "... we have come very close to a possibly direct and unequivocal way out of the crisis."*

Vperyod, No. 13,
April 5 (March 23), 1905

Published according to
the text in *Vperyod*

* See p. 243 of this volume.—*Ed.*

EUROPEAN CAPITAL AND THE AUTOCRACY

The Social-Democratic press has repeatedly pointed out that European capital is the saviour of Russian autocracy. Without foreign loans Russian autocracy would not be able to survive. It was advantageous to the French bourgeoisie to support its military ally, so long, especially, as payments on the loans were punctually forthcoming. And the French bourgeoisie lent the autocratic government the round little sum of *ten milliard francs* (about 4,000 million rubles).

However ... there is nothing eternal under the moon. The war with Japan revealed the utter rottenness of the autocracy and ultimately undermined Russia's credit even with the French bourgeoisie, its "friend and ally". In the first place, the war showed up Russia's military weakness; secondly, a continuous chain of reverses, one more crushing than the other, has shown the hopelessness of the war and the inevitability of the complete downfall of the whole absolutist system of government; thirdly, the formidable growth of the revolutionary movement in Russia has inspired the European bourgeoisie with a mortal dread of an explosion that might set all Europe ablaze. Mountains of inflammable material have piled up within the last few decades. And now all these factors, taken together, have led ultimately to the refusal of further loans. The recent attempt of the autocratic government to borrow from France, as it had done in the past, ended in failure. On the one hand, capital no longer has confidence in the autocracy; on the other, fearing a revolution, capital wants to put pressure on the autocracy to have it conclude peace with Japan and to come to terms with the Russian liberal bourgeoisie.

European capital is speculating on peace. The bourgeoisie in Europe as well as in Russia has begun to see the connection between war and revolution, to fear a really popular and victorious movement against tsarism. The bourgeoisie wants to preserve the "social order" of a society based on exploitation against excessive shocks; it wants to preserve the Russian monarchy as a constitutional, or pseudo-constitutional, monarchy, and is therefore speculating on peace in pursuance of anti-proletarian and anti-revolutionary interests. This indubitable fact clearly shows us that even so "simple" and plain an issue as that of war and peace cannot properly be posed if the class antagonisms of modern society are lost sight of, if the fact is overlooked that the bourgeoisie in everything it does, howsoever democratic or humanitarian it may appear, defends first and foremost the interests of its own class, the interests of "social peace", viz., the suppression and disarming of all oppressed classes. The proletarians' way of presenting the question of peace, therefore, differs and must inevitably differ from that of the bourgeois democrats, as it does on the questions of free trade, anti-clericalism, etc. The proletariat struggles against war and will always struggle against it unremittingly, without, however, forgetting for a moment that war can be abolished only with the complete abolition of society's division into classes; that while class rule continues to exist war cannot be regarded only from the sentimentally democratic standpoint; that in a war between exploiting nations one must distinguish between the roles of the progressive and of the reactionary bourgeoisie of each nation. Russian Social-Democracy has had to apply these general principles of Marxism concretely to the war with Japan. In dealing with the significance of this war (see *Vperyod*, No. 2, the article "The Fall of Port Arthur"*), we pointed out that not only our Socialists-Revolutionaries (who blamed Guesde and Hyndman for sympathising with Japan), but also the new-Iskrists, had adopted a false, bourgeois-democratic standpoint. With the latter this found expression, first, in considerations of "peace at any price", and, secondly, in the contention that it is impermissible "to speculate on a victory of the

Japanese bourgeoisie". Both these considerations were worthy only of a bourgeois democrat, who deals with political questions on sentimental grounds. Reality has now shown that "peace *at any price*" has become the slogan of the European financiers and reactionaries (Prince Meshchersky in *Grazhdanin*⁸⁵ now speaks clearly of the need for peace for the salvation of the autocracy). It is now perfectly clear that speculation on peace for the purpose of suppressing the revolution is a speculation of reactionaries, in contrast to the speculation of the *progressive* bourgeoisie on a victory of the Japanese bourgeoisie. The new *Iskra*'s phrase-mongering against "speculation" in general is actually mere sentimental balderdash, far from the class standpoint and from any consideration of the various social forces.

The events that have exposed the new visage of the reactionary bourgeoisie were so glaring that now even *Iskra* has begun to see its error. Whereas in issue No. 83 it "snapped back" at our article in *Vperyod*, No. 2, we now read with pleasure in issue No. 90 (leader): "We should not demand *only* peace; for if the autocracy continues to exist, peace will spell ruin to the country." Exactly: we should not demand *only* peace; for a tsarist peace is no better (and is sometimes worse) than a tsarist war. We should not put forward the slogan of "peace at any price", but only of peace with the fall of the autocracy, of peace concluded by a liberated nation, by a free Constituent Assembly, i.e., peace not at any price, but solely at the price of overthrowing absolutism. Let us hope that *Iskra*, having realised this, will also realise the inappropriateness of its highly moral tirades against speculation on a victory of the Japanese bourgeoisie.

Let us return, however, to European capital and its political "speculations". How much tsarist Russia quails before this capital may be seen, for instance, from the following highly instructive incident. *The Times*, organ of the conservative English bourgeoisie, published an article entitled "Is Russia Solvent?" The article described in detail the "subtle mechanism" of the financial manipulations of Messrs. Witte, Kokovtsev & Co. They are always running their business at a loss. They muddle through only by getting deeper and deeper into debt. In between loans the proceeds of the preceding loan are placed in the Treasury, and the "gold

reserve" is then triumphantly proclaimed a "free cash balance". The gold obtained as a loan is shown to everybody as proof of Russia's wealth and solvency! Small wonder that the English merchant compared this hanky-panky to the tricks of the Humberts, the famous impostors, who used to display borrowed or swindled money (or even a safe purporting to contain money) in order to obtain new loans. *The Times* writes: "The frequent appearances of the Russian Government as a borrower in the Continental money market are due, not to capital requirements—that is to say, to reproductive enterprises or exceptional and transitory expenses—but almost exclusively to the normal deficiency of national income. This means that, as she is situated today, Russia is marching direct to insolvency. Her national balance-sheet leaves her every year deeper in debt. Her liabilities to the foreigner are more than her people can bear, and she has practically nothing to show for them. Her gold reserve is a colossal Humbert safe, the vaunted millions of which are unconsciously lent by her dupes for their own further deception."

How artful! To pick a dupe, borrow money from him, then show him this very money as evidence of your wealth, in order to wheedle further loans from him!

The comparison with those notorious swindlers, the Humbert family, was so apt and the "gist" and purpose of the famous "free cash balance" were so neatly nailed that that article in such a respectable conservative newspaper created a sensation. Kokovtsev, the Minister of Finance, personally sent a telegram to *The Times*, which it printed forthwith (March 23 [10]). In his telegram the insulted Kokovtsev invited the editors of *The Times* to come to St. Petersburg and verify the gold reserve in person. The editors thanked him for the kind invitation, but declined it, on the simple grounds that the article which had hurt the feelings of the tsar's servant did not in the least deny the existence of a gold reserve. The comparison with the Humberts implied, not that Russia did not have the gold reserve to which it referred, but that this reserve was actually made up of other people's money, of wholly unsecured borrowings which did not in the least testify to Russia's wealth, and to which it would be ridiculous to refer as security for fresh loans!

Mr. Kokovtsev missed the *point* of this witty but mali-

cious comparison, and set the whole world laughing by his telegram. Investigating gold reserves in banks was not in the range of duties of journalists, *The Times* said in its reply to the Minister of Finance. Indeed, it was the duty of the press to expose the trick played with the aid of these really existing "gold reserves" fictitiously displayed as evidence of the country's wealth. The question is not whether you have this gold reserve or not, the newspaper lectured the Russian Minister of Finance in an article dealing with this comic telegram. We believe that you have it. The question is, what are your assets and your liabilities? What is the amount of your debts and what security have you? Or, more plainly put, is your stored reserve your property, or is it borrowed and liable to be refunded, which you cannot do in full because you do not possess so much? The English bourgeois, making fun of the simple Minister, tried to explain to him this none-too-subtle thing in a variety of ways, adding for his edification: If you are looking for someone to investigate your assets and liabilities, why not call on the representatives of the Russian people? As it happens, the people's representatives are keen to get together in a representative assembly, be it called Zemsky Sobor or by some other name. Surely they will not refuse to investigate *properly*, not only the famous "gold reserve", but *all* the finances of the autocracy. And they will certainly be able to make a thorough job of it.

"Possibly", *The Times* sarcastically concludes, "the knowledge that the representative assembly would claim this office as a right" makes the tsarist government fear the convocation of such an assembly, "at least in any shape in which it could exercise real power."

An insidious assertion. It is all the more insidious, all the more significant, for being made, in reality, not by *The Times*, but by the entire *European bourgeoisie*—made, not as a polemical manoeuvre, but as an open expression of its distrust of the autocracy, of its unwillingness to lend it money, of its desire to deal with the lawful representatives of the Russian bourgeoisie. It is not an assertion, but a warning. It is not a sneer, but an *ultimatum*, the ultimatum of European capital to the Russian autocracy. While Japan's allies, the English, word this ultimatum in the form

of sarcasm, Russia's allies, the French, in their most conservative, most bourgeois paper, *Le Temps*, say the same thing, only a little more mildly—sugar-coating the pill, but virtually nonetheless refusing to lend any more, and advising the autocracy to make peace with Japan and with the Russian bourgeois liberals. Here is another voice, that of a no less respectable English magazine, *The Economist*: "The truth about Russian finance is at length coming to be appreciated in France. We have pointed out again and again that Russia has long been living on borrowed money, that, despite glowing statements issued by succeeding Ministers of Finance, the budgets have shown a large deficit year after year, though these have been cunningly concealed by a book-keeping device, and that the much-vaunted 'free cash balances' of the Treasury consist principally of the proceeds of loans and partly of the deposits of the State Bank." After telling the Russian autocracy these home truths, this financial magazine finds it necessary, however, to add some bourgeois consolations to the effect that if you can manage to make peace immediately and to make some paltry concessions to the liberals, Europe will doubtlessly begin again to lend you millions upon millions.

We are witnessing what is virtually a speculative gamble of the international bourgeoisie to save Russia from revolution and tsarism from utter ruin. The speculators are putting pressure on the tsar by refusing to grant loans. They are making use of their power, the power of the money-bag. They want a moderate and tidy bourgeois-constitutional (or pseudo-constitutional) regime in Russia. The rapid march of events unites them ever more closely into a single counter-revolutionary bourgeois alliance, regardless of differences of nationality—French financiers and English business magnates, German capitalists, and Russian merchants. *Osvobozhdeniye* has acted in the spirit of this mildly moderate bourgeois party. In issue No. 67, where he sets forth the "programme of the Democratic Party" and even recognises (for how long?) universal, direct, and equal suffrage by secret ballot (passing over in modest silence the arming of the people!), Mr. Struve ends his new *profession de foi* with the following characteristic statement, printed in bold type "for the sake of importance": "At the present moment the demand for the immediate

cessation of the war should stand outside and *above the programme of every progressive party in Russia*. In practice this means that *the government now existing in Russia* should, through the medium of France, begin peace negotiations with the Japanese Government." The distinction between the bourgeois-democratic and the Social-Democratic demands to end the war could hardly be stated more trenchantly. The revolutionary proletariat does not put this demand "above the programme"; it addresses it, not to "the government now existing", but to the free, truly sovereign popular Constituent Assembly. The revolutionary proletariat does not "speculate" on the mediation of the French bourgeoisie, which is seeking peace for avowedly anti-revolutionary and anti-proletarian purposes.

Finally, it is essentially with this same international party of the moderate bourgeoisie that Mr. Bulygin is now bargaining—skilfully playing for time, wearing his opponent down, feeding him with promises, but giving absolutely nothing definite, and leaving everything, absolutely everything, in Russia as it was before, beginning with the use of troops against strikers, continuing with the arrest of political suspects and repressive measures against the press, and ending with a dastardly incitement of the peasants against the intellectuals and the brutal flogging of rebel peasants. And the liberals rise to the bait; some are already beginning to believe Bulygin, while in the Lawyers' Association Mr. Kuzmin-Karavayev tries to persuade the liberals to sacrifice universal suffrage for the sake of ... Mr. Bulygin's blue eyes!"

There is only one force that can stand up to the international alliance of the moderate conservative bourgeoisie, and that is the international alliance of the revolutionary proletariat. With respect to political solidarity, this alliance is already fully formed. As for the practical side and the revolutionary initiative, everything depends on Russia's working class and the success of its joint democratic action for the decisive struggle in conjunction with the millions of the urban and rural poor.

SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY AND THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT

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I

Only five years ago many representatives of Social-Democracy thought the slogan "Down with the Autocracy!" premature and unintelligible to the mass of the workers. These representatives were rightly classed as opportunists. It was explained to them again and again and finally made clear that they were lagging behind the movement, that they did not understand the tasks of the Party as vanguard of the class, as its leader and organiser, as the representative of the movement as a whole and of its fundamental and principal aims. These aims might be overshadowed for a time by the day-to-day routine, but they should never lose their significance as the guiding star of the fighting proletariat.

Now the time has come when the flames of revolution have spread throughout the land, and when even the most sceptical have come to believe in the inevitable overthrow of the autocracy in the near future. But Social-Democracy, as if by some irony of history, has to deal once more with precisely the same reactionary and opportunist attempts to drag the movement back, to play down its tasks, and to obscure its slogans. Polemics with the proponents of such attempts become the task of the day, and (contrary to the opinion of the very many who dislike intra-Party polemics) acquire tremendous *practical* importance. For the nearer we get to realising our immediate political tasks, the greater is the need to have an absolutely clear understanding of those tasks and the more harmful is all ambiguity, all reticence and mental inconclusiveness on this question.

And yet mental inconclusiveness is by no means a rare thing among the Social-Democrats of the new *Iskra* or (what is practically the same) the *Rabocheye Dyelo* camp. Down

with the Autocracy!—everyone agrees with this, not only all Social-Democrats, but all democrats, even all liberals, if one is to believe their current declarations. But what does it mean? How is this overthrow of the present government to take place? Who is to convene the Constituent Assembly, which even the *Osvobozhdeniye* people (see issue No. 67 of *Osvobozhdeniye*) are now prepared to advance as their slogan, including the demand for universal, direct, and equal suffrage? Precisely what should constitute the real guarantee that the elections to such an assembly will be free and will express the interests of the whole people?

He who fails to give a clear and definite answer to these questions does not grasp the meaning of the slogan "Down with the Autocracy". And these questions inevitably bring us to the question of the provisional revolutionary government; it is not difficult to understand that really free, popular elections to a Constituent Assembly, fully guaranteeing truly universal, equal, and direct suffrage by secret ballot, are not only improbable, but actually impossible under the autocracy. And if we are in earnest in putting forward a practical demand for the immediate overthrow of the autocratic government, we must be clear in our minds as to *precisely what other government* we want to replace the one that is to be overthrown. In other words, what do we think should be the attitude of the Social-Democrats towards a provisional revolutionary government?

On this question the opportunists of present-day Social-Democracy, viz., the new-Iskrists, are dragging the Party back just as strenuously as the *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists did five years ago on the question of political struggle in general. Their reactionary views on this point are fully elaborated in Martynov's pamphlet *Two Dictatorships*, which *Iskra*, No. 84, approved and recommended in a special review, and to which we have repeatedly called our readers' attention.

At the outset of his pamphlet Martynov tries to frighten us with the following grim prospect: If a strong, revolutionary Social-Democratic organisation could "time and carry out the general armed uprising of the people" against the autocracy, as Lenin dreamed, "is it not obvious that the general will of the people would on the morrow after the rev-

olution designate precisely this party as the provisional government? Is it not obvious that the people would entrust the immediate fate of the revolution precisely to this party, and to no other?"

This is incredible, but true. The future historian of Russian Social-Democracy will have to record with surprise that at the very outset of the Russian revolution the Girondists of Social-Democracy *tried to frighten* the revolutionary proletariat with such a prospect! Martynov's pamphlet (as well as a host of articles and passages in the new *Iskra*) is nothing but an attempt to daub the "horrors" of such a prospect. The ideological leader of the new-Iskrists is haunted by fear of "a seizure of power", by the bogey of "Jacobinism", of Bakuninism, of Tkachovism,⁸⁷ and of all the other dreadful isms with which old wives on the fringe of the revolution are so eager to scare political infants. Naturally, this is done not without "quoting" Marx and Engels. Poor Marx and poor Engels, what abuses their works have suffered through quotations! You remember how the maxim "Every class struggle is a political struggle"⁸⁸ was invoked to *justify* the narrowness and backwardness of *our* political tasks and methods of political agitation and struggle? Now it is Engels who is made to give false evidence in favour of tail-ism. In *The Peasant War in Germany*, he wrote: "The worst thing that can befall a leader of an extreme party is to be compelled to take over a government in an epoch when the movement is not yet ripe for the domination of the class which he represents, and for the realisation of the measures which that domination requires." One has only to read carefully this opening of the lengthy passage which Martynov quotes to see plainly how our tail-ender distorts the author's meaning. Engels speaks of *a government that is required for the domination of a class*. Is this not obvious? Applied to the proletariat, it consequently means a government *that is required for the domination of the proletariat*, i.e., the dictatorship of the proletariat for the effectuation of the socialist revolution. Martynov fails to understand this, and confounds the provisional revolutionary government in the period of the overthrow of the autocracy with the requisite domination of the proletariat in the period of the overthrow of the bourgeoisie; he confounds the democratic dictatorship of the

proletariat and the peasantry with the socialist dictatorship of the working class. Yet if we continue reading the quoted passage, Engels' idea becomes still clearer. The leader of the extreme party, he says, will have to "advance the interests of an alien class, and to feed his own class with *phrases and promises, and with the assurances that the interests of that alien class are its own interests*. Whoever finds himself in this *false position* is irrevocably lost."⁸⁹

The underlined passages clearly show that Engels expressly warns against the false position that results from a leader's failure to understand the real interests of "his own" class and the real class content of the revolution. To make this clearer to the subtle mind of our Martynov we shall essay a simple illustration. When the adherents of the Narodnaya Volya, in the belief that they represented the interests of "Labour", assured themselves and others that 90 per cent of the peasants in the future Russian Constituent Assembly would be socialists, they put themselves in a false position which was bound to spell their irrevocable political doom, since these "promises and assurances" were at variance with objective reality. Actually they would have advanced the interests of the bourgeois democrats, "the interests of an alien class". Are you not beginning to perceive a ray of light, most worthy Martynov? When the Socialists-Revolutionaries describe the agrarian reforms that must inevitably come about in Russia as "socialisation", as "the transfer of the land to the people", as the beginning of "equality in land tenure", they place themselves in a false position which is bound to lead to their irrevocable political doom, because, in practice, the very reforms for which they strive will bring about the domination of *an alien class*, of the peasant bourgeoisie, so that the more rapidly the revolution develops, the more rapidly will their phrases, promises, and assurances be refuted by reality. Do you still fail to see the point, most worthy Martynov? Do you still fail to comprehend that the *essence* of Engels' thought is that it is fatal *not to understand* the real historical tasks of the revolution and that Engels' words are applicable, therefore, to the Narodnaya Volya adherents and the "Socialists-Revolutionaries"?

II

Engels points to the danger of failure on the part of the leaders of the proletariat to understand the *non-proletarian* character of the revolution, but our sage Martynov infers from this the danger that the leaders of the proletariat, who, by their programme, their tactics (i.e., their entire propaganda and agitation), and their organisation, have separated themselves from the revolutionary democrats, will play a leading part in establishing the democratic republic. Engels sees the danger in the leader's confounding of the pseudo-socialist with the really democratic character of the revolution, while our sage Martynov infers from this the danger that the proletariat, together with the peasantry, may consciously assume the dictatorship in the establishment of the democratic republic, the last form of bourgeois domination and the best form for the class struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie. Engels sees the danger in the false, deceptive position of saying one thing and doing another, of promising the domination of one class and actually ensuring that of another. Engels sees the irrevocable political doom consequent upon such a false position, while our sage Martynov deduces the danger that the bourgeois adherents of democracy will not permit the proletariat and the peasantry to secure a really democratic republic. Our sage Martynov cannot for the life of him understand that *such* a doom, the doom of the leader of the proletariat, the doom of thousands of proletarians in the struggle for a truly democratic republic, would well be a physical doom, but not, however, a political doom; on the contrary, it would be a momentous political victory of the proletariat, a momentous achievement of its hegemony in the struggle for liberty. Engels speaks of the political doom of one who unconsciously strays from the path of his own class to that of an alien class, while our sage Martynov, reverently quoting Engels, speaks of the doom of one who goes further and further along the sure road of his own class.

The difference between the point of view of revolutionary Social-Democracy and that of tail-ism is glaringly obvious. Martynov and the new *Iskra* shrink from the task which the proletariat, together with the peasantry, is called upon

to shoulder—the task of the most radical democratic revolution; they shrink from the Social-Democratic leadership of this revolution and thus surrender, albeit unwittingly, the interests of the proletariat into the hands of the bourgeois democrats. From Marx's correct idea that we must prepare, not a government party, but an opposition party *of the future*, Martynov draws the conclusion that we must form a tail-ist opposition to the *present* revolution. This is what his political wisdom adds up to. His line of reasoning, which we strongly advise the reader to ponder, is as follows:

"The proletariat cannot win political power in the state, either wholly or in part, until it has made the socialist revolution. This is the indisputable proposition which separates us from opportunist Jaurèsism..." (Martynov, *op. cit.*, p. 58)—and which, we would add, conclusively proves that the worthy Martynov is incapable of grasping what the whole thing is about. To confound the participation of the proletariat in a government that is resisting the socialist revolution with its participation in the democratic revolution is to miss the point hopelessly. It is like confounding Millebrand's participation in the Cabinet of the murderer Gallifet with Varlin's⁹⁰ participation in the Commune, which defended and safeguarded the republic.

But listen further, and see what a tangle our author gets himself into: "But that being the case, it is evident that the coming revolution cannot realise any political forms *against the will of the whole* bourgeoisie, for the latter will be the master tomorrow..." (Martynov's italics). In the first place, why are only political forms mentioned here, when the previous sentence referred to the power of the proletariat in general, even to the extent of the socialist revolution? Why does not the author speak of realising economic forms? Because, without noticing it, he has already leaped from the socialist to the democratic revolution. Secondly, that being the case, the author is absolutely wrong in speaking *tout court* (bluntly) of "the will of the whole bourgeoisie", because the very thing that distinguishes the epoch of democratic revolution is the diversity of wills of the various strata of the bourgeoisie which is just emancipating itself from absolutism. To speak of the democratic revolution and confine oneself to a bald

contrast of "proletariat" and "bourgeoisie" is sheer nonsense, for *that* revolution marks the period in the development of society in which the mass of society virtually stands between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie and constitutes an immense petty-bourgeois, peasant stratum. For the very reason that the democratic revolution has not yet been consummated, this immense stratum has far more interests in common with the "proletariat" in the matter of realising political forms than has the "bourgeoisie" in the real and strict sense of the word. Failure to understand this simple thing is one of the main sources of Martynov's muddle.

Further: "That being the case, the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat, by simply frightening the majority of the bourgeois elements, can have but one result—the restoration of absolutism in its original form ... and, of course, the proletariat will not halt before this possible result; at the worst, if things tend decidedly towards a revival and strengthening of the decaying autocratic regime by means of a pseudo-constitutional concession, it will not hold back from frightening the bourgeoisie. In entering the struggle, however, the proletariat obviously does not have this 'worst' in view."

Can you make anything of this, dear reader? The proletariat will not hold back from frightening the bourgeoisie, which course will lead to the restoration of absolutism, if there should be a threat of a pseudo-constitutional concession! This is as much as to say: I am threatened with an Egyptian plague in the form of a one-day conversation with Martynov alone; therefore, if the worst comes to the worst, I shall fall back on the method of intimidation, which can lead only to a two-day conversation with Martynov and Martov. This is the sheerest gibberish, sir!

The idea that haunted Martynov when he wrote the nonsense here quoted was the following: if in the period of the democratic revolution the proletariat uses the threat of the socialist revolution to frighten the bourgeoisie, this can lead only to reaction, which will also weaken the democratic gains already won. That and nothing more. There can be no question, of course, either of restoring absolutism in its original form or of the proletariat's readiness, if the worst comes to the worst, to resort to the worst kind of stupidity. The whole

thing takes us back to the difference between the democratic and the socialist revolution, overlooked by Martynov, to the existence of that immense peasant and petty-bourgeois population which is capable of supporting the democratic revolution, but is at present incapable of supporting the socialist revolution.

Let us listen further to our sage Martynov: "Evidently, the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie on the eve of the bourgeois revolution must differ in some respects from the same struggle at its concluding stage, on the eve of the socialist revolution...." Yes, this is evident; and if Martynov had paused to think what this difference actually is, he would hardly have written the above-given drivel, or, indeed, his whole pamphlet.

"The struggle to influence the course and outcome of the bourgeois revolution can find expression only in the exertion of revolutionary pressure by the proletariat on the will of the liberal and radical bourgeoisie, and in the compulsion on the part of the more democratic 'lower strata' of society to bring the 'upper strata' into agreement to carry through the bourgeois revolution to its logical conclusion. The struggle will find expression in the fact that the proletariat will at every opportunity confront the bourgeoisie with the dilemma—either backward, into the strangling grip of absolutism, or forward, with the people."

This tirade is the central point of Martynov's pamphlet. We have here its sum and substance, all its fundamental "ideas". And what do all these clever ideas turn out to be? Who are these "lower strata" of society, the "people" of whom our sage has at last bethought himself? They are precisely that multitudinous petty-bourgeois stratum of town and village which is quite capable of functioning in a revolutionary-democratic capacity. And what is this *pressure* that the proletariat and the peasantry can exert on the upper social strata, what is meant by the proletariat advancing together with the people in despite of the upper social strata? It is *that same revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry* against which our tail-ender is declaiming! Only he is afraid to think to the end, to call a spade a spade. And so he utters words whose meaning he

does not understand. In ludicrous, florid language,* he timidly repeats slogans, the true significance of which escapes him. None but a tail-ender could deliver himself of such a curio in the most "interesting" part of his summary as: revolutionary pressure of the proletariat and the "people" on the upper strata of society, but without a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. Only a Martynov could show himself so adept! Martynov wants the proletariat to threaten the upper strata of society that it will go forward with the people, while at the same time firmly deciding with its new-*Iskra* leaders *not to go forward* along the democratic path, because that is the path of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship. Martynov wants the proletariat to exert pressure on the will of the upper strata by displaying its own lack of will. Martynov wants the proletariat to bring the upper strata "into agreement" to carry the bourgeois revolution through to its logical, democratic-republican conclusion, but to do so by expressing its own fear of *assuming*, jointly with the people, the task of carrying the revolution through, its fear of taking power and forming the democratic dictatorship. Martynov wants the proletariat to be the vanguard in the democratic revolution and *therefore* our sage Martynov *frightens* the proletariat with the perspective of participation in the provisional revolutionary government in the event of the success of the insurrection!

Reactionary tail-ism could go no further. We should all prostrate ourselves before Martynov, as we would before a saint, for having developed the tail-ist tendencies of the new *Iskra* to their logical conclusion and for having given them emphatic and systematic expression with regard to the most pressing and basic political questions.**

* We have already pointed out the absurdity of the idea that, if the worst comes to the worst, the proletariat might push the bourgeoisie back.

** This article was already set up when we received issue No. 93 of *Iskra*, with which we shall deal on another occasion.⁹¹

III

What is Martynov's muddle-headedness due to? To the fact that he confounds democratic revolution with socialist revolution; that he overlooks the role of the intermediate stratum of the people lying between the "bourgeoisie" and the "proletariat" (the petty-bourgeois masses of the urban and rural poor, the "semi-proletarians", the semi-proprietors); and that he fails to understand the true meaning of our minimum programme. Martynov has heard that it is wrong for a socialist to participate in a bourgeois Cabinet (when the proletariat is struggling for the socialist revolution), and he hastens to "understand" this as meaning that we should not participate with the revolutionary bourgeois democrats in the democratic revolution and in the dictatorship that is essential for the full accomplishment of such a revolution. Martynov read our minimum programme, but he missed the fact that the strict distinction it draws between transformations that can be carried out in a bourgeois society and socialist transformations is not merely booklore but is of the most vital, practical significance; he missed the fact that in a revolutionary period this programme must be immediately tested and applied in practice. It did not occur to him that rejecting the idea of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship in the period of the autocracy's downfall is tantamount to renouncing the fulfilment of our minimum programme. Indeed, let us but consider all the economic and political transformations formulated in that programme—the demand for the republic, for arming the people, for the separation of the Church from the State, for full democratic liberties, and for decisive economic reforms. Is it not clear that these transformations cannot possibly be brought about in a bourgeois society without the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the lower classes? Is it not clear that it is not the proletariat alone, as distinct from the "bourgeoisie", that is referred to here, but the "lower classes", which are the active motive force of every democratic revolution? These classes are the proletariat *plus* the scores of millions of urban and rural poor whose conditions of existence are petty-bourgeois. Without a doubt, very many representatives of these masses belong to the bourgeoisie. But

there is still less doubt that the complete establishment of democracy is in the interests of these masses, and that the more enlightened these masses are, the more inevitable will be their struggle for the complete establishment of democracy. Of course, a Social-Democrat will never forget the dual political and economic nature of the petty-bourgeois urban and rural masses; he will never forget the need for a separate and independent class organisation of the proletariat, which struggles for socialism. But neither will he forget that these masses have "a future as well as a past, judgement as well as prejudices",⁹² a judgement that urges them onward towards the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship; he will not forget that enlightenment is not obtained from books alone, and not so much from books even as from the very progress of the revolution, which opens the eyes of the people and gives them a political schooling. Under such circumstances, a theory that rejects the idea of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship cannot be otherwise designated than as a philosophical justification of political backwardness.

The revolutionary Social-Democrat will reject such a theory with contempt. He will not confine himself on the eve of the revolution to pointing out what will happen "if the worst comes to the worst". Rather, he will also show the possibility of a better outcome. He will dream—he is obliged to dream if he is not a hopeless philistine—that, after the vast experience of Europe, after the unparalleled upsurge of energy among the working class in Russia, we shall succeed in lighting a revolutionary beacon that will illumine more brightly than ever before the path of the unenlightened and downtrodden masses; that we shall succeed, standing as we do on the shoulders of a number of revolutionary generations of Europe, in realising all the democratic transformations, the whole of our minimum programme, with a thoroughness never equalled before. We shall succeed in ensuring that the Russian revolution is not a movement of a few months, but a movement of many years; that it leads, not merely to a few paltry concessions from the powers that be, but to the complete overthrow of those powers. And if we succeed in achieving this, then ... the revolutionary conflagration will spread to Europe; the European worker, languishing under bourgeois reaction, will rise in his turn

and show us "how it is done"; then the revolutionary upsurge in Europe will have a repercussive effect upon Russia and will convert an epoch of a few revolutionary years into an era of several revolutionary decades; then—but we shall have ample time to say what we shall do "then", not from the cursed remoteness of Geneva, but at meetings of thousands of workers in the streets of Moscow and St. Petersburg, at the free village meetings of the Russian "muzhiks".

IV

Such dreams, of course, are strange and alien to the philistines of the new *Iskra* and to that "master of men's minds", our good dogmatist Martynov. They fear the full achievement of our minimum programme through the revolutionary dictatorship of the simple, common people. They are afraid for their own political consciousness, afraid of losing the book knowledge they have learned by rote (but not assimilated), afraid that they may not be able to distinguish the correct and bold steps of the democratic transformations from the adventurous leaps of non-class, Narodnik socialism or of anarchism. Their philistine souls warn them with good reason that in a rapid onward march it is more difficult to distinguish the right path and quickly to solve the new and complex problems than in the routine of small-scale, everyday work; therefore, they mutter instinctively: Away, away! Let this cup of revolutionary-democratic dictatorship pass from me! It's as much as our life is worth! Gentlemen, better "go slow, with timid zigzags".

Small wonder that Parvus, who had so generously supported the new-Iskrists as long as it was a question chiefly of co-opting the most venerable and the most deserving, finally began to feel very uncomfortable in this stagnant company. Small wonder, too, that he began more and more to feel the *taedium vitae*, life weariness, in this company. In the end he rebelled. He did not stop at defending the slogan "Organise the revolution", which had frightened the new *Iskra* to death; he did not limit himself to writing manifestos, which *Iskra* published as separate leaflets, carefully avoiding all mention of the name of the Social-Democratic



Labour Party in view of the "Jacobin" horrors.* No, having freed himself from the nightmare of the profound organisation-as-process theory advanced by Axelrod (or was it Luxemburg?), Parvus managed at last to go forward, instead of moving backward like a crab. He refused to perform the Sisyphean labour" of endlessly correcting Martynov's and Martov's follies. He openly advocated (unfortunately, together with the windbag Trotsky in a foreword to the latter's bombastic pamphlet *Before the Ninth of January*) the idea of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship, the idea that it was the duty of Social-Democrats to take part in the provisional revolutionary government after the overthrow of the autocracy. Parvus is profoundly right in saying that the Social-Democrats must not fear to take bold strides forward, to deal joint "blows" at the enemy, shoulder to shoulder with the revolutionary bourgeois democrats, on the definite understanding, however (very appropriately brought to mind), that the organisations are not to be merged, that we march separately but strike together, that we do not conceal the diversity of interests, that we watch our ally as we would our enemy, etc.

But for all our warm sympathy for these slogans of a revolutionary Social-Democrat who has turned away from the tail-enders, we could not help feeling jarred by certain false notes that Parvus struck. We mention these slight errors, not out of captiousness, but because from him to whom much is given, much is demanded. It would be most dangerous at present for Parvus to compromise his correct position by his own imprudence. Among the least imprudent is the following sentence in his preface to Trotsky's pamphlet: "If we wish to keep the revolutionary proletariat apart from the other political currents, we must learn to stand ideologically at the head of the revolutionary movement [this is correct], to be more revolutionary than anyone else." This is incorrect. That is to say, it is incorrect, if the statement is taken in the general sense in which it is expressed by Parvus;

* I do not know whether our readers have noticed the following characteristic fact: among all the trash issued by the new *Iskra* in the form of leaflets, there were some good writings bearing Parvus' signature. The editors of the new *Iskra* turned their back on these leaflets, which they printed without the name of our Party or of the publishers.

it is incorrect from the point of view of the reader to whom this preface is something standing by itself, apart from Martynov and the new-Iskrists, whom Parvus does not mention. If we examine this statement dialectically, i.e., relatively, concretely, in all its aspects, and not after the manner of those literary jockeys, who, even many years after, snatch separate sentences from some single work and distort their meaning, it will become clear that Parvus directs the assertion expressly against tail-ism, *to which extent* he is right (compare particularly his subsequent words: "If we *lag behind* revolutionary development", etc.). But the reader cannot have in mind only tail-enders, since there are others besides tail-enders among the dangerous friends of the revolution in the camp of the revolutionaries—there are the "Socialists-Revolutionaries"; there are people like the Nadezhdins, who are swept along by the tide of events and are helpless in the face of revolutionary phrases; or those who are guided by instinct rather than by a revolutionary outlook (like Gapon). These Parvus forgot; he forgot them because his presentation, the development of his thoughts, was not free, but was hampered by the pleasant memory of the very Martynovism against which he seeks to warn the reader. Parvus' exposition is not sufficiently concrete because he does not consider the totality of the various revolutionary currents in Russia, which are inevitable in the epoch of democratic revolution and which naturally reflect the still unstratified classes of society in such an epoch. At such a time, revolutionary-democratic programmes are quite naturally veiled in vague, even reactionary, socialist ideas concealed behind revolutionary phrases (to wit, the Socialists-Revolutionaries and Nadezhdin, who, it seems, changed only his label when he went over from the "revolutionary socialists" to the new *Iskra*). Under such circumstances we, the Social-Democrats, never can and never will advance the slogan "Be more revolutionary than anyone else". We shall not even try to keep up with the revolutionariness of a democrat who is detached from his class basis, who has a weakness for fine phrases and flaunts catchwords and cheap slogans (especially in agrarian matters). On the contrary, we will always be critical of such revolutionariness; we will expose the real meaning of words, the real content of idealised great events;

and we will teach the need for a sober evaluation of the classes and shadings within the classes, even in the hottest situations of the revolution.

Equally incorrect, for the same reason, are Parvus' statements that "the revolutionary provisional government in Russia will be a government of working-class democracy", that "if the Social-Democrats are at the head of the revolutionary movement of the Russian proletariat, this government will be a Social-Democratic government", that the Social-Democratic provisional government "will be an integral government with a Social-Democratic majority". This is *impossible*, unless we speak of fortuitous, transient episodes, and not of a revolutionary dictatorship that will be at all durable and capable of leaving its mark in history. This is impossible, because only a revolutionary dictatorship supported by the vast majority of the people can be at all durable (not absolutely, of course, but relatively). The Russian proletariat, however, is at present a minority of the population in Russia. It can become the great, overwhelming majority only if it combines with the mass of semi-proletarians, semi-proprietors, i.e., with the mass of the petty-bourgeois urban and rural poor. Such a composition of the social basis of the possible and desirable revolutionary-democratic dictatorship will, of course, affect the composition of the revolutionary government and inevitably lead to the participation, or even predominance, within it of the most heterogeneous representatives of revolutionary democracy. It would be extremely harmful to entertain any illusions on this score. If that windbag Trotsky now writes (unfortunately, side by side with Parvus) that "a Father Gapon could appear only once", that "there is no room for a second Gapon", he does so simply because he is a windbag. If there were no room in Russia for a second Gapon, there would be no room for a truly "great", consummated democratic revolution. To become great, to evoke 1789-93, not 1848-50, and to surpass those years, it must rouse the vast masses to active life, to heroic efforts, to "fundamental historic creativeness"; it must raise them out of frightful ignorance, unparalleled oppression, incredible backwardness, and abysmal dullness. The revolution is already raising them and will raise them completely; the government itself is facilitating

the process by its desperate resistance. But, of course, there can be no question of a mature political consciousness, of a Social-Democratic consciousness of these masses or their numerous "native" popular leaders or even "muzhik" leaders. They cannot become Social-Democrats at once without first passing a number of revolutionary tests, not only because of their ignorance (revolution, we repeat, enlightens with marvellous speed), but because their class position is not proletarian, because the objective logic of historical development confronts them at the present time with the tasks, not of a socialist, but of a democratic revolution.

In this revolution, the revolutionary proletariat will participate with the utmost energy, sweeping aside the miserable tail-ism of some and the revolutionary phrases of others. It will bring class definiteness and consciousness into the dizzying whirlwind of events, and march on intrepidly and unswervingly, not fearing, but fervently desiring, the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship, fighting for the republic and for complete republican liberties, fighting for substantial economic reforms, in order to create for itself a truly large arena, an arena worthy of the twentieth century, in which to carry on the struggle for socialism.

THE REVOLUTIONARY-DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT AND THE PEASANTRY ⁹⁴

The question of the participation of Social-Democracy in the provisional revolutionary government has been highlighted less by the course of events than by the theoretical reasonings of Social-Democrats of a certain trend. We dealt in two articles (issues Nos. 13 and 14) with the arguments of Martynov, who was the first to bring up this question. It appears, however, that the interest in the question is so keen and the misconceptions to which the aforementioned arguments have given rise (see in particular *Iskra*, No. 93) are so great that it is necessary to go into this matter once more. However Social-Democrats may assess the probability of our having to give more than a theoretical answer to this question in the near future, the Party at any rate must be clear as to its immediate aims. Unless there is clarity in this matter there can no longer be any consistent propaganda and agitation free from vacillations and mental reservations.

Let us try to reconstruct the essence of the controversial question. If what we want is not only concessions from the autocracy but its actual overthrow, we must work to replace the tsarist government by a provisional revolutionary government, which would, on the one hand, convene a Constituent Assembly on the basis of really universal, direct, and equal suffrage by secret ballot, and, on the other, be in a position to ensure real and complete freedom during the elections. Thus, the question arises whether it is right for the Social-Democratic Labour Party to participate in such a provisional revolutionary government. This question was first raised by spokesmen of the opportunist wing of

our Party, specifically by Martynov, prior to the Ninth of January, when he, and with him *Iskra*, answered it in the negative. Martynov sought to carry the conceptions of the revolutionary Social-Democrats to an absurdity; he *frightened* them by saying that in the event of a successful outcome to our work of organising the revolution, with our Party's assumption of leadership of the popular armed uprising, we would *have to* participate in the provisional revolutionary government. This participation would mean inadmissible "seizure of power", it would be "crass Jaurèsism", which no class-conscious Social-Democratic Party could tolerate.

Let us dwell on the contentions of those who hold to such a point of view. By participating in the provisional government, we are told, Social-Democracy would have the power in its hands; but as the party of the proletariat, Social-Democracy cannot hold the power without attempting to put our maximum programme into effect, i.e., without attempting to bring about the socialist revolution. In such an undertaking it would, at the present time, inevitably come to grief, discredit itself, and play into the hands of the reactionaries. Hence, participation by Social-Democrats in a provisional revolutionary government is inadmissible.

This argument is based on a misconception; it confounds the democratic revolution with the socialist revolution, the struggle for the republic (including our entire minimum programme) with the struggle for socialism. If Social-Democracy sought to make the socialist revolution its immediate aim, it would assuredly discredit itself. It is precisely such vague and hazy ideas of our "Socialists-Revolutionaries" that Social-Democracy has always combated. For this reason Social-Democracy has constantly stressed the bourgeois nature of the impending revolution in Russia and insisted on a clear line of demarcation between the democratic minimum programme and the socialist maximum programme. Some Social-Democrats, who are inclined to yield to spontaneity, might forget all this in time of revolution, but not the Party as a whole. The adherents of this erroneous view make an idol of spontaneity in their belief that the march of events will compel the Social-Democratic Party in such a position to set about achieving the socialist revolution, despite itself. Were this so, our programme would be incorrect, it would

КАВКАЗСКІЙ СОЮЗЪ РОС. СОЦ.-ДЕМ. РАБОЧЕЙ ПАРТІИ.

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Брошюры по партійнымъ вопросамъ № 3.

РЕВОЛЮЦІОННАЯ ДЕМОКРАТИЧЕСКАЯ ДИКТА- ТУРА ПРОЛЕТАРИАТА И КРЕСТЬЯНСТВА.

(Перепеч. изъ № 14 „Впередъ“).



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Cover of Lenin's pamphlet
*The Revolutionary-Democratic Dictatorship
of the Proletariat and the Peasantry.*
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Facsimile

not be in keeping with the "march of events", which is exactly what the spontaneity worshippers fear; they fear for the correctness of our programme. But this fear (a psychological explanation of which we attempted to give in our articles) is entirely baseless. Our programme is correct. And the march of events will assuredly confirm this more and more fully as time goes on. It is the march of events that will "impose" upon us the imperative necessity of waging a furious struggle for the republic and, in practice, guide our forces, the forces of the politically active proletariat, in this direction. It is the march of events that will, in the democratic revolution, inevitably impose upon us such a host of allies from among the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry, whose real needs will demand the implementation of our minimum programme, that any concern over too rapid a transition to the maximum programme is simply absurd.

On the other hand, however, these very allies from among the petty-bourgeois democrats create in the minds of Social-Democrats of a certain trend new misgivings, namely, fear of "crass Jaurèsism". Participation in a government with the bourgeois democrats has been banned by a resolution of the Amsterdam Congress⁹⁵; it is Jaurèsism, i.e., unconscious betrayal of the interests of the proletariat, the reduction of the proletariat to a hanger-on of the bourgeoisie, its corruption with the illusion of power, which in reality is completely unattainable in bourgeois society.

That reasoning is no less fallacious. It shows that those who resort to it have memorised good resolutions without understanding their meaning; they have learned a few anti-Jaurèsist catchwords by rote, but have not duly weighed them and thus misapply them; they have learned the letter but not the spirit of the recent lessons of international revolutionary Social-Democracy. To judge Jaurèsism from the point of view of dialectical materialism one must draw a clear line between subjective motives and objective historical conditions. Subjectively, Jaurès wanted to save the republic by entering into an alliance with the bourgeois democrats. The objective conditions of this "experiment" were that the republic in France had become an established fact and was in no grave danger; that the working class had every opportunity of developing an independent class

political organisation but did not take full advantage of this opportunity, partly because it was influenced by the parliamentary humbug of its leaders; that in actual practice, history was already objectively posing before the working class the tasks of the socialist revolution, *from which* the Mille-rands were *luring* the proletariat with promises of paltry social reforms.

Now to take Russia. Subjectively, revolutionary Social-Democrats like the *Vperyod*-ists or Parvus want to secure the republic by entering into an alliance with the revolutionary bourgeois democrats. The objective conditions differ from those in France as night differs from day. Objectively, the historical course of events has now posed before the Russian proletariat precisely the task of carrying through the democratic bourgeois revolution (the whole content of which, for brevity's sake, we sum up in the word Republic); this task confronts the people as a whole, viz., the entire mass of the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry; without such a revolution the more or less extensive development of an independent class organisation for the socialist revolution is unthinkable.

Try to visualise concretely this complete difference in the objective conditions and then tell us: what is one to think of people who, carried away by the similitude of certain words, by the resemblance between certain letters, and by the sameness of subjective motives, forget this difference?

Because in France Jaurès paid homage to bourgeois social reform on the mistaken subjective plea of defending the republic, we Russian Social-Democrats are to abandon all serious struggle to win the republic! This exactly is what the profound wisdom of the new-Iskrists amounts to.

Indeed, is it not clear that as far as the proletariat is concerned the struggle for the republic is inconceivable without an alliance with the petty-bourgeois masses? Is it not clear that without the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry there is not a shadow of hope for the success of this struggle? One of the chief flaws in the argument under discussion is its deadness, its stereotyped character, its failure to make allowance for the revolutionary situation. Struggling for the republic while at the same time renouncing the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship is as though Oyama had decided to fight Kuropatkin at Mukden, but

disavowed beforehand any intention of taking the city. If we, the revolutionary people, viz., the proletariat and the peasantry, want to "fight together" against the autocracy, we must fight against it together to the last, finish it off together, and stand together in repelling the inevitable attempts to restore it! (It should be said again, to avoid possible misunderstanding, that by the republic we understand not only and not so much a form of government as the sum-total of democratic changes envisaged in our minimum programme.) One must have a schoolboy's conception of history to imagine the thing without "leaps", to see it as something in the shape of a straight line moving slowly and steadily upwards: first, it will be the turn of the liberal big bourgeoisie—minor concessions from the autocracy; then of the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie—the democratic republic; and finally of the proletariat—the socialist revolution. That picture, by and large, is correct, correct *à la longue*, as the French say—spread over a century or so (in France, for instance, from 1789 to 1905); but one must be a virtuoso of philistinism to take this as a pattern for one's plan of action in a revolutionary epoch. If the Russian autocracy, even at this stage, fails to find a way out by buying itself off with a meagre constitution, if it is not only shaken but actually *overthrown*, then, obviously, a tremendous exertion of revolutionary energy on the part of all progressive classes will be called for to defend this gain. This "defence", however, is nothing else than the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry! The more we gain now and the more vigorously we defend the gains, the less will the inevitable future reaction be able to reappropriate afterwards, the shorter will the intervals of reaction be, and the easier will the task be for the proletarian fighters who will come after us.

But here come those who, yardstick in hand, *à la* Ilovaisky,* would measure off in advance, before the struggle has begun, a modest little bit of our future conquests—people who, before the downfall of the autocracy, even before the events of the Ninth of January, took it into their heads to intimidate the working class of Russia with the bogy of

* D. I. Ilovaisky (1832-1920)—a Russian historian, apologist of monarchism.—*Ed.*

a terrible revolutionary-democratic dictatorship! And these knights of the yardstick lay claim to the name of revolutionary Social-Democrats....

Participation in the provisional government with the bourgeois revolutionary democrats, they weep, means sanctioning the bourgeois order; it means sanctioning the perpetuation of prisons and the police, of unemployment and poverty, of private property and prostitution. This is an argument worthy either of anarchists or of Narodniks. Social-Democrats do not hold back from struggle for political freedom on the grounds that it is bourgeois political freedom. Social-Democrats regard this "sanctioning" of the bourgeois order from the historical point of view. When Feuerbach was asked whether he sanctioned the materialism of Büchner, Vogt, and Moleschott, he said: Backwards I fully agree with the materialists; but not forwards. That is precisely how Social-Democrats sanction the bourgeois system. They have never been afraid of saying, and never will be, that they sanction the republican-democratic bourgeois order in preference to an autocratic serf-owning bourgeois order. But they "sanction" the bourgeois republic only because it is the last form of class rule, because it offers a most convenient arena for the struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie; they sanction it, not for its prisons and police, its private property and prostitution, but for the scope and freedom it allows to combat these charming institutions.

Far be it from us to contend that our participation in the revolutionary provisional government entails no dangers for Social-Democracy. There is not, nor can there be, any form of struggle, any political situation that does not involve dangers. If there is no revolutionary class instinct, if there is no integral world outlook on a scientific level, if (with due apologies to our friends of the new *Iskra*) there are no brains in the head, then it is dangerous even to take part in strikes—it may lead to Economism; to engage in parliamentary struggle—it may end in parliamentary cretinism⁹⁶; to support the Zemstvo liberal democrats—it may lead to a "plan for a Zemstvo campaign". It would then be dangerous even to read the extremely useful writings of Jaurès and Aulard on the French Revolution—it may lead to Martynov's pamphlet on two dictatorships.

It goes without saying that if the Social-Democrats were to forget, even for a moment the class distinctiveness of the proletariat vis-à-vis the petty bourgeoisie, if they were to form an ill-timed and unprofitable alliance with one or another untrustworthy petty-bourgeois party of the intelligentsia, if the Social-Democrats were to lose sight, even for a moment, of their own independent aims and the need (in all political situations and exigencies, in all political crises and upheavals) for attaching paramount importance to developing the class-consciousness of the proletariat and its independent political organisation, then participation in the provisional revolutionary government would be extremely dangerous. But under such circumstances, any political step, we repeat, would be equally dangerous. The groundlessness of these possible apprehensions as applied to the present formulation of the immediate tasks of the revolutionary Social-Democrats is borne out by a few simple statements of fact. We shall not speak about ourselves or quote the numerous declarations, warnings, and counsels on this question given in *Vperyod*; we shall, instead, cite Parvus. He subscribes to the opinion that the Social-Democrats should participate in the provisional revolutionary government, and he is emphatic on the conditions, which we must never forget, namely, to strike together, but to march separately, not to merge organisations, to watch our ally as we would our enemy, etc. We shall not dwell in detail on this aspect of the question, having dealt with it in our previous article.

No, the real political danger to Social-Democracy today does not lie where the new-Iskrists are looking for it. It is not the thought of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry that should frighten us, but rather the spirit of tail-ism and torpidity which has such a demoralising effect on the party of the proletariat and finds expression in all kinds of organisation-as-process, arming-as-process theories, and what not. To take, for instance, *Iskra*'s latest attempt to set up a distinction between the provisional revolutionary government and the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. Is this not an example of lifeless scholasticism? People who invent such distinctions are capable of stringing together fine words but are absolutely incapable of thinking.

Actually, these concepts stand to each other roughly in the relation of legal form to class content. To speak of the "provisional revolutionary government" is to stress the constitutional aspect of the case, the fact that the government originates, not from the law, but from the revolution, that it is a temporary government committed to the future Constituent Assembly. But whatever the form, whatever the origin, whatever the conditions, one thing at any rate is clear—that the provisional revolutionary government must have the support of definite classes. One has only to remember this simple truth to realise that the provisional revolutionary government can be nothing else but the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. Therefore, *Iskra's* distinction only drags the Party back to fruitless disputes, away from the task of making a concrete analysis of the class interests in the Russian revolution.

Or, to take another *Iskra* argument. The slogan "Long Live the Revolutionary Provisional Government!" draws from that paper the didactic remark: "The combination of the words 'long live' and 'government' sullies the lips." What is this, if not sheer bombast? They talk about overthrowing the autocracy and yet fear to sully themselves by acclaiming the revolutionary government! Surprisingly, they are not afraid of sullying themselves by acclaiming a republic, for a republic necessarily implies a government, and—no Social-Democrat ever doubted it—a bourgeois government at that. In what way, then, does acclaiming the provisional revolutionary government differ from acclaiming the democratic republic? Must Social-Democracy, the political leader of the most revolutionary class, take after an anaemic and hysterical old maid who finically insists on a fig-leaf? Is it right to acclaim what the bourgeois-democratic government stands for, but wrong directly to acclaim the provisional revolutionary-democratic government?

Picture it; the uprising of the workers in St. Petersburg has been victorious; the autocracy is overthrown; the provisional revolutionary government has been proclaimed; the armed workers jubilate, with outcries of "Long Live the Provisional Revolutionary Government!" The new-Iskristes stand on the side lines, their innocent eyes raised heavenward, solemnly uttering as they beat their chaste breasts:

"We thank Thee, O Lord, that we are not like these wretches and have not sullied our lips with such word combinations"

No, comrades, a thousand times no! Have no fear of sullyng yourselves by most energetic halting-at-nothing participation in a republican revolution together with the revolutionary bourgeois democrats. Do not exaggerate the dangers of such participation; our organised proletariat is quite capable of coping with them. More will be accomplished in months of the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry than in decades of the peaceful, stupefying atmosphere of political stagnation. If, after the Ninth of January, the Russian working class, under conditions of political slavery, was able to mobilise over a million proletarians for staunch, disciplined, collective action, then, given the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship, we will mobilise scores of millions of the urban and rural poor, and we will make the Russian political revolution the prelude to the socialist revolution in Europe.

Vperyod, No. 14,
April 12 (March 30), 1905

Published according to
the text in *Vperyod*

GRAFT: A FRANCO-RUSSIAN CUSTOM

Under this headline the German Social-Democratic newspaper *Vorwärts* recently published an extremely valuable document—the original text of a letter written by M. Jules Gouin, the manager of a large machine works in Batignolles (a suburb of Paris), to a ministry official in St. Petersburg. Through the medium of this gentleman the French works received an order for 114 locomotives. The total value of the order (at 27,700 francs per locomotive) is some 3,000,000 francs, or about 1,200,000 rubles. For his good offices in this transaction the honourable ministerial official (who, we may add, probably occupies a fairly high post) receives for a start, as we see from the letter, two per cent of the purchase price. This amounts to about 25,000 rubles. It further appears from the letter (which we do not quote in full for lack of space) that of this sum 13,000 francs have already been received by the go-between; the rest is payable in instalments. Moreover, alterations in the standard type of locomotives to the specifications of the Russian railways are to be paid for separately. The St. Petersburg representative of the Paris firm undertakes to inform this official in advance what this extra charge demanded by the works will amount to. If the official can “get” from the Russian Government a higher price than that fixed by the works, the difference too will be placed to his credit as the “go-between”. In the German translation of the letter (written in French) this is called *Vermittlungsgebühr*, “broker’s commission”. Actually, of course, this expression is merely a veil to cover a most brazen swindle, an embezzlement of public funds, committed by a French capitalist and a Russian ministry official working under a collusive contract.

Vorwärts rightly says that the letter casts a lurid light on Russian venality and the advantage that foreign capital takes of it. The letter is documentary proof of the usual "business" practices prevailing in civilised, capitalist countries. These things are done everywhere in Europe, too, but nowhere in such a shameless manner as in Russia; and nowhere is there such "political safety" (safety from exposure) for corruption as in autocratic Russia. No wonder, conclude the German Social-Democrats, that European industry is interested in preserving the Russian autocracy with its irresponsible officials and their shady practices. No wonder Russian officials fight tooth and nail against a constitution that threatens to establish public control over the administration. One can gather from this exposure what the Russian officialdom is "making" on the war with Japan, what sums have found their way into the pockets of officials employed in the St. Petersburg ministries from, say, the sale of German marine shipping to Russia! The national calamity is a gold mine for the war contractors and venal officials.

Vperyod, No. 14,
April 12 (March 30), 1905

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THE GUILTY BLAMING THE INNOCENT *

Iskra, No. 92, contains an article "The Zigzags of a Firm Course", purporting to show that, in reality, *Vperyod* is not at all maintaining the principles and the line of the old *Iskra* firmly and consistently, but, on the contrary, is zigzagging in the wake of the new *Iskra*. Strictly speaking, this allegation is too ludicrous to merit serious consideration. What strikes us here is not the content of the new-*Iskra* polemic, for it has no content, but its methods. These methods are worth considering; upon examination they reveal that there are polemics and polemics. The old *Iskra* was disliked for its polemics, but no one ever thought of calling them unprincipled. The new *Iskra* is despised for its polemics, because their unprincipled nature is evident to the mass of the Party members engaged in practical work and the consistent *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists, as well as to the "conciliators" headed by Plekhanov.

It is our intention to show the reader with what methods these polemics operate.

Let us follow *Iskra* step by step. *Vperyod* is leading the Party towards a split, it says. This is not true. All who have studied the Party crisis, not from old wives' tales, but from documents, know that it was the Minority that split the Party immediately after the Second Congress, and that it did so clandestinely by setting up a secret organisation. *Iskra* is engaging in hypocrisy now and is misrepresenting the facts. An open split may evoke hatred, but a secret split can evoke only contempt. *Vperyod* wants no secret split; that is all there is to it.

* Delayed for lack of space.

Further, they want to charge us with contradicting ourselves on the question of autonomy and centralism. Lenin, they allege, asserted in *Steps* * that autonomy is a principle of opportunism, whereas now the Bureau of Committees of the Majority itself is in favour of the broadest possible autonomy for the local committees. Lenin maintained that bureaucracy stands in the same relation to democracy as the organisational principle of revolutionary Social-Democracy to the organisational principle of the opportunists, whereas now the Bureau of Committees of the Majority itself complains of bureaucracy. This is the substance of their accusation against us. This charge too is built on downright falsehood. In *Steps* (and, before *Steps*, in his "Letter to *Iskra*"**), Lenin cautioned, declared, reiterated, and emphasised countless times that the phrases used against bureaucracy, for autonomy, etc., were extremely vague, that they were open to any number of different constructions and could be made to mean almost anything. Lenin declared hundreds of times that, in substance, these phrases were used exclusively to veil the desire for co-optation. These words of Lenin have now been fully borne out by the most authentic documentary evidence. If, however, we take these words in the sense of principle, said Lenin (*if we take!*), we shall find the following: Bureaucracy, taken in general, may denote officialism, red tape, formalism, paper answers. This sort of bureaucracy is evil, said Lenin, illustrating his remarks with Martov's well-known draft of the Rules. It is clear to every reader who is at all conscientious that this is the kind of bureaucracy meant by the Bureau of Committees of the Majority, so that to accuse *Vperyod* of contradicting itself is utter childishness. Bureaucracy may mean infringement of the legitimate and, if we may say so, of the "natural" rights of every opposition, a fight waged against a minority by unfair means. Such bureaucracy is possible, said Lenin, but there is no principle involved in it. It must be combated by the establishment of constitutional guarantees of the rights of minorities. Such guarantees

* *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back*, Geneva, May 1904. See present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 203-425.—*Ed.*

** *Iskra*, November 25, 1903. See present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 115-18.—*Ed.*

were proposed clearly, frankly, and openly for the first time by the Stone-Hards, or *Vperyod*-ists, as they are now called, in the well-known Declaration of the Twenty-Two,* which was issued in August, seven months ago, without having since evoked the slightest attempt on the part of the new-Iskrists unequivocally to define their attitude towards it.

But apart from these interpretations of bureaucracy, anti-autonomy, etc., it is possible to have interpretations based on real principles—not in the form of any irregularities, extremes, etc., but as general principles governing the entire organisation. This was the interpretation the Mensheviks tried to force upon us against our will, despite our resistance. Lenin, both in his “Letter to *Iskra*” and in *Steps*, sounded innumerable warnings against such an interpretation, which obscures the actual concrete course that the crisis and the split have been taking. Lenin made a straightforward appeal in his “Letter to *Iskra*”: Drop this nonsense, gentlemen; nine-tenths of it is squabbling! Lenin was attacked for this, and the Central Organ tried to prove that principles were involved. Well, if that is so, Lenin replied and the *Vperyod*-ists always will reply, then the *principle* of autonomy is really an opportunist principle for a Social-Democratic organisation. If that is so, then your outcries against bureaucracy are, in principle, of a piece with those of the Jaurèsists in France, the Bernsteinians in Germany, and the reformists in Italy. That is how the matter stands; and to prove it, one has only to study the Party crisis from documents and not from the assurances of friends. Lenin had told the Bundist Lieber at the Second Congress (see proceedings) that he would defend the autonomy of “any”, even a Tula, Committee,** against petty centralism; Lenin did not utter a word against the guarantee of such autonomy in Clause 8 of our Party Rules. The *principle* of autonomy, however, was never defended either by Lenin or by the Bureau of Committees of the Majority; it was defended by Akimov, by Lieber, by the new-Iskrists. It is not difficult, of course, to confuse the issue in the

“To the Party”. See present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 454-61.—*Ed.*
See present edition, Vol. 6, p. 487.—*Ed.*

mind of the unenlightened reader by tearing words from their context regardless of the circumstances under which they were used and of their original meaning; but newspapers that employ such methods in polemics can only expect to be treated like *Novoye Vremya*.^{*}

Let us take the pamphlet by "A Worker". What essentially is the point that *Iskra* confuses? It is that certain unprincipled people have only let themselves in for it with their shouting about the principle of autonomy and the like, since the only reply could be a demand for the elective principle. Thereupon these people began to beat a retreat. The *Vperyod*-ists, on the other hand, have always held that talking big and flaunting the "principles" of autonomy and democracy is indecent; but if the Rules require serious, practical amendments along the line of democracy, as far as it is feasible under Russian conditions, let us discuss them openly and above-board. *Vperyod* challenged "A Worker" to produce, if he could, any passage in Social-Democratic literature where the necessity of drawing workers into the Party committees is put as clearly as Lenin put it.* "A Worker", led astray by the new-Iskrists, replied in print that he accepted the challenge; it turned out, however, that he did not understand what accepting the challenge implied, for he did not point out any such passage, but only threatened to "give it" to Lenin, to "get even" with him. Naturally, *Vperyod* left these terrible threats unanswered.

Now let us take again the question of a single centre. Lenin, it is alleged, said in *Steps* that it was the opportunists who stood for a single centre, whereas now this is the position of the Bureau of Committees of the Majority. Again the same gross distortion of facts, with an eye to the uninformed or inattentive reader. Whoever wishes to read *Steps* will find (on page 28, mention of which is so studiously avoided by the *Iskra* columnist) that long before the first article written by a Bolshevik against two centres (Ryadovoi's articles in *Our Misunderstandings*), Lenin had written that the idea of two centres "took into account the temporary [mark this!] and special requirements of the Russian Social-Democratic working-class movement in the

* See pp. 58-59 of this volume. - *Ed.*

existing conditions of political slavery, with the initial base of operations for the revolutionary assault being set up abroad". "The first idea," the author of *Steps* goes on to say at once in regard to the idea of centralism in general, "as the one [!] matter of principle, had [according to the plan of the old *Iskra*] to pervade the entire Rules; the second, being a particular idea necessitated by temporary circumstances of place and mode of action, took the form of a seeming departure from centralism in the proposal to set up two centres" (p. 28).^{*} Now, we leave it to the reader to judge the methods of controversy employed by our Party's *Novoye Vremya*! *Iskra* simply tries to mislead the reader by keeping back from him the fact (1) that Lenin pointed out long ago the temporary, *particular* significance of the idea of two centres; and (2) that, therefore, Lenin never explained the opportunists' defence of a single centre by general principles, but only by "temporary circumstances of place and mode of action", by circumstances under which the opportunist wing of the Party *actually* stood for and had to stand for a single centre. That the old *Iskra* was a bulwark in the struggle against opportunism is a fact. That it was the opportunist wing which constituted the minority at the Congress is also a fact. Why, then, should it be a matter of surprise that now, when the new *Iskra* has turned out to be opportunist and when those in Russia have shown greater firmness in principle and Party consistency than those abroad, the "temporary circumstances" have changed? We should not be at all surprised now if the *Rabocheye Dyelo*-ists, Martynov, the "Marsh", and the new-Iskrists all took up a stand (say, at the Third Congress) for two centres, while all the Bolsheviks (or nearly all) stood for one centre. It would only be a change, in keeping with the "temporary circumstances", in the methods of struggle for the same principles of revolutionary Social-Democracy, the principles of the old *Iskra* for which Lenin and the Bolsheviks fought and continue to fight steadfastly. It is only people of the *Novoye Vremya* type who can see anything "miraculous" in such a change. (We said that nearly all Bolsheviks were likely to stand for one centre. We have yet to see how things

^{*} See present edition, Vol. 7, p. 242.—*Ed.*

will turn out at the Third Congress. There are differences of opinion among us as to the significance of "temporary circumstances of place and mode of action". We shall compare these different opinions at the Congress and "strike a balance".)

The new-*Iskra* methods of polemising would seem to have been made sufficiently clear in the foregoing, so that we can now be more brief. *Iskra* contends that the Bureau of Committees of the Majority violated Party discipline by calling the Congress, in contravention of the Rules, over the head of the Council. This is untrue, for the Council had broken the Rules long before by its evasion of the Congress. We openly declared this in the press quite some time ago (Orlovsky).⁹⁸ After the Mensheviks had torn the Party asunder by a secret split and dodged the Congress on all kinds of false pretexts, we had no practical way out of the preposterous situation other than to convene the Congress against the will of the centres. *Iskra* says that the editorial in issue No. 9 of *Vperyod*, "New Tasks and New Forces", by insisting on the necessity of considerably increasing the number of Party organisations of every description, contradicts the spirit of Clause 1 of the Rules as formulated by Lenin, who, in defending his idea at the Congress, had urged the necessity of narrowing the concept of Party. The objection raised by *Iskra* can be recommended as a high-school problem in logic to train young people in debating. The Bolsheviks have always held that the Party should be limited to the sum-total of Party organisations and that the number of these organisations should then be increased (see Proceedings of the Congress and *Steps*, p. 40 *et al.*, particularly pp. 40-41 and 46).^{*} The new *Iskra* confounds extension of the Party's *framework* with extension of the *concept* of Party, it confounds extension of the *number of Party organisations* with extension of the Party *beyond the limits of the Party organisations*! To explain this perplexing riddle, we shall give a plain, easy illustration: let us assume for the sake of simplicity an army consisting exclusively of men of a single arm of the service; the manpower of the army must be narrowed down to a total of men who have actually proved

^{*} See present edition, Vol. 7, pp. 258-60 and 265-66.—*Ed.*

themselves able to shoot, with none allowed to get past with general phrases or verbal assurances of military fitness; after that every effort must be made to increase the number of men who can pass the rifleman's test. Aren't you beginning to see a glimmer of light, gentlemen of the new *Iskra*?

Iskra writes, accusing *Vperyod*: "Previously only consistent Social-Democrats, who had to be recognised as such, were wanted; now all sorts of elements are admitted to the holy of holies, except those that are avowedly non-Social-Democratic." Take *Vperyod*, No. 9. There you will read: "Let all ... circles, except those that are avowedly non-Social-Democratic, either directly join the Party or *align themselves with the Party* [author's italics]. In the latter event we must not demand that they accept our programme or that they necessarily enter into organisational relations with us...."* Is it not clear that *Iskra* is simply juggling, confounding what was "previously needed" for joining the Party with what "is now permitted" for aligned groups? The Bolsheviks have constantly said, and say now in *Vperyod*, that self-enrolment in the Party is intellectualist anarchism, that Party members must accept "obligatory organisational relations" not in words alone. Only people set on creating confusion can fail to understand this. *Vperyod*'s slogan was: Organise new forces for the new tasks into Party organisations or, at least, into organisations aligned with the Party. *Iskra*'s slogan is: "Open the doors wider!" The ones say: "Take new marksmen into your regiments, organise those who are learning to shoot into auxiliary units." The others say: "Open the doors wider! Let all comers enroll themselves in the army, any way they please!"

As to the question of organising the revolution and organising the arming, *Iskra* now seeks to assure us that it has no differences with *Vperyod*. We would ask first of all: what about Parvus? If the differences have merely been invented by the perfidious *Vperyod*, why don't you have it out with the new-Iskrist Parvus, who cannot be suspected of picking on *Iskra*? You yourselves had to admit your disagreement with Parvus and were the first to do so. Why then this game of

* See p. 219 of this volume.—Ed.

hide-and-seek? Essentially, the new *Iskra* argues here against *Vperyod* in the very manner in which *Rabocheye Dyelo* used to argue against the old *Iskra*. We cannot too strongly advise comrades interested in the history of *their own* Party to re-read *Rabocheye Dyelo*, particularly issue No. 10. It had been pointed out to *Rabocheye Dyelo* that it minimised the tasks of the political struggle. Its retort was that *Iskra* underestimated the economic struggle. It is pointed out to the new *Iskra* that it minimises the tasks of organising the revolution, the conduct of the uprising and the arming of the workers, and the participation of Social-Democracy in the provisional revolutionary government. The new *Iskra* retorts that *Vperyod* underestimates the spontaneity of revolution and insurrection, the primacy of politics over "technique" (arming). Like tail-ender views lead to like tail-ender conclusions. These people seek to cover up their inability to provide a guiding slogan for the new tasks by moralising on the importance of the old tasks. Words are torn out of context to show that the opponent himself appreciates the importance of the old tasks, the significance of the ABC of Social-Democracy. Of course, comrades of the new *Iskra*, we prize the ABC of Social-Democracy very highly, but *we do not want to remain at the abecedarian stage for ever*. Let this be plain. Neither Parvus nor the Bureau of Committees of the Majority nor *Vperyod* would ever think of disputing the elementary truth that the workers themselves can, will, and must arm, even without the organisations and the Party. But if *Iskra* makes its famous "self-arming" a *slogan*—then, of course, everyone smiles at the sight of such a worshipful attitude towards spontaneity. When *Iskra*, *correcting* Parvus, discovers a new task—worthy of the lucubrations of Krichevsky and Akimov—the task of "arming the workers with a sense of the burning necessity to arm", it is only natural that it should meet with nothing but ridicule. If at a time when the new tasks of arming the masses, organising street fighting, etc., have been added to the old tasks of Social-Democracy, *Iskra* hastens to belittle these tasks (which we have scarcely begun to tackle) with its disparaging sophisms about "technique" and its secondary role; if instead of *supplementing* the old, customary, constant political tasks of the Party with the new tasks of "tech-

nique", *Iskra* argues about the *separation* of the former from the latter, then, of course, everyone regards such arguments as a new variety of tail-ism.

In conclusion, as a curiosity, we would mention *Iskra's* attempt to discard its sterling reputation as the author of the famous no-panic-mongering theory. *Iskra* itself now calls this a "famous" question and tries to prove that the Bureau of Committees of the Majority, too, advocates "no panic-mongering" when in its leaflet on the insurrection it recommends caution in destroying property belonging to petty bourgeois (except in cases of absolute necessity), so as not to frighten them needlessly.⁹⁹ "Ah," *Iskra* exults, "so you, too, do not want to frighten people!"

Isn't this just too precious? An agreement with the Zemstvo men not to cause a panic during a peaceful demonstration is compared to a warning against the unwarranted destruction of property during the uprising! In the first case, moreover, it is "demonstrations of a higher type"; in the second, the base, contemptible "technique" of armed street fighting.... Just one slight question, friends: why is it that every Social-Democrat* agrees and will agree with the advice not to frighten the petty bourgeoisie needlessly during an uprising? And why, on the other hand, did your plan for a Zemstvo campaign become "famous" among Social-Democrats, by your own admission? Why did Parvus and many others from your own ranks protest against it? Why are you yourselves to this very day ashamed to publish this famous plan? Is it not because the advice contained in your notorious letter was as irrelevant and ridiculous as the advice of the Bureau is indisputably correct and generally accepted by Social-Democrats?

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* So far only the anarchists have expressed their disagreement on this point. They attacked *Vperyod* in their paper, revealing an absolute lack of understanding of the difference between a democratic and a socialist revolution.

THE AGRARIAN PROGRAMME OF THE LIBERALS

The legal press reported some time ago that a conference of Zemstvo leaders from various parts of Russia had been held in Moscow. *Moskovskiye Vedomosti*¹⁰⁰ even sought to give the alarm, shouting that the government was allowing revolutionary assemblies to be held in Russia, and that it was necessary to call a congress of the monarchist party, etc.; but no one paid serious attention to these outcries, since the police these days have their hands full with affairs of a much more disturbing nature. By all accounts, however, the Zemstvo men kept within the bounds of their usual constitutional aspirations. Still, their conference proceedings were of considerable interest, inasmuch as they comprehended the agrarian question. We quote in full the theses which, by the press reports, were adopted by a majority of the conference:

"1) State interference in the economic life should be extended to agrarian relations as well. 2) Proper agrarian legislation presumes a radical change [??]. 3) The impending agrarian reform should be framed on the following principles: I. Improvement of the economic conditions of the farming class by the compulsory redemption of the necessary supplementary plots from private holdings for the benefit of the land-poor of various categories [the elaboration of this question has been entrusted to several persons]. II. Crown lands and some of the royal demesnes to be declared state lands; these state lands to be increased by the purchase and redemption of privately owned land and to be utilised for the benefit of the labouring population. III. The conditions of lease to be regulated through governmental intervention in the relations between owners and tenants. IV. The establishment of public and state mediation commissions to enforce agrarian measures in accordance with the above-mentioned principles. V. The proper organisation of a widely-conceived system of migration and settlement, better credit facilities, reform of the Peasant Bank, and assistance to

co-operative enterprises. VI. The radical revision of land-surveying legislation with a view to simplifying, facilitating, and cheapening demarcation, abolishing the open-field system on privately owned lands and peasant allotments, making possible the exchange of lots, etc."

Before dealing with this most instructive programme point by point, let us dwell on its significance as a whole. Undoubtedly, the very fact that spokesmen of the landlord class present such a programme proves more conclusively than lengthy arguments that Russia differs substantially in some respect from all the fully formed capitalist nations of Western Europe. In what does this difference consist? Is it in the semi-socialist village communal system that prevails in our country with the corresponding absence of a bourgeois intelligentsia and of bourgeois democracy, as the old Narodnik socialists used to think and as the "Socialists-Revolutionaries" still think to some extent? Or is it in the multitude of feudal survivals that enmesh our countryside, making it impossible for capitalism to develop widely and freely and creating Narodnik moods precisely in bourgeois-democratic circles? This is a question no thinking socialist will dismiss with evasive excuses, or on the grounds that it is too abstract and theoretical, supposedly out of place in an epoch of revolution, or by reference to the fact of peasant uprisings as a sufficient explanation of the landlords' complaisance. Now, in the epoch of revolution, evasiveness or lack of principle in theoretical questions is tantamount to utter ideological bankruptcy; for now of all times a socialist requires a well-thought-out and consistent world outlook, so that he may control the events and not the events him. Reference to the peasant uprisings contributes nothing either, for the programme now adopted by the landed proprietors, who are politically organised in Zemstvo unions, embodies the wishes which have been expressed for many a decade by the whole liberal press and by all liberal leaders. The Narodnik programme has become the programme of the landlords—a fact that gives a clear political answer to the question we have raised. In a revolutionary epoch theoretical disputes over social issues are settled by the direct action of the diverse classes.

Let us now examine the agrarian programme of the liberals more closely. Our legal press is inclined to sing its

praises. *Economicheskaya Gazeta*, for instance, "records the fact that the Zemstvo people have come forward with an agrarian programme that is incomparably more extreme [really!] than could have been expected, judging from the prevailing impression of the composition of the Zemstvo at the present time" (extreme, that is, from the point of view of the landlords?). "This is evidence of the fact," continues the article, "that the Zemstvo political group possesses both political tact and a deep understanding of what is taking place about us...."

The tact and the understanding of the landlords consist in the fact that when the peasants themselves began to intervene actively and definitely in agrarian relations, these landlords began to speak of the necessity of state interference. The same old story! State intervention in agrarian relations has always been a fact in Russia. When it was intervention in the interests of the upper classes, it was called in police parlance "order"; when the intervention comes from below, it is called "disorder". Yes, but what kind of intervention do the landlords want? Their programme shows that they want intervention exclusively to regulate the relations between owners and tenants. All the measures which they propose, from redemption of supplementary plots to credit facilities and the exchange of lots, etc., apply exclusively to those persons who use the land, i.e., the various categories of farmers. And what of the rural labourers who have no farms of their own? As far back as the nineties of the past century, in Russia's fifty "interior" gubernias alone there were estimated to be no fewer than *three and a half million* farm-hands and day-labourers for whom farm employment was the principal means of earning a livelihood. Today, the number of agricultural wage-labourers is undoubtedly* still greater, and the overwhelming majority of them are entirely or almost entirely farmless. Apart from those who possessed neither home nor farm, it was estimated that more than three million of the approximately ten million peasant *farms* in the stated gubernias possessed no horses; and that was ten years ago. All these are farmers in name alone. Their most vital interests lie in higher wages, shorter hours, and improved working conditions. The landlords are discreetly silent

on the subject of intervention in the relations between employers and workers. And we may rest assured that no one will give this kind of intervention serious thought until the rural workers themselves intervene.

We Social-Democrats must pay most serious attention to *this* kind of intervention. Both the immediate practical interests of the movement and our general principles demand it. The bourgeois-democratic nature of Russian liberalism and of Russian Narodism has always manifested itself; among other things, in the fact that the interests of small farming completely overshadow the interests of rural hired labour. Of course, convinced Narodniks, and sometimes "Socialists-Revolutionaries", are prone to regard this as quite natural in view of the "secondary" role (in their imagination, but not in actual peasant life) of hired labour, in view of the fact that with the further development of "village communal traditions", "labour views", and "equalised tenure", this role *might* even be reduced to nought. But this tendency, however earnest, sincere, and socialistic the justifying speeches may be, is in fact a sign of nothing but petty-bourgeois narrow-mindedness. This sort of day-dreaming, a quality possessed by both the Russian peasant and the Russian intellectual, is petty-bourgeois day-dreaming. The flowers of this Narodnik day-dreaming are the same fictitious flowers that decorate one of the chains of labouring mankind, and Social-Democratic criticism must ruthlessly pluck out such flowers, "not that man should continue to wear his chain bereft of all joy and pleasure, but that he should throw off the chain and reach for the living flower."¹⁰¹

We are in full sympathy with the peasant movement. We would consider it a tremendous gain both for the general social development of Russia and for the Russian proletariat if the peasantry, with our help, succeeded in wresting from the landlords *all* their lands by revolutionary means. But even assuming this most favourable outcome—*even then*, the mass of agricultural hired labourers would only temporarily diminish in number but could in no event disappear altogether. *Even then*, the independent interests of the rural hired labourers would remain independent interests.

The transfer of the land to the peasants would not at all do away with the predominance of the capitalist mode

of production in Russia; it would, on the contrary, provide a broader base for its development; it would bring this development from the type approximating the Italian closer to the American. The property distinctions among the peasants, which are already tremendous, but relatively not very noticeable chiefly on account of the general oppression under the absolutist serf-owning system, would not in any way cease to exist. The expansion of the home market, the development of exchange and commodity production on a new scale, the rapid growth of industry and of cities—all these inevitable effects of a substantial improvement in the condition of the peasants would unavoidably increase property distinctions. The more illusions on that score are widespread among us, the more energetically must the Social-Democrats combat them, if they really want to represent the interests of the working-class movement as a whole, and not merely of one of its stages.*

Until there has been a complete socialist revolution, not even the most radical and most revolutionary measures for agrarian reform will eliminate the class of agricultural wage-workers. The dream of making all people petty-bourgeois is a reactionary platitude. For this reason we should start working now to develop the class-consciousness of the rural wage-workers and to rally them into an independent class organisation. The strike wave in the towns can and should spread to the villages, not only in the form of peasant uprisings, but in the form of real labour strikes, especially at mowing and harvesting time. The demands contained in the working-class section of our programme, which are so often presented by the urban workers to their employers, must, with the corresponding changes necessitated by the different living conditions, be put forward by the rural workers, too. We must take advantage of the fact that so far there are no special laws in Russia degrading the position of the rural workers below that of the urban workers (except for the law forbidding them to leave their work without permission). We must see to it that the rising tide of the proletarian movement creates a specifically proletarian mood and

* Cf. Marx's article of 1846 printed below. (See pp. 323-29 of this volume.—*Ed.*)

proletarian methods of struggle among the farm-hands and day-labourers.

The petty-bourgeois stratum of the rural population, the peasantry in the strict and narrow sense of the word, cannot help being revolutionary at certain periods in history. Its present revolutionary attitude is an inevitable product of the conditions of the "old order", and we must vigorously support and develop it. But it will follow just as inevitably from the conditions of the new order, of the new, free, capitalist Russia, that part of the rural petty bourgeoisie will side with "order"; and the more land the peasants take away from the landlords now, the sooner this will come about. In the countryside, too, only the rural proletariat can be a truly revolutionary class, a class that, under all circumstances, is revolutionary to the end. The conversion of the wretched, downtrodden muzhik into a free, energetic European farmer will be a tremendous democratic gain; but we socialists shall not forget for a moment that this gain will be of no real use to the cause of mankind's complete emancipation from all oppression unless and insofar as the farmer is confronted by a class-conscious, free, and organised rural proletariat.

The liberal landlords keep quiet about the rural worker. As far as the future farmer is concerned, their sole concern is to get him converted as quickly as possible, with the minimum loss to their pockets (it would, perhaps, be more correct to say with the maximum gain to their pockets), into their ally, into a man of property, a pillar of order. What miserable sops they hope to get off with! Their only revolutionary measure, the confiscation of the royal demesnes, is restricted to a *part* of these lands; they are afraid to call confiscation confiscation, and say nothing about the church lands. While promising supplementary plots to the land-poor, they firmly insist on redemption, with not a word about who should make the redemption payment. They obviously take it for granted that the peasant will pay, as in the case of the famed redemption of 1861. The landlords will give up their worst lands at exorbitant prices, which is what their supplementary endowments promise. All the measures they propose in regard to credits, co-operation, exchange of lots, etc., are restricted entirely to narrow proprietary

interests. With regard to leases—one of the most acute problems of peasant farming—they offer nothing but the vaguest of catchwords—"regulation". This may mean anything at all, even an increase in rents, on the pretext of standardisation; we indicated above what the representatives of the ruling classes have always understood by "order".

However, the most important and politically most dangerous feature of the liberal programme is, in our view, the clause concerning the "public and state mediation commissions". The method of realising the agrarian reform is a matter of great importance; for on the method of realisation, concretely and actually, will depend the earnest character of the reform. In regard to this question too (as in regard to many others), we have the Narodniks to thank when we pay the main attention to the economic advantage, ignoring or underestimating the political aspect of the matter. This point of view, natural in a petty bourgeois, understandable in a farmer, is absolutely inadmissible in a Social-Democrat. To the Social-Democrat shifts within the classes and categories of farmers and proprietors are of no consequence unless accompanied by a political gain that facilitates the class struggle of the proletariat. From the point of view of petty-bourgeois day-dreaming, all schemes for "equalised tenure", etc., are important. From the point of view of the Social-Democrat, all such projects are idle and harmful day-dreams that divert the public mind from the realities of real democratic gains. The Social-Democrats will never forget that the ruling classes always and everywhere try to divide and corrupt the working people with economic sops. In the sphere of agrarian reform they find this policy particularly easy and pursue it with particular skill.

All the more definitely and emphatically must we insist on the *basic* demand of our agrarian programme, namely, the establishment of revolutionary peasant committees that will themselves enforce really radical (not in the landlords' sense "radical") agrarian reforms. Short of this, every agrarian reform will inevitably and inescapably be a new fraud, a new trap, like the famed "Reform" of 1861. This is precisely what the "public [?] and state mediation commissions" are—the laying of a trap! By "public" we understand the landlords; by "state"—the bureaucrats. "Public and state

commissions" means *landlords'* and *bureaucrats'* commissions pure and simple.

That is the point on which we must immediately focus our agitation in the countryside. Peasants, do you hear? They want once again to load you with benefits in true bureaucratic manner, to "regulate" your life by landlord intervention, to "redeem" land for you on the pattern of that old-time land redemption of dismal memory! The landlords are so kind, so very kind: seeing that their lands are in danger of being taken away for nothing, they magnanimously consent to *sell* them—at a suitable price, of course.... Do you agree to such intervention on the part of landlords and bureaucrats? Or do you want to intervene *yourselves* and build up a life of freedom for yourselves? Then unite with the urban proletariat, fight for the republic, arise for the insurrection which will bring you a revolutionary government and revolutionary peasant committees!

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MARX ON THE AMERICAN “GENERAL REDISTRIBUTION”

In *Vperyod*, No. 12,* there was a reference to Marx's polemic against Kriege on the agrarian question. The year was not 1848, as erroneously stated in the article by Comrade —, but 1846. Hermann Kriege, a co-worker of Marx and at the time a very young man, had gone to America in 1845 and there started a journal, the *Volkstribun*, for the propaganda of communism. But he conducted this propaganda in such a manner that Marx was obliged to protest very strongly in the name of the German Communists against Hermann Kriege's discrediting of the Communist Party. The criticism of Kriege's trend, published in 1846 in *Westphälische Dampfboot*¹⁰² and reprinted in Volume II of Mehring's edition of Marx's works, is of tremendous interest to present-day Russian Social-Democrats.

The point is that the agrarian question at that time had been brought to the fore by the course of the American social movement, as is the case now in Russia; it was not a question of a developed capitalist society, but, on the contrary, of the creation of the primary and fundamental conditions for a real development of capitalism. This circumstance is of particular importance for drawing a parallel between Marx's attitude towards the American ideas of “general redistribution” and the attitude of Russian Social-Democrats towards the present-day peasant movement.

Kriege gave no data in his journal for a concrete study of the distinctive features of the American social system and for defining the true character of the movement of the

* See p. 250 of this volume.—Ed.

contemporary agrarian reformers who campaigned for the abolition of rent. What Kriege did do, though (quite in the style of our "Socialists-Revolutionaries"), was to clothe the question of the agrarian revolution in bombastic and high-sounding phrases: "Every poor man," wrote Kriege, "will become a useful member of human society as soon as he is given an opportunity to engage in productive work. He will be assured such an opportunity for all time if society gives him a piece of land on which he can keep himself and his family.... If this immense area (the 1,400,000,000 acres of North American public domain) is withdrawn from commerce and is secured in restricted amounts for labour,* an end will be put to poverty in America at one stroke...."

To this Marx replies: "One would have expected him to understand that legislators have no power to decree that the evolution of the patriarchal system, which Kriege desires, into an industrial system be checked, or that the industrial and commercial states of the East coast be thrown back to patriarchal barbarism."

Thus, we have before us a real plan for an American general redistribution: the withdrawal of a vast land expanse from commerce, the securing of title to the land, limitation of the extent of landownership or land tenure. And from the very outset Marx subjects this utopianism to sober criticism, he points out that the patriarchal system evolves inevitably into the industrial system, i.e., to use present-day idiom, he points out the inevitability of the development of capitalism. But it would be a great mistake to think that the utopian dreams of the participants in the movement caused Marx to adopt a negative attitude to the movement in general. Nothing of the kind. Already then, at the very beginning of his literary activity, Marx was able to extract the real and progressive content of a movement from its tawdry ideological trappings. In the second part of his criticism, entitled "The Economics [i.e., the political economy]

* Recall what *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya*, beginning with issue No. 8, wrote on the passing of the land from capital to labour, on the importance of state lands in Russia, on equalised land tenure, on the bourgeois idea of drawing land into commercial transactions, etc. Precisely like Kriege!

of the *Volkstribun* and Its Attitude to Young America", Marx wrote:

"We fully recognise the historical justification of the movement of the American National Reformers. We know that this movement strives for a result which, true, would give a temporary impetus to the industrialisation of modern bourgeois society, but which, as a product of the proletarian movement, and as an attack on landed property in general, especially under prevailing American conditions, must inevitably lead, by its own consequences, to communism. Kriege, who with the German Communists in New York joined the Anti-Rent *Bewegung* [movement], clothes this simple fact in bombastic phrases, without entering into the content of the movement, thereby proving that he is quite at sea as regards the connection between young America and American social conditions. We will cite another example of his outpouring of enthusiasm for humanity over the agrarians' plan for parcelling the land on an American scale.

"In issue No. 10 of the *Volkstribun*, in an article entitled 'What We Want', we read: 'The American National Reformers call the land the common heritage of all men ... and demand that the national legislature pass measures to preserve the 1,400,000,000 acres of land not yet fallen into the hands of the grabbing speculators, as the inalienable common property of the whole of mankind.' In order to preserve for all mankind this 'inalienable common property', he accepts the plan of the National Reformers: 'to provide every peasant, whatever country he may come from, with 160 acres of American land for his subsistence'; or, as it is expressed in issue No. 14, in 'An Answer to Conze': 'Of these unappropriated public lands no one is to have a holding in excess of 160 acres, and this only provided he tills it himself.' Thus, in order to preserve the land as 'inalienable common property', and for 'the whole of mankind' besides, it is necessary immediately to begin parcelling it out. Kriege, moreover, imagines that he can rule out the necessary consequences of this allotment—concentration, industrial progress, and the like, by legislation. He regards 160 acres of land as an invariable quantity, as though the value of such an area did not vary according to its quality. The 'peasants' will have to exchange the produce of the land, if

not the land itself, among themselves and with others, and, having gone thus far, they will soon find that one 'peasant', even without capital, thanks to his labour and the greater original fertility of his 160 acres, has reduced another to the position of his farm-hand. Besides, what matters it whether it is 'the land' or the produce of the land that 'falls into the hands of grabbing speculators'? Let us seriously examine Kriege's gift to mankind. One thousand four hundred million acres are to be preserved as the 'inalienable common property of the whole of mankind', with every 'peasant' getting 160 acres. We can therefore compute the magnitude of Kriege's 'mankind': exactly 8,750,000 'peasants', who, counting five to a family, represent 43,750,000 people. We can also compute the duration of the 'for all time' during which 'the proletariat, as the representative of the whole of mankind', at least in the U.S.A., can lay claim to all the land. If the population of the U.S.A. continues to increase at its present rate, i.e., if it doubles in 25 years, then this 'for all time' will last something under 40 years; by then these 1,400,000,000 acres will have been occupied, and future generations will have nothing to 'lay claim to'. But as the free grant of land would greatly increase immigration, Kriege's 'for all time' might come to an end even sooner, particularly if it is borne in mind that land for 44,000,000 people would not be an adequate outlet even for the pauperism existing in Europe today; for in Europe one out of every 10 persons is a pauper, and the British Isles alone account for 7,000,000 paupers. A similar example of naïveté in political economy is to be found in issue No. 13, in the article 'To the Women', in which Kriege says that if the city of New York gave up its 52,000 acres of land on Long Island, this would suffice to rid New York of all pauperism, misery, and crime 'at one stroke' and for ever.

"Had Kriege regarded the movement for freeing the land as an early form of the proletarian movement, necessary under certain conditions, as a movement which, by reason of the position in social life of the class from which it emanates, must necessarily develop into a communist movement; **had he shown why the communist aspirations in America had to manifest themselves initially in this agrarian form,**

which seems to contradict all communism, there would have been nothing to object to. But he declares what is merely a subordinate form of a movement of definite, real people to be a cause of mankind in general. He represents this cause ... as the ultimate and highest aim of every movement in general, thus turning the definite aims of the movement into sheer bombastic nonsense. In the same article (issue No. 10) he continues to chant his paean: 'And so the old dreams of the Europeans would at last come true. A place would be prepared for them on this side of the ocean which they would only have to take and to fructify with the labour of their hands, so as to be able proudly to declare to all the tyrants of the world, 'This is *my* cabin, which you have not built; this is *my* hearth whose glow fills your hearts with envy.'

"He might have added, This is *my* dunghill, which I, my wife, my children, my manservant, and my cattle have produced. And who are the Europeans whose 'dreams' would thus come true? Not the communist workers, but bankrupt shopkeepers and handicraftsmen, or ruined cottars, who yearn for the good fortune of once again becoming petty bourgeois and peasants in America. And what is the 'dream' that is to be fulfilled by means of these 1,400,000,000 acres? No other than that all men be converted into private owners, a dream which is as unrealisable and as communistic as the dream to convert all men into emperors, kings, and popes."

Marx's criticism is full of caustic sarcasm. He scourges Kriege for those very aspects of his views which we now observe among our "Socialists-Revolutionaries", namely, phrase-mongering, petty-bourgeois utopias represented as the highest revolutionary utopianism, incomprehension of the real foundations of the modern economic system and its development. With remarkable penetration, Marx, who was then only the *future* economist, points to the role of exchange and commodity production. The peasants, he says, will exchange the produce of the land, if not the land itself, and that says everything! The question is dealt with in a way that is largely applicable to the Russian peasant movement and its petty-bourgeois "socialist" ideologists.

Marx, however, does not simply "repudiate" this petty-bourgeois movement, he does not dogmatically ignore it, he

does not fear to soil his hands by contact with the movement of the revolutionary petty-bourgeois democrats—a fear that is characteristic of many doctrinaires. While mercilessly ridiculing the absurd ideological trappings of the movement, Marx strives in a sober, materialist manner to determine its *real* historical content, the consequences that must inevitably follow from it because of objective conditions, regardless of the will and the consciousness, the dreams and the theories, of the various individuals. Marx, therefore, does not condemn, but fully approves communist support of the movement. Adopting the dialectical standpoint, i.e., examining the movement from every aspect, taking into account both the past and the future, Marx notes the revolutionary aspect of the attack on private property in land. He recognises the petty-bourgeois movement as a peculiar initial form of the proletarian, communist movement. You will not achieve what you dream of by means of this movement, says Marx to Kriege: instead of fraternity, you will get petty-bourgeois exclusiveness; instead of inalienable peasant allotments, you will have the drawing of the land into commerce; instead of a blow at the grabbing speculators, you will witness the expansion of the basis for capitalist development. But the capitalist evil you are vainly hoping to avoid is a historical benefit, for it will accelerate social development tremendously and bring ever so much nearer new and higher forms of the communist movement. A blow struck at landed property will facilitate the inevitable further blows at property in general. The revolutionary action of the lower class for a change that will temporarily provide a restricted prosperity, and by no means for all, will facilitate the inevitable further revolutionary action of the very lowest class for a change that will really ensure complete human happiness for all toilers.

Marx's presentation of the case against Kriege should serve as a model for us Russian Social-Democrats. That the peasant movement in Russia today is of a really petty-bourgeois nature there can be no doubt. We must explain this fact by every means in our power, and we must ruthlessly and irreconcilably combat all the illusions of all the "Socialists-Revolutionaries" or primitive socialists on this score. The organisation of an independent party of the proletariat which,

through all democratic upheavals, will strive for the complete socialist revolution, must be our constant aim, not to be lost sight of for a moment. But to turn away from the peasant movement for this reason would be sheer philistinism and pedantry. No, there is no doubt as to the revolutionary and democratic nature of this movement, and we must with all our might support it, develop it, make it a politically conscious and definitely class movement, advance it, and go hand in hand with it to the end—for we go much further than the end of any peasant movement; we go to the very end of the division of society into classes. There is hardly another country in the world where the peasantry is experiencing such suffering, such oppression and degradation as in Russia. The worse this oppression has been, the more powerful will now be the peasantry's awakening, the more irresistible its revolutionary onset. The class-conscious revolutionary proletariat should support this onset with all its might, so that it may leave stand no stone of this old, accursed, feudal, autocratic, and slavish Russia; so that it may create a new generation of free and courageous people, a new republican country in which our proletarian struggle for socialism will be able freely to expand.

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THE COUNCIL IS CAUGHT OUT

A reprint of the decision of the "Party Council" from *Iskra*, No. 95, dated Geneva, April 7, 1905, has just appeared. This decision is a veritable maze of "deviations from the truth". Let us consider the major ones.

We are told that the Council has taken care not to let the inner struggle in the Party undermine its unity. This is untrue. All Party members should know from unrefuted and irrefutable documents that over a year ago, in January 1904, Lenin and Vasilyev, members of the Central Committee, proposed in the Council that a call be issued to the entire Party to stop the boycott and the secret appropriation of Party funds by the circles.* *The Council rejected their proposal.* Instead, it participated directly in the *secret split* of the Party, thus sanctioning the struggle of the secret organisation of the Minority for "co-optation". This struggle, as is now proved by documentary evidence, had been going on since the Second Congress, viz., from August 1903 to November or December 1904.

Thus, from January 1904 on, the Council was no longer the supreme Party body, but a tool of the secret organisation of the Minority. The existence of this organisation was admitted publicly and in print, not only by the conciliatory C.C., but even by *Iskra*, at the time when the C.C. sided with the Minority.

As a tool of the Minority's secret organisation, the Council has exerted all efforts to evade the demand of the committees for an all-Party congress. For eighteen months Social-Democratic activities in Russia were hampered by the dis-

ruptive tactics of the Minority abroad. For eighteen months the committees in Russia waged an intense unremitting struggle for a congress against the Geneva Council, which either pigeonholed the committees' resolutions or returned them with insulting remarks ("blackguards, sheer humbug, fabrication of documents" are the expressions contained in a letter by Martov; see Orlovsky's pamphlet *The Council Against the Party*). Every important step in this painful struggle against the machinations of the promoters of the secret split is now documented in Party literature. As far back as October 1904, i.e., *six months ago*, it was proved—e.g., in Orlovsky's *The Council Against the Party*—that the Council, without offering reasons, had refrained from convening the Congress, although called upon to do so by the Party Rules. After that, one Party committee in Russia after another *formally voiced no confidence* in the Council and in all the central bodies. The Council, however, ignored these actions and with no sense of shame flouted the Party. The Council was a tool of the Minority. Now the Council, in its decision of April 7, 1905, has openly declared itself *a party to the dispute*, but at the same time it has had no scruples about using the title, the rights, and the powers of an *all-Party* body, and it has refused to return to the Party the mandate it has received from it. The thing has been a flagrant breach of confidence from beginning to end.

When, finally, the Party committees in Russia, seeing that the Council was evading the Congress, *themselves called the Congress* through the "Bureau" which they had elected at three conferences, *even the C.C., which had gone over to the Minority*, hastened to rectify its mistake. *The C.C. in Russia*, which not only did not sympathise with the Committees of the Majority but actually combated them, *upon seeing how matters stood in Russia* and knowing the Majority to be really preponderant there, had to admit that the Bureau of Committees of the Majority had been absolutely impartial in convening the Congress and had had to *rebel against the Council*. In its appeal of March 12, 1905, to the general membership of the Party, the C.C. in Russia, as we noted in the press and as all Party workers in Russia know from the declaration, *openly rebelled against*

the Council; it declared in Point 5 of the declaration that "the March 8 resolution of the Council (*Iskra*, No. 89) against the Congress is not considered grounds for halting organisation work for the Congress".

What is the significance of this announcement, which our Council so studiously passes over? The significance is that the C.C. in Russia, knowing Russian affairs and, evidently, having investigated the assertions of the Council abroad, *designates the assertions* as untrue and the pretexts for not convening the Congress as pure invention; it considers as a *proved* fact that the demand for the Congress has the support of the overwhelming majority of the Russian committees that had a chance to study the facts of the case.

Hence, the silence of our Council regarding the declaration made by the C.C. in Point 5! For it is in effect a direct admission to the whole Party membership that the Council has made false allegations, that it has misrepresented the general opinion of the Party!

In vain, therefore, does the Council attempt to mislead the Party once more by proposing conferences and agreements between the disputants. *In Russia such an agreement has already been reached.* The centre of the Mensheviks in Russia was the Central Committee; *Iskra* itself admitted as much in its announcement that the July declaration of the C.C. had been accepted by the Menshevik organisations. The centre of the Majority in Russia was the Bureau of Committees of the Majority. The *Russian* centres of both sides to the dispute *have agreed to hold a joint congress.* It is evident from this that there are Mensheviks in Russia who set a slightly higher value on the Party spirit and Party unity than do the Mensheviks abroad. It is evident that the Russian Mensheviks themselves, as represented by their centre, the C.C., expose the Council abroad and turn their backs on it. It is evident that after an agreement has been reached between the Russian centres of the disputants, any agreement with the Council abroad, i.e., with the gentlemen sitting in Geneva, is entirely out of the question.

In vain, therefore, does our Council speak of its deposition by the C.C. in the future tense. It is not a matter of the future but of the past. Point 5 of the C.C.'s appeal to the Party, dated March 12, 1905, proves to all who can under-

stand what they read that this deposition has actually taken place. Russia, represented by the united centres of the two sides, has overthrown the group abroad. The Party Council now represents merely the Geneva group and not the Party.

How accurately this describes the state of affairs in the Party may be seen very clearly from the following. The Council declares that its decision of April 7, 1905, was adopted unanimously. Party members who read this are, of course, supposed to believe that *the two members of the C.C. on the Council also* had a hand in this decision. However, any such idea, which the Council tries to inspire in the readers, is very much open to question.

The proof: As we stated in *Vperyod*, No. 13, we are not yet authorised to publish the agreement between the Bureau of Committees of the Majority and the C.C. Still, we were informed that at least one point of the agreement might be made public, should the Party Council decide against convening the Third Party Congress.

This eventuality has now arisen.

We, therefore, now publish this point—Point 1 of the unpublished agreement.

"Agreement between the Bureau of Committees of the Majority and the Central Committee, signed March 12, 1905.

"Point 1. The Organising Committee composed of representatives of the Central Committee and of the Bureau of Committees of the Majority shall organise the Third Party Congress immediately, regardless of any resolution the Council may adopt on the convocation of the Congress."

Clear enough, it would seem.

The C.C. expressly stipulated that it would refuse to abide by any *future* resolutions of the Council, without making this public for the time being, in the hope that the Council might for once act honestly. This means that the Russian Mensheviks still believed it possible for the Council to do the right thing, even if by way of exception.

The Russian Mensheviks, represented by their Russian centre, have now been disillusioned.

Hence, it is now proved conclusively that even the C.C., whose sympathies were entirely on the side of the Council, was compelled to expose its colleague abroad to the full,

It now remains for us in conclusion to put one small question to the reader: In view of all this, what is one to think of the members of the Council sitting in Geneva, who have declared publicly, in print, that the Council decision dated Geneva, April 7, 1905, had been adopted unanimously?

Vperyod, No. 15,
April 20 (7), 1905

Published according to
the text in *Vperyod*

**OPEN LETTER TO COMRADE PLEKHANOV,
CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF THE R.S.D.L.P.¹⁰³**

Dear Comrade,

On April 4 (17), the Central Committee notified the Party Council that it had appointed Comrades Johansen¹⁰⁴ and Valerian¹⁰⁵ to represent it on the Council and requested that a meeting of the Council as constituted in conformity with the Party Rules be called in the immediate future.

Having received no reply to this request, we took the liberty of approaching you a second time, and on April 22 (9) we received an answer in which you refused to call a meeting of the Council as long as we "go on acting as violators of the Party Rules and usurpers of the Council's functions".

The situation arising from your refusal to call an official meeting of the Council prevents us from presenting a number of communications to the Party Council; and since, in our opinion, it is impossible to withhold them any longer, we are obliged to address ourselves to you before the whole Party membership with a written recital of the main statements that we intended to submit to the next meeting of the Council.

1. The Central Committee informs the Party Council that up to April 4 (17) the following qualified Party organisations went on record for the Third Party Congress: the St. Petersburg, Moscow, Northern League, Nizhni-Novgorod, Tver, Tula, Riga, Siberian League, Voronezh, Saratov, Odessa, Caucasian League (8 votes), Nikolayev, Ural, Orel-Bryansk, Kursk, Smolensk, Polesye, North-Western, Kharkov, and Samara committees—a total of 21 organisations, entitled

to 48 votes. The C.C. also declared itself in favour of calling the Congress and decided to send a delegate, as well as its representatives on the Party Council, to the Congress.

From the Astrakhan, Kazan, Kuban, and Don committees, from the League of the Mining and Metal District, from the Ekaterinoslav Committee, from the Crimean League, from the League, from the Editorial Board of the Central Organ, and from the three members of the Council residing abroad either no resolutions were received or the resolutions received declared the convening of the Congress to be undesirable.

Finally, the Kiev Committee, although it had adopted a resolution against the Congress on March 25, subsequently elected a delegate to the Congress and sent him abroad.

Thus, out of the 75 votes * that would represent the whole Party at the Congress, 52 (not counting the Kiev Committee) were in favour of convening the Third Party Congress.

Under these circumstances the C.C. deems it necessary to insist, through its representatives on the Party Council, that the Council immediately fulfil its formal obligation, in accordance with Clause 2 of the Party Rules, to convene the Congress when this is demanded by Party organisations commanding aggregately half the total voting strength of the Congress.

Since, according to the information of the C.C., many more votes have now been cast for the Congress than are required by the Rules (52 out of 75), the Council must immediately and unconditionally give notice of the convening of the Congress, without stipulating any prior conditions or demands not provided for in the Party Rules.

2. The Central Committee is profoundly convinced that, even granting the fullest sincerity of all Council members, a question of such extraordinary importance as the convening of the Party Congress, at a time such as the Party and all Russia are now living through, cannot be decided on purely formal grounds. Our Party Rules are not explicit enough for that. Thus, they give no answer to the question of the time limit within which the Party Council is *obliged* to convene the Congress after the required number of votes in favour has been cast. Respecting this and other ques-

tions, the central bodies of the Party are obliged to resort to an *interpretation* of the Rules and act not only in keeping with the formally expressed will of the Party, which, as is evident from Clause 1, has declared in favour of the Congress, but in conformity with the actual state of affairs in the Party as well as in Russia generally.

The C.C. considers it its duty to inform the Party Council that the Party crisis in Russia has grown to such dimensions that Party work has been brought to an almost complete standstill. The situation in the committees has reached the height of confusion. There is hardly a single question of tactics or organisation that does not provoke the most violent dissension locally between the groups, more often than not because the disputants belong to different camps in the Party rather than on essential matters. Neither the Party Council, nor the Central Organ, nor the C.C. has sufficient prestige with the majority of the Party workers; dual organisations are springing up everywhere, hampering each other's work and discrediting the Party in the eyes of the proletariat. To comrades active chiefly as publicists, whose work can go on uninterrupted even in an atmosphere of mistrust on the part of a large portion of the Party membership, the present unbearable, blind-alley situation in which general Party matters stand is perhaps not so apparent as to the Party workers of the practical centre, who come daily up against increasing difficulties in their work in Russia. The time has come when the growth of the internal contradictions in our Party life begins to tax the narrow and, as we can all see now, far from perfect framework of the Rules which the Second Party Congress has given us. New forms are needed, or at least a modification of the old; and this can only be done by the sole lawgiver of the Social-Democratic Party—the Party Congress, since it and it alone has the right to establish rules *binding on all*, rules that cannot be imposed by any conference, or any local agreement. Realising the importance of resolving the Party crisis by means of an immediate congress, the majority of the committees in Russia have taken all the necessary steps for the convening of the Congress as soon as possible, including the election and the sending of delegates; this applies not only to the committees of the Majority, which had previously declared

for the Congress, but also to the greater part of the Minority committees, of the groups and the periphery organisations. The Party has declared for the Congress and has expended considerable means and efforts in preparation for it. The central bodies of the Party have no formal right to postpone notice of the Congress now that the obligation to convene it is incontestable, and they are morally bound to do their utmost to ensure that the Party's expenditure of energy shall not have been wasted. To keep scores of delegates, our most active comrades, abroad indefinitely, when they are so badly needed in Russia, or still worse, to have them go back to Russia from a congress not held because the comrades of the Central Organ refused to forego the letter of the Party Rules for the spirit, for the higher interest of preserving Party unity, would be an unpardonable waste of Party forces and would mean that the leaders of the Party fell short of the tasks which Party life has put before them. When forms have outlived themselves, when a growing and developing Party feels cramped in these forms, we cannot remedy things by harping for the hundredth time on the sanctity of the letter of the law. That is no way out of the crisis; the only possible solution is to call the Party Congress.

3. On the strength of Clause 6 of the Party Rules which empowers it to organise and conduct all activities of general Party importance, the C.C. insists upon its right, inalienable and not subject to restriction, to take all the preparatory measures and to perform all the practical work involved in the organisation of Party congresses. The C.C., as the only practical centre of the Party, considers all attempts of other Party bodies to interfere in this work a breach of the Party Rules, and it protests against them as an encroachment upon its rights. As for the rights granted to the Party Council in Clause 2 of the Rules with regard to the convocation of Party congresses, the C.C. interprets them to mean that the Council shall give notice of such convocation and control the work actually done by the C.C.

In view of the foregoing, the C.C. admits that its agreement with the Bureau of Committees of the Majority to call the Third Party Congress contravenes the Party Rules only insofar as it expresses (see Point 1 of the agreement) the

intention of convening the Congress even without prior official notice by the Party Council.

4. Having received word that eighteen qualified Party organisations, apart from the C.C. itself, had passed resolutions in favour of convening the Third Congress, the C.C., on March 12, decided to bring this to the attention of the Council, to whom it sent the following statement: "The Central Committee notifies the Party Council that to date (March 12) eighteen qualified Party committees (besides the C.C.), or more than half the total voting strength at the Third Congress under the Party Rules, have declared in favour of convening the Third Party Congress. Similar resolutions from several other committees are expected in the very near future. Under the circumstances the C.C. deems it necessary to convene the Congress immediately and asks the Party Council to give due notice of its convocation by adopting a corresponding resolution. All documents in the possession of the C.C. relating to this question will be submitted to the Party Council in the near future." Besides this, the C.C., as early as March 10, instructed its agent, Comrade Vadim,¹⁰⁶ to go abroad immediately in order to report the situation to the Party Council, to which he had been accredited by the C.C. Owing to an unfortunate coincidence, Comrade Vadim was arrested before he reached the frontier. As for the document cited above, in which the C.C. records the receipt of resolutions that oblige the Council to give immediate notice of the Congress, we find that, according to private information received on April 4 (17) from Comrade Deutsch by the members of the C.C., Comrades Johansen and Valerian, it was not received at all. Afterwards Comrade Deutsch corrected this information, stating that the document had been received at Locarno, but only after the Council's meeting of April 7. Since we, the representatives of the C.C., were barred from the session of the Council, we are not in a position to determine why there was such a delay in delivering the C.C.'s statement to the Council members. However, even if it was received after the meeting of the three Council members at Locarno, the document, which established a clear case for the convocation of the Congress, was of such importance that the comrades from the Central Organ and the fifth member of the Council should

have met immediately and taken the decision prescribed by the Party Rules, or, at least, in view of the failure of the C.C. representative to arrive because of his arrest before reaching the frontier, they should have held up publication of the resolution of April 7.

5. The C.C. questions the validity of the decisions which the Party Council has adopted since February 1905, because after the return of Comrades B. and Vtorov¹⁰⁷ from abroad at the end of January, the C.C. did not accredit anyone to the Party Council. Long before the present conflict between the C.C. and the Council members abroad, specifically, on February 14, 1904, a plenary meeting of the C.C. adopted a decision construing Clause 4 of the Party Rules relating to the representation of the C.C. on the Council to mean that the members of the C.C. who are delegated to the Council must be accredited by the C.C. as a body, and that even members of the C.C. who for one reason or another are abroad have no right to attend meetings of the Council unless a resolution to that effect has been adopted by a plenary meeting of the C.C.

This explanatory decision of the C.C. has served as the basis for representation of the C.C. abroad. Since February 1904 all representatives of the C.C. without exception have sat in the Party Council only after having previously been endorsed by a plenary meeting of the C.C. Comrades Glebov and Lenin, Comrade Glebov in the course of his second stay abroad, Comrade B., who was the C.C. representative on the Council until his departure for Russia, Comrade Vtorov, who went abroad in January with authority to negotiate certain questions with the Editorial Board of the Central Organ and to attend the meetings of the Council, all received their credentials, not from any member of the C.C. or from his predecessor on the Party Council, but from a plenary meeting of the C.C. The reason that prompted the C.C. to reach the mentioned decision of February 14, 1904, and to adhere to it so rigidly in its entire subsequent practice was that such a method of organising the representation of the C.C. on the Council was the only way to prevent comrades who are not in close enough touch with the C.C. and not familiar in detail with its policy on all questions of Party life from speaking at the Party Council in the name of the

C.C. We go further: the provision that *only a plenary meeting of the C.C.* could appoint the two Council members was the sole means whereby the centre working in Russia could have anything like parity of influence in the Party Council with the comrades from the Central Organ, who preponderate in the Council not only numerically, but also in point of authority, which some of them have won through long years of honourable service in the front ranks of Social-Democracy, both Russian and international. With all due respect to these comrades on the Council, the C.C. would, however, fail in its duty to the entire Party if it permitted, even for a short time, a change in the composition of the Party Council whereby all questions would be decided by a body consisting exclusively of comrades, who, worthy and respected though they be, cannot by dint of circumstances be in direct contact with the real practical work carried on in Russia. Since our request for a meeting of the Council was denied, we could not determine on what grounds Comrade Deutsch, whom Comrade Vtorov had appointed C.C. representative *pro tem.* on the "Technical Committee" abroad, considered himself entitled to speak at the Party Council in the name of the C.C., with whose activities in Russia he never had any contact. The C.C. declares Comrade Deutsch's action to be invalid, since it was not authorised by the C.C.; even assuming that Comrade Vtorov (at that time only an agent of the C.C.) or any member of the C.C. had asked Comrade Deutsch to represent it on the Party Council, this will not cure the illegality of Comrade Deutsch's position, since such authorisation can be granted only by a plenary meeting of the C.C., which was not done in the case of Comrade Deutsch. On the grounds aforesaid, the C.C. considers all decisions of the Party Council subsequent to the departure from abroad of Comrades B. and Vtorov to have been taken wholly without the participation of the C.C. and demands a reconsideration of all questions at a new meeting to which the rightful representatives of the C.C. shall be invited.

6. The C.C. denies the right of the Party Council to pass judgement on any of the centres and to demand from them absolute submission to all its decisions. According to the Rules, the function of the Council is to co-ordinate and

unify the activities of the C.C. and of the Editorial Board of the Central Organ. However, in the event of a conflict between one of the centres and the Council, obviously only a special Party congress can settle the dispute. The word of the Party Council cannot be final in case of a disagreement between itself and one of the centres, since then the Council would simultaneously be both judge and a party to the dispute. However, as a result of the refusal to call a meeting of the Party Council with the participation of C.C. representatives, the C.C. is not only condemned by the three members of the Council (editors of the Central Organ) but even penalised by being deprived of its inalienable right, guaranteed by the Party Rules, to be represented in the Party Council.

Still other measures are being taken to force the C.C. to submit under all circumstances to the decisions of the three members of the Council (editors of the Central Organ). Thus, in reply to the C.C.'s legitimate demand to its own agent abroad, Comrade Deutsch, that all its technical and financial affairs be handed over to Comrade Valerian, the member of the C.C. entrusted by it with assuming charge of them, Comrade Deutsch, refused, giving as his reason the conflict between the C.C. and the Council.

Thus, while the C.C. in Point 1 of its agreement with the Bureau of Committees of the Majority expressed its willingness to convene the Congress even in the event of a refusal on the part of the Council and thus came into conflict with the Rules, the three Council members in their turn broke the Rules twice by depriving the C.C. of its right to participate in the Council and to manage and control its own technical and financial undertakings abroad (a breach of Clauses 2 and 6 of the Party Rules).

In placing before the Party this conflict (for which the Party Rules provide no solution) between the Party Council (represented only by two members from the Central Organ and the fifth member of the Council), on the one side, and the C.C. on the other, the C.C., in view of the refusal of Comrade Plekhanov, Chairman of the Party Council, to call a meeting of that body, declares that by this action, which is a flagrant breach of the Rules, the Chairman of the

Council makes it impossible for the Council to function and, in effect, wilfully annuls the Party Council.

Absolute submission of the C.C. to the Party Council, on which you, comrade, insist, as the *sine qua non* for calling a meeting of the Council, actually amounts to postponing the Congress indefinitely and flouting the clearly expressed will of the Party.

Placing its loyalty to the Party above loyalty to three foreign-resident members of the Council, the C.C. submits the entire conflict to the judgement of the Party itself.

April 23 (10), 1905

Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.

Vperyod, No. 16,
April 30 (17), 1905

Published according to
the text in Vperyod

CONCERNING THE THIRD CONGRESS

The news of the Central Committee's support to the Bureau of Committees of the Majority on the question of convening the all-Party Congress has brought from *Iskra*, No. 94, a retort of abuse and hysteria, further personal suspicions, fairy-tales about the strength of the Minority groups, and so on. Naturally, we ignore all these tricks, which are worthy of the famous League Congress. Strictly speaking, only two points are worth taking up. If the Congress does take place, says *Iskra*, it will be only as a *conference of separated trends*. In other words, the new-Iskrists admit their break-away from the Party, they admit the split as an accomplished fact. We would always prefer this frank admission to a sneaking secret split. But how do you make this out, gentlemen? You admit yourselves to be one part of the Party that has broken away from the other and yet modestly retain the titles and ranks that belong to the whole Party ("Central Organ", "Council")! Is this honourable?

Secondly, *Iskra* usually considers the Party to be split when it is a question of the centres reporting to the Party, while considering the Party to be united when the issue is the power of the centres over the Party. The very thing is now happening again. On the one hand, "separated trends"; on the other, "the Congress can be convened only by the Council". Fine, gentlemen! But why, then, is your "Council" silent? Why did it not respond to the C.C.'s statement of March 4, 1905? Why no word about the Council in *Iskra*, No. 94? Are not the Party members justified in asking whether the Council exists at all, whether it is in a position to meet and make decisions?

Written in April 1905

Published according to
the manuscript

PLAN FOR A MAY DAY LEAFLET

1. "Springtime" of words and vileness of deeds.
2. The Bulygin fraud.
3. The war and the collapse of the government system.
4. Ruin, famine, cholera....
5. St. Petersburg, Riga, Warsaw, etc. *J a n u a r y 9.*
6. Baku and the sinister anti-Jewish movement.
7. The revolutionary strike and the revolutionary movement of January 9 and later. Revolution!
8. Peasant movement. Its suppression and its aims.
9. The Constituent Assembly and the provisional revolutionary government.
10. The struggle for the republic and all democratic liberties.
11. The proletarian struggle for the republic and for socialism.
12. The revolutionary Russian proletariat at the head of the world revolutionary proletariat.

First of May generally.

It has come to such a pass. 1-4.

Revolutionary movement. 5 and 7.

Government incitements. 6.

Peasant movement. 8.

Armed uprising.

Aims of the struggle. 9-11.

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| <p>Z. First of May generally.
A. Beginning of the revolution 1-6.
B. Struggle of the workers and peasants 7-8.
C. Aims of the struggle 9-11.
D. World-wide historical significance of the Russian revolution 12.</p> |
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Written prior to April 12 (25), 1905

Published according to
the manuscript

RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY

*Workers of All Countries, Unite!*THE FIRST OF MAY ¹⁰⁸

Comrades workers! The great holiday of the workers of all the world is coming. On the First of May they celebrate their awakening to light and knowledge, their association in one fraternal union for the struggle against all oppression, against all tyranny, against all exploitation, for a socialist system of society. All who work, who feed the rich and the nobility by their labour, who spend their lives in back-breaking toil for scanty wages, who never enjoy the fruits of their own labour, who live like beasts of burden amidst the luxury and splendour of our civilisation—all stretch out their hands to fight for the emancipation and happiness of the workers. Down with enmity between workers of different nationalities or different creeds! This enmity can only benefit the plunderers and tyrants, who live by the ignorance and disunion of the proletariat. Jews and Christians, Armenians and Tatars, Poles and Russians, Finns and Swedes, Letts and Germans—all, all of them march together under the one common banner of socialism. All workers are brothers, and their solid union is the only guarantee of the well-being and happiness of all working and oppressed mankind. On the First of May this union of the workers of all countries, international Social-Democracy, reviews its forces and gathers its strength for a further unremitting and unswerving struggle for freedom, equality, and fraternity.

Comrades! We stand now in Russia on the eve of great events. We are engaged in the last desperate fight with the autocratic tsarist government, we must carry this fight on to its victorious end. See what calamities this government of brutes and tyrants, of venal courtiers and hangers-on of capital, has brought upon the entire Russian people! The tsarist government has plunged the Russian people into

an insane war against Japan. Hundreds of thousands of young lives have been torn away from the people to perish in the Far East. Words cannot describe all the calamities that this war brings upon us. And what is the war for? For Manchuria, which our predatory tsarist government has seized from China! Russian blood is being shed and our country ruined for the sake of foreign territory. Life is becoming harder and harder for the workers and peasants; the capitalists and officials keep tightening the noose round their necks, while the tsarist government is sending the people out to plunder foreign territory. Bungling tsarist generals and venal officials have led to the destruction of the Russian fleet, squandered hundreds and thousands of millions of the nation's wealth, and lost entire armies, but the war still goes on, claiming further sacrifices. The people are being ruined, industry and trade are coming to a standstill, and famine and cholera are imminent; but the autocratic government in its blind madness follows the old path; it is ready to ruin Russia if only it can save a handful of brutes and tyrants; it is launching another war besides the one with Japan—war against the entire Russian people.

Never before has Russia experienced such an awakening from her slumber, from her oppression and enslavement, as she is experiencing today. All classes of society are stirring, from the workers and peasants to the landlords and capitalists, and voices of protest have been raised everywhere, in St. Petersburg and the Caucasus, in Poland and Siberia. Everywhere the people demand an end to the war; they demand the establishment of a free people's rule, the convocation of deputies of all citizens without exception in a Constituent Assembly to institute a people's government and save the nation from the abyss into which the tsarist government is pushing it. Workers of St. Petersburg, about two hundred thousand strong, went to the tsar on Sunday, the Ninth of January, with the priest Georgi Gapon in order to submit these demands of the people. The tsar received the workers as enemies. He shot down thousands of unarmed workers in the streets of St. Petersburg. The struggle is now on all over Russia. Workers are on strike, demanding freedom and a better life. Blood is being spilt in Riga and in Poland, on the Volga and in the South. Everywhere the peasants are

rising. The struggle for freedom is becoming the struggle of the entire people.

The tsarist government has gone mad. It wants to borrow money to carry on the war, but no one will trust it with a loan any longer. It promises to convene representatives of the people, but actually everything remains unchanged; the persecutions do not cease, the lawlessness of the officials proceeds as before; there are no free public meetings, no freely circulated people's newspapers; the prisons in which fighters for the working-class cause are languishing have not been thrown open. The tsarist government is trying to set one people against another. It has brought about a massacre in Baku by maligning the Armenians among the Tatars; now it is preparing a fresh massacre aimed at the Jews by fanning hatred against them among the ignorant people.

Comrades workers! We will tolerate no longer such outrageous treatment of the Russian people. We will rise to defend freedom, we will strike back at all who try to deflect the wrath of the people from the real enemy. We will rise up in arms to overthrow the tsarist government and win freedom for the entire people. To arms, workers and peasants! Hold secret meetings, form fighting squads, get whatever weapons you can, send trusted men to consult with the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party! Let this year's First of May be for us the celebration of the people's uprising, let us prepare for it and await the signal for the decisive attack on the tyrant. Down with the tsarist government! We will overthrow it and set up a provisional revolutionary government to convene a Constituent Assembly of the people. Let people's deputies be elected by universal, direct, and equal vote, through secret ballot. Let all fighters for freedom be released from prison or brought back from exile. Let public meetings be held openly and people's newspapers be printed without surveillance by the accursed officials. Let all the people arm, let a rifle be given to every worker, so that the people themselves, not a handful of plunderers, may decide their own destiny. Let free peasants' committees be set up in the countryside to overthrow the serf-owning landlord power, to free the people from the hateful oppression of the officials, to restore to the peasants the land that has been taken away from them.

This is what the Social-Democrats want, this is what they call upon you to fight for, arms in hand: for complete freedom, for the democratic republic, for the eight-hour day, for peasants' committees. Prepare then for the great battle, comrades workers, stop work in the factories and mills on the First of May, or take up arms according to the advice of the committees of the Social-Democratic Labour Party. The hour of the insurrection has not yet struck, but it is not far off now. The workers of the world are now looking with bated breath to the heroic Russian proletariat which has offered incalculable sacrifices to the cause of freedom. The St. Petersburg workers proclaimed on the famed Ninth of January: Freedom or death! Workers of all Russia, we will repeat that great battle-cry, we will not shrink from any sacrifices: through the uprising we will win freedom; through freedom, socialism!

Long live the First of May, long live international revolutionary Social-Democracy!

Long live the freedom of the workers and peasants, long live the democratic republic! Down with the tsarist autocracy!

1905

*Bureau of Committees of the Majority
Editorial Board of "Vperyod"*

Written prior to April 12 (25), 1905

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the text of the leaflet

THE CONSTITUTIONAL MARKET-PLACE

Bulygin, as the St. Petersburg aristocratic circles justly remark, is now playing for time. He is trying to postpone the reforms promised by the tsar as long as possible, and to reduce them to trifles that will in no way diminish the power of the autocratic tsar and of autocratic officialdom. In place of a constitution, he is preparing, as we pointed out once before in *Vperyod*,* a consultative body enjoying no rights whatever. Now we have confirmation of what we said, namely, the text of Bulygin's project published in the German liberal newspaper *Vossische Zeitung*. According to that newspaper, Bulygin, Yermolov, Shcherbatov, Meshchersky, Count Sheremetyev, and Prince Urusov have been mentioned as authors of the project, which in substance is as follows:

For the discussion (no more than that!) and the drafting of all bills, two bodies shall be set up: (1) a State Council, and (2) a State Assembly. Bills may be introduced by any member of the State Council or by no fewer than twenty members of the Assembly. Bills are discussed and passed by the Assembly, after which they go to the Council and finally *to the tsar for his approval*. The tsar decides the form in which bills shall become law, or he vetoes them altogether.

Thus, the Bulygin "constitution" does not limit the autocratic regime at all but merely introduces two exclusively consultative bodies: an Upper House and a Lower House! The Upper House, or State Council, is to consist of 60 members elected by the Assemblies of the Nobles of 60 gubernias (including the Polish gubernias), as well as of members appointed by the tsar from among the officials and

* See p. 273 of this volume.—*Ed.*

officers. The total number of members is not to exceed 120. The term of office of the elected members is three years. The sessions of the Council may be open to the public or closed, at the discretion of the Council.

The Lower House, or State Assembly, is to consist of elective members only (Ministers and heads of departments may sit *ex officio* in both Houses), namely: 10 representatives from each of the 34 Zemstvo gubernias (a total of 340); 8 representatives from each of the three gubernias having Zemstvo institutions but no institutions of the nobility (a total of 24); 8 from each of the nine North-Western gubernias (72); 5 from each of the 10 Polish gubernias (50); 5 from each of the three Baltic gubernias (15); 30 from Siberia; 30 from the Caucasus; 15 from Central Asia and the Transcaspian region; 32 from Finland; 20 from the big cities (St. Petersburg, 6; Moscow, 5; Warsaw, 3; Odessa, 2; Lodz, Kiev, Riga, and Kharkov, 1 each); 10 from the Greek Orthodox clergy; 1 each from the Catholics, Lutherans, Armenians, Mohammedans, and Jews. That makes a total of 643 members. This Assembly is to elect an Executive Committee consisting of a chairman, two vice-chairmen, and 15 members. Their term of office will be three years. The Executive Committee is to be a permanent institution; the Assembly is to meet only twice a year: February-March and October-November. The sessions may be open or closed at the discretion of the Assembly. During their term of office the members of the Assembly will enjoy personal immunity. Only Russian subjects not under 25 years of age, with the ability to read and write Russian, will be eligible. They will receive a salary of 3,000 rubles a year.

Elections shall be held as follows: in each of the 34 Zemstvo gubernias, two members will be elected by the Assembly of the Nobles, three by the gubernia Zemstvo Assembly, one from the towns through special electors, three from the peasants through special electors, and one from the merchants, also through electors. The deputies from the non-Zemstvo gubernias are to be elected on a similar basis; we shall not enumerate all these absurd bureaucratic and police institutions. To illustrate the proposed method of indirect election, we shall instance the procedure for the election of peasant representatives in the Zemstvo gubernias,

Every volost elects three electors. These meet at the uyezd centre, the *Marshal of the Nobility presiding* (!), and choose three electors of the second degree. These electors meet at the gubernia capital, the gubernia Marshal of the Nobility presiding, and elect the three representatives of the peasantry, who must themselves be peasants. Thus the elections go through three stages!

Mr. Bulygin does not work at all badly. He gets his salary from the tsar for services rendered. His constitution, as the reader can see, is a downright travesty of popular representation. The power of the autocracy, as we have shown, is not in the least restricted. Both Houses are purely consultative, while the tsar alone has the power to decide. The whole thing is simply a fine promise never meant to be kept. In the first place, it is a "representation" specifically of the *nobility*, of the *landlords*. The nobility has half the votes in the Upper House and close to half in the Lower (of the ten representatives from each Zemstvo gubernia, two are from the nobility direct and three from the Zemstvo Assemblies, which to all intents and purposes are assemblies of the nobility). The participation of the peasants in the elections is ludicrously remote. The three-stage system of elections makes sure that the common people are thoroughly sifted out before they get to the Assembly.

In the second place, one is struck by the *complete exclusion of the workers*. Representation in this sheep's parliament is based entirely on the social-estate principle. There is no workers' "estate", and there cannot be. In the case of the townsfolk and the merchants, the elections are so manipulated that only the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie filter through the various gradations of electors, and it is extremely illuminating to see how this bourgeoisie is pushed well into the background as compared with the nobility. The tsar's servants, it seems, do not much fear landlord liberalism; they are shrewd enough to perceive under this veneer of liberalism the profoundly conservative social nature of "The Wild Gentleman".¹⁰⁹

It would be serving a very useful purpose to make Bulygin's constitution widely known among the workers and the peasants. One could hardly show up more plainly the real aspirations and the class basis of the tsarist power which

is supposed to stand above the classes. One could hardly conceive of better material for object lessons in universal, direct, and equal suffrage by secret ballot.

It is interesting also to view this skimpy "constitution" of landlords and bureaucrats in the light of the latest reports on the Russian political parties. Except for the extreme parties, the terrorists and the reactionaries, a certain English correspondent (who evidently mixes in "society" and therefore does not see common people such as the workers) counts three parties: (1) the conservative, or pan-Slavic, party (the "Slavophil" system: to the tsar, the power of authority; to his subjects, the power of opinion, viz., a representative assembly with consultative powers only); (2) the liberal, or "opportunist", party (its leader, Shipov; its programme—like that of all opportunists—"between two stools"); and (3) the radical, or (a very characteristic "or"!) constitutional party, which includes most of the Zemstvo people, professors "and students" (?). Its programme: universal suffrage by secret ballot.

The conservatives are said to be meeting now in St. Petersburg, the liberals will meet at the beginning of May in Moscow, and the radicals at the same time in St. Petersburg. Government circles are said to regard universal suffrage by secret ballot as equivalent to "*the proclamation of the republic*". The "radicals" are the most numerous of all the parties.

Bulygin's project is, to all appearances, the project of the conservative party. The project of the *Osvobozhdeniye* camp is very similar to the programme of the "radical or constitutional" party (in reality, not at all radical and but poorly constitutional). Finally, the "liberal", or Shipov, party probably wants a little more than is offered by Bulygin and a little less than is demanded by the constitutionalists.

The market-place is having a great day. The bargaining is brisk. The fine gentlemen of society are standing out for a high price and so are the cunning gentlemen of the Court. Everything points to the two of them knocking a bit off and then—striking a bargain, *before the workers and peasants step in*.

The government is playing a deep game. It threatens the conservatives with the liberals; it threatens the liberals

with the *Osvobozhdeniye* "radicals"; it threatens the last-named with the spectre of a republic. Translated into the language of class interests, particularly of the chief interest—exploitation of the workers by the bourgeoisie—this game means: Let us come to terms, my dear landlords and merchants; let us divide the power peaceably, in bonds of harmony, before it is too late, before the real popular revolution sets in, before we have the rising of the whole proletariat and the whole peasantry, who will not swallow skimpy constitutions, indirect elections, or any other bureaucratic rubbish.

The class-conscious proletariat must have no illusions. The only pledge of Russia's real emancipation from the entire serf-holding, absolutist system lies in it alone, in the proletariat supported by the peasantry, in the armed uprising of the two, in their desperate struggle under the slogan of "Death or freedom".

Vperyod, No. 16,
April 30 (17), 1905
Signed: K—v

Published according to
the text in *Vperyod*

FORTNIGHTLY REPORTS OF THE PARTY ORGANISATIONS

Fortnightly reports by *all* the Party organisations, especially all the *workers'* Party organisations, would contribute greatly towards consolidating the membership and the organisational unity of the Party, particularly towards readjusting the Party's representation (at congresses) in conformity with the number of the organised workers.

The Central Organ of the Party could publish extracts from these reports which would serve as valuable material on the actual and genuine state of affairs in the Party.

The number of members in the study circles, groups, etc., could also be published by using one or two letters of the alphabet to denote this or that group or organisation. Such reports concerning the membership of our Party organisations would serve as useful material for control. (The objection that they would occupy too much space is groundless. With two letters and two figures to show the number of members—e.g., ab 13, cd 41, ef 17, etc.—we would have *eleven* such reports to each line of column space.)

The Congress should break up the interval between the Third and Fourth Congresses (one year) into two parts. During the first half, *every* Party organisation down to the lowest workers' unit of our Party should constitute itself and *arrange* without fail regular contact with the centre and the regular submission of fortnightly reports. I say "arrange", because it is not enough to take the address and write; it is necessary to check the addresses, to make sure

that the reports are delivered, etc., etc. Four to five months* is quite sufficient for organising this new practice of fortnightly reports with full regularity. Without a doubt, *given the will*, this could be done in a *third* of the time.

After that, in the second half-year, the fortnightly reports of the Party organisations could be placed on a constitutional basis, so to speak, i.e., they would be used directly to readjust the Party's representation at the Fourth Congress. Thus, let us say, the Third Congress decides in April 1905 that only Party organisations submitting the regular fortnightly reports to the centre as of September 1, 1905, shall be entitled to consideration in the readjusted Party representation for the Fourth Congress. The Party's representation at congresses pro-rata to the number of workers organised in Social-Democratic leagues in each area will be determined at the Fourth Congress only on the basis of these reports for a period of not less than three months (a minimum of six reports). The number of members, therefore, must be given in each report.

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of April 1905

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* During this period *every* organisation should submit its cipher (two or three letters=*name* of the organisation) to the centre and achieve the publication of at least one of its reports in the Central Organ, so that *all* the members of that organisation may convince themselves of its connection with the centre.

THE THIRD CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P.¹¹⁰

APRIL 12 (25)-APRIL 27 (MAY 10), 1905

Speeches, reports, resolutions,
and draft resolutions first
published in 1905
in the book *The Third
Regular Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.*
Full Text of the Proceedings

Published by
the Central Committee, Geneva

Published according to
the text of the book
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of the R.S.D.L.P.*,
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the manuscript text

Россійская Соц. Дем. Рабочая Партія
ПРОЛЕТАРИИ ВСѢХЪ СТРАНЪ, СОЕДИНЯЙТЕСЬ'

ТРЕТІЙ ОЧЕРЕДНОЙ СЪѢЗДЪ

Росс. Соц.-Дем. Рабочей Партіи.

ПОЛНЫЙ ТЕКСТЪ ПРОТОКОЛОВЪ.

Издание Центрального Комитета.

ЖЕНЕВА
Типографія Партіи. 6, Quai du Cheval Blanc, 6
1905.

Cover of the book *The Third Regular Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.*
Full Text of the Proceedings.
Published by the C.C., Geneva, 1905
Reduced

1

SPEECH ON THE VALIDITY OF THE CONGRESS
APRIL 13 (26)

I wish to reply to the remarks made here concerning the validity of the convocation of this Congress. The Central Committee considered the Congress to be unauthorised. The C.C. has characterised its own message to the Party Council as "repentant". But was there anything for the C.C. to repent? The Congress is perfectly valid. It could, admittedly, be held invalid according to the *letter* of the Rules, but it would be grotesque formalism on our part to give the Rules such an interpretation. According to the spirit of the Rules, the validity of the Congress is beyond question. The Party Council exists for the Party, and not the Party for the Council. At the Second Congress, in connection with the Organising Committee incident, it was pointed out, by none other than Comrade Plekhanov, that discipline with regard to a lower body yields precedence to discipline with regard to a higher body. The C.C. declared its readiness to submit to the Party Council, if the latter would submit to the Party, viz., to the Congress. This was a perfectly legitimate demand, yet the Party Council rejected it. But the C.C., we are told, began to doubt the loyalty of the Party Council and expressed its lack of confidence in it. However, as we know, in all constitutionally governed countries the citizens have a right to express their lack of confidence in any public servant or institution. This is their inalienable right. Finally, even if the C.C. acted unwarrantedly, did that give the Party Council the right also to act unwarrantedly? What guarantee is there that the clause in the Rules which puts the Party Council under obligation to call a congress upon its endorse-

ment by half the qualified votes will actually be enforced? The Rules of the German Social-Democratic Party contain a clause authorising the Control Commission to convene a congress, if the *Vorstand* * refuses to do so. We have no such provision, and it rests entirely with the Party to ensure that the Congress is convened. From the spirit of the Rules, and even from their letter, if taken as a whole, it is clear that the Party Council is the agent of the Party committees. The agent of the committees refuses to do the bidding of its principals. If the agent does not carry out the will of the Party, the only thing left for the Party is to execute its will itself. The Party committees not only had the right to call the Congress themselves, but were in duty bound to do so. I maintain that the Congress was convened in a perfectly legitimate way. Who is the judge in this dispute between the Party Council and the committees? Why, these very committees, the Party. The will of the Party was expressed long ago. All the delay and procrastination on the part of the centres abroad could not alter it. The committees were obligated to convene the Congress themselves, and the Congress has been convened lawfully.

Now, to meet Comrade Tigrov's point. Comrade Tigrov says we ought not to judge the Party Council. But the whole report of the Organising Committee is a judgement of the Party Council. I think Comrade Tigrov errs in holding that we must not judge the accused *in absentia*. In politics one is constantly compelled to judge *in absentia*. Do we not constantly judge the Socialists-Revolutionaries, the Bundists, and others in our writings, at our meetings, and everywhere? What else can we do but judge *in absentia*, if the Party Council refuses to appear at the Congress? In that case we could never judge anyone. Even the official court judges *in absentia* if the accused refuses to appear before it.

* The executive body.—*Ed.*

2

SPEECH ON THE QUALIFIEDNESS
OF THE KAZAN AND KUBAN COMMITTEES
APRIL 14 (27)

The findings of the Credentials Committee show that the Party is represented by a total number of 75 votes, so that our Congress, as now constituted, must beyond a doubt be recognised as valid. Considering the present attitude of suspicion towards the Congress, we must recognise as commendable the "liberal" tendency of the Credentials Committee to confirm the largest possible number of committees in order to increase the lawful majority necessary for the Congress. From this angle I am even ready to express my sympathy with such "liberality". But, on the other hand, one must be equally careful and impartial towards all, and for that reason I feel constrained to oppose the Credentials Committee's confirmation of the Kazan and Kuban committees. They are included in the list of qualified committees published in issue No. 89 of *Iskra*, but not in the list recorded in the minutes of the Party Council. At the Council session Comrade Martov read the list of qualified committees valid until September 1, 1904.

(An excerpt from the minutes of the Party Council follows):

"Martov reads his resolution: According to Clause 2 of the Rules, the Party Council is obligated to convene a congress when this is demanded by Party organisations commanding aggregately at least half the total voting strength of the congress. According to Note 1 to Clause 3, only organisations duly confirmed after the adoption of the Party Rules shall be entitled to representation at a congress.

"Organisations not represented at the Second Congress are to be considered confirmed, if their confirmation by the C.C. was accorded

not later than one year prior to the Congress. (I) The Party Council resolves that any organisation which shall have been confirmed within the specified period of time shall be entitled to have its vote counted at the computation of the number of organisations that have gone on record in favour of convening the Congress. The organisations represented at the Second Congress and elected by it shall be considered qualified organisations. (II) In view of this, only the following organisations shall hereafter and until September 1904 be entitled to vote on the question of convening a congress: (1) the C.C.; (2) the Central Organ; (3) the League Abroad; (4-20) the committees of St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kharkov, Kiev, Odessa, Nikolayev, of the Don region, of Ekaterinoslav, Saratov, Ufa (now the Ural region), of the North, of Tula, Tver, Nizhni-Novgorod, Baku, Batum, and Tiflis (until the expiration of one year from the time of the confirmation of the Caucasian League); (21-23) the League of the Mining and Metal District (Donets), and the Siberian and the Crimean leagues.

"The qualifiedness of these organisations assumed, the number of votes they are entitled to cast at the Congress is 46. With the 5 votes of the Party Council members, the total voting strength of the Congress is 51; therefore, to convene a congress 26 votes are required, viz., the votes of 13 of the above-named qualified organisations. The C.C. is requested to furnish the Party Council with the dates of its confirmation of the new committees since the Congress."

The first part of the resolution was adopted unanimously.

Later in his speech at that meeting, Comrade Glebov read out a list of the newly-formed committees.

Comrade Glebov's speech (from the minutes of the Party Council):

"I agree with Comrade Martov and would like to state that the following new committees have been organised: Smolensk and Astrakhan, confirmed in September 1903; Voronezh (the Fund for the Struggle), in January 1904; Riga, in January; Polesye, in April; North-Western, in April; Kursk, in January; Orel-Bryansk, in September 1903; Samara, in September 1903; Ural (Ufa), in April."

These facts were made public in Comrade Orlovsky's pamphlet *The Council Against the Party*, and so far the Council has neither refuted them nor published the dates of the confirmation of the committees under dispute, which would seem to indicate that there is no evidence of such confirmation. At the stated meeting of the Party Council, Comrade Martov declared in one of his speeches that in his opinion two more committees were to be confirmed in August, namely, the Kremenchug and Poltava committees—but again not a word about the Kazan and Kuban committees.

After the July declaration, Comrade Glebov sent me the full minutes of the C.C. meetings, in which no reference is made to the confirmation of either the Kazan or the Kuban Committee; at subsequent C.C. meetings, as Comrade Letnev,¹¹¹ a member of the C.C., has testified, there was likewise no mention of their confirmation. True, Comrade Zimin,¹¹² a member of the C.C., has a hazy recollection of the Kazan and Kuban committees having been confirmed, but he can state nothing definite.

The Credentials Committee's decision to recognise these committees as qualified on the evidence of their having functioned for over a year, is not correct, and I move, therefore, that these committees be declared non-qualified.

3 .

**DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE ATTITUDE OF THE R.S.D.L.P.
TOWARDS THE ARMED UPRISING**

1. Whereas the proletariat, being, by virtue of its position, the foremost and most consistent revolutionary class, is therefore called upon to play the role of leader and guide of the general democratic revolutionary movement in Russia;

2. Whereas only the performance of this role during the revolution will ensure the proletariat the most advantageous position in the ensuing struggle for socialism against the propertied classes of the bourgeois-democratic Russia about to be born; and

3. Whereas the proletariat can perform this role only if it is organised under the banner of Social-Democracy into an independent political force and if it acts in strikes and demonstrations with the fullest possible unity;—

Therefore, the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. resolves that the task of organising the forces of the proletariat for direct struggle against the autocracy by means of mass political strikes and the armed uprising, and of setting up for this purpose an apparatus for information and leadership, is one of the chief tasks of the Party at the present revolutionary moment; for which reason the Congress instructs both the C.C. and the local committees and leagues to start preparing the political mass strike as well as the organisation of special groups for the obtainment and distribution of arms, for the elaboration of a plan of the armed uprising and the direct leadership of the rising. The fulfilment of this task can and should proceed in such a way as will not only not in the least prejudice the general work of awakening the class-consciousness of the proletariat, but, on the contrary, will render that work more effective and successful.

Written on April 14 (27), 1905

4

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE ARMED UPRISING

The Congress holds, on the basis of the practical experiences of the functionaries and on the basis of the mood of the working-class masses, that preparations for the uprising imply, not only the preparation of weapons, the formation of groups, etc., but also the accumulation of experience by means of practical attempts at separate armed actions, such as attacks by armed squads on the police and on troops during public meetings, or on prisons, government offices, etc. While fully relying on the local Party centres and on the C.C. to determine the limits of such actions and the most convenient occasions for them, while fully relying on the comrades' discretion in avoiding a useless expenditure of effort on petty acts of terror, the Congress draws the attention of all Party organisations to the need for taking into consideration the above-mentioned facts of experience.

Written at the end of April 1905

Published according to
the manuscript

5

SPEECH ON THE QUESTION OF THE ARMED UPRISING
APRIL 15 (28)

It has been said here that the question is clear enough in principle. Nevertheless, statements have been made in Social-Democratic literature (see *Iskra*, No. 62, and Comrade Axelrod's foreword to the pamphlet by "A Worker") which go to show that the question is not so clear after all. *Iskra* and Axelrod talked about conspiracy and expressed the fear that too much thought would be given to the uprising. The facts show, however, that there has been too little thought on the subject.... In his foreword to the pamphlet by "A Worker", Comrade Axelrod maintains that it can only be a question of an uprising of the "uncivilised masses". Events have shown that we are dealing, not with an uprising of the "uncivilised masses", but with an uprising of politically conscious masses capable of carrying on an organised struggle. The entire history of the past year proved that we underestimated the significance and the inevitability of the uprising. Attention must be paid to the practical aspect of the matter. In this respect the experience of those engaged in practical work and of the workers of St. Petersburg, Riga, and the Caucasus is of exceptional importance. I would suggest, therefore, that the comrades tell us of their experience; that will make our discussion practical instead of academic. We must ascertain the mood of the proletariat—whether the workers consider themselves fit to struggle and to lead the struggle. We must sum up this collective experience, from which no generalised conclusions have as yet been drawn.

6

SPEECH ON THE QUESTION OF THE ARMED UPRISING
APRIL 16 (29)

During the debate the question was put on a practical plane: what is the mood of the masses? Comrade Leskov^{11*} was right in saying that it was chequered. But Comrade Zharkov is right, too, in saying that we must reckon with the fact that the uprising, whatever we may think of it, is bound to take place. The question arises whether there are any differences in principle between the resolutions submitted. I fail totally to see any. Although I am viewed as an arch-intransigent, I will, nevertheless, try to reconcile and bring these two resolutions into line—I will undertake their reconciliation. I have nothing against the amendment to Comrade Voinov's resolution. Nor do I see any difference in principle in the addendum. Very energetic participation does not necessarily imply hegemony. I think Comrade Mikhailov expressed himself in a more positive manner; he emphasises hegemony, and in a concrete form, too. The English proletariat is destined to bring about a socialist revolution—that is beyond doubt; but its inability to bring it about at the present moment, owing to its lack of socialist organisation and its corruption by the bourgeoisie, is equally beyond dispute. Comrade Voinov expresses the same thought: the most energetic participation is undoubtedly the most decisive participation. Whether the proletariat will decide the outcome of the revolution—no one can assert absolutely. This is likewise true of the role of leader. Comrade Voinov's resolution is worded more carefully. Social-Democracy may organise the uprising, it may even be the deciding factor in it. But whether Social-Democracy will

have the leading role in it cannot be predetermined; that will depend on the strength and organisation of the proletariat. The petty bourgeoisie may be better organised and its diplomats may prove to be superior and better trained. Comrade Voinov is the more cautious; he says, "You may be able to do it." "You will do it," says Comrade Mikhailov. The proletariat may possibly decide the outcome of the revolution, but this cannot be asserted positively. Comrades Mikhailov and Sosnovsky are guilty of the very error they charge Comrade Voinov with: "Count not your trophies before the battle."

"For guarantee, it is necessary," says Voinov; "necessary and sufficient," say Mikhailov and Sosnovsky. As to organising special fighting groups, I might say that I consider them necessary. We need not fear to form them.

7

RESOLUTION ON THE ARMED UPRISING ¹¹⁴

1. Whereas the proletariat being, by virtue of its position, the foremost and only consistently revolutionary class, is therefore called upon to play the leading role in the general democratic revolutionary movement in Russia;

2. Whereas this movement at the present time has already led to the necessity of an armed uprising;

3. Whereas the proletariat will inevitably take the most energetic part in this uprising, which participation will decide the destiny of the revolution in Russia;

4. Whereas the proletariat can play the leading role in this revolution only if it is united in a single and independent political force under the banner of the Social-Democratic Labour Party, which directs its struggle both ideologically and practically; and

5. Whereas only the performance of this role will ensure to the proletariat the most advantageous conditions for the struggle for socialism against the propertied classes of bourgeois-democratic Russia;—

Therefore, the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. holds that the task of organising the proletariat for direct struggle against the autocracy by means of the armed uprising is one of the major and most urgent tasks of the Party at the present revolutionary moment.

Accordingly, the Congress instructs all Party organisations:

a) to explain to the proletariat by means of propaganda and agitation, not only the political significance, but the practical organisational aspect of the impending armed uprising,

b) to explain in that propaganda and agitation the role of mass political strikes, which may be of great importance at the beginning and during the progress of the uprising, and

c) to take the most energetic steps towards arming the proletariat, as well as drawing up a plan of the armed uprising and of direct leadership thereof, for which purpose special groups of Party workers should be formed as and when necessary.

Written on April 16 (29), 1905

Published according to
the manuscript

8

SPEECH ON THE ATTITUDE
TOWARDS THE GOVERNMENT'S TACTICS ON THE EVE
OF THE REVOLUTION
APRIL 18 (MAY 1)

We are in a quandary. We have three resolutions and three amendments. The resolutions are growing in number and scope, and this process is not being regulated in any way. The subject has proved to be broader than the speaker who made the report anticipated. We shall have to refer the resolution back to the committee, although Comrade Sergeyev¹¹⁸ evidently ridicules this proposal. The question of open action was touched upon by all the speakers. The report was appropriate to the subject, but needs amplifying. On the question of participation in the societies opinion is divided. The Congress cannot lay down a hard and fast rule on this point. All methods should be used for agitation. The experience of the Shidlovsky Commission gives no grounds whatever for a downright negative attitude. Some say that there is nothing new in the resolution. A good thing bears repeating again and again. Comrade Zimin's view is too rigid. It is impossible to reply categorically whether it is advisable to participate in the Zemsky Sbor. Everything will depend on the political situation, on the electoral system, and on other specific factors which cannot be estimated in advance. Some say that the Zemsky Sobor is a fraud. That is true. But there are times when we must take part in elections to expose a fraud. We can give nothing more than a general directive. I repeat, in my opinion all the resolutions should be referred back to the committee, the membership of which should be enlarged.

9

ADDENDUM TO THE RESOLUTION
ON THE ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY
ON THE EVE AND AT THE MOMENT OF THE REVOLUTION

Could we not satisfy Comrade Alexandrov¹¹⁶ with the following amendments to Schmidt's¹¹⁷ resolution (roughly):

1) instead of (the Congress) "resolves": the Congress *confirms* the old tactics of the Social-Democrats as laid down at the Second Congress, with a detailed explanation applicable to the present moment (or something of the kind);

2) to add another clause to the resolution approximately as follows:

As regards the actual and sham concessions which the weakened autocracy is now making to the democrats in general and to the working class in particular, the Social-Democratic party of the working class should *take advantage of them* in order, on the one hand, to *consolidate* for the people every improvement in the economic conditions and every extension of liberties with a view to intensifying the struggle, and on the other, steadily to expose before the proletariat the reactionary aims of the government, which is trying to disunite and corrupt the working class and draw its attention away from its urgent class needs at the moment of the revolution.

Written at the end of April 1905

Published according to
the manuscript

10

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE QUESTION
OF OPEN POLITICAL ACTION BY THE R.S.D L.P.

1. Whereas the revolutionary movement in Russia has already to a certain degree shaken and disorganised the autocratic government, which has been compelled to tolerate the comparatively extensive exercise of freedom of political action by the classes inimical to it;

2. Whereas this freedom of political action is mostly, almost exclusively, enjoyed by the bourgeois classes, which thereby strengthen their existing economic and political domination over the working class and increase the danger that the proletariat may be transformed into a mere appendage of bourgeois democracy; and

3. Whereas there is developing (breaking through, coming to light) among increasingly wider masses of the workers the urge towards independent open action in the political arena, even though (on occasions of lesser importance) without the participation of the Social-Democrats;—

Therefore, the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. calls the attention of all Party organisations to the fact that it is necessary

a) to make use of each and every case of open political action on the part of the educated spheres and the people, whether in the press, in associations, or at meetings, for the purpose of contraposing the independent class demands of the proletariat to the general democratic demands, so as to develop its class-consciousness and to organise it in the course of such actions into an independent socialist force;

b) to make use of all legal and semi-legal channels for creating workers' societies, associations, and organisations,

and to put forward every effort towards securing (in whatever way) the predominance of Social-Democratic influence in such associations and to convert them into bases for the future openly functioning Social-Democratic working-class party in Russia;

c) to take the necessary steps to ensure that our Party organisations, while maintaining and developing their underground machinery, will proceed at once to the preparation of expedient forms of transition, wherever and whenever possible, to open Social-Democratic activity, even to the point of clashes with the armed forces of the government.

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11

DRAFT RESOLUTION
ON THE PARTICIPATION OF THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS
IN A PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT

1. Whereas a really free and open mass struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie requires the widest possible political liberty and, consequently, the fullest possible realisation of republican forms of government;

2. Whereas various bourgeois and petty-bourgeois sections of the population, the peasantry, etc., are now coming out in increasing numbers with revolutionary-democratic slogans, which are the natural and inevitable expression of the basic needs of the masses, the satisfaction of which—impossible under the autocracy—has been made imperative by the objective development of the entire socio-economic life of Russia;

3. Whereas international revolutionary Social-Democracy has always recognised that the proletariat must render most energetic support to the revolutionary bourgeoisie in its struggle against all reactionary classes and institutions, provided that the party of the proletariat maintain absolute independence and a strictly critical attitude towards its temporary allies;

4. Whereas the overthrow of the autocratic government in Russia is inconceivable without its replacement by a provisional revolutionary government, and whereas only such a change can ensure real freedom and a true expression of the will of the whole people during the inauguration of the new political system in Russia and guarantee the realisation of our programme of immediate and direct political and economic changes;

5. Whereas without the replacement of the autocratic government by a provisional revolutionary government supported by all revolutionary-democratic classes and class elements in Russia, it will be impossible to achieve a republican form of government and win over to the revolution the backward and undeveloped sections of the proletariat and particularly of the peasantry—those sections whose interests are completely opposed to the absolutist, serfholding order and which cling to the autocracy or stand apart from the struggle against it largely on account of the oppressive stupefying atmosphere; and

6. Whereas with the existence in Russia of a Social-Democratic party of the working class, which, though only in the initial stage of its development, is nevertheless already organised and capable, particularly under conditions of political freedom, of controlling and directing the actions of its delegates in a provisional revolutionary government, the danger that these delegates may deviate from the correct class line is not insurmountable;—

Therefore, the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. holds that representatives of the Party may participate in the provisional revolutionary government for the purpose of relentlessly combating, together with the revolutionary bourgeois democrats, all attempts at counter-revolution, and of defending the independent class interests of the proletariat, provided that the Party maintain strict control over its representatives and firmly safeguard the independence of the Social-Democratic Labour Party, which aims at the complete socialist revolution and is in this respect hostile to all bourgeois-democratic parties and classes.

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12

ADDENDUM TO THE RESOLUTION
ON THE PARTICIPATION OF THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS
IN A PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT .

Another argument in favour of participating in a provisional revolutionary government:

Whereas the categorical refusal to participate in a provisional revolutionary government, which is at this moment recommended by the Right Wing of our Party, inevitably dooms the activity of the revolutionary proletariat aimed at preparing, organising, and carrying out the armed uprising, to irresolution, half-way policies, and disunity;—

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13

REPORT ON THE QUESTION
OF THE PARTICIPATION OF THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATS
IN A PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT
APRIL 18 (MAY 1)

My task is to present the question of the participation of the Social-Democrats in a provisional revolutionary government. It may seem strange, at first glance, that such a question should have arisen. One might think the cause of Social-Democracy to be thriving and the probability of its participation in a provisional revolutionary government to be very great. Actually it is not so. To debate this question as an immediately realisable prospect would be quixotic. But the question has been forced upon us not so much by the actual state of affairs as by literary polemics. It must always be borne in mind that the question was first raised by Martynov, and that he raised it *before January 9*. He wrote in his pamphlet *Two Dictatorships* (pp. 10-11):

"Imagine, dear reader, for a moment, that Lenin's utopia has been realised; imagine that the Party, whose membership has been narrowed down to only professional revolutionaries, has succeeded in 'preparing, *timing*, and carrying out the general armed uprising of the people'. Is it not obvious that it would be this Party which would be *designated* as the provisional government by the will of the whole people immediately after the revolution? Is it not obvious that the people would place the immediate fate of the revolution in the hands of this Party, and no other? Is it not obvious that this Party, not wishing to betray the confidence previously placed in it by the people, would be forced, be *in duty bound*, to assume power and maintain it until it had consolidated the victory of the revolution by revolutionary measures?"

Incredible as it may seem, this is actually how the question is presented: Martynov believes that if we were thor-

oughly to prepare and launch the uprising, we should find ourselves in a desperate predicament. If we were to submit our dispute to a foreigner, he would never believe it possible for the question to be formulated in that manner and he would not understand us. Our dispute cannot be understood without a knowledge of the history of Russian Social-Democratic views and the nature of the tail-endist views of *Rabocheye Dyelo*. This question has become an urgent question of theory and must be clarified. It is a question of clarity in our aims. I urge the comrades when reporting on our discussion to the members engaged in practical Party work in Russia to emphasise strongly Martynov's formulation of the question.

Iskra, No. 96, contains an article by Plekhanov. We have always held Plekhanov in great esteem for the "offence" he has repeatedly given to the opportunists, which, to his honour, has earned him a mass of enemies. But we cannot esteem him for defending Martynov. This is not the Plekhanov we knew. He entitles his article "On the Question of the Seizure of Power". This artificially narrows the issue. We have never thus presented the question. Plekhanov presents things as though *Vperyod* called Marx and Engels "virtuosi of philistinism". But that is not so; it is a slight substitution. *Vperyod* expressly stressed the correctness of Marx's general conception of this question. The charge of philistinism referred to Martynov or to L. Martov. Well disposed though we are to hold in high esteem all who collaborate with Plekhanov, it must be said, however, that Martynov is not Marx. Plekhanov errs in seeking to hush up Martynovism.

Martynov asserts that if we take a decisive part in the uprising, we shall be in great danger of being forced by the proletariat to take power. This argument has a certain original logic of its own, although a logic of retreat. It is in reference to this peculiar warning against the danger of victory in the struggle against the autocracy that *Vperyod* asks Martynov and L. Martov what they are talking about: a socialist or a democratic dictatorship? We are referred to Engels' famous words about the danger involved in the position of a leader who has been given power in behalf of a class that is not yet mature for the exercise of complete domination. We explained in *Vperyod* that Engels points out the danger to the position of a leader when he establishes

post factum a divergence between principle and reality, between words and facts. Such a divergence leads to disaster in the sense of political failure, not in the sense of physical defeat*; you must affirm (this is Engels' thought) that the revolution is socialistic, when it is really only democratic. If we promised the Russian proletariat now that we could secure its complete domination immediately, we would fall into the error of the Socialists-Revolutionaries. It is this mistake of the Socialists-Revolutionaries that we Social-Democrats have always ridiculed—their claim that the revolution will be “democratic and not bourgeois”. We have constantly said that the revolution would strengthen the bourgeoisie, not weaken it, but that it would create for the proletariat the necessary conditions for waging a successful struggle for socialism.

But since it is a question of a democratic revolution, we are faced with two forces: the autocracy and the revolutionary people, viz., the proletariat as the chief combatant, and the peasantry and all the different petty-bourgeois elements. The interests of the proletariat do not coincide with those of the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie. Social-Democracy has always stressed the fact that these class differences in the midst of a revolutionary people are unavoidable. In a hard-fought struggle, the object of the struggle may change from hand to hand. A revolutionary people strives for the sovereignty of the people; all the reactionary elements defend the sovereignty of the tsar. A successful revolution, therefore, cannot be anything but the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, whose interests, equally *opposed to the sovereignty of the tsar*, coincide. Both *Iskra* and *Vperyod* are agreed on the slogan “To march separately but strike together”, but *Vperyod* adds that striking jointly means jointly striking the final blow and jointly beating off the enemy's attempts to recover the ground he has lost. After the overthrow of the autocracy, the struggle will not cease, but become more intense. That is precisely the time when the reactionary forces will organise for the struggle in real earnest. If we are going to employ the slogan of the uprising, we must not frighten the

* See pp. 279-80 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Social-Democrats with the possibility of victory in the uprising. When we have won the sovereignty of the people, we shall have to consolidate it—this is what is meant by the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship. We have no reason whatever to fear it. The establishment of the republic would be a tremendous victory for the proletariat, although, unlike the bourgeois revolutionary, the Social-Democrat does not regard the republic as the “absolute ideal” but merely as something that will guarantee him freedom to wage the struggle for socialism on a broad basis. Parvus says that in no other country has the struggle for freedom entailed such tremendous sacrifices. This is true. It is confirmed by the European bourgeois press, which is following events in Russia very closely from the outside. The autocracy’s resistance to the most elementary reforms is incredibly strong, and the greater the action the greater the counter-action. Hence the autocracy’s utter collapse is highly probable. The entire question of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship hinges on the complete overthrow of the autocracy. Possibly the history of 1848-50 will repeat itself with us, that is, the autocracy will not be overthrown but only limited in power and converted into a constitutional monarchy. In that case a democratic dictatorship will be out of the question. If, however, the autocratic government is really overthrown, it will have to be replaced by another. This other can be only a provisional revolutionary government: It can base itself for support only on the revolutionary people—on the proletariat and the peasantry. It can be only a dictatorship, that is, not an organisation of “order”, but an organisation of war. If you are storming a fortress, you cannot discontinue the war even after you have taken the fortress. Either the one or the other: either we take the fortress to hold it, or we do not storm the fortress and explain that all we want is a little place next to it.

Let me pass on to Plekhanov. His method is totally incorrect. He evades important questions of principle to indulge in quibbling, with an element of misstatement. (*Exclamation by Comrade Barsov: “Hear, hear!”*) *Vperyod* maintains that Marx’s general scheme is correct (that of replacing the autocracy first by a bourgeois monarchy and then by a petty-bourgeois democratic republic); but if we set out

beforehand to restrict the limits to which we shall go in accordance with this scheme, we shall prove ourselves philistines. Thus, Plekhanov's defence of Marx is *verlorene Liebesmühe* (love's labour's lost). In defending Martynov, Plekhanov refers to the Address¹¹⁸ of the Central Committee of the Communist League¹¹⁹ to the League membership. Plekhanov misstates this Address too. He draws a veil over the fact that it was written at a time when the people had failed to score a complete victory, notwithstanding the victorious uprising of the Berlin proletariat in 1848. Absolutism had been superseded by a bourgeois constitutional monarchy, and, consequently, a provisional government backed by the entire revolutionary people was out of the question. The whole point of the Address is that after the failure of the popular uprising Marx advises the working class to organise and prepare. Can these counsels serve to clarify the situation in Russia before the uprising has begun? Can they resolve the moot question which presupposes the victorious uprising of the proletariat? The Address begins thus: "In the two revolutionary years 1848-49 the League proved itself in double fashion: first, in that its members energetically took part in the movement in all places.... The League further proved itself in that its conception of the movement [as set forth, by the way, in the *Communist Manifesto*] turned out to be the only correct one.... At the same time, the former firm organisation of the League was considerably slackened. A large part of the members who directly participated in the revolutionary movement believed the time for secret societies to have gone by and public activities alone sufficient. The individual circles and communities allowed their connections with the Central Committee (*Zentralbehörde*) to become loose and gradually dormant. Consequently, while the democratic party, the party of the petty bourgeoisie, organised itself more and more in Germany, the workers' party lost its only firm hold, remained organised at the most in separate localities for local purposes and in the general movement (in der allgemeinen Bewegung) thus came completely under the domination and leadership of the petty-bourgeois democrats" (*Ansprache*, p. 75).

Thus, Marx found in 1850 that the petty-bourgeois democrats had gained in organisation during the Revolution of

1848, which had run its course, while the workers' party had lost. Naturally, Marx's chief concern was that the workers' party should not lag behind the bourgeoisie a second time. It is "extremely important that ... precisely at this moment, when a new revolution is impending, the workers' party must act in the most organised, most unanimous and most independent fashion possible, if it is not to be exploited and taken in tow again by the bourgeoisie as in 1848" (*Ansprache*, p. 76).

It is because the bourgeois democrats were better organised that Marx did not doubt that they would definitely predominate, should a second revolution take place at once. "That, during the further development of the revolution, the petty-bourgeois democracy will for a moment (*für einen Augenblick*) obtain predominating influence in Germany is not open to doubt" (*Ansprache*, p. 78). Taking all this into consideration, we can understand why Marx does not mention a word in *Ansprache* about the participation of the proletariat in a provisional revolutionary government. Plekhanov, therefore, is entirely incorrect in asserting that Marx "considered inadmissible the thought that the political representatives of the proletariat could work together with the representatives of the petty bourgeoisie for the creation of a new social order" (*Iskra*, No. 96). This is not correct. Marx *does not raise* the question of participation in a provisional revolutionary government, whereas Plekhanov makes it appear as though *Marx decided this question in the negative*. Marx says: We Social-Democrats have all been lagging behind, we are worse organised, we must organise independently for the eventuality that the petty bourgeoisie will come to power after a new revolution. From these premises of Marx, Martynov draws the following conclusion: We Social-Democrats, now better organised than the petty-bourgeois democrats and constituting undoubtedly an independent party, ought to shrink from *having* to participate in a provisional revolutionary government in the event of a successful uprising. Yes! Comrade Plekhanov, Marxism is one thing and Martynovism another. To bring out more clearly the great difference between the situation in Russia in 1905 and that in Germany in 1850, let us deal with some further interesting passages in the Address. Marx did not

even mention the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat, for he believed in the direct socialist dictatorship of the proletariat immediately after the petty-bourgeois revolution. On the agrarian question, for instance, he says that the democrats want to create a petty-bourgeois peasant class, but that the workers must oppose this plan in the interests of the rural proletariat and in their own interests; they must demand that the confiscated feudal landed property remain state property, and that it be used for labour colonies in which the associated rural proletariat should employ all the means of large-scale agriculture. Obviously, with such plans in mind, Marx *could not* speak of a democratic dictatorship. He wrote, not on the eve of the revolution, as the representative of the organised proletariat, but after the revolution, as the representative of the workers in the process of organising. Marx emphasises the first task as follows: "After the overthrow of the existing governments, the Central Committee will, as soon as it is at all possible, betake itself to Germany, immediately convene a congress, and put before the latter the necessary proposals for the centralisation of the workers' clubs...." Thus, the idea of an independent workers' party, which has become with us bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh, was then something new. We must not forget that in 1848, when Marx was editing the free and extremely revolutionary newspaper (*Die Neue Rheinische Zeitung* ¹²⁰), he had no working-class organisation behind him. His paper was supported by bourgeois radicals, who nearly wrecked it when Marx made his scathing attack on the Paris bourgeoisie after the June Days. That is why the Address has so much to say about the independent organisation of the workers. It deals with the formation of revolutionary workers' governments parallel with the new official government, whether in the form of workers' clubs and committees or of local communal councils and municipalities. The point made therein is that the workers should be armed and that they should form an independent workers' guard. The second clause in the programme states that working-class candidates, preferably members of the League, should be nominated for these bodies alongside the bourgeois candidates. How weak the League was is shown by the fact that Marx had to argue the need for nominating

independent candidates. The inference to be drawn from all this is that Marx did not mention and had no intention of deciding the question of participation in a provisional revolutionary government, since that question could have no practical significance at the time; the entire attention was concentrated exclusively on the organisation of an independent workers' party.

Plekhanov says further in *Iskra* that *Vperyod* produces no relevant evidence, but confines itself to repeating a few favourite catchwords, and he alleges that *Vperyod* seeks to criticise Marx. With what truth? Do we not see, on the contrary, that *Vperyod* puts the question on a concrete basis, taking into account the real social forces engaged in Russia in the struggle for the democratic revolution? Plekhanov, on the other hand, does not say a word about the concrete conditions in Russia. His stock-in-trade consists of a couple of inapposite quotations. Monstrous, but true. The situation in Russia differs so greatly from that in Western Europe that even Parvus was prompted to ask: Where is our revolutionary democracy? Unable to prove that *Vperyod* wants to "criticise" Marx, Plekhanov drags in Mach and Avenarius by the ears. I cannot for the life of me understand what these writers, for whom I have not the slightest sympathy, have to do with the question of social revolution. They wrote on individual and social organisation of experience, or some such theme, but they never really gave any thought to the democratic dictatorship. Does Plekhanov mean to say that Parvus, perhaps, has become a disciple of Mach and Avenarius? (*Laughter.*) Or perhaps things have come to such a pass with Plekhanov that he has to make a butt of Mach and Avenarius without rhyme or reason. Plekhanov goes on to say that Marx and Engels soon lost faith in an imminent social revolution. The Communist League broke up. Petty squabbles arose among the political emigrants abroad, which Marx and Engels put down to the fact that while there were revolutionaries there was no revolution. Plekhanov writes in *Iskra*: "They [Marx and Engels, who had lost faith in an imminent social revolution] would have formulated the political tasks of the proletariat on the assumption that the democratic system would be predominant for a fairly long time. But for this very reason they would have been

more emphatic than ever in condemning the socialists' participation in a petty-bourgeois government" (*Iskra*, No. 96). Why? No answer. Once more Plekhanov uses democratic dictatorship interchangeably with socialist dictatorship, i.e., he falls into Martynov's error, against which *Vperyod* has time and again strongly warned. Without the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry no republic is possible in Russia. This assertion was made by *Vperyod* on the basis of an analysis of the actual situation. Unfortunately, Marx did not know this situation and he did not write of it. Therefore the analysis of this situation can neither be confirmed nor refuted with simple quotations from Marx. As to the concrete conditions, Plekhanov says not a word.

Even less felicitous is the adducing of the second quotation from Engels. For one thing, it is rather odd of Plekhanov to refer to a private letter without mention of the time and place of its publication.¹²¹ We could only be grateful for the publication of Engels' letters, but we should like to see their full text. We have, however, some information which permits us to judge of the true meaning of Engels' letter.

We know definitely, in the second place, that the situation in Italy in the nineties was nothing like the present situation in Russia. Italy had been enjoying freedom for forty years. In Russia the working class cannot even dream of such freedom without a bourgeois revolution. In Italy, consequently, the working class had long been in a position to develop an independent organisation for the socialist revolution. Turati is the Italian Millerand. It is quite possible, therefore, that even at that time Turati advocated Millerandian ideas. This assumption is borne out by the fact that, according to Plekhanov himself, Engels had to explain to Turati the difference between a bourgeois-democratic and a socialist revolution. Thus, Engels feared that Turati would find himself in the false position of a leader who did not understand the social significance of the revolution in which he was taking part. Accordingly, we must say again of Plekhanov that he confounds democratic with socialist revolution.

But perhaps we might find in Marx and Engels an answer which, though not applying to the concrete situation in

Russia, would apply to the general principles of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat? *Iskra* at any rate raises one such general question.

It states in issue No. 93: "The best way to organise the proletariat into a party in opposition to the bourgeois-democratic state is to develop the bourgeois revolution *from below* through the pressure of the proletariat on the democrats in power." *Iskra* goes on: "*Vperyod* wants the pressure of the proletariat on the revolution [?] to be exerted not only from below, not only from the street, but also from above, from the marble halls of the provisional government." This formulation is correct; *Vperyod* does want this. We have here a really general question of principle: is revolutionary action permissible only from below, or also from above? To this general question we can find an answer in Marx and Engels.

I have in mind Engels' interesting article "The Bakuninists at Work"¹²² (1873). Engels describes briefly the Spanish Revolution of 1873, when the country was swept by a revolution of the Intransigentes, i.e., the extreme republicans. Engels stresses the fact that the immediate emancipation of the working class was out of the question at that time. The task was to accelerate for the proletariat the transition through the preliminary stages that prepare the social revolution and to clear the obstacles in its way. The working class of Spain could utilise this opportunity only by taking an active part in the revolution. In this it was hindered by the influence of the Bakuninists and, among other things, by their idea of the general strike, which Engels criticised so effectively. Engels describes, in passing, the events in Alcoy, a city with 30,000 factory workers, where the proletariat found itself master of the situation. How did the proletariat act? Despite the principles of Bakuninism, they were obligated to participate in the provisional revolutionary government. "The Bakuninists," says Engels, "had for years been propagating the idea that all revolutionary action from above downward was pernicious, and that everything must be organised and carried out from below upward."

This, then, is Engels' answer to the general question of "from above or from below" raised by *Iskra*. The "*Iskra*" principle of "*only from below and never from above*" is an anarchist principle. Drawing his conclusion from the events of the

Spanish revolution, Engels says: "The Bakuninists repudiated the credo which they had just proclaimed: that the establishment of a revolutionary government was only a new deception and a new betrayal of the working class [as Plekhanov is trying to persuade us now], by figuring quite complacently on the government committees of the various cities, and at that almost everywhere as an impotent minority outvoted and exploited politically by the bourgeoisie." *Thus, what displeases Engels is the fact that the Bakuninists were in the minority, and not the fact that they sat there on these committees.* At the conclusion of his pamphlet, Engels declares that the example of the Bakuninists is "an example of how *not* to make a revolution".

If Martov confined his revolutionary work exclusively to action from below, he would be repeating the mistake of the Bakuninists.

Iskra, however, after inventing differences on points of principle with *Vperyod*, comes round to our own point of view. Martynov, for instance, says that the proletariat, in common with the people, must force the bourgeoisie to consummate the revolution. This, however, is nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of "the people", viz., of the proletariat and the peasantry. The bourgeoisie has no wish whatever to consummate the revolution. But the people cannot help wanting this because of the social conditions of their existence. The revolutionary dictatorship will educate them and draw them into political life.

Iskra writes in issue No. 95:

"If, however, we should finally be swept into power against our will by the inner dialectics of the revolution at a time when the national conditions for the establishment of socialism are not yet mature, we would not back out. We would make it our aim to break down the narrow national framework of the revolution and impel the Western world towards revolution, as France impelled the East a century ago."

Thus, *Iskra* itself admits that, were it our misfortune to be victorious, we should have to act in keeping with the *Vperyod* position. Hence, in the practical aspect of the question, "*Iskra*" follows "*Vperyod*" and undermines its own position. The only thing I fail to understand is how Martov and Martynov can be dragged to power against their own will. If ever there was idiocy!

Iskra cites France as an example. But that was Jacobin France. To make a bogey of Jacobinism in time of revolution is a cheap trick. A democratic dictatorship, as I have pointed out, is not an organisation of "order", but an organisation of war. Even if we did seize St. Petersburg and guillotined Nicholas, we would still have several Vendées¹²³ to deal with. Marx understood this perfectly when in 1848, in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, he recalled the Jacobins. He said that "the Reign of Terror of 1793 was nothing but a plebeian manner of settling accounts with absolutism and counter-revolution."¹²⁴ We, too, prefer to settle accounts with the Russian autocracy by "plebeian" methods and leave Girondist methods to *Iskra*. The situation confronting the Russian revolution is singularly auspicious (an anti-popular war, the Asiatic conservatism of the autocracy, etc.), and it justifies the hope that the uprising may prove successful. The revolutionary temper of the proletariat is mounting almost hourly. At such a moment Martynovism is not mere folly, but a downright crime, for it saps the revolutionary energy of the proletariat, clips the wings of its revolutionary enthusiasm. (*Lyadov*: "Hear, hear!") It is the mistake Bernstein made in the German Party, under different circumstances, on the question, not of the democratic, but of the socialist dictatorship.

To give you a definite idea of what these celebrated "marble halls" of the provisional revolutionary government are really like, I shall quote still another source. In his article "*Die Reichsverfassungskampagne*"* Engels recounts how he took part in a revolution in the precincts of these "marble halls". He describes, for instance, the uprising in Rhenish Prussia, which was one of the most industrialised centres in Germany. The chances for the victory of the democratic party, he says, were particularly strong there. The thing to do was to rush all available forces to the right bank of the Rhine, spread the insurrection over a wider area and try to set up the nucleus of a revolutionary army with the aid of the *Landwehr* (militia). This was precisely what Engels proposed when he went to Elberfeld to do everything possible to put his plan into operation. He attacks the pet-

* "The Campaign for an Imperial Constitution".—*Ed.*

ty-bourgeois leaders for their inability to organise the insurrection, for their failure to furnish funds, for instance, for the maintenance of the workers fighting on the barricades, etc. They should have acted more energetically, he says. Their first step should have been to disarm the Elberfeld Citizens' Army and distribute its arms among the workers, and then to levy a compulsory tax for the maintenance of the workers thus armed. But this suggestion, says Engels, came only and exclusively from me. The highly respectable Committee of Public Safety was not in the least inclined to take such "terrorist measures".

Thus, while our Marx and Engels—that is, Martynov and Martov (*Homeric laughter*)—try to frighten us with the boggy of Jacobinism, Engels castigated the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie for its disdain of the "Jacobin" mode of operation. He understood that going to war and—in the course of the war—renouncing the State Treasury and government power meant engaging in an unworthy game of words. Where, then, will you get money for the uprising, if it becomes an all-people's uprising, gentlemen of the new *Iskra*? Not from the State Treasury, surely? That is bourgeois! That is Jacobinism!

Concerning the uprising in Baden Engels writes that "the insurgent government had every chance of success, in that it found ... a ready army, well-stocked arsenals ... a full State Treasury, and what was practically solid support of the population". After the event everyone understood what had to be done under the circumstances. What had to be done was to organise an army for the protection of the National Assembly, to drive the Austrians and Prussians back, to spread the revolt to the neighbouring states, and "bring the trembling German so-called National Assembly under the terroristic influence of an insurgent population and insurgent army.... It was necessary, furthermore, to centralise the power of the insurrection, put the necessary funds at its disposal and win for the insurrection the sympathy of the vast farming majority of the population by immediately abolishing all feudal burdens.... All this should have been done at once, however, if it was to be carried out promptly. A week after the appointment of the Committee of Safety it was too late".

We are convinced that when the uprising starts in Russia the revolutionary Social-Democrats, following the example of Engels, will enlist as soldiers of the revolution and will give the same kind of "Jacobin" advice. But our *Iskra* prefers to discuss the colour of the ballot envelopes, relegating to the background the question of the provisional revolutionary government and of a revolutionary guard for the Constituent Assembly. Our *Iskra* will not act "from above" under any circumstances.

From Karlsruhe Engels went to Pfalz, where his friend D'Ester (who had once freed Engels from arrest) was on the provisional government. "Official participation in a movement that was utterly alien to our party was plainly out of the question in this case as well," Engels says. He had "to take the only position in this movement that anyone working on the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* could take: that of a soldier." We have spoken of the break-up of the Communist League, which deprived Engels of practically all ties with the workers' organisations. This clarifies the passage we quoted: "I was offered many civilian and military posts," writes Engels, "posts that I would not have hesitated for a moment to accept in a proletarian movement. Under the circumstances I declined them all."

As we see, Engels did not fear to act from above; he did not fear that the proletariat might become too organised and too strong, which could lead to its participation in the provisional government. On the contrary, he regretted that the movement was not successful enough, not proletarian enough, because the workers were completely unorganised. But even under these circumstances, Engels accepted a post; he served in the army as Willich's adjutant, took over the delivery of ammunition, transporting under the greatest difficulties powder, lead, cartridges, etc. "To die for the republic was (thenceforward) my aim," writes Engels.

I leave it to you, comrades, to judge whether this picture of a provisional government drawn according to the words of Engels resembles the "marble halls" which the new *Iskra* is holding up as a bogey to frighten the workers away from us. (*Applause.*) (*The speaker reads his draft of the resolution and explains it.*)

14

DRAFT RESOLUTION
ON THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT

1. Whereas both the direct interests of the Russian proletariat and those of its struggle for the ultimate aims of socialism require the fullest possible measure of political freedom, and, consequently, the replacement of the autocratic form of government by the democratic republic;

2. Whereas the armed uprising of the people, if completely successful, i.e., if the autocracy is overthrown, will necessarily bring about the establishment of a provisional revolutionary government, which alone is capable of securing complete freedom of agitation and of convening a Constituent Assembly that will really express the will of the people, an Assembly elected on the basis of universal, direct, and equal suffrage by secret ballot; and

3. Whereas this democratic revolution in Russia will not weaken, but, on the contrary, will strengthen the domination of the bourgeoisie, which, at a certain juncture, will inevitably go to all lengths to take away from the Russian proletariat as many of the gains of the revolutionary period as possible;—

Therefore, the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. resolves:

a) that we should spread among the working class the conviction that a provisional revolutionary government is absolutely necessary, and discuss at workers' meetings the conditions required for the full and prompt realisation of all the immediate political and economic demands of our programme;

b) that in the event of the victorious uprising of the people and the complete overthrow of the autocracy, representa-

tives of our Party may participate in the provisional revolutionary government for the purpose of waging a relentless struggle against all counter-revolutionary attempts and of defending the independent interests of the working class;

c) that essential conditions for such participation are strict control of its representatives by the Party, and the constant safeguarding of the independence of the Social-Democratic Party, which strives for the complete socialist revolution, and, consequently, is irreconcilably opposed to all the bourgeois parties;

d) that, irrespective of whether participation of Social-Democrats in the provisional revolutionary government is possible or not, we must propagate among the broadest sections of the proletariat the idea that the armed proletariat, led by the Social-Democratic Party, must bring to bear constant pressure on the provisional government for the purpose of defending, consolidating, and extending the gains of the revolution.

Written prior to April 18 (May 1), 1905

15

SPEECH ON THE AMENDMENTS TO THE RESOLUTION
ON THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT
APRIL 19 (MAY 2)

On the whole I share the opinion of Comrade Zimin. It is only natural that, as publicist, I should have given my attention to the literary formulation of the question. Comrade Zimin has very properly stressed the importance of the aim which our struggle pursues, and I subscribe to all he has said. You cannot fight if you do not expect to capture the point you are fighting for....

Comrade Zimin's amendment to Point 2: "that the establishment, etc. ... a provisional government, which alone", etc., is quite to the purpose, and I readily accept it.

This is likewise true of the amendment to Point 3; it is very appropriate to show here that under the present social and economic conditions the bourgeoisie will of necessity grow stronger.

In point (a) of the resolution, the wording "the proletariat will demand" is better than my formulation, since it shifts the emphasis to the proletariat. In point (b) the reference to the dependence on the relation of forces is also quite appropriate. This formulation, in my opinion, renders Comrade Andreyev's amendment unnecessary.¹²⁵ Incidentally, I should like to know the opinion of the comrades from Russia as to whether the expression "immediate demands" is clear enough or whether we should not add "the minimum programme" in parenthesis. In point (c) I use the word "are", while Comrade Zimin proposes "should be"; evidently a stylistic correction is needed here. Where Party control is dealt with, I think my old formulation "the safeguarding of the

independence of the Social-Democratic Party" is better than "preserving", which Comrade Zimin proposes. Our task is not only to "preserve" the independence of the Social-Democratic Party, but constantly to "safeguard" it. Comrade Sosnovsky's amendment to this point only mars the formulation by making it vaguer. Comrade Andreyev's proposals for changes are covered in part in the points of my resolution and of Comrade Zimin's. Incidentally, it is hardly appropriate to put "provisional government" in the plural in the formulation, as Comrade Andreyev proposes. Of course, we may have many provisional governments; but we should not make a point of it, for we do not in any sense strive for such partitioning. We shall always stand for a single provisional government of all-Russia and strive to create "a single centre, and a Russian one at that". (*Laughter.*)

16

REPORT ON THE RESOLUTION
ON THE SUPPORT OF THE PEASANT MOVEMENT
APRIL 19 (MAY 2)

In view of the statement of seventeen comrades calling attention to the urgent need for speeding up the work of the Congress, I shall try to be as brief as possible. Strictly speaking, there are no moot points of principle in the question under discussion; none arose even during the Party crisis, which was rich in differences on points of "principle".

Moreover, the draft resolution was published in *Vperyod* quite some time ago; I shall therefore confine myself merely to supporting the resolution.

The question of supporting the peasant movement divides itself into two aspects: (1) fundamentals, and (2) the practical experience of the Party. The latter will be dealt with by our second reporter, Comrade Barsov,¹²⁶ who is thoroughly familiar with our most advanced peasant movement—that in Guria. As regards the fundamentals involved, it is now a matter of reaffirming the slogans elaborated by Social-Democracy and adapting them to the peasant movement of today. This movement is growing and spreading before our eyes. The government is up to its old game of trying to fool the peasantry with sham concessions. This policy of corruption must be countered with the slogans of our Party.

These slogans, in my opinion, are set forth in the following Draft Resolution:

"The Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, as the party of the class-conscious proletariat, strives to bring about the complete emancipation of all working people

from every kind of exploitation, and supports every revolutionary movement against the present social and political system. Therefore, the R.S.D.L.P. strongly supports the present-day peasant movement, among others, and stands for all revolutionary measures capable of improving the condition of the peasantry, not halting at the expropriation of the landed estates to this end. At the same time, as the class party of the proletariat, the R.S.D.L.P. works undeviatingly towards an independent class organisation of the rural proletarians, ever mindful of its obligation to make clear to them the antagonism of their interests to those of the peasant bourgeoisie, to bring them to understand that only the common struggle of the rural and the urban proletariat against the whole of bourgeois society can lead to the socialist revolution, which alone is capable of really freeing the mass of the rural poor from poverty and exploitation.

"As a practical slogan for agitation among the peasantry, and as a means of instilling the utmost political consciousness into this movement, the R.S.D.L.P. proposes the immediate formation of revolutionary peasant committees for all-round support of all democratic reforms and for their implementation in detail. In these committees as well the R.S.D.L.P. will strive for an independent organisation of the rural proletarians for the purpose of supporting the entire peasantry in all its revolutionary-democratic actions, on the one hand, and, on the other, of safeguarding the true interests of the rural proletariat in its struggle against the peasant bourgeoisie" (*Vperyod*, No. 11*).

This Draft was discussed by the Agrarian Committee, which the delegates had appointed in advance of the Congress for its preparation. Although opinion was considerably divided, certain major trends were clearly in evidence, and it is with these that I intend to deal. The nature of the possible and necessary revolutionary measures in the sphere of the agrarian question is according to the Draft Resolution "the improvement in the condition of the peasantry". Thus, the Resolution clearly expresses thereby the general conviction of all Social-Democrats that no fundamental change in the present social and economic system can be achieved by

* See pp. 235-36 of this volume.—*Ed.*

these measures. In this we differ from the Socialists-Revolutionaries. The revolutionary movement of the peasants may lead to a considerable improvement in their condition, but not to the supplanting of capitalism by another mode of production.

The Resolution speaks of measures that will not halt at the expropriation of the landed estates. It has been said that this formulation modifies our agrarian programme. I consider this opinion wrong. The wording could be improved, of course, to read that it is the peasantry and not our Party that will not halt at expropriation; our Party supports the peasantry and will support it also when it does not halt at such measures. The narrower concept "confiscation" should be used instead of expropriation, since we are emphatically opposed to compensation in any shape or form. We will never hesitate to employ such measures as confiscation of the land. But apart from these partial emendations, we see nothing in our Resolution that modifies our agrarian programme. All Social-Democratic publicists have constantly expressed the view that the point concerning the cut-off lands does not by any means set limits to the peasant movement, either to curtail or to restrict it. Both Plekhanov and I have stated in the press that the Social-Democratic Party will never hold the peasantry back from revolutionary measures of agrarian reform, including the "general redistribution"¹²⁷ of the land. Thus, we are not modifying our agrarian programme. We must now take a definite stand on the practical question of consistent support to the peasants, to avoid any possible misunderstandings or misinterpretations. The peasant movement is now on the order of the day, and the party of the proletariat should declare officially that it gives this movement full support and does not in any way limit its scope.

The Resolution goes on to speak of the need to bring the interests of the rural proletariat into focus and to organise this proletariat separately. There is hardly any need to defend this simple axiom before a gathering of Social-Democrats. It was stated in the Agrarian Committee that it would be a good thing to add a point on the support of strikes of the farm labourers and peasants, especially during the harvesting, haymaking, etc. In principle, of course, there can

be nothing against this. Let our practical workers say what they think of the possible significance of such a point for the immediate future.

The Resolution further speaks of the formation of revolutionary peasant committees.

The idea that the demand for the immediate formation of revolutionary peasant committees should be made the pivot of our agitation was developed in *Vperyod*, No. 15.* Even the reactionaries now talk of "improving the living conditions", but they stand for an official, bureaucratic way of pseudo-improvement, whereas the Social-Democrats, of course, must stand for the revolutionary way of effecting the improvement. The main task is to instil political consciousness into the peasant movement. The peasants know what they want in a vague sort of way, but they are unable to see their wishes and demands in relation to the entire political system. That is why they are such easy game for political tricksters, who reduce the question of political changes to economic "improvements", which cannot really be effected without political changes. Therefore, the slogan calling for revolutionary peasant committees is the only correct one. Unless these committees are able to enforce the revolutionary law, the peasants will never be able to hold what they may now win. It is objected that here, too, we are modifying the agrarian programme, which says nothing about *revolutionary* peasant committees or their functions in the field of democratic reforms. This objection does not hold water. We are not modifying our programme but applying it to a concrete case. Since no doubt exists that the peasant committees cannot be anything but revolutionary under the given conditions, by noting this fact we are merely applying the programme to the revolutionary moment, not changing it. Our programme, for instance, declares that we recognise the right of nations to self-determination; if concrete conditions brought us to express ourselves in favour of self-determination of a definite nation, of its complete independence, that would be, not a change of the programme, but its application. The peasant committees are an elastic institution, suitable both under present conditions and

* See pp. 321-22 of this volume.—*Ed.*

under, let us say, a provisional revolutionary government, when they would become organs of the government. Some hold that these committees may become reactionary instead of revolutionary. But we Social-Democrats have never forgotten the dual nature of the peasant or the possibility of a reactionary peasant movement against the proletariat. Not this is the point at issue, but rather that at the present time peasant committees formed to sanction land reforms cannot be anything but revolutionary. At the present time the peasant movement is unquestionably revolutionary. Some say that the peasants will quieten down after they have seized the land. Possibly. But the autocratic government will not quieten down if the peasants seize the land, and this is the crux of the matter. Only a revolutionary government or revolutionary peasant committees can sanction this seizure.

Lastly, the concluding part of the Resolution defines once more the position of the Social-Democrats in the peasant committees, namely, the necessity of marching together with the rural proletariat and organising it separately and independently. In the countryside, too, there can be only one consistently revolutionary class—the proletariat.

17

DRAFT RESOLUTION
ON THE SUPPORT OF THE PEASANT MOVEMENT

1. Whereas the growing peasant movement, though spontaneous and politically unconscious, is nonetheless inevitably directed against the existing political order and *against the privileged classes*;

2. Whereas it is one of the tasks of Social-Democracy to support every revolutionary movement against the existing social and political order;

3. Whereas, in view of the aforesaid, the Social-Democrats must strive to bring out the revolutionary-democratic features (characteristics) of the peasant movement, to uphold them and develop them to their logical conclusion; and

4. Whereas the Social-Democratic Party, as the party of the proletariat, must in all cases and under all circumstances work steadfastly for the independent organisation of the rural proletariat and to clarify for this class the irreconcilable antagonism between its interests and those of the peasant bourgeoisie;—

Therefore, the Third Party Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. instructs all Party organisations:

a) to carry on propaganda among the proletariat at large, explaining that the R.S.D.L.P. makes it its aim to support with the utmost vigour the present-day peasant movement, *without opposing* its revolutionary manifestations, including the confiscation of the landed estates;

b) as a practical slogan for agitation among the peasantry and as a means of instilling the utmost political consciousness into the peasant movement, a plan should be launched

for the immediate organisation of revolutionary peasant committees that shall have as their aim the carrying out of all revolutionary-democratic reforms in the interests of the peasantry and the liberation of the peasantry from the tyranny of the police, the officials, and the landlords;

c) to recommend to the peasantry non-performance of military service, flat refusal to pay taxes, and refusal to recognise the authorities, in order to disorganise the autocratic regime and support the revolutionary onset directed against it;

d) to work within the peasant committees for the independent organisation of the rural proletariat and for its closest possible association with the urban proletariat in a single Social-Democratic party of the working class.

Written on April 20 (May 3), 1905

18

SPEECH

ON THE QUESTION OF THE RELATIONS
BETWEEN WORKERS AND INTELLECTUALS
WITHIN THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC ORGANISATIONS
APRIL 20 (MAY 3)

I cannot agree with the comrades who said it was inappropriate to broaden the scope of this question. It is quite appropriate.

It has been said here that the exponents of Social-Democratic ideas have been mainly intellectuals. That is not so. During the period of Economism the exponents of revolutionary ideas were workers, not intellectuals. This is confirmed by "A Worker", the author of the pamphlet published with a foreword by Comrade Axelrod.

Comrade Sergeyev asserted here that the elective principle will not make for better information. That is not so. If the elective principle were applied *in practice*, we should unquestionably be much better informed than we now are.

It has also been pointed out that splits have usually been the work of intellectuals. This is an important point, but it does not settle the question. In my writings for the press I have long urged that as many workers as possible should be placed on the committees.* The period since the Second Congress has been marked by inadequate attention to this duty—such is the impression I have received from talks with comrades engaged in practical Party work. If in Saratov only one worker was placed on the committee, this means that they did not know how to choose suitable people

* *A Letter to a Comrade on Our Organisational Tasks*, September 1902. See present edition, Vol. 6, p. 237.—*Ed.*

from among the workers. No doubt, this was due also to the split within the Party; the struggle for the committees has had a damaging effect on practical work. For this very reason we endeavoured in every way possible to speed the convening of the Congress.

It will be the task of the future centre to reorganise a considerable number of our committees; the inertness of the committee-men has to be overcome. (*Applause and booing.*)

I can hear Comrade Sergeyev booing while the non-committee-men applaud. I think we should look at the matter more broadly. To place workers on the committees is a political, not only a pedagogical, task. Workers have the class instinct, and, given some political experience, they pretty soon become staunch Social-Democrats. I should be strongly in favour of having eight workers to every two intellectuals on our committees. Should the advice given in our Party literature—to place as many workers as possible on the committees—be insufficient, it would be advisable for this recommendation to be given in the name of the Congress. A clear and definite directive from the Congress will give you a radical means of fighting demagoguery; this is the express will of the Congress.

19

DRAFT RESOLUTION
ON THE RELATIONS BETWEEN WORKERS
AND INTELLECTUALS
WITHIN THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC ORGANISATIONS

1. Whereas the Right Wing of our Party still continues the systematic attempts, begun in the days of Economism, to spread hostility and distrust among the Party members—the workers and the intellectuals—attempts to represent our Party organisations as consisting solely of intellectuals (an allegation of which the enemies of Social-Democracy make clever use); attempts to accuse the Social-Democratic organisations of striving to fetter the initiative of the working class through the instrumentality of Party discipline; attempts to flaunt the elective-principle slogan for the most part without any design to apply it in practice; and

2. Whereas the *full* assertion of the elective principle, possible and necessary under conditions of political freedom, is unfeasible under the autocracy, though even under the autocracy this principle could be applied to a much larger extent than it is today, were it not for the obstacle presented by the Party organisation's diffuse form and actual disorganisation, for which the Party is indebted to the selfsame Right Wing of Social-Democracy;—

Therefore, the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., recognising its duty to prepare for the coming congresses, by a series of organisational reforms, the pre-conditions for a real application of the elective principle in Party life, to the extent possible, calls attention once more to the task confronting the class-conscious adherents of the Social-Democratic workers' party: that they make every effort to

strengthen the ties between the Party and the masses of the working class by raising still wider sections of proletarians and semi-proletarians to full Social-Democratic consciousness, by developing their revolutionary Social-Democratic activity, by seeing to it that the greatest possible number of workers capable of leading the movement and the Party organisations be advanced from among the mass of the working class to membership on the local centres and on the all-Party centre through the creation of a maximum number of working-class organisations adhering to our Party, by seeing to it that working-class organisations unwilling or unable to enter the Party should at least be associated with it.

Written on April 22 (May 5), 1905

20

A REMARK DURING THE DISCUSSION OF THE RESOLUTION
ON THE RELATIONS BETWEEN WORKERS
AND INTELLECTUALS
WITHIN THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC ORGANISATIONS
APRIL 22 (MAY 5)

I could hardly keep my seat when it was said here that there are no workers fit to sit on the committees. The question is being dragged out; obviously there is something the matter with the Party. Workers must be given places on the committees. Oddly enough, there are only three publicists at the Congress, the others being committee-men; it appears however that the publicists are for placing the workers, whereas the committee-men for some reason are quite wrought up over it.

The statements by Comrades Golubin¹²⁸ and Mikhailov are highly valuable.

21

SPEECH ON THE PROCEDURE OF THE DISCUSSION
OF THE RESOLUTIONS ON THE RELATIONS
BETWEEN WORKERS AND INTELLECTUALS
WITHIN THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC ORGANISATIONS
APRIL 22 (MAY 5)¹²⁹

I am not of accord with Comrade Sergeyev in this; it is precisely such congress resolutions that do not exist. The wishes of the publicists are not enough. Besides, the resolutions were not rejected, but merely shifted to another item of the agenda. Some point to the fact that the workers have the right, with the consent of the Central Committee, to cashier the committees. That is not enough; we want a directive, not demagogy. Comrade Sergeyev misinterprets *Vperyod* when he talks about "fine words buttering no parsnips". It is the brevity of the Rules clause that makes us adopt a resolution containing a certain directive. I am against Comrade Andreyev's proposal. It is not true that it was neither the "Economists" nor the "Mensheviks" who started the demagogy. On the contrary, it was they who were the demagogues. Precisely this is what the resolution is—a warning against demagogy. For this reason I insist upon the resolution.

22

SPEECH DURING THE DISCUSSION OF THE PARTY RULES
APRIL 21 (MAY 4)

I must confess that the arguments employed by Comrade Ivanov in defence of his idea of a single centre seem to me untenable. (*The speaker reads the argumentation of Comrade Ivanov*):

"On Clauses 4 and 5. The system of two centres with a balancer, the Council, has been condemned by past experience. The history of the Party crisis plainly shows that this system provides too favourable a soil for the growth of differences, squabbles, and Court intrigues. It means the subordination of the people in Russia to those abroad: owing to arrests, the Central Committee personnel is unstable, whereas the Editorial Board of the Central Organ is constant; and the Council resides abroad. On the one hand, all the most important objections against a single centre, based on the actual severance of Russia from the people abroad, only confirm the idea that a split between the two centres is possible and even probable. On the other hand, these objections largely fall away if the Congress makes periodic conferences obligatory between the Russian members of the C.C. and the members abroad."

It has been found, however, that the fine qualities here alluded to are possessed in equal measure both by the Central Organ abroad and by the "genuinely Russian" Central Committee. In Comrade Ivanov's entire reasoning I discern the fallacy envisaged by logic as *post hoc, ergo propter hoc*. * Because the three centres have, pardon the expression, played us dirty, let us have a single centre. I fail to see the *propter* here. Our troubles were not due to the mechanism but to persons; what happened was that certain persons, using a formal interpretation of the Rules as a subterfuge,

* After this, therefore on account of this.—*Ed.*

ignored the will of the Congress. Has not the "genuinely Russian" C.C. "dialectically" turned into its exact opposite? Comrade Ivanov's reasoning is—the group abroad has acted shabbily; we must therefore put it under a "state of siege" and keep a "tight hold" on it. As you know, I have always been an advocate of a "state of siege" and of a "tight hold", so that I shall raise no objection to such measures. But does not the C.C. deserve the same treatment? Besides, who will deny that the Central Organ can be constant, while the C.C. cannot? This, after all, is a fact. But in practice I shall abstain from all polemic. Formerly we had the Council, and now we shall have a conference (of the C.C. section working abroad and of the section working in Russia). A difference of only a couple of letters. Our cart has been lurching all the time to the right, towards the Central Organ—Comrade Ivanov has been laying the straw on the right side, to cushion the fall. But I think it ought to be laid on the left side as well, on the side of the C.C. I would subscribe to Comrade Mikhailov's proposal to cashier the committees, but I really don't know what the periphery exactly is. "Chair-warmers and keepers of the seal" should all be smoked out; but how is one to define precisely the concept "periphery"? "Two-thirds of the votes of the periphery!"—but who can keep a strict record of the periphery? I must, besides, warn the Congress against cramming the Rules with too many clauses. It is easy enough to pen nice clauses, but in practice they usually prove superfluous. The Rules should not be made a collection of pious wishes....

23

SPEECH ON THE WORDING OF CLAUSE 9
OF THE PARTY RULES
APRIL 21 (MAY 4)

I was for cashiering the committees, but in the Party Council, at the time when our factional strife was raging, I spoke against it, since there would have been a certain impropriety in the exercise of that right. If this clause constitutes a threat to the committees consisting of intellectuals, then I am all for it. A tight hold must always be kept on the intelligentsia. It is always the instigator of all sorts of squabbles, and therefore I move that we substitute the words "organised workers" for the word "periphery" (*the speaker submits his amendment in writing*): "Clause 9. A local committee must be dissolved by the C.C. if two-thirds of the local workers belonging to the Party organisations declare for such dissolution."

One cannot rely on a small periphery of intellectuals, but one can and should rely on hundreds of organised workers. I would like to connect this clause closely with the question of submitting reports. In this respect we should take an example from the Bund, which always knows the exact number of organised workers it has. And when our C.C. is constantly posted on the number of organised workers in any particular organisation, it will have to reckon with their opinion and will be bound to cashier the local committee on the demand of the organised workers.

24

SPEECH ON AN AGREEMENT
WITH THE SOCIALISTS-REVOLUTIONARIES
APRIL 23 (MAY 6)

I have to inform the Congress of an unsuccessful attempt to come to an agreement with the Socialists-Revolutionaries. Comrade Gapon arrived abroad. He met with the Socialists-Revolutionaries, then with the *Iskra* people, and finally with me. He told me that he shared the point of view of the Social-Democrats, but for various reasons did not deem it possible to say so openly. I told him that diplomacy was a good thing, but not between revolutionaries. I shall not repeat our conversation; it was reported in *Vperyod*.^{*} He impressed me as being an enterprising and clever man, unquestionably devoted to the revolution, though unfortunately without a consistent revolutionary outlook.

Some time later I received a written invitation from Comrade Gapon to attend a conference of socialist organisations, convened, according to his idea, for the purpose of co-ordinating their activities. Here is a list of the eighteen organisations which, according to that letter, were invited to Comrade Gapon's conference:

(1) The Socialist-Revolutionary Party, (2) the *Vperyod* R.S.D.L.P., (3) the *Iskra* R.S.D.L.P., (4) the Polish Socialist Party, (5) the Social-Democracy of Poland and Lithuania, (6) the P.S.P., *Proletariat*, (7) the Lettish Social-Democratic Labour Party, (8) the Bund, (9) the Armenian Social-Democratic Labour Organisation, (10) the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Droshak), (11) The Byelorussian Socialist

^{*} See pp. 162-66 of this volume.—*Ed.*

Hromada, (12) the Lettish Social-Democratic League, (13) the Active Resistance Party of Finland, (14) the Workers' Party of Finland, (15) the Georgian Party of Socialist-Federalist Revolutionaries, (16) the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party, (17) the Lithuanian Social-Democratic Party, and (18) the Ukrainian Socialist Party.

I pointed out both to Comrade Gapon and to a prominent Socialist-Revolutionary that the dubious make-up of the conference might create difficulties. The Socialists-Revolutionaries were building up an overwhelming conference majority. The convocation of the conference was greatly delayed. *Iskra* replied, as documents submitted to me by Comrade Gapon show, that it preferred direct agreements with organised parties. A "gentle" hint at *Vperyod's* being an alleged disrupter, etc. In the end *Iskra* did not attend the conference. We, the representatives of both the *Vperyod* Editorial Board and the Bureau of Committees of the Majority, did attend. Arriving on the scene, we saw that the conference was a Socialist-Revolutionary affair. As it became clear, either the working-class parties had not been invited at all, or there was no record of their having been invited. Thus, the Active Resistance Party of Finland was represented, but not the Workers' Party of Finland.

When we asked for the reason, we were told that the invitation to the Workers' Party of Finland had been sent via the Active Resistance Party, since, in the words of the Socialist-Revolutionary who offered the explanation, they did not know how to send it directly. Yet anyone who is at all familiar with things abroad knows that connections with the Workers' Party of Finland can be established, if only through Branting, the leader of the Swedish Social-Democratic Labour Party. There were representatives from the Polish Socialist Party in attendance, but no representative from the Social-Democracy of Poland and Lithuania. Nor was it possible to ascertain whether an invitation had been extended. No reply had been received from the Lithuanian Social-Democracy or from the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party, we were told by the same Socialist-Revolutionary.

From the outset the national question was made an issue. The Polish Socialist Party raised the question of having several constituent assemblies. This gives me reason to say

that in the future it will be necessary for us either to refuse outright to take any part in such conferences, or to convene a conference of representatives of the working-class parties of one nationality, or to invite to the conference representatives of local party committees from the regions with a non-Russian population. But I certainly do not infer from this that conferences are impossible because of differences on points of principle. All that is necessary is that only practical questions be taken up.

We cannot control the composition of conferences, etc., from abroad. The Russian centre must be represented, and representatives of the local committees must take part without fail. The question that led to our withdrawal concerned the Letts. On leaving the conference we submitted the following declaration:

"The important historical period through which Russia is passing confronts the Social-Democratic and revolutionary-democratic parties and organisations working within the country with the task of reaching a practical agreement for a more effective attack on the autocratic regime.

"While, therefore, attaching very great importance to the conference called for that purpose, we must naturally subject the composition of the conference to the closest scrutiny.

"In the conference called by Comrade Gapon this condition, so essential to its success, has unfortunately not been properly observed, and we were therefore obliged, at its very initiation, to take measures calculated to ensure the genuine success of the gathering.

"The fact that the conference was to deal solely with practical matters made it necessary, in the first place, that only organisations truly constituting a real force in Russia should be afforded participation.

"Actually, the composition of the conference, as far as the reality of some of the organisations is concerned, is most unsatisfactory. Even an organisation of whose fictitious nature there is not the slightest doubt, found representation. We refer to the Lettish Social-Democratic League.

"The representative of the Lettish Social-Democratic Labour Party objected to the seating of this League and couched his objection in the form of an ultimatum.

"The utter fictitiousness of the 'League', as subsequently established at a special meeting of the representatives of the four Social-Democratic organisations and the delegates of the 'League', naturally compelled us, the remaining Social-Democratic organisations and parties attending the conference, to endorse the ultimatum.

"At the outset, however, we came up against the strong resistance of all the revolutionary-democratic parties, which, in refusing to meet our peremptory demand, showed that they preferred one fictitious group to a number of well-known Social-Democratic organisations.

"Finally, the practical significance of the conference was still further lowered by the absence of a number of other Social-Democratic organisations, whose participation, as far as we could ascertain, no proper measures had been taken to ensure.

"Though compelled, in view of all this, to leave the conference, we express our conviction that the failure of this one attempt will not stand in the way of earnest efforts to renew the endeavour in the very near future, and that the task that confronts all revolutionary parties of reaching a practical agreement will be accomplished by the coming conference, to be composed of organisations actually working in Russia, and not of fictitious organisations.

"For the Lettish S.D.L.P. F. Rozin.

"For the *Vperyod* R.S.D.L.P. N. Lenin.

"For the Central Committee of the Bund I. Gelfin.

"For the Armenian Social-Democratic
Labour Organisation Lerr."

A week and a half or two weeks later Comrade Gapon sent me the following statement:

"Dear Comrade,

"I am forwarding to you two declarations issued by the conference of which you know, and I request that you communicate their contents to the forthcoming Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. I deem it my duty to state that for my own part I accept these declarations with certain reservations on the questions of the socialist programme and the principle of federalism.

"Georgi Gapon."

This statement was accompanied by two interesting documents, containing the following striking passages:

"The application of the federative principle to the relations between nationalities remaining under one state roof....

"Socialisation, i.e., the transfer under public administration to the use by the labouring agricultural population of all lands whose cultivation is based on the exploitation of the labour of others; the determination of the concrete forms this measure is to take, of the order in which it is to be instituted, and of its scope, is to remain within the jurisdiction of the parties of the different nationalities, in keeping with the specific local conditions of each country; the development of public, municipal, and communal economy....

"... Bread for the starving!

"The land and its bounties for all the toilers!

"... A Constituent Assembly of representatives of all parts of the Russian Empire, exclusive of Poland and Finland!

"... Convocation of a Constituent Assembly for the Caucasus, as an autonomous part of Russia with which it is to be federated...."

The result of the conference, as appears from these quotations, has fully confirmed the fears which induced us to leave the conference. We have here a copy of the Socialist-Revolutionary programme with all sorts of concessions to the nationalist non-proletarian parties. It was strange taking part in deciding the questions raised at the conference without the participation of the national proletarian parties. For instance, the conference presented the demand for a separate Constituent Assembly for Poland. We can be neither for nor against the demand. Our programme recognises the principle of the self-determination of nationalities. But to decide this question without the Social-Democracy of Poland and Lithuania is impermissible. The conference divided up the Constituent Assembly, and this in the absence of the working-class parties! We cannot allow any practical solution of such questions to be reached without the party of the proletariat.

At the same time, I find that differences on points of principle do not exclude the possibility of practical conferences, provided, first, that they be held in Russia; secondly, that the reality of the forces be verified; and, thirdly, that questions concerning the various nationalities be dealt with separately, or at least, that representatives of the local committees of the regions where there are Social-Democratic and non-Social-Democratic national parties be invited to the conference.

I now pass to the proposed resolution on practical agreements with the Socialists-Revolutionaries. (*The speaker reads the draft as worded by Comrade Voinov*):

"Confirming the attitude of the R.S.D.I.P. towards the Socialist-Revolutionary Party as set forth in the resolution of the Second Congress, and

1. Whereas temporary militant agreements between the Social-Democratic Party and the organisation of the Socialists-Revolutionaries for the purposes of combating the autocracy are on the whole desirable at the present time; and

2. Whereas such agreements should under no circumstance restrict the complete independence of the Social-Democratic Labour Party, or affect the integrity and purity of its proletarian tactics and principles;—

Therefore, the Third Congress of the R.S.D.I.P. instructs the C.C. and the local committees, should the necessity arise, to enter into temporary militant agreements with the Socialist-Revolutionary organ-

isations, provided that local agreements are concluded only under the direct supervision of the C.C."

I agree with this draft. We might perhaps tone down the end. For instance, instead of "under the direct supervision of the Central Committee", we might have only "under the supervision of the Central Committee".

25

SPEECH ON THE REPORT ON THE WORK
OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
APRIL 25 (MAY 8)

Actually, the report on the work of the Central Committee dealt more with its technical than its political activities. I have been following the work of the central apparatus of the Party since 1900 and I must say that gigantic progress has been made. If it does not quite satisfy us, well, complete satisfaction can be expected only under the dictatorship of the proletariat, and even then, hardly! Let us not forget that "co-optation" is still working harm! The C.C. had little to say about its policies, for it cannot say anything good about them. Its major mistake was its opposition to the calling of the Congress. Had the Congress been called a year earlier, it would have proved more conciliatory. I am myself in favour of cashiering; but I am definitely against it in one case—if it is done because of agitation for the Congress. However, I shall not dwell on this. There is more joy over one sinner that repenteth than over ninety and nine just persons. As to the reproaches levelled at me, let me say only that a publicist is not in a position to do anything without the Party.

26

RESOLUTION ON THE PUBLICATION
OF THE CONGRESS PROCEEDINGS¹⁸⁰

The Congress instructs the Central Committee to proceed immediately to the publication of a brief report on the Third Congress with the full text of the Programme, the Rules, and the Resolutions.

The Congress instructs the Central Committee to speed the publication of this report in every possible way.

The Congress instructs the Congress Proceedings Publication Committee: (1) to determine definitely what materials, for reasons of secrecy, are not to be published under any circumstances; (2) to determine in what manner and to what extent the Party membership should be made acquainted with the unpublished proceedings of the Third Congress; (3) to make the necessary cuts for publication, exclusively in regard to the discussion of points of order or of rejected minor amendments to the resolutions.

Written on April 25 (May 8), 1905

27

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE EVENTS IN THE CAUCASUS¹¹

1. Whereas the specific social and political conditions in the Caucasus have favoured the creation there of the most militant organisations of our Party;

2. Whereas the revolutionary mood of the majority of the population in the Caucasus, both in the towns and in the villages, has reached the stage of a people's uprising against the autocracy;

3. Whereas the autocratic government has begun to send troops and artillery to Guria for the ruthless destruction of all the important seats of rebellion; and

4. Whereas a victory of the autocracy over the popular uprising in the Caucasus, which would be rendered easier by the non-Russian composition of the population, would most grievously affect the success of the uprising throughout Russia;—

Therefore, the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, on behalf of the class-conscious proletariat of Russia, sends ardent greetings to the heroic proletariat and peasantry of the Caucasus and instructs the Central Committee and the local Party committees to take the most energetic measures towards promulgating information on the state of affairs in the Caucasus as widely as possible by means of pamphlets, meetings, workers' rallies; study circle talks, etc., as well as measures towards rendering timely support to the Caucasus by armed force.

Written on April 26 (May 9), 1905

POLITICAL SOPHISMS

The Russian revolution has only just begun, but already all the features peculiar to political revolutions of the bourgeoisie stand clearly revealed. The lower classes fight, the upper reap the benefit of it. All the incredible hardships of the revolutionary struggle have fallen upon the proletariat, as a class, and on a few young intellectuals from among the bourgeoisie. Nine-tenths of all the liberties that have been partially won (rather, scant strips of liberty) go to the upper classes of society, to those who do not work. Despite the law, there is now incomparably greater freedom of speech, assembly, and the press in Russia than there was ten years, one year, ago; but only the bourgeois newspapers and the "liberal" meetings benefit thereby to any extent worth mentioning. In their powerful urge towards freedom the workers keep forcing their way into new realms hitherto thought inaccessible to them; but this infiltration of the proletarian element proves, rather than refutes, our point. Active participation in the political struggle is in inverse ratio to the active appropriation of its fruits. The more advantageous the status of a given class in the socio-economic structure is, the more "advantageous" is the relation between the legal and the illegal movement (i.e., between what is permitted by law and what is contrary to the law). The movement of the liberal bourgeoisie, especially since January 9, has spread so widely in forms *tolerated* by the law that the illegal liberal movement has begun to dwindle before our very eyes with amazing rapidity. The movement of the working class, *despite* its assumptions, in one of its crucial phases, of an ultra-"legal" form (the presentation of a petition to the tsar by the working people of St. Petersburg),

finds itself completely outlawed and subject to harsh military reprisals. The movement of the working class has grown incomparably wider, but the relation between the legal and the illegal elements has hardly changed in favour of the former.

Whence this difference? Because the whole social and economic structure of Russia yields most fruit to those who work the least. Under capitalism that cannot be otherwise. It is the law of capital, which rules the political as well as the economic life. The movement of the lower classes raises a revolutionary force; it raises a mass of people, who, for one thing, are capable of tearing down the whole rotten structure, and, for another, are not attached to that structure by any special features of their position and would gladly tear it down. What is more, even though they are not fully conscious of their aims, these masses are nonetheless able and prone to tear the structure down, because their position is desperate, since constant oppression drives them to take the revolutionary way, and they have nothing to lose but their chains. This popular force, the proletariat, looms formidable before the lords of the rotten structure because there is something in the very position of the proletariat that is a menace to all exploiters. For that reason, any movement of the proletariat, however small, however modest it may be at the start, however slight its occasion, inevitably threatens to outgrow its immediate aims and to develop into a force irreconcilable to the *entire* old order and destructive of it.

The movement of the proletariat, by reason of the essential peculiarities of the position of this class under capitalism, has a marked tendency to develop into a desperate *all-out* struggle, a struggle for complete victory over all the dark forces of exploitation and oppression. The movement of the liberal bourgeoisie, on the contrary, and for the same reasons (i.e., by virtue of the essential peculiarities of the bourgeoisie's position), has a tendency towards compromise instead of struggle, towards opportunism instead of radicalism, towards modest calculation of the likeliest and most possible immediate gains instead of a "tactless", bold, and determined bid for complete victory. He who puts up a real fight will naturally go *all out*; he who prefers compromise to struggle will naturally point out beforehand what "morsels" he would be inclined, at best, to content himself

with (at worst, he would be content even with no struggle at all, i.e., he would make a lasting peace with the masters of the old world).

It is therefore quite natural for Social-Democracy, as the party of the revolutionary proletariat, to be so concerned for its *programme*, to take such pains to establish well in advance its ultimate aim, the complete emancipation of the working people, and jealously to guard this aim against any attempts to whittle it down. For the same reasons Social-Democracy is so dogmatically strict and firmly doctrinaire in keeping its ultimate goal clear of all minor, immediate economic and political aims. He who goes *all out*, who fights for complete victory, must alert himself to the danger of having his hands tied by minor gains, of being led astray and made to forget that which is still comparatively remote, but without which all minor gains are hollow vanities. Such concern for the programme and the ever critical attitude towards small and gradual improvements are incomprehensible and foreign to a party of the bourgeoisie, however great its love for freedom and the people may be.

We were launched upon these reflections by the "Draft of a Russian Constitution", recently published by *Osvobozhdeniye* under the title "The Fundamental State Law of the Russian Empire". This draft, known in Russia for some time, has now been issued with annotations and an explanatory comment as "the only complete, definitive edition revised by the authors themselves". It appears that this draft originates, not with the *Osvobozhdeniye* League, but rather with a private group belonging to the League. Thus, we see here once again the dread of a clear, definite, and straightforward programme, which is typical of liberalism. The liberal party in Russia possesses immeasurably greater funds and publication capacities, and immeasurably greater freedom of movement on legal ground than does Social-Democracy; yet, with regard to programmatic definiteness, it falls strikingly behind Social-Democracy. The liberals fight shy of programmes; they prefer various contradictory statements in their newspaper (e.g., on the question of universal suffrage), or the "drafts" of private groups, which do not in any way commit the party as a whole (or the whole *Osvobozhdeniye* League). This is no accident, of course. It is the in-

evitable result of the bourgeoisie's social position, as a class, in modern society—a class caught between the autocracy and the proletariat and rent into factions over petty differences in interests. Political sophisms follow naturally from such a situation.

We should like to draw the reader's attention to one such sophism. The main features of *Osvobozhdeniye's* draft constitution are well known: the monarchy is retained—the question of the republic is not even discussed (apparently the "*Realpolitiker*" of the bourgeoisie do not consider this question important enough!); a *bicameral* parliamentary system is to be set up with universal, *direct*, and equal suffrage by secret ballot for the Lower House, and with *two-stage* elections for the Upper. The members of the Upper House are to be elected by the Zemstvo Assemblies and the municipal councils. There is no need to dwell on the details of this draft. The interest lies in its general conception and its advocacy on grounds of principle.

Our generous-spirited liberals want to share the state power as evenly and "fairly" as possible among three forces: the monarch, the Upper House (the Zemstvo House), and the Lower House (the House of People's Representatives), that is, the autocratic bureaucracy, the bourgeoisie, and the "people" (the proletariat, the peasantry, and the petty bourgeoisie at large). The liberal publicists, in their heart of hearts, want the strife between these contending forces and the various combinations of these forces to be superseded by a "fair" concord of unity ... on paper! The thing is to have a gradual, balanced development, to justify universal suffrage from the point of view of the conservatives (Mr. Struve's preface to this draft); a real guarantee for the interests of the ruling classes (i.e., real conservatism) is to be created in the form of the monarchy and the Upper House; and this supposedly cunning, but actually very naïve, construction is to be clothed in highflown sophisms. The Russian proletariat will have to deal with liberal sophisms for a long time to come. It is time we examined them more closely.

The liberals begin their defence of the bicameral system by analysing anticipated objections to it. Characteristically, these objections are borrowed entirely from the usual

font of liberal-Narodnik ideas, which are being widely promulgated by our legal press. The nature of Russian society, it is claimed, is "profoundly democratic" and there is nothing in Russia like an upper class that owes its strength to its political services, to wealth, etc., for our nobility has been a class of servants of the government without "political ambitions", besides which its material power has been "sapped". From the point of view of a Social-Democrat it is absurd to take this Narodnik phrase-mongering seriously; there is not a word of truth in it. The political privileges enjoyed by the nobility in Russia are only too well known; the nobility's strength is plainly evident in the tendencies of the conservative and moderate, or Shipov, party; its material power is "sapped" only by the bourgeoisie, with which the nobility is merging, and which does not in the least prevent it from amassing immense wealth that enables it to rob tens of millions of toilers. The class-conscious workers should have no illusions on this score. Narodnik phrase-mongering on the insignificance of the Russian nobility merely serves the liberals as a means of sugaring the pill of future constitutional privileges of the nobility. This liberal logic is psychologically inevitable; our nobility must be depicted as negligible in order that its privileges may seem only a negligible departure from democracy.

With the bourgeoisie occupying a position between the hammer and the anvil, idealistic phrases, too, are psychologically inevitable, phrases which our liberals in general and their pet philosophers in particular are now mouthing with such bad taste. "As far as the Russian liberation movement is concerned," we read in the explanatory comment, "democracy is not only a fact but a moral and political postulate. It places moral justification for any social form above its historical justification...." Not a bad example of the turgid meaningless phraseology with which our liberals "justify" their approach towards betrayal of democracy! They complain of the "*obloquy* [?]" that is heaped upon the Russian liberal party by representatives of the more extreme elements, who allege that this party seeks to put a bourgeois-aristocratic autocracy in the place of the bureaucratic autocracy"—yet our liberals would have the only truly democratic institution in their scheme, the House of People's

Representatives, share power with both the monarchy and the Upper, Zemstvo, House!

Their "ethical" and "moral-political" arguments for an Upper House are these. In the first place, "a bicameral system exists everywhere in Europe, except in Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Luxemburg...." Not everywhere, then, if there are exceptions? Besides, what sort of argument is this: there are a great many anti-democratic bodies in Europe, therefore ... therefore they should be copied by our "profoundly democratic" liberals? The second argument: "It is dangerous to concentrate the legislative power in a single body"; another body should be set up to rectify mistakes and "too hasty" decisions...; "should Russia be bolder than Europe?" Thus, Russian liberalism does not want to be bolder than European liberalism, which has *knowingly* lost its progressive character through fear of the proletariat! Fine leaders of the "liberation" movement, indeed! Not a single serious step towards freedom has been made in Russia; yet the liberals already fear "hastiness". Cannot the same arguments be used, gentlemen, to justify the renunciation of universal suffrage as well?

A third argument: "One of the principal dangers to any political system in Russia is that it may be converted into a regime of Jacobin centralisation." How dreadful! The liberal opportunists evidently do not mind borrowing ammunition against lower-class democracy from the Social-Democratic opportunists, the new-Iskrists. The ridiculous boggy of "Jacobinism" dragged out by Axelrod, Martynov & Co. is doing the *Osvobozhdeniye* camp a good turn. But, gentlemen, if you really feared the excesses of centralism (and not the "excesses" of consistent democracy), why should you *limit* universal suffrage in elections of the *local*—Zemstvo and municipal—bodies, as you are doing? Article 68 of your draft stipulates that "every person having the right to vote in the elections to the House of People's Representatives has equally the right to vote in the local elections, *if he has been domiciled in the given uyezd or town for a definite period of time, such restricted period not to exceed one year.*" This article introduces a *qualification*, thereby virtually making the franchise *non-universal*; for everyone understands that it is the workers, farm-hands, and day-

labourers who are mostly obliged to move from town to town and from district to district without a permanent place of residence. Capital drives masses of workers from one end of the country to the other, giving them no chance to claim permanent residence; and *because of that* the working class is to forfeit a part of its political rights!

This limitation of universal suffrage is to apply to the very bodies, rural and municipal, that elect the Upper, Zemstvo, House. To combat alleged excesses of Jacobin centralism, a *double* departure is made from democracy: first, *universal* suffrage is to be limited by the residence qualification; secondly, the principle of *direct* suffrage is to be annulled by the introduction of two-stage elections! Can anything be clearer than that the boggy of Jacobinism only serves the purpose of every type of opportunists?

Small wonder, indeed, that Mr. Struve expressed his sympathy in principle with the Social-Democratic Girondists—the new-Iskrists, that he sang the praises of Martynov, the famous champion of anti-“Jacobinism”. The Social-Democratic enemies of Jacobinism have paved the way for the liberal bourgeois.

The contention of the *Osvobozhdeniye* crowd that the Upper House, elected by the Zemstvo bodies, can best express “the principle of decentralisation”, the “multiformity of the different parts of Russia”, is sheer nonsense. Decentralisation cannot be expressed by limitation of the universal basis of the elections; multiformity cannot be expressed by limitation of the principle of direct elections. This is not the crux of the matter, which the *Osvobozhdeniye* people are trying to obscure. The real point is that by their system the Upper House is bound to become *pre-eminently* and chiefly an organ of the nobility and the bourgeoisie, since it is the proletariat that is largely affected by the residence qualification and the two-stage system of elections. The point is so plain to anyone at all familiar with political questions that the authors of the draft anticipate this inevitable objection.

“Some people will say,” we read in the explanatory comment, “that no matter how the elections are organised, the *big landowners and the employer class* stand a chance of keeping control in the local community. We think [what a profoundly democratic thought!] that this is just another

case of exaggerated fear of the 'bourgeois element'. There is nothing unfair [!] in the landowning and manufacturing classes obtaining an adequate [!] chance of representing their interests [universal suffrage is not enough for the bourgeois element!], so long as other social groups are granted wide opportunities for representation. Only privileges are morally objectionable and politically dangerous...."

Let the workers make a careful note of this "liberal" morality. It presumes to boast of democracy, to condemn "privileges", while at the same time *justifying* residence qualification, two-stage elections, and the monarchy.... The monarchy, evidently, is not a "privilege", or perhaps it is a morally unobjectionable and politically non-dangerous privilege!

Our society leaders of the "liberation" movement have started off well! Even in their most ambitious projects, which do not in the least commit their party as a whole, they devise advance apologies for reaction, defending the privileges of the bourgeoisie with sophistic attempts to prove that privileges are not privileges. Even in their publishing activities that least depend on material calculations and are least affected by immediate political aims, they contrive to prostitute the idea of democracy and slander the most consistent of all bourgeois democrats—the Jacobins of the Great French Revolution. And what are we to expect further? What are the practical politicians of the liberal bourgeoisie, responsible to their party, going to say, if the most idealistic of the liberals are already now preparing the theoretical ground for betrayal? If the boldest ambitions of the extreme Left Wing of the *Osvobozhdeniye* camp do not go beyond a monarchy with a bicameral parliament, if that is the only *price* the ideologues of liberalism *demand*, then on what terms will liberalism's businessmen *strike a bargain*?

The political sophisms of liberalism offer the revolutionary proletariat slight, yet valuable, documentation as to the real class nature of even the most advanced elements of the bourgeoisie.

REPORT ON THE THIRD CONGRESS OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY

Comrades Workers! The Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. was recently held. This Congress should mark a new phase in the history of our Social-Democratic working-class movement. Russia is passing through a great historical period. Revolution has broken out and its flames are spreading wider and wider, embracing new regions and new sections of the population. The proletariat stands at the head of the fighting forces of the revolution. It has already borne the greatest sacrifices in the cause of freedom and is now preparing for the decisive battle with the tsarist autocracy. The class-conscious representatives of the proletariat know that freedom will not rid the working people of poverty, oppression, and exploitation. The bourgeoisie, which now stands for the cause of freedom, will, on the morrow of the revolution, try to deprive the workers of as large a part of its conquests as possible and will show itself to be the implacable enemy of the socialist demands of the proletariat. But we do not fear a free, united, and strengthened bourgeoisie. We know that freedom will enable us to wage a broad and open mass struggle for socialism. We know that economic development will inexorably sap the power of capital and prepare the victory of socialism, and that it will do this the more rapidly, the more freely it proceeds.

Comrades Workers! To achieve this great aim we must unite all class-conscious proletarians in a single Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. Our Party began to constitute itself quite some time ago, immediately following the broad working-class movement of 1895 and 1896. The year 1898 saw the convocation of its First Congress,

which founded the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party and outlined its aims. The Second Congress was held in 1903. It gave the Party a programme, adopted a series of resolutions on tactics, and endeavoured, for the first time, to build an integral Party organisation. True, the Party did not at once succeed in this effort. The minority at the Second Congress refused to submit to the majority and started a split that has caused great harm to the Social-Democratic working-class movement. The first step towards this split was the refusal to carry out the decisions of the Second Congress and to accept the leadership of the central bodies it had set up. The last step was the refusal to participate in the Third Congress. The Third Congress was convened by a Bureau elected by the majority of the committees working in Russia, and by the Central Committee of the Party. All the committees, breakaway groups, and the periphery organisations dissatisfied with the committees were invited to the Congress. The vast majority of these organisations, including nearly all the committees and organisations of the Minority, elected delegates and sent them abroad to attend the Congress. Thus everything possible under our police régime was done to convene an all-Party congress; it was only the refusal of three members of the former Party Council resident abroad that resulted in the boycott of the Congress by the entire Party Minority. The Third Congress, as will be seen from its resolution ¹³² printed below, lays the entire responsibility for the split in the Party on these three members. Nevertheless, despite the absence of the Minority, the Third Congress took every measure to enable the Minority to work with the Majority in one party. The Congress held the reversion to the antiquated and superseded views of Economism discernible in our Party to be incorrect; at the same time, it provided precise and definite guarantees of the rights of every minority, guarantees embodied in the Rules of the Party and binding on all its members. The Minority now has the unconditional right, guaranteed by the Party Rules, to advocate its views and to carry on an ideological struggle, so long as the disputes and differences do not lead to disorganisation, so long as they do not impede constructive work, split our forces, or hinder the concerted struggle against the autocracy and the

LES PROLÉTAIRES

Пролетарій

Центральный Органъ Россійской Соціалдемократической Рабочей Партіи.

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capitalists. The right to publish Party literature is now granted by the Rules to every qualified Party organisation. It has now been made incumbent on the C.C. of the Party to transport all kinds of Party literature upon the demand of five qualified committees, or one-sixth of all such committees in the Party. The autonomy of the committees has been defined more precisely and their membership declared inviolable, which means that the C.C. no longer has the right to remove members from local committees or to appoint new members without the consent of the committees themselves. This rule admits of only one exception, namely, in cases where two-thirds of the organised workers demand the removal of a committee; under the Rules adopted by the Third Congress such removal is incumbent on the C.C. if two-thirds of its members agree with the decision of the workers. Every local committee has been accorded the right to confirm periphery organisations as Party organisations. The periphery organisations have been accorded the right to nominate candidates for committee membership. The boundaries of the Party have been defined more precisely, in accordance with the wishes of the Party majority. A single centre has been set up instead of two or three. The comrades working in Russia have been guaranteed a decided preponderance over the Party's section abroad. In a word, the Third Congress has done everything to remove all possibility of charging the Majority with abuse of numerical superiority, with mechanical suppression, with despotism of the central bodies of the Party, and so on and so forth. Full opportunity has been provided for all Social-Democrats to work in co-operation, to join confidently the ranks of a single party, broad and virile enough, strong and welded enough to cut loose from the old traditions of the study circle days and to wipe out all traces of past friction and petty conflicts. Let all members of the Social-Democratic Party who really cherish the Party spirit now respond to the call of the Third Congress; let its decisions serve as the starting-point for restoring the unity of the Party, for eliminating all disorganisation, and for consolidating the ranks of the proletariat. We are convinced that the class-conscious workers, who are best able to appreciate the importance of united and concerted work, and who have most

keenly felt all the harmful effects of discord, vacillation, and strife, will now insist with the utmost vigour on universal and unreserved recognition of Party discipline by all Party members, whether rank and file or leaders.

While striving, in all its decisions on organisation and tactics, to maintain continuity with the work of the Second Congress, the Third Congress sought to take into consideration the new tasks of the moment in its resolutions on the Party's preparation for open action; on the necessity for the Party to participate practically and most energetically in the armed uprising and to give it leadership; and, finally, on the Party's attitude towards a provisional revolutionary government. The Congress drew the attention of all Party members to the need for taking advantage of all waverings on the part of the government and of every legal or actual extension of freedom for our activities in order to strengthen the class organisation of the proletariat and to prepare for its open action. But apart from these general and basic tasks of the Social-Democratic working-class party, the present revolutionary moment demands of the Party that it assume the role of foremost champion of freedom, of vanguard in the armed uprising against the autocracy. The more stubbornly the tsarist government resists the people's strivings towards freedom, the more powerful will be the force of the revolutionary onset and the more likely the complete victory of democracy, headed by the working class. The conduct of a victorious revolution and the defence of its conquests lay tremendous tasks on the shoulders of the proletariat. But the proletariat will not flinch at these great tasks. It will contemptuously brush aside all who predict that its victory will bring it misfortune. The Russian proletariat will be able to do its duty to the very end. It will be capable of taking the lead of the people's insurrection. It will not be daunted by the difficult task of participating in a provisional revolutionary government, if it has to tackle this task. It will be able to repel all attempts at counter-revolution, to crush ruthlessly all enemies of freedom, to defend staunchly the democratic republic, and to realise, in a revolutionary way, the whole of our minimum programme. The Russian proletarians should not fear such an outcome, but should passionately desire it. Our victory in the

coming democratic revolution will be a giant stride forward towards our socialist goal; we shall deliver all Europe from the oppressive yoke of a reactionary military power and help our brothers, the class-conscious workers of the whole world who have suffered so much under the bourgeois reaction and who are taking heart now at the sight of the successes of the revolution in Russia, to advance to socialism more quickly, boldly, and decisively. With the help of the socialist proletariat of Europe, we shall be able, not only to defend the democratic republic, but to advance with giant strides towards socialism.

Forward, then, comrades workers, to the organised, concerted, and staunch struggle for freedom!

Long live the revolution!

Long live international revolutionary Social-Democracy!

Central Committee, R.S.D.L.P.

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HOW THE CONGRESS WAS CONSTITUTED¹³³

In supplementation of the resolution adopted at the beginning of the Congress, the Central Committee deems it necessary, on the basis of subsequent information, to add the following. The Congress set the total number of votes in our Party at 71, namely: 62 from the 31 qualified organisations and 9 from the central bodies. The Congress did not recognise the Kremenchug, Kazan, and Kuban committees as qualified Party organisations. The following committees had voting delegates at the Congress: St. Petersburg, Moscow, Tver (at the conclusion of the Congress), Riga, Northern, Tula, Nizhni-Novgorod, Ural, Samara, Saratov, the Caucasian League (8 votes, the equivalent of four committees), Voronezh, Nikolayev, Odessa, Polesye, North-Western, Kursk, and Orel-Bryansk. Altogether 21 organisations with 42 votes. In addition there were the C.C. delegates and the representatives of the C.C. on the Council commanding four votes. All in all, 46 votes out of 71. Present with consultative voice were: the delegates from the Archangel Committee, the League of the Urals (a second delegate, who arrived towards the end of the Congress), the Kazan Committee, the Odessa Committee, the Ekaterinoslav, Kharkov, and Minsk groups, the Editorial Board of *Vperyod*, and the Committee of the Organisation Abroad. The delegate of the Kremenchug Committee had expressed a desire to take part in the Congress proceedings, but he arrived too late. Furthermore, the delegates to the Third Congress received a document during the proceedings from which it appears that, owing to the efforts of the Organising Committee to convene the all-Party Congress, representatives of the following organisations had arrived abroad: the St. Petersburg

group of the C.C., the Odessa group of the C.C., the Nikolayev Committee, the Kharkov Committee, the Kiev Committee, the Ekaterinoslav Committee, the Kuban Committee, the Don Committee, the Donets League, the Siberian League, the periphery of the Moscow Committee, the Sor-movo periphery, the Smolensk Committee, the Crimean League, and the Ukrainian Social-Democratic League. The document is a letter to "The comrades assembled in Congress at the invitation of the Organising Committee", signed by the representatives of all the above-mentioned organisations. From this it will be seen that the Organising Committee actually succeeded in making possible an all-Party congress in the full sense of the word.

Altogether the Congress held 26 sessions. The following questions of tactics were on the agenda: (1) the armed uprising; (2) the attitude towards the government's policy on the eve of and during the revolution; (3) the position on the peasant movement. Then questions of organisation: (4) the relations between the workers and the intellectuals within the Party organisations; (5) the Party Rules. Further, the questions dealing with our relationship towards other parties and organisations, namely: (6) the relationship to the breakaway section of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, (7) to the non-Russian Social-Democratic parties, (8) to the "Socialists-Revolutionaries", and (9) to the liberals. Further, (10) improvement of propaganda and agitation; (11) report of the C.C.; (12) reports of delegates from the local committees; (13) elections; (14) standing order for publication of the proceedings and decisions of the Congress, and for the assumption of office by newly elected functionaries.

The publication of the proceedings of the Congress has been entrusted to a committee specially elected by the Congress. This committee has already commenced its work.

C.C., R.S.D.L.P.

THE THIRD CONGRESS ¹³⁴

The long and stubborn struggle within the R.S.D.L.P. for the Congress is over at last. The Third Congress has been held. A detailed appraisal of all its work will be possible only after the proceedings of the Congress have been published. At present we propose, on the basis of the published "Report"* and the impressions of the Congress delegates, to touch on the principal landmarks of Party development as reflected in the decisions of the Third Congress.

Three major questions confronted the Party of the class-conscious proletariat in Russia on the eve of the Third Congress. First, the question of the Party crisis. Second, the more important question of the form of organisation of the Party in general. Third, the main question, namely, our tactics in the present revolutionary situation. Let us see how these questions were dealt with, in the order of lesser to major.

The Party crisis solved itself by the mere fact that the Congress was convened. The root cause of the crisis, as everyone knows, was the stubborn refusal of the minority at the Second Congress to submit to the majority. The agonising and protracted nature of the crisis was conditioned by the delay in convening the Third Congress, by the fact that there was virtually a split in the Party, a split that was kept hidden and secret beneath a hypocritical show of unity, while the Majority was making desperate efforts to find a quick and direct way out of the impossible situation. The Congress provided this way out by bluntly asking the Minority whether it accepted the decisions of the Majority, i.e., whether Party unity was to be restored in actual fact

or to be formally and completely broken. The Minority chose the latter course. It preferred a split. The Council's refusal to take part in the Congress in face of the clearly expressed will of the majority of qualified Party organisations and the refusal of the entire Minority to attend the Congress represented, as the "Report" states, the final step towards the split. We shall not dwell here on the formal validity of the Congress, which has been conclusively evidenced in the "Report". The argument that the Congress was invalid, that is, not in accordance with the Party Rules, because it had not been convened by the Council, can hardly be treated seriously after all that happened as a result of the Party conflict. It is clear to anyone who has any idea of the general principles of Party organisation that discipline in regard to a lower body is conditional upon discipline in regard to the higher body; the discipline which the Council may command is conditional upon the Council's subordination to its principals, that is, the committees and their totality, the Party Congress. To disagree with this elementary principle is to come to the absurd conclusion that it is not the agents who are responsible and accountable to their principals, but vice versa. But this question, we repeat, is not worth dwelling upon, not only because those do not see the point who do not wish to see it, but because, from the outset of the split, the dispute on formalities between the breakaway groups becomes barren, pointless, and scholastic.

The Minority has split away from the Party; that is an accomplished fact. Some of them will probably be brought to see by the decisions of the Congress, and still more by its proceedings, how naïve the sundry tales about mechanical suppression, etc., are; they will come to see that the rights of the Minority in general are fully guaranteed by the new Rules, that the split is harmful; and this section of the Minority will re-enter the Party. The other section may persist for a while in refusing to recognise the Party Congress. As to this section, we can but hope that it will lose no time in organising itself internally into a separate organisation with its own tactics and its own Rules. The sooner it does this, the easier it will be for all, for the broad mass of the Party workers, to understand the causes of the split and its implications; the more practicable it will be for our Party to come.

to a working agreement with the breakaway organisation, depending on the needs of local work; and the sooner will a way be found for the inevitable future restoration of the Party's unity.

Let us now pass to the second question, to the general organisational standards of the Party. The Third Congress made changes of a substantial character in these standards in the course of revising the Party Rules. The revision affected three main points: (a) the amendment of Clause 1 of the Rules; (b) the precise definition of the rights of the C.C. and the autonomy of the committees, with the extension of the scope of this autonomy; and (c) the creation of a single centre. As to the famous Clause 1 of the Rules, this has been sufficiently clarified in Party literature. The erroneousness of defending in principle Martov's vague formula has been demonstrated conclusively. Kautsky's attempt to defend this formula from considerations, not of principle, but of expediency, namely, the conditions of secrecy prevailing in Russia, was not successful, as indeed it could not be. Anyone who has worked in Russia knows well that such considerations of expediency do not exist. The only thing now is to wait for the first results of the Party's collective *work* in implementing the new Clause 1 of the Rules. We emphasise the fact that a great deal of work has still to be done for this implementation. No work at all is needed to enrol oneself as a member of the Party "under the control of a Party organisation", since this formula is a mere name and remained such from the Second Congress to the Third. A wide network of varied Party organisations, from narrow and secret organisations to the broadest possible and least secret, can only be built up by dint of long, hard, and efficient organising work; this is the work that has now devolved upon our C.C. and to a still greater extent upon our local committees. It is the committees that will have to confirm the largest number of organisations in the capacity of Party branches and in the course avoid all unnecessary red tape and faultfinding; it is the committees that will have to propagate among the workers constantly and unremittingly the idea of the necessity to create the greatest possible number of diverse workers' organisations affiliated to our Party. We cannot deal here with this interesting question at greater length. We

should like to point out, however, that the revolutionary epoch makes it particularly essential to draw a line of demarcation between Social-Democracy and all the other democratic parties. But this demarcation is unthinkable unless sustained efforts are made to increase the number of Party organisations and strengthen the ties among them. The fortnightly reports decided upon by the Congress will, among other things, serve to strengthen these ties. Let us hope that the reports will not remain an unrealised wish; that they will not cause the practical workers to draw for themselves a horrible picture of red tape and bureaucracy; that these comrades will start off in a small way till they develop the habit, by perhaps just reporting the number of members of every Party organisation, even the smallest and the farthest from the centre. "The first step is the hardest", runs the proverb. After that they will realise how tremendously important it is to acquire the habit of maintaining regular organisational connections.

We shall not dwell at length on the question of the single centre. The Third Congress rejected "bicentrism" by as huge a majority as the Second Congress had adopted it. The reasons will easily be understood by anyone who has carefully followed the history of the Party. Congresses do not so much create something new as consolidate results already achieved. At the time of the Second Congress the *Iskra* Editorial Board was the recognised pillar of stability, and it enjoyed dominant influence. The preponderant position of the comrades in Russia in relation to those resident abroad still seemed problematical at that stage of the Party's development. After the Second Congress it was the Editorial Board abroad that proved to be unstable. The Party, on the other hand, had developed considerably and unquestionably in Russia. Under these circumstances the appointment of an Editorial Board of the Central Organ by the Party C. C. could not but meet with the approval of the mass of the Party workers.

Finally, the attempts to delimit more precisely the rights of the C. C. and of the local committees, to draw a line between ideological struggle and disruptive squabbles, followed inevitably also from the whole course of events after the Second Congress. We have here a consistent and

systematic "accumulation of Party experience". Plekhanov's and Lenin's letter of October 6, 1903,* to the disgruntled editors was an attempt to distinguish between irritation and disagreement. The C.C.'s ultimatum of November 25, 1903, was a similar attempt in the form of a proposal formulated by a group of publicists. The statement issued by the C.C. representatives on the Council at the end of January 1903** was an attempt to call upon the whole Party to differentiate the ideological forms of struggle from boycott, etc. Lenin's letter of May 26, 1904,*** to the members of the C.C. in Russia was an admission of the necessity of formally guaranteeing the rights of the Minority. The well-known Declaration of the Twenty-Two (autumn 1904) was a similar admission in a more distinct, detailed, and categorical form. Quite naturally, the Third Congress took the same path when it "finally dispelled, dispelled by formal decisions, the mirage of a state of siege". What these formal decisions were, viz., the changes in the Party Rules, can be seen from the Rules and the "Report"; therefore we shall not repeat them here. We shall mention only two things. First, it is to be hoped that the guarantee of the right to publish literature and the safeguarding of the committees against "cashiering" will help the seceded non-Russian Social-Democratic organisations to return to the Party. Secondly, in view of the inviolability of committee membership, some provision had to be made against the possible abuse of this guarantee, viz., against being saddled with a perfectly useless committee that was "undeposable". That accounts for Clause 9 of the new Party Rules, which sets forth the conditions under which a committee may be dissolved upon the demand of two-thirds of the local workers belonging to the Party organisations. Let us wait for the guidance of experience before deciding to what extent this rule is practical.

Finally, in passing to the last and most important item of the Congress proceedings, the determination of the Party's tactics, we must state that this is not the place to list and

* See present edition, Vol. 7, p. 354.—*Ed.*

** *Ibid.*, pp. 147-49.—*Ed.*

*** *Ibid.*, pp. 426-29.—*Ed.*

analyse the various resolutions. Possibly we shall have to do this in special articles devoted to the major resolutions. Here we need only outline the general political situation which the Congress had to analyse. Two alternative courses and outcomes are open to the Russian revolution, which has begun. The tsarist government may yet succeed by means of trivial concessions and a "Shipov" constitution in extricating itself from the vice in which it is now caught. There is little likelihood of such an outcome; but should the international position of the autocracy improve as the result, let us say, of a relatively favourable peace, should the betrayal by the bourgeoisie of the cause of freedom be brought quickly to a head by a compromise with the powers that be, should the inevitable revolutionary outbreak or outbreaks end in the defeat of the people, then such an outcome is likely. We Social-Democrats and the entire class-conscious proletariat must then face a long dreary period of harsh, ostensibly constitutional class rule of the bourgeoisie, with all manner of suppression of the political activity of the workers and slow economic progress under the new conditions. We shall not lose heart, of course, whatever the outcome of the revolution; we will take advantage of every change in conditions to widen and strengthen the independent organisation of the working-class party, to train the proletariat politically for renewed struggle. The Congress took this task, among others, into account in its resolution on open action by the R.S.D.L.P.

The other possible and more probable outcome of the revolution is the "complete victory of democracy, headed by the working class", of which the "Report" speaks.* We need hardly say that we will do all in our power to achieve this result, to eliminate the possibility of the other alternative. The objective historical conditions, too, are shaping themselves favourably for the Russian revolution. The senseless and shameful war is tightening the noose round the neck of the tsarist government and creating an exceptionally favourable situation for the revolutionary destruction of militarism, for the widespread propaganda of the idea of

* See p. 438 of this volume.—*Ed.*

arming the people in lieu of standing armies and for the speedy effectuation of this measure, in view of its support by the masses of the population. The long and undivided rule of the autocracy has stored up revolutionary energy among the people to a degree perhaps never before known in history. Simultaneously with the vast movement of the working class, the peasant revolt is spreading and growing, and the petty-bourgeois democratic forces, consisting mostly of the professional classes, are coming into alliance. The irony of history has punished the autocracy in that even friendly social forces, such as clericalism, must organise against it to some extent, thereby breaking down or widening the framework of the bureaucratic police regime. Discontent among the clergy, the striving among them after new forms of life, the emergence of clericals as a separate group, the appearance of Christian Socialists and Christian Democrats, the resentment of the "heterodox", sectarians, etc.—this all serves the purpose of the revolution and creates exceedingly favourable conditions for agitation for the complete separation of the Church from the State. The allies of the revolution, voluntary and involuntary, conscious and unconscious, are growing and multiplying hour by hour. The outlook brightens for the victory of the people over the autocracy.

This victory is possible only through a heroic effort of all the forces of the proletariat. It makes demands of Social-Democracy such as history has never before and nowhere made of a working-class party in an epoch of democratic revolution. We have before us now, not the well-trodden paths of slow preparatory work, but the colossal, grandiose tasks of organising the insurrection, mustering the revolutionary forces of the proletariat, uniting them with the forces of the whole revolutionary people, launching the armed attack, and establishing a provisional revolutionary government. In the resolutions which have now been published for general information, the Third Congress has sought to take into account these new tasks and give all possible directives to the organisations of the class-conscious proletariat.

Russia is nearing the denouement of the age-long struggle of all the progressive popular forces against the autocracy. No one doubts any longer that the proletariat will take the

most energetic part in this struggle and that its participation in the struggle will decide the outcome of the revolution in Russia. We Social-Democrats will now have to prove ourselves worthy representatives and leaders of the most revolutionary class, to help it win the fullest freedom, which is the pledge of our victorious march towards socialism.

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VICTORIOUS REVOLUTION

We often hear and read these words nowadays. What do they actually mean? We should not idolise the concept of "revolution" (the bourgeois revolutionaries will assuredly do that and are indeed doing that). We must not create illusions or myths for ourselves; this would be entirely incompatible with the materialist conception of history and the class point of view.

Yet there is no question that a struggle of two forces is taking place before our eyes, a life-and-death struggle of precisely two forces; for the issue at stake now is the sovereignty of the tsar versus the sovereignty of the people. These two forces are: revolution and counter-revolution.

Our task, therefore, is to be quite clear in our minds as to (1) the class content of these social forces, and (2) the real economic content of their struggle now, at the present time.

The following may be taken as a brief answer to these questions (an answer that requires to be thoroughly elaborated):

Revolutionary forces=proletariat and peasantry (the peasantry as the chief representative of the *revolutionary* petty bourgeoisie; the intelligentsia negligible as a *revolutionary* factor).

Victorious revolution=democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.

Content of the revolution=the creation of a democratic political system, economically equivalent to (1) free development of capitalism; (2) abolition of the survivals of serfdom; (3) the raising of the living and cultural standards of the masses, especially of the lower strata. [America and Russia, pauperism and capitalism.]

Mythenbildung,* as the inevitable consequence of the historical position of the bourgeois democrats. [Cf. the lawyers' resolutions.¹³⁶] All are "socialists"....

Umwälzung,** *Umsturz* ***... Where? Among the intelligentsia? Among the lawyers? *Nil*. Only among the proletariat and the *peasantry*. What can guarantee their conquests? Only the republic, the democratic dictatorship.

Written in May-June 1905

Published according to
the manuscript

* Myth-making.—*Ed.*
** Revolution, upheaval.—*Ed.*
*** Overthrow.—*Ed.*

ON CONFOUNDING POLITICS WITH PEDAGOGICS

We have quite a few Social-Democrats who give way to pessimism every time the workers suffer a reverse in single battles with the capitalists or with the government, and who scornfully dismiss all mention of the great and lofty aims of the working-class movement by pointing to the inadequate degree of our influence on the masses. Who and what are we, they say, to strive towards such things? It is purposeless to speak of the role of Social-Democracy as vanguard of the revolution when we do not even really know the mood of the masses, when we are unable to merge with them and to rouse the working masses! The reverses suffered by the Social-Democrats last May Day have considerably intensified this mood. Naturally, the Mensheviks, or new-Iskrists, have seized this opening to raise anew the special slogan "To the masses!"—as if in spite, as if in answer to those who have thought and spoken of the provisional revolutionary government, of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship, etc.

It must be admitted that in this pessimism, and in the conclusions which the hasty publicists of the new *Iskra* draw from it, there is one very dangerous feature that may cause great harm to the Social-Democratic movement. To be sure, self-criticism is vitally essential to every live and virile party. There is nothing more disgusting than smug optimism. There is nothing more warranted than the urging of attention to the constant, imperative necessity of deepening and broadening, broadening and deepening, our influence on the masses, our strictly Marxist propaganda and agitation, our ever-closer connection with the economic struggle of the working class, etc. Yet, because such urging is at all times

warranted, under all conditions and in all situations, it must not be turned into special slogans, nor should it justify attempts to build upon it a special trend in Social-Democracy. A border-line exists here; to exceed the bounds is to turn this indisputably legitimate urging into a narrowing of the aims and the scope of the movement, into a doctrinaire blindness to the vital and cardinal political tasks of the moment.

It is our duty always to intensify and broaden our work and influence among the masses. A Social-Democrat who does not do this is no Social-Democrat. No branch, group, or circle can be considered a Social-Democratic organisation if it does not work to this end steadily and regularly. To a great extent, the purpose of our strict separation as a distinct and independent party of the proletariat consists in the fact that we always and undeviatingly conduct this Marxist work of raising the whole working class, as far as possible, to the level of Social-Democratic consciousness, allowing no political gales, still less political changes of scenery, to turn us away from this urgent task. Without this work, political activity would inevitably degenerate into a game, because this activity acquires real importance for the proletariat only when and insofar as it arouses the mass of a definite class, wins its interest, and mobilises it to take an active, foremost part in events. This work, as we have said, is always necessary. After every reverse we should bring this to mind again, and emphasise it, for weakness in this work is *always* one of the causes of the proletariat's defeat. Similarly, we should always call attention to it and emphasise its importance after every victory, otherwise the victory will be only a seeming one, its fruits will not be assured, its real significance in the great struggle for our ultimate goal will be negligible and may even prove adverse (particularly if a partial victory should slacken our vigilance, lull our distrust of unreliable allies, and cause us to forgo the right moment for a renewed and more vigorous attack on the enemy).

But for the very reason that the work of intensifying and broadening our influence on the masses is always necessary, after each victory as after each defeat, in times of political quiescence as in the stormiest periods of revolution, we should

not turn the emphasis upon this work into a special slogan or build upon it any special trend if we do not wish to court the risk of descending to demagogy and degrading the aims of the advanced and only truly revolutionary class. There is and always will be an element of pedagogics in the political activity of the Social-Democratic Party. We must educate the whole class of wage-workers to the role of fighters for the emancipation of mankind from all oppression. We must constantly teach more and more sections of this class; we must learn to approach the most backward, the most undeveloped members of this class, those who are least influenced by our science and the science of life, so as to be able to speak to them, to draw closer to them, to raise them steadily and patiently to the level of Social-Democratic consciousness, without making a dry dogma out of our doctrine—to teach them not only from books, but through participation in the daily struggle for existence of these backward and undeveloped strata of the proletariat. There is, we repeat, a certain element of pedagogics in this everyday activity. The Social-Democrat who lost sight of this activity would cease to be a Social-Democrat. That is true. But some of us often forget, these days, that a Social-Democrat who would reduce the tasks of politics to pedagogics would also, though for a different reason, cease to be a Social-Democrat. Whosoever might think of turning this “pedagogics” into a special slogan, of *contraposing* it to “politics”, of building a special trend upon it, and of appealing to the masses under this slogan against the “politicians” of Social-Democracy, would instantly and unavoidably descend to demagogy.

That comparisons are odious is an old axiom. In every comparison a likeness is drawn in regard to only one aspect or several aspects of the objects or notions compared, while the other aspects are tentatively and with reservation abstracted. Let us remind the reader of this commonly known but, frequently ignored axiom and proceed to compare the Social-Democratic Party to a large school which is at once elementary, secondary, and collegiate. The teaching of the ABC, instruction in the rudiments of knowledge and in independent thinking, will never, under any circumstances, be neglected in this big school. But if anyone sought to invoke the need for teaching the ABC as a pretext for dis-

missing questions of higher learning, if anyone attempted to offset the impermanent, dubious, and "narrow" results of this higher learning (accessible to a much smaller circle of people than those learning the ABC) to the durable, profound, extensive, and solid results of the elementary school, he would betray incredible short-sightedness. He might even help to pervert the whole purpose of the big school, since by ignoring higher education he would simply be making it easier for charlatans, demagogues, and reactionaries to mislead the people who had only learned the ABC. Or again, let us compare the Party to an army. Neither in peace-time nor in war-time dare we neglect the training of recruits, dare we neglect rifle drill, or the dissemination of the rudiments of military science as intensively and extensively as possible among the masses. But if those directing the manoeuvres or actual battles.... *

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the manuscript

Here the manuscript breaks off.—*Ed.*

universal suffrage. On Monday a score among them voted with the majority for universal suffrage. Thereupon a resolution on the convocation of a Constituent Assembly on the basis of universal suffrage was adopted unanimously, a considerable majority declaring for direct elections and for the non-admission (to the Constituent Assembly) of representatives of the municipal councils and Zemstvos. Thus, *for the time being*, the followers of Shipov have been defeated at the Congress of the Zemstvo representatives. The majority has come to the conclusion that the only way to preserve the monarchy and prevent revolution is to grant universal, direct, and equal suffrage by secret ballot, rendered innocuous through indirect and unequal elections to one of the two houses.

The opinion of the English conservative bourgeoisie on this Congress and on this decision is most instructive. "It is quite impossible," writes *The Times*, "for foreigners to gauge the political importance of this remarkable meeting until we learn from trustworthy authority what measure of support it commands amongst the huge mass of the Russian people. It may mark the beginning of a real constitutional reform; it may be the first stage on the road to revolution; it may be a mere fire of straw which the bureaucracy have tolerated because they know it will burn harmlessly out."

A remarkably true characterisation! Indeed, the further course of the Russian revolution is far from being determined by an event like this Congress. "The support of the huge mass of the people" is still a moot question, not as regards the actual fact of the people's support (which is assured), but rather as regards the strength of this support. If the government puts down the uprising, then the liberal Congress will indeed have been a fire of straw. And the moderate European liberals, of course, advise the golden mean: a moderate constitution which would stave off the revolution. The government's confusion, however, fills them with dismay and discontent. The ban on publishing the decisions of the Congress puzzles *The Times*, since the delegates, now dispersed to their home districts, have every means of informing the entire Russian public of their decisions. "To have refused to allow the Congress to meet, to have arrested its members when they did meet, or to have used them as a screen

for a sham reform would all have been intelligible courses. But to let them meet and disperse, and then to try and silence them is merely inept."

The stupidity of the tsarist government, as proved by its confusion and impotence (for confusion at a revolutionary moment is a sure sign of impotence), fills European capital with grave concern (*The Times* is a mouthpiece of "the City", the high financiers of the world's richest city). This confusion increases the probability of a real, victorious revolution sweeping everything in its path, a revolution that strikes terror into the hearts of the European bourgeoisie. The latter blames the autocracy for losing its head and the liberals for making "immoderate" demands! Upon the question (universal suffrage) "which the ... most experienced Legislatures in Europe would hesitate to decide in the course of a prolonged session [fumes *The Times*]—they seem to have practically reversed their attitude in five short days" and adopted extremist decisions. European capital advises Russian capital to follow its example. We do not doubt that this advice will be taken—but hardly before the autocracy has had its power *curtailed*. The European bourgeoisie in its day fought against absolutism still more "immoderately", by still more revolutionary methods than the Russian bourgeoisie does in its day. The "obduracy" of the Russian autocracy and the immoderacy of Russian liberalism are due, not to their inexperience, as *The Times* seems to imply, but to factors beyond their control—the international situation, foreign policy, and most of all to that heritage of Russian history which has driven the autocracy to the wall and piled up under its dominance contradictions and conflicts never known in Western Europe. The proverbial stability and strength of Russian tsarism in the past necessarily condition the force of the revolutionary assault upon it. This is most unpleasant to all gradualists and opportunists; it terrifies even many Social-Democrats from the tail-ender camp, but such is the fact.

The Times deplores the defeat of Shipov. Why, only last November he was the undisputed chief of the reform party and now... "so rapidly does revolution devour its children". Poor Shipov! To suffer defeat and be branded as the evil genius of the revolution—could fate be more unjust? The

"radicals" who voted Shipov down at the Congress of the Zemstvo representatives shock *The Times*, which cries in horror that they adhere to the theoretical principles of the French Convention. The doctrine of equality, of equal rights for all citizens, of the sovereignty of the people, etc., "has been proved by many... experiments to be, perhaps, the most prolific of evil amongst all the brood of disastrous sophistries which Jean Jacques Rousseau bequeathed to mankind. It is the tap-root of Jacobinism, fatal by its mere presence to the growth of just and wholesome reforms."

The opportunists of liberalism touchingly embrace with the opportunists of Social-Democracy in their partiality for employing the boggy of "Jacobinism". In an epoch of democratic revolution only hopeless reactionaries or hopeless philistines can raise the boggy of Jacobinism.

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ON THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT

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ARTICLE ONE
PLEKHANOV'S REFERENCE TO HISTORY

The Third Congress of the Party adopted a resolution on the question of the provisional revolutionary government. The resolution expresses the position we have taken in *Vperyod*. We now propose to examine in detail all objections to our position and to clarify from all points of consideration the true doctrinal significance and the practical implications of the Congress resolution. We shall begin with Plekhanov's attempt to deal with the question strictly as a point of principle. Plekhanov entitled his article "On the Question of the Seizure of Power". He criticises the "tactics aimed [evidently by *Vperyod*] at the seizure of political power by the proletariat". As everyone who knows *Vperyod* is perfectly well aware, it has never raised the question of the *seizure of power* nor ever aimed at any "tactics of seizure". Plekhanov seeks to substitute a fictitious issue for the real issue. We have only to recollect the course of the controversy to see this.

The question was first raised by Martynov in his famous *Two Dictatorships*. He stated that if our Party took the lead in the uprising and the uprising were successful, this would inevitably bring about our participation in the provisional revolutionary government, which participation was inadmissible in principle and could only lead to disaster and discredit. *Iskra* defended this view. *Vperyod* contended that, on the contrary, such an outcome was highly desirable, that Social-Democratic participation in a provisional revolutionary government, which would be tantamount to the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, was permissible, and that without such a dictatorship the republic could not be maintained. Thus, in answering

the question posed by Martynov, both camps to the dispute proceeded from two like premises but reached different conclusions. Both assumed: 1) that the party of the proletariat would take the lead in the uprising, and 2) that the uprising would be victorious and the autocracy completely overthrown; they differed in the evaluation of the tactical conclusions to be drawn from these premises. Does this bear any resemblance to "tactics aimed [!] at the seizure [?] of power"? Is it not obvious that Plekhanov seeks to *evade* Martynov's presentation of the question discussed by *Iskra* and *Vperyod*? At issue was the question whether a victorious uprising would be dangerous or disastrous, since it might necessitate participation in a provisional revolutionary government. The point that Plekhanov wants to argue is whether the tactics should be aimed at seizure of power. We are afraid that Plekhanov's wish (which can only be understood as a desire to obscure Martynov's presentation of the question) will remain a pious wish, since this is a subject that no one has discussed or is arguing.

What this substitution of the question signifies for the whole of Plekhanov's argumentation is clearly revealed in the "virtuosi-of-philistinism" incident. Plekhanov cannot get over this expression, which was used by *Vperyod*. He reverts to it time and again, sternly and angrily assuring his readers that *Vperyod* has dared to apply this none too flattering epithet to Marx and Engels, that *Vperyod* was beginning to "*criticise*" Marx, etc., etc. Seeing that Plekhanov's aim was to rehabilitate Martynov and to give *Vperyod* a "dressing down", we quite understand how pleased he would have been had *Vperyod* said anything like the nonsense he attributes to it. The point is that "*Vperyod*" *did not say anything of the kind*, and any attentive reader could easily challenge Plekhanov, who has confused an interesting question of principle by meaningless and paltry cavil.

Tedious though it is to answer cavils, the notorious "virtuosi-of-philistinism" incident will have to be explained at length. *Vperyod* reasoned as follows. We all talk of achieving the republic. To achieve it in reality, we must "strike together" at the autocracy—"we" being the revolutionary people, the proletariat and the peasantry. But that is not all. It is not enough even to "strike the finishing blow together"

at the autocracy, that is, completely to overthrow the autocratic government. We shall also have to "repulse together" the inevitable desperate attempts to restore the deposed autocracy. In a revolutionary epoch this "repulsing together" is, in effect, the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, the participation of the proletariat in the revolutionary government. Therefore, they who seek to *frighten* the working class with the perspective of such a dictatorship, as people like Martynov and L. Martov have done in the new *Iskra*, contradict their own slogan of struggling for the republic and consummating the revolution. At bottom, these people reason as if they wanted to restrict, to prune down their struggle for freedom—in a word, to measure off in advance the tiniest of modest gains, some sort of skimpy constitution in place of the republic. Such people, said *Vperyod*, vulgarise, philistine fashion, the well-known Marxist thesis concerning the three major forces of the revolution in the nineteenth (and the twentieth) century and its three main stages. The gist of this thesis is that the first stage of revolution is the restriction of absolutism, which satisfies the bourgeoisie; the second is the attainment of the republic, which satisfies the "people"—the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie at large; the third is the socialist revolution, which alone can satisfy the proletariat. "*That picture, by and large, is correct*," *Vperyod*, said. We actually have here an ascent by three different schematic stages, varying according to the classes, which, at best, will accompany us in this ascent. But if we interpret this correct Marxist scheme of three stages to mean that we must measure off in advance, *before any ascent begins*, a very modest part, let us say, not more than one step, if, in keeping with this scheme and before any ascent begins, we sought to "*draw up a plan of action in the revolutionary epoch*", we should be virtuosos of philistinism.

This was *Vperyod*'s line of thought in issue No. 14.* And it was on the concluding italicised words that Plekhanov decided to pick. *Vperyod*, he triumphantly declared, thereby dubs Marx a philistine, because it was in keeping with

* See p. 299 of this volume.—*Ed.*

this scheme that Marx drew up his plan of activity in the revolutionary epoch itself!

The evidence? The evidence is that in 1850, when the revolutionary people of Germany was defeated in the struggle of 1848-49 because it failed to deal the autocracy the finishing blow, when the liberal bourgeoisie had secured a skimpy constitution and passed over to the side of reaction—in a word, when the German democratic-revolutionary movement had only ascended the first step and halted for want of strength to mount higher, ... then Marx said that the next revolutionary ascent would be an ascent to the second step.

You smile, dear reader? Plekhanov's syllogism is in fact somewhat—shall we say, to put it mildly—"dialectic". *Because* Marx, in the corresponding concrete situation of a concrete democratic revolution, said that the ascent to the first step would be followed by the ascent to the second, *therefore* only "critics" of Marx could apply the word philistines to people who, before the first step is ascended, try to scare us with the awful perspective (in the event of an exceptionally well organised and accomplished uprising) of having to leap two steps at once.

No, indeed, it is not a nice thing to "criticise" Marx ... but neither is it nice to cite Marx maladroitly. Martynov was unfortunate in interpreting Marx; Plekhanov was unfortunate in defending Martynov.

Let no hypercritical reader infer from what we have said that we advocate "tactics aimed" at unconditionally leaping over one step, regardless of the correlation of the social forces. No, we advocate no such tactics. We only seek to prevent the proletariat from coming under the influence of people capable of talking of the republic and of carrying through the revolution while at the same time frightening themselves and others with the possibility of having to participate in a democratic dictatorship. We pointed out in *Vperyod*, No. 14, that after the present revolutionary upsurge, reaction would inevitably set in, but that the more freedom we win now and the more ruthlessly we suppress and destroy the counter-revolutionary forces in the epoch of the possible (and desirable) democratic dictatorship, the less will reaction be able to take away from us. We also point-

ed out in the same issue that the very question of this dictatorship makes no sense unless one assumes a course of events in which the democratic revolution goes to the length of completely overthrowing absolutism and establishing the republic without stopping midway.

Let us now pass from the "virtuosi-of-philistinism" incident to the substance of the famous Address (of the Central Committee of the Communist League to the League members, March 1850) which Plekhanov cites. In this extremely interesting and informative Address (deserving to be translated fully into Russian) Marx deals with the concrete political situation in Germany in 1850. He indicates the likelihood of another political outbreak, establishes the inevitability of the transition of power to the republican, petty-bourgeois democratic party in the event of a revolution, and analyses the tactics of the proletariat. Dealing with the tactics before and during the revolution, and following the victory of the petty-bourgeois democrats, Marx urges the necessity of creating "an independent secret and open organisation of the workers' party"; he struggles with might and main against "its reduction to the role of appendage of the official bourgeois-democratic party"; and he stresses the importance of arming the workers, of forming an independent proletarian guard, and of having the proletarians keep a close watch on the treacherous petty-bourgeois democracy, etc.

There is not a word in the Address on the participation of the workers' party in a provisional revolutionary government, or on the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. From that Plekhanov infers that Marx "apparently regarded as inconceivable the idea that the political representatives of the revolutionary proletariat could work together with those of the petty bourgeoisie to create a new social order". The logic of this deduction limps. Marx *does not raise* the question of the participation of the workers' party in a provisional revolutionary government, but Plekhanov concludes that Marx decides this question generally and in principle in a definitely negative sense. Marx speaks only of the concrete situation; Plekhanov draws a general conclusion without at all considering the question in its concreteness. Yet one has only to scan some passages in the Address which Plekhanov

has omitted to see that his conclusions are entirely false.

The Address was written from the experience of two years in a revolutionary epoch, 1848 and 1849. Marx formulates the results of this experience as follows: "At the same time [i.e., in 1848-49] the former firm organisation of the League was considerably slackened. A large part of the members who directly participated in the revolutionary movement believed the time for secret societies to have gone by and public activities alone sufficient. The individual circles and communities [*Gemeinden*] allowed their connections with the Central Committee to become loose and gradually dormant. Consequently, while the democratic party, the party of the petty bourgeoisie, organised itself more and more in Germany, the workers' party lost its only firm hold, remained organised at the most in separate localities for local purposes, and in the general movement thus came completely under the domination and leadership of the petty-bourgeois democrats."* On the following page of the Address Marx declares: "At this moment, when a new revolution is imminent ... it is extremely important that the workers' party ... act in the most organised, most unanimous, and most independent fashion possible, if it is not to be exploited and taken in tow again by the bourgeoisie as it was in 1848."

Consider the meaning of these categorical statements! After two years of open revolution, after the victory of the popular uprising in Berlin, after the convocation of a revolutionary parliament, after part of the country had been in open revolt and the power had passed temporarily into the hands of the revolutionary governments, Marx records the defeat of the revolutionary people, and as regards party organisation, a *gain* for the petty-bourgeois democrats and a *loss* for the workers' party. Is it not as plain as plain can be that this implies a political situation in which it would

* *Ansprache der Zentralbehörde an den Bund, von März 1850, K. Marx: Enthüllungen über den Kommunistenprocess zu Köln, 1885, Anhang IX, S. 75. (Address of the Central Committee to the League, March 1850, K. Marx: Revelations Concerning the Cologne Trials of the Communists, 1885, Appendix IX, p. 75.—Ed.)* The italics in the quotation are ours.

have been pointless to raise the question of the participation of the workers' party in the government? After two years of a revolutionary epoch, when Marx, for nine months, had openly published the most revolutionary newspaper of the workers' party, it had to be recorded that the party was completely disorganised, that there was no clearly marked proletarian current in the mainstream (Stephan Born's ¹³⁸ Workers' Brotherhoods were too negligible), and that the proletariat had fallen completely, not only under the domination of the bourgeoisie, but under its leadership! Obviously, economic relations were still extremely undeveloped, there was practically no large-scale industry, nor was there an independent workers' movement of any appreciable size, and the petty bourgeoisie was in complete control. Naturally, under such circumstances, the idea of participation by the workers' party in a provisional government could never be entertained by a writer who was dealing with the concrete situation. Naturally, in his Address, Marx had to knock (pardon the expression) into the heads of the Communist League members axioms, which today seem elementary to us. He had to demonstrate the need for workers to nominate their own candidates in elections independently of the bourgeois democrats. He had to refute the democratic phrasemongering to the effect that the workers' separation would "split" the democratic party (mark well!—you can only split what was yesterday united and what in the ideological sense is still united). Marx had to *warn* the members of the Communist League not to be carried away by such phrases. On behalf of the Central Committee of the League, he had to promise to convene a congress of the workers' party at the first opportunity with the object of centralising the workers' clubs; in the revolutionary years of 1848-49 the conditions were still lacking for anyone to entertain the idea of convening a separate congress of the workers' party.

The conclusion is obvious: Marx, in the famous Address, does not even mention the question whether it is admissible in principle for the proletariat to participate in a provisional revolutionary government. He deals exclusively with the concrete situation that prevailed in Germany in 1850. He does not say a word about the participation of the Communist

League in a revolutionary government, because, under the conditions then prevailing, the idea of such participation in the name of the workers' party for the purpose of the democratic dictatorship could not have arisen.

Marx's idea consists in the following: We, the German Social-Democrats of 1850, are unorganised, we were defeated in the first period of the revolution and were taken completely in tow by the bourgeoisie; we must organise independently—absolutely and under all circumstances independently—if we do not wish to be caught lagging again in an eventual victory of the organisationally strengthened and powerful petty-bourgeois party.

Martynov's idea consists in the following: We, the Russian Social-Democrats of 1905, are organised in an independent party and we want to march at the head of the petty-bourgeois people for the first assault on the fortress of tsarism. But if we organise the assault too efficiently and carry it through successfully—which heaven forbid!—we may have to participate in a provisional revolutionary government, or even in the democratic dictatorship. Such participation is inadmissible in principle.

Does Plekhanov seriously want to convince us that Martynov can be defended according to Marx? Plekhanov must take the readers of *Iskra* for children. All we can say is: Marxism is one thing; Martynovism, another.

Before concluding with the Address we must clarify another incorrect view of Plekhanov. He rightly points out that in March 1850, when the Address was written, Marx believed that capitalism was in a state of senile decay and the socialist revolution seemed to him "quite near". Shortly afterwards Marx corrected this mistake; as early as September 15, 1850, he broke with Schapper (Schapper found himself with Willich in a minority in the League and resigned from it), who had succumbed to bourgeois-democratic revolutionism or utopianism to the extent of saying, "We must achieve power at once, otherwise we may as well go to sleep." Marx answered that it was incorrect to regard solely one's own will, instead of the actual conditions, as the motive force of the revolution. The proletariat might still have

to face fifteen, twenty, or fifty years of civil wars and international conflicts "not only to change the conditions, but to change yourselves [the proletarians] and to render yourselves fit for political rule".¹⁹ Plekhanov briefly mentions this change in Marx's views and concludes:

"They [Marx and Engels after this "change"] would have formulated the political tasks of the proletariat on the assumption that the democratic system had come to stay for a fairly long time. *But for that very reason they would have all the more emphatically condemned the participation of socialists in a petty-bourgeois government.*" (*Iskra*, No. 96.)

Plekhanov's inference is entirely false. It brings us back to the confusion of socialist dictatorship and democratic dictatorship for which we have so often had occasion to criticise L. Martov and Martynov. Marx and Engels in 1850 did not differentiate between democratic dictatorship and socialist dictatorship, or, rather, they did not mention the former at all, since they considered capitalism to be in a state of senile decay and socialism near. Nor did they, for the same reason, differentiate at the time between a minimum and a maximum programme. If this distinction is to be made (as it is being made now by all of us, Marxists, who are combating the bourgeois-democratic revolutionariness of the "Socialists-Revolutionaries", because they do not understand the distinction), then the question of the socialist and the democratic dictatorship must be dealt with *separately*. In not so doing, Plekhanov is guilty of inconsistency. By choosing an evasive formulation and speaking in general terms of "the participation of socialists in a petty-bourgeois government", he substitutes the question of the socialist dictatorship for the clearly, definitely and precisely presented question of the democratic dictatorship. He confounds (to cite the comparison of *Vperyod**) the participation of Millerand in a Cabinet together with Galliffet in the epoch immediately preceding the socialist revolution with that of Varlin in a revolutionary government together with petty-bourgeois democrats who defended and safeguarded the republic.

* See p. 282 of this volume.—Ed.

Marx and Engels considered socialism near in 1850; hence, they underestimated the democratic gains, which seemed to them to be well-established in view of the unquestionable victory of the petty-bourgeois democratic party.¹⁴⁰ Twenty-five years later, in 1875, Marx drew attention to the undemocratic system in Germany—"military despotism, embellished with parliamentary forms".¹⁴¹ Thirty-five years later, in 1885, Engels predicted that in the coming European upheaval the power in Germany would pass to the petty-bourgeois democrats.¹⁴² What follows from this is the very reverse of what Plekhanov seeks to prove. If Marx and Engels had realised that the democratic system was bound to last for a fairly long time, they would have attached *all the more* importance to the *democratic* dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry with the object of consolidating the republic, of completely eradicating all survivals of absolutism, and of clearing the arena for the battle for socialism. They would *all the more* strongly have condemned the tail-enders, who, on the eve of the democratic revolution, were capable of *frightening* the proletariat with the *possibility* of a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship.

Plekhanov is aware of the weakness of his position, which is based on a misinterpretation of the Address. He therefore makes the discreet reservation that his reference to history does not claim to exhaust the subject, although he draws "exhaustively" categorical conclusions based on nothing beyond a reference which has no bearing on the matter, with no attempt even to examine the question posed concretely by *Vperyod*. Plekhanov seeks to impute to *Vperyod* both the desire to "criticise" Marx and the point of view of Mach and Avenarius. The attempt but makes us smile. Plekhanov's position must be weak indeed if he can find no target for his darts among *Vperyod*'s actual assertions but needs must contrive a target from subjects as foreign to *Vperyod* as to the point in question. Finally, Plekhanov produces another piece of evidence, which he thinks "incontrovertible". Actually, this evidence (a letter of Engels to Turati written in 1894) is worse than useless.

From Plekhanov's version of this letter (unfortunately he does not quote it in full and does not say whether it was published and where), it appears that Engels *had to demon-*

strate to Turati the difference between a socialist and a petty-bourgeois revolution. No more need be said, Comrade Plekhanov! Turati is an Italian Millerand, a Bernsteinian, whom Giolitti had offered a portfolio in his Cabinet. Turati evidently *confounded* two revolutions of an entirely different class content. He imagined he would be furthering the interests of proletarian rule; but Engels explained to him that in the given situation in Italy in 1894 (i. e., several decades *after* Italy's ascent to the "first step", after the conquest of political freedom, which enabled the proletariat to organise openly, widely, and independently!), he, Turati, in a Cabinet of the victorious petty-bourgeois party, would actually be defending and promoting the interests of an *alien class*, the petty bourgeoisie. What we have here, consequently, is a case of Millerandism. It was against this confounding of Millerandism with the democratic dictatorship that *Vperyod* spoke out; but Plekhanov made no mention whatever of *Vperyod's* arguments. This is a characteristic instance of the false position against which Engels had long warned the leaders of the extreme parties, that is, a position in which they fail to grasp the true nature of the revolution and unconsciously further the interests of an "alien" class. In the name of all that is sacred, Comrade Plekhanov, what on earth has this to do with the question raised by Martynov and analysed by *Vperyod*? If there is the danger that people who have risen to the first step may confound the second step with the third, can this danger serve as justification for frightening us, as we are about to mount the first step, with the perspective of possibly having to take two at once?

No, Plekhanov's "brief reference to history" proves precisely nothing. His basic conclusion that "to participate in a revolutionary government together with representatives of the petty bourgeoisie would be a betrayal of the proletariat" is not in the least corroborated by references to the situation in Germany in 1850 or in Italy in 1894, which were radically different from the situation in Russia in January and May 1905. These references add nothing to the question of the democratic dictatorship and of the provisional revolutionary government. And if Plekhanov should want to apply his conclusion to *this* question, if he considers *every* participation of the proletariat in a revolutionary government

in the course of the struggle for the republic, in the course of the democratic revolution, *inadmissible in principle*, we undertake to prove to him that this is an anarchistic "principle" unequivocally condemned by Engels. We shall demonstrate this point in our next article.

ARTICLE TWO
ONLY FROM BELOW, OR FROM ABOVE
AS WELL AS FROM BELOW?

In our previous article analysing Plekhanov's reference to history we showed that he draws unwarranted general conclusions on points of principle from statements by Marx, which apply wholly and exclusively to the concrete situation in Germany in 1850. That concrete situation fully explains why Marx did not raise, and at that time could not have raised, the question of the Communist League's participation in a provisional revolutionary government. We shall now proceed to examine the general, fundamental question of the admissibility of such participation.

In the first place, the question at issue must be accurately presented. In this respect, fortunately, we are able to use a formulation given by our opponents and thus avoid arguments on the essence of the dispute. *Iskra*, No. 93, says: "The best way towards achieving such organisation [the organisation of the proletariat into a party in opposition to the bourgeois-democratic state] is to develop the bourgeois revolution *from below* [*Iskra's italics*] through the pressure of the proletariat on the democrats in power." *Iskra* goes on to say that *Vperyod* "wants this pressure of the proletariat on the revolution to proceed not only 'from below', not only from the street, but also from above, from the marble halls of the provisional government".

The issue is thus clearly stated. *Iskra* wants pressure from below, *Vperyod* wants it "from above as well as from below". Pressure from below is pressure by the citizens on the revolutionary government. Pressure from above is pressure by the revolutionary government on the citizens. Some *limit* their activity to pressure from below; others do not agree with such a limitation and demand that pressure from

below be *supplemented* by pressure from above. The issue, consequently, reduces itself to the question contained in our subtitle: only from below, or from above as well as from below? Some consider it wrong in principle for the proletariat, in the epoch of the democratic revolution, to exert pressure from above, "from the marble halls of the provisional government". Others consider it wrong in principle for the proletariat, in the epoch of the democratic revolution, to reject entirely pressure from above, to renounce participation in the provisional revolutionary government. Thus, the question is not whether pressure from above is probable in a given situation, or whether it is practicable under a given alignment of forces. We are for the moment not considering any concrete situation, and in view of the numerous attempts to substitute one question at issue for another, we urgently ask the readers to bear this in mind. We are dealing with the general question of principle, whether in the epoch of the democratic revolution it is *admissible* to pass from pressure from below to pressure from above.

To elucidate this question, let us first refer to the history of the tactical views of the founders of scientific socialism. Were there no disputes in this history over the general question of the admissibility of pressure from above? There was such a dispute. It was caused by the Spanish insurrection of the summer of 1873. Engels assessed the lessons which the socialist proletariat should learn from that insurrection in an article entitled "The Bakuninists at Work", printed in the German Social-Democratic newspaper *Volksstaat*¹⁴³ in 1873 and reprinted in the pamphlet *Internationales aus dem Volksstaat* in 1894. Let us see what general conclusions Engels drew.

On February 9, 1873, King Amadeo of Spain abdicated the throne—"the first king to go on strike", as Engels facetiously remarks. On February 12 the republic was proclaimed, soon to be followed by a Carlist revolt in the Basque provinces. April 10 saw the election of a Constituent Assembly which, on June 8, proclaimed the federal republic. On June 11 a new Cabinet was formed by Pi y Margall. In the commission charged with drafting the constitution the extreme republicans, known as the "Intransigentes", were not represented.

And when, on July 3, the new constitution was proclaimed the Intransigentes rose in revolt. Between July 5 and 11 they gained the upper hand in the Seville, Granada, Alcoy, Valencia, and several other provinces. The government of Salmeron, who succeeded Pi y Margall when the latter resigned, sent troops against the rebel provinces. The revolt was suppressed after a more or less stiff resistance. Cádiz fell on July 26, 1873, and Cartagena on January 11, 1874. Such are the brief chronological facts with which Engels introduces his subject.

In evaluating the lessons to be drawn from these events, Engels stresses, first, that the struggle for the republic in Spain was not and could not have been a struggle for the socialist revolution. "Spain," he says, "is such an industrially backward country that there can be no thought of an *immediate* complete emancipation there of the working class of that country. Before it comes to that, Spain will have to pass through various preliminary stages of development and remove a considerable number of obstacles from its path. The republic offered that country the chance of going through those preliminary stages in the shortest possible time and of quickly surmounting the obstacles. But that chance could be utilised only through the active *political* intervention of the Spanish working class. The mass of the workers felt this. They strove everywhere to have a part in the events, to take advantage of the opportunity for action, instead of leaving the owning classes, as heretofore, a clear field for action and intrigues."

It was thus a question of struggle for the republic, a question of the democratic, not of the socialist, revolution. The question of the workers' taking a hand in the events presented itself in a twofold aspect at the time. On the one hand, the Bakuninists (or "Alliancists"—the founders of the "Alliance" for struggle against the Marxist "International") 'negated political activity, participation in elections, etc. On the other hand, they were against participation in a revolution which did not aim at the immediate and complete emancipation of the working class; they were against participation of whatever kind in a revolutionary government. It is this second aspect of the question that holds special interest for us in the light of our dispute.

It was this aspect, incidentally, which gave rise to the formulation of the difference *in principle* between the two tactical slogans.

"The Bakuninists," says Engels, "had for years been propagating the idea that *all revolutionary action from above was pernicious*, and that *everything must be organised and carried out from below upward*."

Hence, the principle, "only from below" is an *anarchist* principle.

Engels demonstrates the utter absurdity of this principle in the epoch of the democratic revolution. It naturally and inevitably leads to the practical conclusion that the establishment of revolutionary governments is a betrayal of the working class. The Bakuninists drew this very conclusion, which they elevated into a principle, namely, that "*the establishment of a revolutionary government is but a new deception and a new betrayal of the working class*."

We have here, as the reader will see, the same two "principles" which the new *Iskra* has arrived at, namely: (1) that only revolutionary action from below is admissible, as opposed to the tactics of "from above as well as from below"; 2) that participation in a provisional revolutionary government is a betrayal of the working class. Both these new-*Iskra* principles are anarchist principles. The actual course of the struggle for the republic in Spain revealed the utter preposterousness and the utterly reactionary essence of both these principles.

Engels brings this truth home with several episodes from the Spanish revolution. The revolution, for example, breaks out in Alcoy, a manufacturing town of comparatively recent origin with a population of 30,000. The workers' insurrection is victorious despite its leadership by the Bakuninists, who will, in principle, have nothing to do with the idea of organising the revolution. After the event the Bakuninists began to boast that they had become "masters of the situation". And how did these "masters" deal with their "situation", asks Engels. First of all, they established in Alcoy a "Welfare Committee", that is, a revolutionary government. Mind you, it was these selfsame Alliancists (Bakuninists), who, only ten months before the revolution, had

resolved at their Congress, on September 15, 1872, that "every organisation of a political, so-called provisional or revolutionary power can only be a new fraud and would be as dangerous to the proletariat as all existing governments". Rather than refute this anarchist phrase-mongering, Engels confines himself to the sarcastic remark that it was the supporters of this resolution who found themselves "members of this provisional and revolutionary governmental power" in Alcoy. Engels treats these gentlemen with the scorn they deserve for the "utter helplessness, confusion, and passivity" which they revealed when in power. With equal contempt Engels would have answered the charges of "Jacobinism", so dear to the Girondists of Social-Democracy. He shows that in a number of other towns, e.g., in Sanlúcar de Barrameda (a port of 26,000 inhabitants near Cádiz) "the Alliancists; ...here too, in opposition to their anarchist principles, formed a revolutionary government". He reproves them for "not having known what to do with their power". Knowing well that the Bakuninist labour leaders participated in provisional governments *together with the Intransigentes*, i.e., together with the republicans, the representatives of the petty bourgeoisie, Engels reproves the Bakuninists, not for their participation in the government (as he should have done according to the "principles" of the new *Iskra*), but for their *poor organisation, the feebleness of their participation*, their subordination to the leadership of the bourgeois republican gentry. With what withering sarcasm Engels would have flayed those people who, in the epoch of the revolution, try to minimise the importance of "technical" and military leadership, may incidentally be seen from the fact that he reproved the Bakuninist labour leaders for having, as members of the revolutionary government, left the "political and *military* leadership" to the bourgeois republican gentry, while they fed the workers with bombastic phrases and paper schemes of "social" reforms.

A true Jacobin of Social-Democracy, Engels not only appreciated the importance of action from above, he not only viewed participation in a revolutionary government together with the republican bourgeoisie as perfectly legitimate, but he *demande*d such participation, as well as energetic military initiative on the part of the revolutionary power,

considering it his duty to give *practical* and guiding *military* advice.

"Nevertheless," he says, "the uprising, even if begun in a brainless way, would have had a good chance to succeed, *had it been conducted with some intelligence*,"* if only in the manner of the Spanish military revolts, in which the garrison of one town rises, marches on to the next, sweeping along with it the town's garrison previously worked on by propaganda, and, growing into an avalanche, the insurgents press on to the capital, until a fortunate engagement, or the crossing over to their side of the troops sent against them, decides the victory. This method was especially applicable in the given situation. The insurgents had long been organised everywhere into volunteer battalions, whose discipline, true, was pitiable, yet assuredly not more pitiable than that of the remnants of the old, largely demoralised Spanish army. The government's only dependable troops were the gendarmes, and these were scattered all over the country. The thing was, above all, to prevent these gendarmes from being drawn together, which could be done only by a bold assumption of the offensive in the open field. Such a course of action would not have involved much danger, since the government could only put up against the volunteers equally undisciplined troops. For anyone bent on winning there was no other way."

That is how a founder of scientific socialism reasoned when faced with the problems of an uprising and direct action in the epoch of a revolutionary upheaval! Although the uprising was begun by the petty-bourgeois republicans and although confronting the proletariat was neither the question of the socialist revolution nor that of elementary political freedom, Engels set very great store on the highly active participation of the workers in the struggle for the republic; he demanded of the proletariat's leaders that they should subordinate their entire activity to the need for

* *Wäre er nur mit einigem Verstand geleitet worden.* Poor Engels! A pity he was not acquainted with the new *Iskra*! He would have known then how disastrous, noxious, utopian, bourgeois, technically one-sided, and conspiratorially narrow is the "Jacobin" idea that an insurrection can be *conducted* (*geleitet werden*)!

achieving victory in the struggle, which had begun. Engels himself, as a leader of the proletariat, even went into the details of military organisation; he was not averse to using the old-fashioned methods of struggle by military revolts when victory demanded it; he attached paramount importance to offensive action and the centralisation of the revolutionary forces. He bitterly reprimanded the Bakuninists for having made a principle of "what in the German Peasant War and in the German uprisings of May 1849 was an unavoidable evil, namely, *the state of disunion and isolation of the revolutionary forces*, which enabled the same government troops to put down one uprising after another." Engels' views on the conduct of the uprising, on the organisation of the revolution, and on the utilisation of the revolutionary governmental power are as far removed from the tail-ist views of the new *Iskra* as heaven is from earth.

Summarising the lessons of the Spanish revolution, Engels established in the first place that "the Bakuninists, as soon as they were confronted with a serious revolutionary situation, were compelled to give up their whole former programme". To begin with, they had to scrap the principle of abstention from political activity and from elections, the principle of the "abolition of the state". Secondly, "they gave up the principle that the workers must not participate in any revolution that did not aim at the immediate and complete emancipation of the proletariat, and they themselves participated in an avowedly purely bourgeois movement". Thirdly, and this conclusion answers precisely the point in dispute, "they trampled under foot the article of faith they had only just proclaimed—that the establishment of a revolutionary government is but a new deception and a new betrayal of the working class; they did this, sitting coolly in the government committees of the various towns, almost everywhere as an impotent minority outvoted and politically exploited by the bourgeois". By their inability to lead the uprising, by splitting the revolutionary forces instead of centralising them, by leaving the leadership of the revolution to the bourgeois, and by dissolving the solid and strong organisation of the International, "the Bakuninists in Spain gave us an unsurpassable example of how *not* to make a revolution".

* * *

Summing up the foregoing, we arrive at the following conclusions:

1) Limitation, in principle, of revolutionary action to pressure from below and renunciation of pressure also from above is *anarchism*.

2) He who does not understand the new tasks in the epoch of revolution, the tasks of action from above, he who is unable to determine the conditions and the programme for such action, has no idea whatever of the tasks of the proletariat in every democratic revolution.

3) The principle that for Social-Democracy participation in a provisional revolutionary government with the bourgeoisie is inadmissible, that every such participation is a betrayal of the working class, is a principle of *anarchism*.

4) Every "serious revolutionary situation" confronts the party of the proletariat with the task of giving purposive leadership to the uprising, of organising the revolution, of centralising all the revolutionary forces, of boldly launching a military offensive, and of making the most energetic use of the revolutionary governmental power.

5) Marx and Engels could not have approved, and never would have approved, the tactics of the new *Iskra* at the present revolutionary moment; for these tactics are nothing short of a repetition of all the errors enumerated above. Marx and Engels would have called the new *Iskra*'s doctrinal position a contemplation of the "posterior" of the proletariat, a rehash of anarchist errors.

In the next article we shall discuss the tasks of the provisional revolutionary government.¹⁴⁴

DEBACLE

The naval battle in the Korea Strait has captured the attention of the political press the world over. At first the tsarist government tried to conceal the bitter truth from its loyal subjects, but it soon realised the hopelessness of such an attempt. In any case it would have been impossible to conceal the utter rout of the entire Russian navy.

In appraising the political significance of the last naval battle, we can only repeat what we said in *Vperyod*, No. 2,* on the fall of Port Arthur. The complete military debacle of tsarist Russia had become evident by then, but the Baltic squadron still gave the Russian patriots a ray of hope. All realised that the outcome of the war depended on victory at sea. The autocracy understood that an adverse outcome of the war would be tantamount to a victory of the "internal enemy", viz., of the revolution. It, therefore, staked its all. Hundreds of millions of rubles were spent on hastily dispatching the Baltic fleet, motley crews were scraped together, final preparations to get the warships into sea trim were rushed through, and old tubs were added to the new and powerful battle-ships to increase the total number of craft. The great armada—as huge and unwieldy, as absurd, helpless, and monstrous as the whole Russian Empire—put to sea, expending a fortune in coal and maintenance, making itself the laughing-stock of Europe, especially after its brilliant victory over the fishing smacks, and grossly violating all the usages and principles of neutrality. According to the most conservative estimates this armada cost nearly 300,000,000 rubles, besides 100,000,000 rubles on the expedi-

* See. pp. 47-55 of this volume.—*Ed.*

tion. Altogether 400,000,000 rubles were thrown away on this last war gamble of the tsarist autocracy.

Now this last gamble, too, has failed. Everyone had expected the defeat of the Russian fleet, but no one had thought it would be so crushing. Like a horde of savages, the Russian ships flung themselves headlong upon the Japanese fleet, which was magnificently armed and equipped with the most up-to-date means of defence. After a two-day battle, thirteen of Russia's twenty warships manned by from twelve to fifteen thousand, were sunk or destroyed, four were captured, and only one (the *Almaz*) escaped and reached Vladivostok. More than half the crews were killed or drowned, and Rozhdestvensky "himself" and his right-hand man, Nebogatov, were taken prisoner, while the Japanese fleet came out of the engagement unscathed, except for the loss of three destroyers.

Russia's naval strength has been completely destroyed. The war has been lost irretrievably. The complete expulsion of the Russian troops from Manchuria and the seizure of Sakhalin and Vladivostok by the Japanese are now only a matter of time. We are witnessing, not just a military defeat, but the complete military collapse of the autocracy.

With every new blow struck by the Japanese, the significance of this collapse, as the collapse of the entire political system of tsarism, grows clearer both to Europe and to the whole Russian people. Everything is up in arms against the autocracy: the wounded national pride of the big and petty bourgeoisie, the outraged pride of the army, the bitter feeling over the loss of hundreds of thousands of young lives in a senseless military adventure, the resentment against the embezzlement of hundreds of millions from the public funds, the fears of an inevitable financial collapse and a protracted economic crisis as a result of the war, and the dread of a formidable people's revolution which (in the opinion of the bourgeoisie) the tsar could and should have avoided by means of timely and "reasonable" concessions. The demand for peace is spreading far and wide. The liberal press is indignant. Even the most moderate elements, like the landowners of the "Shipov" trend, are beginning to utter threats, and even the sycophantic *Novoye Vremya* is demanding the immediate convening of representatives of the people.

The European bourgeoisie, that most faithful prop of the tsarist government, is also beginning to lose patience. It is alarmed at the inevitable realignment in international relations, at the growing power of the young and fresh Japan, and the loss of a military ally in Europe. It is disturbed over the fate of the thousands of millions which it has so generously lent to the autocracy. It is seriously perturbed by the revolution in Russia, which is unduly exciting the European proletariat and may lead to a revolutionary conflagration on a world scale. In the name of "friendship" with tsarism it appeals to its common sense, insists on the necessity of peace—peace with Japan, and peace with the liberal Russian bourgeoisie. Europe does not for a moment shut its eyes to the fact that peace with Japan can now be bought only at a very high price; but it figures out in sober and business-like fashion that every extra month of war abroad and of revolution at home is bound to raise the price still higher and increase the danger of a revolutionary explosion that would blow the entire policy of "concessions" away like whiffs of smoke. Europe understands that it is terribly difficult, almost impossible, for the autocracy to call a halt now—it has gone too far for that; and so this bourgeois Europe tries to reassure itself and its ally with roseate dreams.

The following, for example, is from a short article by Cornély entitled "The End of an Epic", which appeared in *Le Siècle*, a newspaper of the patriotic French bourgeoisie: "Now with the Russians beaten at sea after having been defeated on land, it is incumbent upon their government to conclude peace and reorganise its armed forces. Adventurist governments are sometimes compelled, on the strength of their pretensions or by considerations of security, to involve the peoples over which they rule in war. Since they have staked their very existence on a victorious outcome, they demand sacrifice upon sacrifice from their peoples, thus leading them to ultimate disaster. Such was the history of our two empires in France. Such would have been the history of the third empire, if its establishment in our country had met with success.

"Such, on the contrary, is not the position of the Russian Government; this government is deeply rooted among the Russian people, so that common misfortunes do not divide

the government and the people but only cement the bonds between them. A Caesar vanquished is no longer Caesar. An unfortunate tsar may yet remain august and popular."

Alack and alas! The braggadocio of this chauvinistic French shopkeeper is "all too obvious". His assurances that the war has caused no rift between the Russian Government and the people are at such variance with the generally known facts that one can only smile, as at some naïve and innocent ruse. To warn his friend and ally, the Russian autocrat, of the inevitable ruin towards which he, like a true "Caesar", is heading blindly and doggedly, the French bourgeois kindly assures this Caesar that he need not resemble other Caesars, that he has a different, a better way out. We soon believe what we desire. The French bourgeoisie is so desirous of having a powerful ally in the person of the tsar that it comforts itself with the romantic fable that misfortune unites the Russian people with its tsar. M. Cornély does not take this fable seriously himself, and still less should we.

Not only the Caesarian governments were given to adventurism, but also the governments of the most legitimate monarchs of a most ancient dynasty. There has been more adventurism in the Russian autocracy, which is a whole century behind the times, than in any of the French empires. It was sheer adventurism that made the autocracy plunge the people into this senseless and shameful war. Now the autocracy is facing the end it deserves. The war has laid bare all its sores, revealed its rottenness to the core, proved its complete alienation from the people, and destroyed the sole pillars of its Caesarian rule. The war has proved a stern trial. The people have already passed sentence on this government of brigands. The revolution will execute the sentence.

REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE AND LIBERAL BROKERAGE

The rise of political parties is one of the most interesting and characteristic features of our interesting epoch. The old order, the autocracy, is falling to pieces. Increasing sections, not only of so-called "society", i.e., the bourgeoisie, but also of the "people", i.e., the working class and the peasantry, have begun to reflect on the kind of new order that has to be built and on the way to build it. For the class-conscious proletariat these attempts of the various classes to frame a programme and organise the political struggle are of momentous importance. Although these attempts largely originate from individual "figures" responsible to no one and leading no one, and are therefore often fortuitous, arbitrary, and at times bombastic, the basic interests and tendencies of the big social classes, broadly speaking, assert themselves with irresistible force. Out of the seeming chaos of declarations, demands, and platforms there clearly emerge the political physiognomy of our bourgeoisie and its real (not only specious) political programme. The proletariat is obtaining increasingly more material by which to judge how the Russian bourgeoisie, which now talks of political action, is really going to act—what stand it will take in the decisive revolutionary struggle towards which Russia is so rapidly heading.

Valuable material for studying the policy of the bourgeoisie is sometimes offered by *Osvobozhdeniye*, published abroad, which is able to review the numerous public utterances of the Russian liberals without censorship restrictions. The Programme of the *Osvobozhdeniye* League, which this

journal has just published (or reprinted from *Novosti* * of April 5) with instructive commentaries by Mr. P. S., is an excellent addendum to the resolutions of the Zemstvo congresses and to the *Osvobozhdeniye* liberals' draft constitution, of which we wrote in *Vperyod*, No. 18.** "The drafting and voting of this programme," as Mr. P. S. justly remarks, "is a big step towards the creation of a Russian Constitutional-Democratic Party."

For the Russian liberals this is unquestionably a big step, which stands out in the long list of liberal activities. Nevertheless, how little this big "step" of the liberals is, as compared with what is needed for building a real party, as compared even with what Social-Democracy has already done to this end. The bourgeoisie has far greater freedom of legal expression than the proletariat, incomparably more intellectual forces and financial means, and far greater facilities for party organisation; yet we still have before us a "party" without an official name, without a common, distinct, and lucid programme, without worked-out tactics, without a party organisation, a "party" which, according to the competent testimony of Mr. P. S., consists of the "Zemstvo group" and the *Osvobozhdeniye* League, i.e., of an unorganised conglomeration of individuals plus an organisation. But perhaps the members of the Zemstvo group are "party members" in the now famous sense that they accept the programme and work "under the control of a party organisation", of a group of the *Osvobozhdeniye* League? Such a conception of party membership is as convenient and suitable to the liberals and as natural a part of the liberal political pattern as it is alien to the whole spirit of Social-Democracy. Such a conception of party (expressed not in written Rules, but in the actual structure of that "party") implies, among other things, that the organised members, i.e., the members of the *Osvobozhdeniye* League, stand, in their majority, *for a unicameral system*, while at the same time rejecting it in their programme, passing the whole question over in silence in deference to the unorganised membership, to the "Zemstvo group", which favours a bicameral system. The balance of

* *News.—Ed.*

** See p. 427 of this volume.—*Ed.*

"forces", one might say, is providential for the politically active bourgeoisie. The organised intellectuals propose, and the unorganised businessmen, money-bags, and capitalists dispose.

While heartily welcoming the Programme of the *Osvobozhdeniye* League, Mr. P. S., *in principle*, defends both the vagueness, inadequacy, and incompleteness of the programme and its organisational haziness and silence on tactics—all for reasons of "*Realpolitik*"! We shall revert to this incomparable conception, so singularly characteristic of the essence of bourgeois liberalism, and shall now proceed to examine the basic principles of the liberal programme.

The party, as we have said, has no official designation. Mr. P. S. calls it by the name under which, I believe, it goes in the columns of our legal newspapers of the liberal trend, namely, "Constitutional-Democratic Party". Unimportant though the question of name may appear at first glance, here too we immediately find material that explains why the bourgeoisie, unlike the proletariat, *must* content itself with political vagueness and even defend it "in principle"; it "must" do this, not only on account of the subjective moods or qualities of its leaders, but by reason of the objective conditions governing the existence of the bourgeois class as a whole. The name "Constitutional-Democratic Party" immediately calls to mind the well-known adage that speech was given to man in order that he might conceal his thoughts. The name "C.D.P." was invented to conceal the *monarchist* nature of the party. Indeed, who does not know that this entire party, in the person both of its master section, the Zemstvo group, and of the *Osvobozhdeniye* League, stands for the monarchy? Neither section so much as mentions the question of the republic, which they consider "idle talk", while their draft constitution bluntly and unequivocally accepts the monarchy as the form of government. We have therefore to do with a party that advocates a constitutional monarchy, a party of constitutional monarchists. This is a fact of which there is not the slightest doubt and which cannot be dismissed by any arguments about acceptance "in principle" of the idea of a republic (though we have heard no such arguments yet from the "Constitutional-Democrats"!), since the issue is not acceptance of the

republic purely "in principle", but acceptance in practical politics, acceptance of the will to achieve the republic and of the necessity to struggle for it.

The fact is that the bourgeois gentlemen *cannot* call themselves by their real name yet, any more than they can go out into the street naked. They cannot tell the truth openly; they cannot *aussprechen was ist* (speak out the truth), for that would mean admitting one of the most outrageous and pernicious of political privileges, it would mean admitting their *anti-democratism*. No bourgeoisie in struggle for political liberty can admit this, and not only because it would be disgraceful, scandalous, and indecent. Nothing is too indecent for bourgeois politicians where their interests are concerned. But their *interests* at the moment demand liberty, and liberty cannot be won *without the people*, and the backing of the people cannot be secured unless one calls oneself a "democrat" (=an adherent of the rule of the people), *unless one conceals one's monarchism*.

And so the class position of the bourgeoisie inevitably gives rise to an inherent instability and falsity in the very formulation of its basic political tasks. The struggle for freedom, for the abolition of the ancient privileges of the autocracy, is incompatible with the defence of the privileges of private property, since these privileges entail "gentle handling" of the monarchy. The real programme of the monarchist constitution, therefore, is draped in the fine, airy raiment of a democratic constitution. And this embellishment of the programme's real content with a display of tawdry tinsel is called "*Realpolitik*".... Thus, the ideologist of the liberal bourgeoisie speaks with inimitable contempt and sublime self-complacency about the "theoretical self-indulgence" which the "representatives of the extreme parties" are practising (*Osvobozhdeniye*, No. 69-70, p. 308). The *Realpolitiker* of the bourgeoisie do not want to indulge in talk or even in day-dreams of the republic because they do not want to struggle for the republic. For this reason, however, they feel the irresistible urge to *edify* the people with the enticement of "democracy". They do not want to deceive themselves with regard to their inability to renounce the monarchy, and so they needs must deceive the people by keeping silent about their monarchism.

The name of a party, as can be seen, is not such an incidental and unimportant affair as one might think at first glance. Sometimes the very showiness and pretentiousness of the name betray the inherent flaw in a party's entire programme and tactical line. The deeper an ideologist of the big bourgeoisie feels himself devoted to the monarchy, the louder he calls upon heaven to witness that he is a democrat. The more an ideologist of the petty bourgeoisie reflects its instability and its incapacity to wage a consistent, steadfast struggle for the democratic revolution and for socialism, the more ardently he holds forth on the party of the "Socialists-Revolutionaries", of which it has been aptly said that its socialism is anything but revolutionary, and its revolutionariness anything but socialist. All we need now is for the adherents of the autocracy to call themselves (as they have on more than one occasion attempted to do) "people's party", and we shall have a complete picture of the metamorphosis which class interests undergo on political signboards.

The signboard of the liberal bourgeoisie (or the programme of the *Osvobozhdeniye* League) starts, as befits a signboard, with a striking preamble: "The *Osvobozhdeniye* League finds that the grave external and internal crisis through which Russia is passing has become so acute at the present time that the people must take its solution into their own hands in conjunction with the other social groups opposed to the existing regime."

And so, let the power pass into the hands of the people, long live the autocracy of the people in place of the autocracy of the tsar. Isn't that it, gentlemen? Isn't that what democratism demands?

No, this is theoretical self-indulgence and a failure to understand practical politics. All power is now in the hands of the absolute monarchy. Ranged against it is the people, namely, the proletariat and the peasantry, who have launched the struggle, are waging it furiously, and ...very likely will maintain their zeal until they have completely overthrown the enemy. But ranged alongside the "people" are "the other social groups", viz., "society", i.e., the bourgeoisie, the landowners, the capitalists, and the professional intelligentsia. Thus, the power is to

be divided into three equal parts. One-third is to be left to the monarchy, another goes to the bourgeoisie (an Upper House based on indirect, and as far as possible actually unequal and non-universal, suffrage), while the remaining third goes to the people (a Lower House on the basis of suffrage that is universal, etc.). This will be a "square deal" providing adequate protection for private property and making it possible to use the organised power of the monarchy (the army, bureaucracy, and police) against the people, should they show "zeal" for any of the "unreasonable" demands put forward by the "representatives of the extreme parties out of sheer theoretical self-indulgence". This square deal, which reduces the revolutionary people to a harmless minority of one-third, is presented as "a radical reform on democratic principles", and not at all on the principles of monarchism or of bourgeois privilege.

How is this deal to be put through? By means of honest brokerage. Mr. Struve predicted this long ago in his preface to the Witte Memorandum when he said that it is always the moderate parties that gain from the intensification of the struggle between the extreme parties. The struggle between the autocracy and the revolutionary people is gaining in intensity. One has to manoeuvre between the one and the other, enlisting the support of the revolutionary people against the autocracy (with the enticement of "democracy") and the support of the monarchy against the "excesses" of the revolutionary people. By skilful manoeuvring a deal like that should come off, with the bourgeoisie getting at least a "third" share in any case, while the shares allotted to the people and the autocracy would depend on the outcome of the decisive struggle between them. Whose backing should be sought most will depend on the exigencies of the moment—such is the essence of the huckstering tactics, that is to say, "practical" politics.

At present all power is still in the hands of the autocracy. The thing to do, therefore, is to say that the people must take power into their hands. The thing to do, therefore, is to call yourself a democrat, to put forward a demand for "the immediate convocation of a Constituent Assembly on the basis of suffrage that is universal, etc., for the purpose of drawing up a Russian constitution". The people now

are unarmed, disunited, unorganised, and helpless in the face of the absolute monarchy. A popular Constituent Assembly will rally them and become a great force which will oppose the power of the tsar. Only then, when the power of the tsar and the united force of the revolutionary people confront each other, will the bourgeoisie have its day; then only will it be possible to "co-ordinate" these two forces with positive chances of success and ensure the most advantageous result for the propertied classes.

Such is the plan of the practical politicians of liberalism. Not a foolish plan at all. It deliberately provides for the preservation of the monarchy and the admission of a Constituent Assembly of the whole people only alongside of the monarchy. The bourgeoisie does not want to have the existing government overthrown or the monarchy replaced by a republic. Therefore, the Russian bourgeoisie (on the pattern of the German bourgeoisie of 1848) stands for a "deal" between the people and the throne. Such a policy can be successful only if neither of these parties engaged in the struggle, neither the people nor the throne, is able to win the day, only if their strength is balanced. Then and only then will the bourgeoisie be able to join with the monarchy and keep a tight hold on the people, compel them to put up with one—"third"—or perhaps one-hundredth part, of the power. The Constituent Assembly of the whole people will be just strong enough to make the tsar grant a constitution, but it will not *and must not* (from the point of view of the bourgeoisie's interests) be any stronger. It must only counterbalance the monarchy, but not overthrow it; it must leave the material instruments of power (the army, etc.) in the hands of the monarchy.

The *Osvobozhdeniye* Leaguers laugh at the Shipovists for wanting to give the tsar the power of authority and the people the power of opinion. But is not their position essentially identical with that of the Shipovists? They do not want to give the people *all* the power either; they, too, stand for a *compromise* between the power of the tsar and the opinion of the people!

We thus see that the interests of the bourgeoisie as a class quite naturally and inevitably lead it at the present revolutionary moment to advance the slogan of a Constituent

Assembly of the people, *but in no case the slogan of a provisional revolutionary government*. The first slogan is or has become the slogan of the policy of compromise, huckstering, and brokerage; the second is the slogan of revolutionary struggle. The first is the slogan of the monarchist bourgeoisie, the second, the slogan of the revolutionary people. The first slogan makes it possible chiefly to preserve the monarchy, despite the revolutionary onset of the people; the second offers the straight road to the republic. The first leaves the power with the tsar, restricted only by public opinion; the second is the only slogan which consistently and unreservedly leads to the sovereignty of the people in the full sense of the word.

Only this radical difference in the political aims of the liberal bourgeoisie and the revolutionary proletariat can explain a number of secondary features in the *Osvobozhdeniye* programme besides those mentioned above. Only in the light of this difference is it possible to understand, for example, why the *Osvobozhdeniye* adherents *require* the reservation that the decisions of their League are to be "regarded as *binding* only insofar as political conditions remain unchanged", and that the programme allows for "a provisional and conditional element". This reservation (developed at length and with keen "relish" in the commentaries of Mr. P. S.) is absolutely essential for a party of "compromise" between the people and tsarism. It is a reservation that makes it as clear as daylight that in pursuance of their line of huckstering ("practical") politics the *Osvobozhdeniye* Leaguers will throw over a good many of their democratic demands. Their programme is not an expression of steadfast convictions (a quality alien to the bourgeoisie), not something designated to be fought for. Rather, their programme is simply a *haggling price*, fixed beforehand with a definite view to "reduction", depending on which of the warring parties can "hold out" longer. *The Constitutional-Democratic* (read: constitutional-monarchist) bourgeoisie will strike a bargain with tsarism at a cheaper price than its present programme—there is no doubt of that, and the class-conscious proletariat should have no illusions on that score. Hence Mr. P. S.'s hostility towards the division into a minimum programme and a maximum programme, and towards

"firm decisions of programme in general". Hence, his assurances that the programme of the *Osvobozhdeniye* League (purposely couched, not in terms of definite demands precisely formulated, but in the form of a literary, approximative *description* of the demands) "*is more than adequate* for a party engaged in practical politics". Hence, the omission of any mention of the arming of the people in the programme of the monarchist "democrats", the avoidance of any definitely formulated demand for the disestablishment of the Church, the insistence on the impracticability of abolishing indirect taxes, the substitution of cultural self-determination of the oppressed nationalities for their political self-determination. Hence, the naïvely frank admission that democracy and the interests of capital are linked together; that instead of "protection for enterprises and businessmen, there must be greater protection for the development of the productive forces of the people"; that "industrial prosperity", etc., must be promoted. Hence, the reduction of the agrarian reform to the level of a purely bureaucratic "granting" of land to the peasants with an absolute guarantee that the landowners will be "*compensated*" for the lands assigned to the peasants. In other words, the sanctity of "property" derived from bondage and serfdom is to be upheld at all costs. All this, we repeat, is the natural and inevitable result of the position of the bourgeoisie as a class in modern society. All this confirms the radical difference between the proletarian policy of revolutionary struggle and the bourgeois policy of liberal brokerage.

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TO THE JEWISH WORKERS ¹⁴⁵

In publishing the Report on the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in Yiddish, the Editorial Board of the Party Central Organ considers it necessary to say a few words in connection with this publication.

The conditions under which the class-conscious proletariat of the whole world lives, tend to create the closest bonds and increasing unity in the systematic Social-Democratic struggle of the workers of the various nationalities. The great slogan "Workers of all countries, unite!", which was proclaimed for the first time more than half a century ago, has now become more than the slogan of just the Social-Democratic parties of the different countries. This slogan is being increasingly embodied both in the unification of the tactics of international Social-Democracy and in the building of organisational unity among the proletarians of the various nationalities who are struggling under the yoke of one and the same despotic state for freedom and socialism.

In Russia the workers of all nationalities, especially those of non-Russian nationality, endure an economic and political oppression such as obtains in no other country. The Jewish workers, as a disfranchised nationality, not only suffer general economic and political oppression, but they also suffer under the yoke which deprives them of elementary civic rights. The heavier this yoke, the greater the need for the closest possible unity among the proletarians of the different nationalities; for without such unity a victorious struggle against the general oppression is impossible. The more the predatory tsarist autocracy strives to sow the seeds of discord, distrust and enmity among the nationalities it oppresses, the more abominable its policy of inciting the

ignorant masses to savage pogroms becomes, the more does the duty devolve upon us, the Social-Democrats, to rally the isolated Social-Democratic parties of the different nationalities into a single Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party.

The First Congress of our Party, held in the spring of 1898, set itself the aim of establishing such unity. To dispel any idea of its being national in character, the Party called itself "*Rossiiskaya*" and not "*Russkaya*". * The organisation of Jewish workers—the Bund—affiliated with the Party as an autonomous section. Unfortunately, from that moment the unity of the Jewish and non-Jewish Social-Democrats within the single party was destroyed. Nationalist ideas began to spread among the leading members of the Bund, ideas which are in sharp contradiction to the entire world view of Social-Democracy. Instead of trying to draw the Jewish and the non-Jewish workers closer together, the Bund embarked upon a policy of weaning the former away from the latter; at its congresses it claimed a separate existence for the Jews as a nation. Instead of carrying on the work begun by the First Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Party towards still closer unity between the Bund and the Party, the Bund moved a step away from the Party. First, it withdrew from the united organisation of the R.S.D.L.P. abroad and set up an independent organisation abroad; later, it withdrew from the R.S.D.L.P. as well, when the Second Congress of our Party in 1903 refused by a considerable majority to recognise the Bund as sole representative of the Jewish proletariat. The Bund held to its position, claiming not only that it was the sole representative of the Jewish proletariat, but that no territorial limits were set to its activities. Naturally, the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. could not accept such conditions, since in a number of regions, as, for instance, in South Russia, the organised Jewish proletariat constitutes part of the general Party organisation. Ignoring that stand, the Bund withdrew from the Party and thereby broke the unity of the Social-Democratic proletariat, despite the work that had been

* The adjective *Russkaya* (Russian) pertains to nationality, *Rossiiskaya* (Russian) pertains to Russia as a country.—Ed.

carried out in common at the Second Congress, and despite the Party Programme and Rules.

At its Second and Third Congresses the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party expressed its firm conviction that the Bund's withdrawal from the Party was a grave and deplorable mistake on its part. The Bund's mistake is a result of its basically untenable nationalist views; the result of its groundless claim to be the sole, monopolistic representative of the Jewish proletariat, from which the federalist principle of organisation necessarily derives; the result of its long-standing policy of keeping aloof and separate from the Party. We are convinced that this mistake must be rectified and that it will be rectified as the movement continues to grow. We consider ourselves ideologically at one with the Jewish Social-Democratic proletariat. After the Second Congress our Central Committee pursued a non-nationalist policy; it took pains that such committees should be set up (Polesye, North-Western) as would unite all the local workers, Jewish as well as non-Jewish, into a single whole. At the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. a resolution was adopted providing for the publication of literature in Yiddish. In fulfilment of that resolution we are now issuing a complete translation into Yiddish of the Report on the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., which has appeared in Russian. The Report will show the Jewish workers—both those who are now in our Party and those who are temporarily out of it—how our Party is progressing. The Report will show the Jewish workers that our Party is already emerging from the internal crisis from which it has been suffering since the Second Congress. It will show them what the actual aspirations of our Party are and what its attitude is towards the Social-Democratic parties and organisations of the other nationalities, as well as the attitude of the entire Party and its central body to its component parts. Finally, it will show them—and this is most important—the tactical directives that were drawn up by the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. with regard to the policy of the entire class-conscious proletariat in the present revolutionary situation.

Comrades! The hour of political struggle against the tsarist autocracy is drawing near—the struggle of the proletariat for the freedom of all classes and peoples in Russia,

for the freedom of the proletarian drive towards socialism. Terrible trials are in store for us. The outcome of the revolution in Russia depends on our class-consciousness and preparedness, on our unity and determination. Let us set to work then with greater boldness and greater unity, let us do all in our power for the proletarians of the different nationalities to march to freedom under the leadership of a really united Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party.

*Editorial Board of the Central Organ
of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party*

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A NEW REVOLUTIONARY WORKERS' ASSOCIATION

We have received the following leaflets of the Central Committee of the Russian Liberation Union (R.L.U.), printed and distributed in Russia: (1) an unaddressed appeal setting forth the aims and the nature of the R.L.U.; (2) an appeal to the workers concerning the establishment of the R.L.U. Workers' Union, and (3) the Rules of this Workers' Union. From these documents it is evident that "the R.L.U. is not a party with a definite and specific programme, but rather an association of all who desire the transfer of power from the autocracy to the people by means of the armed uprising and through the convocation of a Constituent Assembly" based on universal suffrage with all its democratic aspects. "The urgent necessity," we read in the first appeal, "of achieving the universal immediate objective, i.e., a Constituent Assembly, has given rise to the R.L.U., which has made it its aim to unite all who strive for the political freedom of Russia and to take practical steps to achieve the revolution. With the achievement of this objective the R.L.U. will discontinue its activities and entrust the protection of the people's representatives and of public safety to a civil militia to be organised for the purpose."

The Rules of the Workers' Union consist of 43 clauses, and their aim is set forth as follows: "(1) to organise combat groups for the armed uprising; (2) to raise the necessary funds for arms and for literature of a strictly proletarian nature." The organisation of the Workers' Union consists of four-stage bodies: (1) groups of workers (mainly from one and the same workshop); (2) factory councils; (3) district meetings; and (4) committees of the Workers' Union. All higher bodies consist of elected representatives of the lower bodies, with

two exceptions: first, each committee of the Workers' Union contains a member of the C.C. of the Russian Liberation Union; second, it is not specified whether this C.C. is elected or whether it is subject to any control. All that is said on the relations between the Workers' Union and the R.L.U. is: "Through us (the C.C. of the R.L.U.) the Workers' Union will be connected with all the other workers' and non-working-class associations." Not a word is mentioned about the organisation of the R.L.U. itself and the relation of its C.C. to the R.L.U. as a whole. In its appeal to the workers the C.C. of the R.L.U. sets forth its immediate task as follows: "We shall work out a detailed plan of the uprising, tell you how to form combat squads, teach you how to arm, and supply fire-arms. Lastly, we shall unite the activities of all people scattered in all towns and places, who want to free Russia from the yoke of the autocracy, and, when that unity has been achieved, we will give the signal for the general uprising." Finally, we would point out that the Rules of the Workers' Union (§ 4) say: "The appeal to form the Workers' Union will be distributed at all the factories of St. Petersburg and its environs."

From all this it is apparent that we have to do here with an attempt at an "independent" non-party organisation of the armed popular uprising in general and the uprising of the St. Petersburg workers in particular. We shall not dwell here on the question to what extent this attempt is serious; that can be judged conclusively only from its results and tentatively from private and secret information about the R.L.U., but we have *no* such information. We wish to touch therefore on the significance of this attempt in terms of principle and the tactical and organisational tasks which it poses for Social-Democracy.

Without doubt, we are dealing here with weighty evidence pointing to the fact that the question of the armed popular uprising is now looming large. It is a question which practical workers as well as theoreticians have now raised. It is posed, not as a conclusion drawn from a definite programme (as it was, for instance, in Social-Democratic literature abroad in 1902),* but as a vital issue

* See present edition, Vol. 5, p. 515.—*Ed.*

of the practical movement today. It is not a question now of discussing the problem, or even of preparing for the uprising in general, but of actually carrying out the uprising. Manifestly, the whole course of events *brings to the fore* the question of the uprising; the whole struggle for freedom has made necessary such a decisive outcome. From this it is clear, by the way, how deeply mistaken those Social-Democrats are who seek to prevent the Party from putting this task on the order of the day.

Furthermore, the attempt we have considered proves that the *revolutionary-democratic movement* in Russia has made a great stride forward. A long time back, in issue No. 7 of *Vperyod*,* we pointed out the emergence of this new group among the forces, parties, and organisations hostile to the autocracy. We pointed out that the very nature of the revolution taking place in Russia, namely, the bourgeois-democratic revolution, inevitably increased and multiplied, and would continue to increase and multiply, the most diverse militant elements who expressed the interests of the most diverse sections of the people, who were prepared for decisive struggle and were passionately devoted to the cause of freedom and prepared to sacrifice their all for that cause, but who did not and could not grasp either the historic significance or the class content of the revolution that was taking place. The rapid growth of these social elements is highly characteristic of an epoch in which the whole people is oppressed by the autocracy and in which the direct political struggle has not yet succeeded in clearly demarcating the classes and creating clearly defined parties understandable to the broad masses. All these undissociated and undefined elements form the cadres of the revolutionary democrats. Their militant significance for the democratic revolution is very great. Their non-party, indefinite position is, on the one hand, symptomatic of the fact that the intermediate sections of the population are rising to desperate struggle and revolt—the sections that have least of all merged with either of the two hostile classes in capitalist society, the sections of the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie, etc. On the other hand, the fact that these non-party revolutionaries

* See pp. 164-65 of this volume.—*Ed.*

have set out upon the revolutionary path is a pledge that the utterly backward sections of the people, those farthest removed from class definiteness, will now be more easily, quickly, and broadly aroused and drawn into the struggle. Formerly only the intelligentsia in Russia was revolutionary. Later the urban proletariat turned revolutionary. Today a considerable number of other social elements, deeply rooted "in the people" and closely linked with the masses, are turning revolutionary against the autocracy. The active participation of these elements is essential to the cause of the *popular* uprising. Their militant significance, we repeat, is very great. But their political significance for the *proletarian* movement may sometimes be small, if not actually negative. These elements are simply revolutionary and simply democratic because association with the one definite class which has cut loose from the ruling bourgeoisie, viz., the proletariat, is alien to them. By fighting for freedom without close connection with the proletarian struggle for socialism, they play a role that objectively amounts to promoting the interests of the bourgeoisie. They who serve the cause of freedom in general without serving the specific cause of proletarian utilisation of this freedom, the cause of turning the freedom to account in the proletarian struggle for socialism, are, in the final analysis, plainly and simply, fighters for the interests of the bourgeoisie. We do not in the least belittle the heroism of these people. We certainly do not belittle their tremendous role in the struggle for freedom. But we do not cease to maintain with the utmost emphasis that their activity does not yet in the least guarantee that the fruits of victory, the fruits of freedom, will be utilised in the interest of the proletariat, of socialism. They who stand outside the parties thereby serve the interests of the ruling party, albeit unwittingly and against their will. They who struggle for freedom outside the parties thereby serve the interests of the force that will inevitably rule when freedom is won, viz., the interests of the bourgeoisie. For this reason we called the non-party organisation of the uprising "independent" in inverted commas. Actually, non-partyism, with its appearance of independence, implies utter lack of independence and utter dependence on the ruling party. Actually, the just plain revolutionaries, the just

plain democrats are no more than the vanguard of the bourgeois-democratic movement, and sometimes merely its auxiliary force, even its cannon-fodder.

We pass now from these general theses to a more detailed examination of the documents in hand. "Let us abandon for a time party disputes and differences on points of principle," exclaims the C.C. of the R.L.U. in its first call, "let us rally into a mighty whole, into the Russian Liberation Union, and give our strength, our funds, and our knowledge to the people in its great struggle with the common enemy, the autocracy. Until the Constituent Assembly is held, we must all go along together. Only the Constituent Assembly can bring political freedom, without which a proper struggle of the parties is inconceivable." Any worker who is at all class-conscious knows full well that the people struggling against the autocracy consists of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The bourgeoisie is very keen on freedom, it is making a great stir about it, writing in the press and addressing meetings against the autocracy. Yet is there a person so naïve who does not understand that the bourgeoisie will never give up private ownership of the land and of capital, but, on the contrary, will fight to the last ditch to retain it against the encroachment of the workers? For the worker to abandon differences on questions of principle with the bourgeoisie, alongside which he is fighting the autocracy, is tantamount to *abandoning socialism*, to abandoning the idea of socialism, and the preparatory work for socialism. For the worker, in short, it means abandoning the idea of his economic emancipation, the emancipation of the working people from poverty and oppression. All over the world the bourgeoisie struggled for freedom, which it won largely with the hands of the workers, only thereafter to launch a furious struggle against socialism. Therefore, the appeal to sink differences is a *bourgeois* appeal. Under the guise of non-partyism the C.C. of the R.L.U. is feeding the workers with bourgeois phrases, instilling into them bourgeois ideas, demoralising their socialist consciousness with bourgeois exhalations. Only the enemies of socialism, the liberal bourgeois, the *Osvobozhdeniye* gentry, can be consciously in sympathy with the idea of the workers and the bourgeois sinking their differences for a time, and only revolutionary demo-

crats like the Socialists-Revolutionaries, who care little about socialism, can unconsciously be in sympathy with it. The workers should fight for freedom, without *even for a minute* abandoning the idea of socialism, without ceasing to work for its realisation, to prepare the forces and the organisation for the achievement* of socialism.

The C.C. of the R.L.U. says: "As far as our attitude towards the existing parties and organisations is concerned, we, the Central Committee of the R.L.U., declare that we foresee no possibility of the appearance of fundamental differences with the Social-Democratic parties, since the principle of the Union does not contradict their programmes".... These words show the extent to which the C.C. of the R.L.U. misunderstands socialism. The C.C. does not even foresee the possibility of the appearance of differences with Social-Democracy, whereas we have shown that a fundamental difference exists! The C.C. sees no contradiction between the principle of the Union and the programme of Social-Democracy, whereas we have shown that this contradiction is as profound as the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Our radical disagreement with the R.L.U. arises precisely from the fact that it passes socialism over in silence. Any political trend that *passes socialism over* in silence is radically opposed to the Social-Democratic programme.

The quoted passage shows that the R.L.U. is in sympathy with Social-Democracy. Knowing nothing about the R.L.U. beyond the leaflet it has issued, we are not yet in a position to judge the sincerity of that sympathy. At any rate, mere Platonic sympathy cannot satisfy us, mere Platonic love is not enough. We want more than sympathy, we want to be understood and we want our programme to be shared by those who would not like their ideas to contradict this programme. The Russian Liberation Union speaks of its task of "widely distributing among the workers literature advocating a *strictly proletarian* ideology" (our italics). These are very good words, but words are not enough. And if these fine words contradict the deeds, no amount of sincerity will save their authors in actual deeds from becoming carriers of bourgeois ideas into the working class. Let us consider the matter: what does this "strictly proletarian ideology" actually mean? Who is going to judge whether it

is strictly proletarian? Can the problem conceivably be solved by "abandoning for a time party disputes and differences" on points of principle? Would it not then first be necessary to "abandon for a time" the distribution of literature among the workers?

The C.C. of the R.L.U. once more launches the slogan of the "independent activity" of the workers. Our Party has often witnessed attempts to call into life a special trend in Social-Democracy under the banner of this notorious slogan. Thus it was with the "Economists" in the past, thus it is now with the Mensheviks or the new-Iskristis. Ever and always it turned out that this slogan (whether those who released it were conscious of it or not) only suited the purpose of elements who least appreciated the consistency of principle and the idea-content of the movement. We need only see the new use to which this old slogan has been put: we see before our eyes a fusion of the appeal to "independent activity" in assessing a "strictly proletarian ideology" with the "independently active" repetition of anti-proletarian, bourgeois phrases, with the advocacy of the bourgeois idea of non-partyism. We would answer the C.C. of the R.L.U.: there is only one strictly proletarian ideology, and that is *Marxism*. A strictly proletarian programme and strictly proletarian tactics are the programme and the tactics of international revolutionary Social-Democracy. This is borne out, among other things, by proletarian experience, by the experience of the proletarian movement throughout the world, from Germany to America, from England to Italy. It is over half a century since this movement first emerged upon the broad political scene in 1848; the parties of the proletariat formed and grew into vast armies; they experienced a number of revolutions, underwent all kinds of trials, passed through deviations to both the Right and the Left, and waged a struggle with opportunism and with anarchism. This entire gigantic experience serves to confirm the Marxist ideology and the Social-Democratic programme. It is a *pledge* that even those workers who are now following the lead of the R.L.U. will, in the mass, inevitably and unavoidably come to Social-Democracy!

To quote further from the Appeal: "Being largely a practical organisation, the R.L.U. is at one in its activity

also with the Party of the Socialists-Revolutionaries, inasmuch as we are united with it by a common method—armed struggle against the autocracy, and a common aim—the convocation of a Constituent Assembly on democratic lines....” After what has been said we are not surprised, of course, at this rapprochement of the revolutionary democrats with the Socialists-Revolutionaries. While stressing the practical nature of its organisation in the cited passage of the Appeal and limiting its solidarity with the Socialists-Revolutionaries (“inasmuch as”) to common grounds of method and immediate aim, the R.L.U. obviously abstains for the present from determining the relationship between the “principles” of the Socialists-Revolutionaries and those of a “strictly proletarian ideology”. Such an abstention would be a very bad recommendation for a Social-Democrat, but a very good one for a revolutionary democrat. Unfortunately, however, the ensuing sentence in the Appeal shows what a “non-party” stand may lead to.... “We have nothing against even the *Osvobozhdeniye* League,” says the C.C. of the R.L.U., “notwithstanding the radical difference in our political convictions, provided, of course, that it brings itself to realise the inevitability of the armed uprising if a Constituent Assembly is to be convened.”

In the first place, we would remark in this connection that if the R.L.U. differs radically only with the political views of the *Osvobozhdeniye* League, we can infer that it does not differ with its economic programme, in which case it explicitly renounces socialism and fully subscribes to the views of the revolutionary *bourgeois* democrats! This deduction, of course, is at variance with the R.L.U.’s sympathies for a “strictly proletarian ideology”, but the essence of a “non-party” stand consists precisely in the fact that it engenders endless and hopeless contradictions.

Secondly, what exactly is the radical difference between the political views of the R.L.U. and the *Osvobozhdeniye* League? The R.L.U. has just rapped its own knuckles; it has spoken of “going along together to a Constituent Assembly” and “abandoning for a time party disputes and differences on points of principle” (obviously, until the Constituent Assembly is convened), and now, before the Constituent Assembly, it precipitates a dispute and expresses its dis-

agreement with the *Osvobozhdeniye* League, which adopted in its programme the convocation of a popular Constituent Assembly on democratic lines! How does it happen that the R.L.U., while expressing a desire to "propagandise its political convictions", manages to say nothing on the content of those convictions? Is the R.L.U. a republican organisation, as distinct from the *Osvobozhdeniye* League, which is monarchist? Do the political convictions of the R.L.U. include, say, the abolition of the standing army and its replacement by the arming of the people? the demand for the complete disestablishment of the Church? the complete abolition of indirect taxes, etc.? In its desire to simplify and ease things by abandoning party disputes and fundamental differences, the R.L.U. has actually complicated and made things more difficult by the utter vagueness of its position.

Thirdly, how are we to know whether the *Osvobozhdeniye* League will fulfil the condition which the R.L.U. has set it, whether it will "bring itself to realise the inevitability of the armed uprising"? Are we to wait for its official announcement on that score? But the *Osvobozhdeniye* League refuses to say anything about the methods by which its programme is to be carried out. It gives its members full scope both in the choice of those methods and in the matter of modifying the programme itself. It considers itself to be a part of the "Constitutional-Democratic" (read constitutional-monarchist) party, whose other part forms the Zemstvo grouping which refuses to commit itself to any programme or to any tactics whatever. This being the case, what does the condition set to the *Osvobozhdeniye* League by the R.L.U. amount to? Further, who does not know that the *Osvobozhdeniye* adherents do not commit themselves to any definite programme or tactical line, in order to be completely free in certain cases to declare themselves (especially unofficially) both for terrorism and for the uprising? Hence, we arrive at the indubitable conclusion that influential members and even influential groups of the League will experience no difficulty in joining, should they wish to do so, the R.L.U. and in occupying key positions therein. Given the R.L.U.'s non-party position, quite a number of circumstances beyond its control (large financial resources, social connections, etc.) will favour such an

outcome. This outcome would mean the conversion of the armed fighting squads of the people into an instrument of the liberal bourgeoisie, the subjection of the workers' uprising to its interests. It would mean the political exploitation of the proletariat by the bourgeoisie in the Russian democratic revolution. In the event of such an outcome the bourgeoisie would furnish the money to arm the proletariat, taking care to divert the proletariat from socialism by preaching common-party interests, to weaken its ties with Social-Democracy, and thus to render its own chances most favourable for using the workers as its tool and for depriving them of the possibilities to advance their own, "party", proletarian interests in the revolution.

* * *

The tactical tasks, which the appearance of this new union sets before the Social-Democrats, follow naturally from what has been said above. Whether this particular union, the R.L.U., especially its C.C., subject to no control and answerable to no one, merits confidence, we cannot say. We shall not dwell on the C.C. of the R.L.U., but on the R.L.U. Workers' Union, and not so much on this particular workers' union as on workers' unions of this type in general. Similar "unions", organisations, groups, and circles in varying forms, under varying names, and of varying sizes, are today springing up all over Russia. The whole policy of the autocracy, which compels the people to resort to arms and prepare for the uprising, inevitably stimulates the organisation of such groups. The motley, often accidental, nature of their social composition, with its indeterminate class character, in conjunction with an extremely limited scope of effective Social-Democratic work, inevitably lends these groups the character of common-party revolutionary-democratic groups. The practical attitude of the Social-Democrats towards them is one of our Party's most pressing problems.

We must, in the first place, decidedly use all means to make the Social-Democratic standpoint clear to the members of these groups, especially to the workers, without vagueness or reservation in the slightest, that the proletariat must organise definitely on a party basis and definitely in the

Social-Democratic Party, if it does not wish to be politically exploited by the bourgeoisie. It would be sheer pedantry for us simply to dismiss these groups, or to "overlook" their formation and their tremendous importance for the struggle for freedom. It would be unpardonable doctrinairism for the Social-Democrats to adopt a snobbish or contemptuous attitude towards the "common-party" workers belonging to such groups. We should like in particular to warn all members of the Party against such mistakes, which are possible as a result of the revival of Economism of rueful memory and a narrow, tail-ist interpretation of our tasks in the ranks of Social-Democracy. Every effort should be made to effect a mutual exchange of assistance between these groups and the organisations of our Party for the purpose of arming the greatest possible number of workers. There should be an extremely discreet, tactful, and comradely attitude towards the workers, who are ready to die for freedom, who are organising and arming for the fight, who are in complete sympathy with the proletarian struggle, and who are yet divided from us by the lack of a Social-Democratic world outlook, by anti-Marxist prejudices, and by survivals of superannuated revolutionary views. Nothing is easier than the method of immediately breaking with such otherwise-minded workers or of simply keeping aloof from them; nor is there anything more stupid than such a method. We should remember that Social-Democracy's strength lies in the unity of the broad masses of the proletariat, and that such unity, owing to the splitting, disuniting, and dulling conditions of capitalism, is not achieved with immediacy, but only at the cost of persistent effort and tremendous patience. We should remember the experiences of our European comrades, who consider it their duty to show an attitude of comradely concern even towards the workers who are members of the Catholic unions and try not to antagonise them by treating their religious and political prejudices with contempt, but persistently, tactfully, and patiently make use of every act of the political and economic struggle in order to enlighten them and bring them closer to the class-conscious proletariat on the ground of common struggle. How much more careful should our attitude be towards the worker-revolutionaries, who are prepared to fight for freedom

but are still strangers to Social-Democracy! We repeat: no concealment of Social-Democratic views, but no slighting of the revolutionary groups that do not share these views. So long as these groups have not officially joined any non-Social-Democratic party, we are entitled, nay, obligated to regard them as *associated with the R.S.D.L.P.* Thus, too, we should regard the Workers' Union of the Russian Liberation Union. We should make every effort to introduce the members of this union to socialist literature and conduct propaganda of our views by word of mouth at all meetings of all the branches of this union. Even in the free countries of Europe the idea that all proletarians can be made class-conscious Social-Democrats under capitalism is considered utopian. But neither in Europe nor in Russia is the idea of the Social-Democrats' leading influence upon the mass of the proletariat considered utopian. The thing is to learn how to exercise this influence, to remember that our best ally in educating the unenlightened workers will be our enemies, the government and the bourgeoisie; then we shall be sure that, at the decisive moment, the whole working-class mass will respond to the call of Social-Democracy!

THE DEMOCRATIC TASKS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PROLETARIAT¹⁴⁶

The Social-Democratic Party, as the conscious exponent of the working-class movement, aims at the complete liberation of the toiling masses from every form of oppression and exploitation. The achievement of this objective—the abolition of private property in the means of production and the creation of the socialist society—calls for a very high development of the productive forces of capitalism and a high degree of organisation of the working class. The full development of the productive forces in modern bourgeois society, a broad, free, and open class struggle, and the political education, training, and rallying of the masses of the proletariat are inconceivable without political freedom. Therefore it has always been the aim of the class-conscious proletariat to wage a determined struggle for 'complete political freedom and the democratic revolution.

The proletariat is not alone in setting this task before itself. The bourgeoisie, too, needs political freedom. The enlightened members of the propertied classes hung out the banner of liberty long ago; the revolutionary intelligentsia, which comes mainly from these classes, has fought heroically for freedom. But the bourgeoisie as a whole is incapable of waging a determined struggle against the autocracy; it fears to lose in this struggle its property which binds it to the existing order; it fears an all-too revolutionary action of the workers, who will not stop at the democratic revolution but will aspire to the socialist revolution; it fears a complete break with officialdom, with the bureaucracy, whose interests are bound up by a thousand ties with the interests of the propertied classes. For this reason

the bourgeois struggle for liberty is notoriously timorous, inconsistent, and half-hearted. One of the tasks of the proletariat is to prod the bourgeoisie on, to raise before the whole people slogans calling for a complete democratic revolution, to start working boldly and independently for the realisation of these slogans—in a word, to be the vanguard, to take the lead in the struggle for the liberty of the whole people.

In the pursuit of this aim the Russian Social-Democrats have had to fight many a battle against the inconsistency of bourgeois liberalism. Let us recall, for instance, how Mr. Struve began his career, unhampered by the censor, as a political champion of the “liberation” of Russia. He made his *début* with his preface to the Witte “Memorandum”, in which he advanced the markedly “Shipovian” (to use the current political nomenclature) slogan, “Rights, and an Authoritative Zemstvo”. The Social-Democratic Party exposed the retrogressive, absurd, and reactionary nature of that slogan; it demanded a definite and uncompromising democratic platform, and itself put forward such a platform as an integral part of its Party programme. Social-Democracy had to combat the narrow conception of the aims of democracy which obtained in its own ranks when the so-called Economists did their best to play down these aims, when they advocated the “economic struggle against the employers and the government”, and insisted that we must start by winning rights, continue with political agitation, and only then gradually (the theory of stages) pass on to political struggle.

Now the political struggle has become vastly extended, the revolution has spread throughout the land, the mildest liberals have become “extremists”; it may therefore seem that historical references to the recent past such as we have just made are out of place, with no bearing on the actual turbulent present. But this may seem so only at first glance. To be sure, such slogans as the demand for a Constituent Assembly and for universal, direct, and equal suffrage by secret ballot (which the Social-Democrats long since and in advance of all presented in their Party programme) have become common property; they have been adopted by the illegal *Osvobozhdeniye*, incorporated in the programme of

the *Osvobozhdeniye* League, turned into Zemstvo slogans, and are now being repeated in every shape and form by the legal press: That Russian bourgeois democracy has made progress in recent years and months cannot be doubted. Bourgeois democracy is learning by experience, is discarding primitive slogans (like the Shipovian "Rights, and an Authoritative Zemstvo") and is hobbling along behind the revolution. But it is only hobbling along behind; new contradictions between its words and its deeds, between democracy in principle and democracy in "*Realpolitik*", are arising in place of the old; for revolutionary developments are making steadily growing demands on democracy. But bourgeois democracy always drags at the tail of events; while adopting more advanced slogans, it always lags behind; it always formulates the slogans several degrees below the level really required in the real revolutionary struggle for real liberty.

Indeed, let us take that now current and generally accepted slogan, "For a Constituent Assembly on the basis of universal, direct, and equal suffrage by secret ballot". Is that slogan adequate from the standpoint of consistent democracy? Is it adequate in the light of the urgent revolutionary tasks of the present moment? The answer to both these questions can be only in the negative. To be convinced that this is so one has only to examine carefully our Party programme, to which our organisations, unfortunately, do not often refer and which they quote and disseminate all too little. (As a happy exception, worthy of the widest emulation, we note the recent reprint of our Party programme in leaflet form by the Riga, Voronezh, and Moscow committees.) The keynote of our programme, too, is the demand for a popular Constituent Assembly (let us agree, for brevity's sake, to use the word "popular" as denoting suffrage that is universal, etc.). But this slogan does not stand isolated in our programme. The context and the addenda and notes prevent any misconception on the part of those who are least consistent in the struggle for liberty or who even struggle against it. It occurs in our programme in conjunction with the following other slogans: (1) the *overthrow* of the tsarist autocracy; (2) its replacement by the democratic *republic*; (3) the *sovereignty of the people*, safeguarded by a democratic constitution, i.e., the concentration of supreme

governmental authority *entirely* in the hands of a legislative assembly composed of representatives of the people and forming a single chamber.

Can there be any doubt that every consistent democrat is obligated to accept all these slogans? Why, the very word "democrat", both by its etymology and by virtue of the political significance it has acquired throughout the history of Europe, denotes an adherent of the sovereignty of the people. It is absurd, therefore, to talk of democracy and in the same breath to reject even a single one of these slogans. But the main contradiction, the contradiction between the desire of the bourgeoisie to preserve private property at all costs and its desire for liberty, is so profound that spokesmen or followers of the liberal bourgeoisie inevitably find themselves in this ridiculous position. As everyone knows, a very broad liberal party is forming itself in Russia with enormous rapidity, a party which has the adherence of the *Osvobozhdeniye* League, of the mass of the *Zemstvo* people, and of newspapers like *Nasha Zhizn*, *Nashi Dni*, *Syn Otechestva*, *Russkiye Vedomosti*,* etc., etc. This liberal-bourgeois party likes to be called the "Constitutional-Democratic" Party. In actual fact, however, as can be seen from the declarations and the programme of the illegal *Osvobozhdeniye*, it is a *monarchist* party. It does not want a republic at all. It does not want a unicameral assembly, and it proposes for the Upper House indirect and virtually non-universal suffrage (residence qualification). It is anything but anxious for the supreme governmental authority to pass *entirely* into the hands of the people (although for window-dressing purposes it is very fond of talking about the transfer of power to the people). It does not want the autocracy to be *overthrown*. It wants only a division of power among (1) the monarchy; (2) the Upper House (where landowners and capitalists will predominate); and (3) the Lower House, which *alone* is to be built on democratic principles.

Thus, we have before us the indisputable fact that our "democratic" bourgeoisie, even as represented by its most advanced, most educated elements, those least subject to

* *Our Life, Our Days, Son of the Fatherland, Russian Recorder*.—Ed.

the direct influence of capital, is trailing behind the revolution. This "democratic" party *fears* the sovereignty of the people. While repeating our slogan of a popular Constituent Assembly, it in fact completely distorts its sense and significance and misleads the people by its use, or, rather, abuse.

What is a "popular Constituent" Assembly? It is an assembly which, in the first place, really expresses the will of the people. To this end we must have universal suffrage in all of its democratic aspects, and a full guarantee of freedom to conduct the election campaign. It is an assembly which, in the second place, *really has the power and authority* to "inaugurate" a political order which will ensure the sovereignty of the people. It is clear as daylight that without these two conditions the assembly can be neither truly popular nor truly constituent. Yet our liberal bourgeois, our constitutional monarchists (whose claim to be democrats is a mockery of the people) do not want real safeguards to ensure *either* of these conditions! Not only do they fail to ensure in any way complete freedom of election propaganda or the actual transfer of power and authority to the Constituent Assembly, but, on the contrary, they *seek to make* both *impossible* since they aim at maintaining the monarchy. The real power and authority is to remain in the hands of Nicholas the Bloody. This means that the dire enemy of the people is to convene the assembly and "ensure" that the elections will be free and universal. How very democratic! It means that the Constituent Assembly will never have and (according to the idea of the liberal bourgeois) must never have all power and all authority; it is to be utterly devoid of power, devoid of authority; it is merely *to come to terms, to reach an agreement, to arrive at an understanding, to strike a bargain* with Nicholas II for the assembly to be granted a modicum of his royal power! The Constituent Assembly elected by universal suffrage is to differ in no way from a Lower House. That is to say, the Constituent Assembly, convened for expressing and executing the will of the people, is designed by the liberal bourgeoisie to "constitute", *over the will of the people*, the will of an Upper House and on top of that the will of the monarchy, the will of Nicholas.

Is it not obvious that in talking, speechifying, and shouting about a popular Constituent Assembly, the liberal bourgeois, the *Osvobozhdeniye* gentry, are actually planning an *anti-popular consultative* assembly? Instead of emancipating the people, they want to subject the people, by constitutional means, first, to the power of the tsar (monarchism), and, secondly, to the power of the organised big bourgeoisie (the Upper House).

If anyone wishes to dispute this conclusion, let him assert: (1) that there can be a true expression of the popular will in elections without complete freedom of propaganda and without the actual abolition of all the propaganda privileges of the tsarist government; or (2) that an assembly of delegates devoid of real power and authority, in that these are left in the hands of the tsar, is not, in effect, a mere consultative body. To make either of these assertions one must be either a brazen charlatan or a hopeless fool. History proves conclusively that a representative assembly coexisting with a monarchical form of government is in actual fact, so long as governmental power remains in the hands of the monarchy, a consultative body which does not bend the will of the monarch to the will of the people, but only *conforms* the will of the people to the will of the monarch, i. e., divides the power between monarch and people, bargains for a new order, but does not constitute it. History proves conclusively that there can be no such thing as really free elections, that the significance and character of these elections can hardly be brought home to the *whole* people unless the government that is combating the revolution is replaced by a provisional revolutionary government. Granting for a moment the improbable and the impossible, namely, that the tsarist government, having decided to convene a "Constituent" (read: consultative) Assembly, will give *formal* guarantees of freedom of propaganda, all the vast advantages and superior facilities for campaigning which accrue from the organised power of the state will nevertheless remain in its hands. These advantages and facilities for propaganda during the elections to the first people's assembly will be enjoyed by the very ones who have oppressed the people by all the means in their power, and from whom the people have begun to wrest liberty by force.

In a word, we arrive at the very conclusion we reached on the previous occasion (*Proletary*, No. 3),* when we examined this question from another angle. The slogan of a popular Constituent Assembly, taken by itself, separately, is at the present time a slogan of the monarchist bourgeoisie, a slogan calling for a deal between the bourgeoisie and the tsarist government. Only the overthrow of the tsarist government and its replacement by a provisional revolutionary government, whose duty it will be to convene the popular Constituent Assembly, can be the slogan of the revolutionary struggle. Let the proletariat of Russia have no illusions on this score; in the din of the general excitation it is being deceived by the use of its own slogans. If we fail to match the armed force of the government with the force of an armed people, if the tsarist government is not utterly defeated and replaced by a provisional revolutionary government, every representative assembly, whatever title—"popular", "constituent", etc.—may be conferred upon it, will in fact be an assembly of representatives of the big bourgeoisie convened for the purpose of bargaining with the tsar for a division of power.

The more the people's struggle against the tsar comes to a head and the greater likelihood there is of a speedy realisation of the demand for an assembly of people's representatives, the more closely must the revolutionary proletariat watch the "democratic" bourgeoisie. The sooner we gain freedom, the sooner will this ally of the proletariat become its enemy. Two circumstances will serve to cloak this change: (1) the vagueness, incompleteness, and non-committal character of the would-be democratic slogans of the bourgeoisie; and (2) the endeavour to turn the slogans of the proletariat into mere phrases, to substitute empty promises for *real* safeguards of liberty and revolution. The workers must now watch the "democrats" with intensified vigilance. The words "popular Constituent Assembly" will be nothing more than words if, owing to the actual conditions under which the election campaign and the elections themselves are conducted, this assembly fails to express the will of the people, if it lacks the strength independently to establish the new order.

* See pp. 492-93 of this volume.—*Ed.*

The cardinal issue is now shifting from the question of summoning the popular Constituent Assembly to the question of the *method* by which it is to be summoned. We are on the eve of decisive events. The proletariat must not pin its faith in general democratic slogans but must contrapose to them its own proletarian-democratic slogans in their full scope. Only a force guided by these slogans can really ensure the complete victory of the revolution.

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THE FIRST STEPS OF BOURGEOIS BETRAYAL

Geneva, Wednesday, June 21(8)

Yesterday the telegraph brought the news that Nicholas II had received a Zemstvo deputation last Monday. Responding to speeches by Prince Sergei Trubetskoi and Mr. Fyodorov, the tsar emphatically confirmed his promise to convene an assembly of people's representatives.

To appreciate fully the significance of this "event" we must first of all reconstruct certain facts that were reported in the foreign press.

On May 24 and 25, old style, about 300 Zemstvo and municipal representatives held three meetings in Moscow. In the lithographed copies we have received from Russia of their petition to the tsar and of a resolution adopted by them the number of attending delegates is not indicated; mention is made only of City Mayors and Marshals of the Nobility, as well as Zemstvo and municipal councillors, having attended the Conference. The representatives of landlordism and urban capital discussed the political fortunes of Russia. According to the foreign correspondents, the debate was very heated. The Shipov party, with its moderate policy and its extensive Court connections, enjoyed great influence. The most radical were the provincial delegates, the most moderate those from St. Petersburg, while the "Centre" was formed by the Moscow delegates. Every word of the petition was debated, St. Petersburg finally joining in the vote for it. The resulting document was a patriotic and loyal petition. "Actuated solely by ardent love of country", the respectable bourgeois gentlemen sink "all discord

and all differences that divide them" and appeal to the tsar. They point to "the grave danger to Russia and to the Throne itself", which emanates not so much from abroad as from "internal strife". (True, "Russia" comes before the "Throne", but our patriots appealed to the Throne first and only threatened—privately and *à la sourdine*—to appeal to the people.) As usual, the petition is full of official eyewash: everything is blamed on the tsar's councillors, on the distortion of his designs and prescriptions which has led to a tightening of the police regime and prevented the "voice of truth" from ascending to the Throne, etc. They conclude with the request, "before it is too late", that "representatives of the people elected for this purpose by all subjects on an equal basis, without any distinction, be convoked without delay". The representatives of the people are to decide the question of war or peace "in concert" with the tsar and to "establish [also *in concert* with the tsar] an improved system of government". Thus, the petition contains no explicit demand for universal, direct, and equal suffrage by secret ballot, which was alleged to have been adopted by the "Constitutional-Democratic" Party (all reference to direct suffrage and secret ballot is omitted and, of course, not by accident); and no guarantees whatever are demanded to ensure that the elections will be free. The authors of the petition state pathetically: "Oppression of the individual and of society, denial of free speech, and all manner of tyranny are multiplying and growing"; but no measures against them are suggested. Tyranny is growing "in concert" with the tsar; so let the political system be "improved" in concert with the tsar.... The representatives of the bourgeoisie are holding fast to the theory of an "agreement", not, of course, on the part of the people, but on the part of the bourgeoisie, and the people's oppressors.

The Conference elected a delegation to present the petition to the tsar. It consisted of Messrs. Heyden, Golovin, Petrunkevich, G. and N. Lvov, Pyotr and Pavel Dolgorukov, Kovalevsky, Novosiltsev, Rodichev, Shakhovskoi, and Sergei Trubetskoi. Later, at the audience given by Nicholas II, they were joined by Messrs. Korf, Nikitin, and Fyodorov, from St. Petersburg.

The Conference then adopted the following *resolution*,

which was not reported in the foreign press but is reproduced in the Russian leaflet:

"This Conference of united groups of Zemstvo and municipal representatives, imbued, notwithstanding differences of opinion on certain political questions, with the common conviction that the root cause of the present difficult position of Russia, domestic and foreign, is the still existing system of government by decree, which denies individual and public freedom, represses the self-realisation and independent activity of the people, debars the population from participation in the life of the state, and breeds unrestrained and constantly increasing lawlessness on the part of an irresponsible administration; that this system of government, which for many years has been a source of violence, falsehood, and corruption in our internal life, has now led to the dire threat of grave external danger, by having involved the nation in a disastrous war, in the course of which it has engendered and sustained internecine strife, and brought the country to a series of defeats culminating in a disaster to its naval forces unprecedented in Russian history;—and, firm in the conviction that the further existence of this regime menaces, not only the internal peace, the order, and the welfare of the people, but also the stability of the Throne and the territorial integrity and external security of Russia, this Conference declares that the salvation of the country makes it imperatively necessary:

"1. That freely elected popular representatives be immediately convoked to decide, jointly with the Sovereign, the question of war and peace and of establishing a constitutional state system;

"2. That all laws, institutions, decisions, and orders which contravene the principles of personal liberty, freedom of speech, of the press, and of association and assembly, be immediately nullified, and that a political amnesty be proclaimed;

"3. That the administrative personnel be immediately renewed through the placement of the central administration in the charge of persons who are sincerely devoted to the cause of reforming the state and who enjoy the confidence of the community."

We do not know in what relation this resolution stands to the petition and to the mandates of the delegation, whether the delegation undertook to set forth the substance of the resolution or to present it together with the petition. Perhaps the petition is the official document for the "Throne", and the resolution the unofficial document for the "people"?

As regards the character of the debates at the Conference, the correspondent of the French paper *Le Matin*,¹⁴⁷ M. Gaston Leroux, reports that the most "progressive-minded" of the delegates, those from the provincial Zemstvos, stood for a two-stage electoral system, fearing that under

direct elections they would be overwhelmed by the "towns" (evidently they feared that under direct elections the privileges of the landlords over the peasants would not be fully guaranteed). The correspondent of the *Frankfurter Zeitung* wrote:

"The Russian Zemstvo as a political party consists of three groupings: the *liberal* Zemstvo majority (with Count Heyden as its leader), the *moderately liberal* nationalist-Slavophil Zemstvo minority headed by Mr. Shipov, and the group of radical Zemstvo constitutionalists. It is characteristic that at the election of delegates ... it was the 'feudal' candidates that got through. The moderates wanted to be worthily represented before the tsar by members of respected old families. And the radicals, who entertained no illusions as to the outcome of the petition, wanted the representatives of the old families to see with their own eyes that the government would not yield an inch *voluntarily*."

The conveniences of that nebulous organisation of the "Constitutional-Democratic" (read: monarchist) party eulogised by Mr. Struve were not long in revealing themselves in practice. A strong, firmly knit party organisation will not lend itself to dickering and bargaining, to dodges and subterfuges. Let the "party" include both the *Osvobozhdeniye* League (perhaps this is the "group of radicals" mentioned by the correspondent of the *Frankfurter Zeitung*) and the "Zemstvo group" (i.e., the followers of Heyden and of Shipov, from whom Mr. Struve is *now* officially seeking to dissociate himself). But the Zemstvo group includes the Heydenists, the Shipovists, and ... the "radicals". Work this out if you can! But they are all agreed, moved as they were by ardent love for their country and for the privileges of the bourgeois, on the *theory of agreement*, with which we have often dealt in *Proletary*, and which is clearly in evidence both in the "petition" and in the "resolution".

The resolution was probably designed to satisfy the "ideal" demands of the radicals, while the petition, as interpreted by the "moderate" delegates, was to serve the purpose of a material deal with tsarism. Such things as the numerical representation of the groupings at the Conference, the powers of the delegates, the terms of the deal,

and the further intentions of the Zemstvo men were very carefully concealed from the uninitiated plebs. The "people", in whose name the bourgeois gentlemen are bargaining with tsarism, have no need to know the high politics of the "Constitutional-Democratic Party"! The bourgeois gentlemen will converse with the tsar about the suppression of free speech and the voice of truth, about *people's* representatives, about a Russia that has "rallied round the one standard of the *people*", etc.; but for this people to know the whole truth about the policy pursued by the liberal and *Osvobozhdeniye* hagglers is quite superfluous.... Indeed, not without reason did Mr. Struve, in *Osvobozhdeniye*, recently reproach the "extreme parties" (the Social-Democrats in particular) for their immoderate leaning to narrow, conspiratorial, Jacobin "secrecy". We Social-Democrats resort to secrecy from the tsar and his bloodhounds, while taking pains that the people should know everything about our Party, about the shades of opinion within it, about the development of its programme and policy, that they should even know what this or that Party congress delegate said at the congress in question. The enlightened bourgeois of the *Osvobozhdeniye* fraternity surround themselves with secrecy... from the people, who know nothing definite about the much-talked-of "Constitutional-Democratic" Party; but they make up for this by taking the tsar and his sleuths into their confidence. Who can say they are not democrats?

What secrets the Zemstvo delegates unbosomed to the Court cabal, who refused to admit them to the tsar, we do not know. But the confidences and talks continued for quite a while. The foreign press was agog for news about the delegates' every step in the game of "high politics". St. Petersburg, June 9 (May 27): The Zemstvo deputation will in the first place see Mr. Bulygin, Minister of the Interior, in order to lodge a complaint against Trepov. June 10 (May 28): Bulygin told the deputation that it would not be received by the tsar and advised it to leave St. Petersburg. June 12 (May 30): It is thought probable that the tsar will receive the deputation. June 15 (2): A special telegram from M. Gaston Leroux to *Le Matin*: "*The Zemstvo delegates have accepted the conditions set by the Minister of the Court for an audience with the Emperor.* Thereupon Baron Fred-

ericks went this evening to Tsarskoye Selo to inquire of the tsar whether he had decided to receive the deputation."

Do you hear this, Russian workers and peasants? This is how they behave, these "liberationists" and "democrats", these foes of conspiracy, these abhorrrers of secrecy! They conspire with the Minister of the Court of His Policemanic Majesty, hugger-mugger with the spies against the people. They pose as the representatives of the "people", while accepting conditions framed by spies on *how* to speak with a tsar on the needs of the "people"!

This is how they act, the rich, independent, enlightened, and liberal-minded patriots who are "actuated by ardent love of country". How unlike the rough unschooled working-class rabble, dependent on every clerk, which tries to push its way straight to the tsar without any concealment, led by an audacious priest, without having even talked with the influential spies about the conditions of an interview with the tsar. How can one think of a republic, or even of direct elections or of a unicameral system with such politically uneducated masses? The politically educated know the ropes and understand that one should first make a backstairs call on the spies—perhaps even consult them as to the substance and style of the petition to the tsar—after which the "voice of truth" will surely "ascend to the Throne".

What sort of bargain the "representatives [save the mark!] of the people" struck with the tsar's spies we do not know. We know from the telegrams that at the reception of the delegation Prince Trubetskoi delivered "a lengthy speech" in which, for half an hour, he described to the tsar the plight of Russia and the conditions that had compelled the Zemstvo men to appeal directly to the tsar (and not through his spies?). The speech made a profound impression upon the tsar. Mr. Fyodorov spoke on behalf of the representatives of St. Petersburg. The tsar responded with a long speech. He expressed regret at the enormous sacrifices caused by the war, lamented the latest defeat at sea, and concluded with the words: "I thank you, gentlemen, *for the sentiments you have expressed* [fine sentiments they must have been, considering that the "democrat" Trubetskoi had consulted the spies on how to express them!]. I believe in your desire to work with me [the tsar believes

the liberal bourgeoisie; the liberal bourgeoisie believes the tsar; claw me—claw thee] in setting up a new system of government built on new principles. My desire to convene a popular assembly [When? Are the representatives to be elected? If so, in what manner and by whom? This is not known. Evidently Mr. Trubetskoi concealed from his beloved sovereign the “resolution” of the conference; the spies must have advised him not to broach this subject to the tsar!] is unshakable. It is daily in my thoughts. My will shall be carried out. You may announce this to the population of town and countryside this very day. You will help me in this new work. The popular assembly will restore unity between Russia and its emperor [between the Trubetskois and Fyodorovs and the emperor?]. It will lay the foundation of the system which will repose on Russian national principles.” The delegates—says the official telegram—came away from the audience tremendously impressed. The tsar seemed pleased, too....

This does look like the real truth! The tsar is pleased, the liberal bourgeois are pleased. They are ready to conclude a lasting peace with one another. The autocracy and the police (the true Russian national principles) are pleased. The money-bags as well are pleased (from now on their advice will be sought constantly and regularly).

But will the workers and peasants be pleased—they whose interests the bourgeois traitors are bartering away?

“REVOLUTIONARIES” IN KID GLOVES

Friday, June 23 (10)

The press abroad has begun to comment on the audience granted to the Zemstvo deputation by the tsar. As usual, the bourgeois press fawns, waxing sentimental over the tsar's amenability and the reasonableness of the Zemstvo representatives, though certain doubts creep in as to the value of promises given in so vague a form. The socialist papers bluntly and definitely declare that the audience was a farce.

The autocracy is playing for time and leading the liberal bourgeoisie by the nose. On the one hand, dictatorial powers for Trepov; on the other, meaningless and worthless promises to the liberals in order to cause further vacillation in their all-too vacillating ranks. The tactics of the autocratic government are not so stupid. The liberals are playing at loyalty, moderation, and modesty. Why should not the government take advantage of their stupidity and cowardice? *“A la guerre comme à la guerre.”* There are no wars without military stratagems. And when the “enemy” (the liberal bourgeoisie) is something between a foe and a gullible friend, why not lead him by the nose?

M. Gaston Leroux, referred to in our leading article, reports the following details concerning the audience, details which, though not very authentic, are at any rate characteristic and significant. “Baron Fredericks, Minister of the Court, told the delegates that, with the best of intentions, it was difficult for him to obtain an imperial audience for Mr. Petrunkevich, who was said to have revolutionary connections. It was pointed out to the Minister that the Austrian Emperor had had among his Ministers M. Andrassy,

who had at one time been sentenced. This argument removed the last difficulty and the delegates ... were conducted to the Court.”

The argument is a good one. The West-European bourgeoisie did fight in earnest at first; at times it was even republican, its leaders were “sentenced”—sentenced for *treason*, i.e., not only for revolutionary connections, but for *actual revolutionary deeds*. Then, many years, sometimes decades, later these bourgeois accommodated themselves to the most wretched of skimpy constitutions without a republic and without even universal suffrage or real political freedom. The liberal bourgeois became fully reconciled to “the Throne” and the police; they rose to power themselves and brutally suppressed, as they do to this day, every aspiration of the workers towards freedom and social reforms.

Russia’s liberal bourgeoisie wants to combine pleasure with profit. *To be regarded* as a man with “revolutionary connections” is pleasant; to be capable of occupying a ministerial seat under the Emperor Nicholas the Bloody is profitable. The bourgeois liberals of Russia have no desire whatever to risk “being sentenced” for treason. They prefer *the direct leap* into the stage in which ex-revolutionaries like Andrassy became Ministers on the side of law and order. In 1848 Count Andrassy had taken such an energetic part in the revolutionary movement that, after the suppression of the revolution, he was sentenced *to death and hanged in effigy*. He lived as an émigré in France and in England, and he did not return to Hungary until after the amnesty of 1857. That is when his “ministerial” career began. The Russian liberals do not want a revolution; they dread it; they want to be accepted as *ex-revolutionaries* straight away, without ever having been revolutionaries! They want to leap from 1847 into 1857 at a single bound! They want to make a deal with the tsar straight away for a constitution like those operating in Europe during the violent reaction which followed the *defeat* of the Revolution of 1848.

Indeed, the example of Andrassy was an ideal choice. As the sun is reflected in a tiny drop of water, so the parallel between the bourgeois democracy of Europe, once revolutionary and republican, and the monarchist constitutionalist (even

after January 9, 1905) bourgeois "democracy" of Russia is reflected in the comparison between Andrassy and Petrunkevich. First the European bourgeois fought on the barricades for the republic, then they lived in exile, and they ended up by turning traitors to the cause of liberty, betraying the revolution, and taking service with the constitutional monarchs. The Russian bourgeois want to "learn from history" and "reduce the stages of development": they want to betray the revolution straight away, to turn traitor to liberty straight away. In private conversation they repeat the words of Christ to Judas: "That thou doest, do quickly."

"They were ushered into another hall, ... where the tsar was to receive them," continues M. Gaston Leroux, "when it was suddenly discovered that the revolutionary Petrunkevich had no kid gloves. Colonel of the Life Guards Putyatin instantly took off his own and hastily handed them to the revolutionary."

The audience began. Prince Trubetskoi delivered his speech. As reported by M. Gaston Leroux, he began by stating how grateful they were to the tsar for having "deigned to receive us, thereby proving your confidence in us.... We are simply people of peace and order," declared Prince Trubetskoi (on behalf of the whole "Constitutional-Democratic", or *Osvobozhdeniye*, Party), adding that "the tsar had been deceived" by his councillors. The most "daring" passage in his speech was the one in which he declared that an assembly of representatives based on social-estates, as proposed by Bulygin, was "*inadmissible*" ... why, you think? ... because "You, Your Majesty, are not the Tsar of the nobles, of the merchants and the peasants; you are the Tsar of All the Russias, and the representation must be of the entire people without exception". As to the resolution of the Zemstvo Conference, which we publish in our leading article,* of that *not a whisper*, as was only to be expected.

Mr. Fyodorov dealt in his speech with the *financial side* ... of the "revolution in kid gloves". The national budget would increase after the war by an amount ranging from three hundred to four hundred millions; "an enormous exertion for progress and civilisation" will be necessary, and this

* See pp. 520 - 21 of this volume.—*Ed.*

requires the “independence of society” and the “call to life of all men of talent among the people” (chosen under the control of Trepov?).

The tsar’s answer we know. “His speech over,” telegraphs M. Gaston Leroux, “the tsar conversed amiably with each member of the deputation. He went so far as to ask the famous revolutionary [Petrunkovich] if he was a Marshal of the Nobility. The latter replying in the negative, the tsar expressed the hope that the day would come when he would attain that rank and passed on to another delegate. When he had taken leave of the company, the delegates were ushered into a back room in the palace, where they were served a lunch, which, they estimated, might cost 75 kopeks. In any case, the delegates were pleased with the outcome. [If not at once a ministerial portfolio, at least the post of Marshal of the Nobility had been promised! Even Andrásy must have started as a Marshal of the Nobility, or something of the sort!] They had begun dispatching innumerable telegrams [to the effect that confidence between the tsar and the “people” had now been restored?] ... when they received the official text of the tsar’s reply. Great was their stupefaction when they failed to find in it the only important sentence that seemed to promise at least something. The words: ‘Our imperial will to convene representatives of the people is unshakable’ was changed to the simple affirmation: ‘Our imperial will is unshakable’. The delegates immediately returned this official text as unacceptable. Today, not without impatience, they looked forward to receiving a text that would contain the words they all had heard. One of the deputies told me tonight [the telegram of M. Leroux is dated June 20 (7)] with reference to this fantastic manipulation of sentences: This is no longer an autocracy, it’s hocus-pocus.”

Well put, or well invented, if M. Leroux invented it all. There is hocus-pocus in it even if the promise to convene the popular representatives had been included in the official text of the speech. Kid gloves, and a flunkey’s at that, are the true emblem of the political act performed by the Petrunkoviches and the Rodichevs. They started with hocus-pocus themselves, not only by accepting the terms of the audience, but by hiding their resolution in their pockets, by concealing

their real wishes, and by most improperly misrepresenting the tsar as a victim of deception, etc., etc. They have no right to complain now that their trickery was answered with trickery. For a general promise to convene representatives of the people means absolutely nothing and yields absolutely nothing while leaving a clear field for a Bulygin and Trepov "constitution", and ample opportunity for procrastination of every description. Everything remains as it was, except that the liberals, fooled like schoolboys, and disgraced by the promise of a Marshal's rank, have done a service to the autocracy by dispatching telegrams hailing the return of "confidence" and making reports about the audience like Mr. Nikitin's in the St. Petersburg municipal council.

We should not like to assume the role of Cassandra.¹⁴⁸ We should not like to prophesy a ludicrous and ignoble end for the Russian revolution. But it is our duty to tell the workers bluntly and openly, to tell the whole people that things are heading that way. The Constitutional would-be Democratic Party and all these gentlemen of *Osvobozhdeniye* are bringing matters to such an end and to no other. Do not be deceived by the claptrap of the radical-*Osvobozhdeniye* speeches and the Zemstvo resolutions. This is the gaudily painted stage set for the "people", while a brisk trade is going on behind the scenes. The liberal bourgeoisie knows how to cast parts: the radical spellbinders are sent to speechify at banquets and meetings, while the hard-boiled businessmen are sent to "prepare the ground" among the Court clique. And since the power remains perfectly intact and unlimited in the hands of the autocracy, the inevitable result of *such* a course of development will be a "constitution" a hundred times more like the Bulygin scheme than that of *Osvobozhdeniye*.

The destiny of the Russian revolution now rests with the proletariat. Only the proletariat can put a stop to this haggling. Only the proletariat can, by a new heroic effort, rouse the masses, split the wavering army, win over the peasantry, and, arms in hand, gain freedom for the whole people by ruthlessly crushing the enemies of liberty and hurling aside its self-seeking and wavering bourgeois bell-ringers.

**OPEN LETTER TO THE EDITORIAL BOARD
OF THE *LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG*¹⁴⁹**

Dear Comrades,

In issue No. 135 of the *Leipziger Volkszeitung* Comrade Karl Kautsky writes on the split in the Russian Social-Democracy. We feel compelled to ask that you publish our reply to Kautsky's attacks and to allow us to refute the factual inaccuracies which his article contains. We shall be brief.

Kautsky says that "the German edition of the resolutions adopted at the recent Russian Congress could not have appeared at a more inopportune moment", that the resolutions "will give most readers a totally false picture of the relations that exist in the Russian Social-Democracy". Kautsky goes so far as to propose to the German comrades that they should not make these resolutions public.

We take the liberty of pointing out that nothing could give our German comrades a better idea of the relations within the Russian Social-Democracy than the original resolutions of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, as well as the resolutions of the "conference" held by the new-Iskrists.

We declare that Kautsky is making a great mistake in writing on matters of which, at best, he knows only by hearsay, and that his picture of the relations that exist in the Russian Social-Democracy is a highly distorted one. It is utterly ridiculous, for instance, to hear Kautsky suggest that "the resolutions [of the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P.] may have lost their significance at the

present moment even for those who drafted* them". Many unity negotiations between us and the new-Iskristis have been held in the course of the past two or three months, but the outcome of these negotiations so far has amounted to nothing.

We strongly protest against the attempt to silence us in the German Social-Democratic press by means of such a crude, mechanical, and unheard-of method as boycotting a pamphlet which contains only a translation of the resolutions of the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. and which was issued by the Munich Party publishing house of the Social-Democratic Labour Party of Germany (G. Birk & Co.). Kautsky has no right to speak about his impartiality. He has always been partial as regards the present struggle within the Russian Social-Democracy. This is his right, of course. But one who is partial would do better not to speak too much of impartiality, if he does not want to be accused of hypocrisy.

Kautsky tries to make out that all the resolutions of the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. are "attacks by Lenin and his friends against Plekhanov and his friends". We have three brief remarks to make on this score. In the first place, only four of the seventeen resolutions directly or indirectly touch on our opponents within the R.S.D.L.P. Secondly, Plekhanov has now retired from the Editorial Board of *Iskra* (see *Iskra*, No. 101). This shows how little Kautsky understands our relations. Thirdly, we would ask the German comrades to consider the impression that is likely to be created on the Russian Social-Democrats when a man with Kautsky's authority tries to discredit the work of an entire Party Congress by "representing" it as "attacks by Lenin and his friends". What would people in Germany think of men who (without having read the record of the proceedings) presumed to represent the deliberations, say, of the Dresden Party Congress as an attack by Kautsky and his friends...?

A word of warning to all the German Social-Democrats: Comrades! If you really consider the R.S.D.L.P. to be a fraternal party, do not believe a word of what the so-called impartial Germans tell you about our split. Insist on seeing

the documents, the authentic documents. And do not forget that prejudice is further from the truth than ignorance.

With Social-Democratic greetings,

*The Editorial Board of the Central Organ ("Proletary")
of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party*

P.S. The French socialists' idea of impartiality differs from that of the Germans. Their Central Organ *Le Socialiste* has just published a translation of the resolutions of the Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in a special supplement.

Written after June 12 (25), 1905

Published according to
the manuscript.
Translated from the German

SKETCH OF A PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT

Setting: Tsarism in St. Petersburg struck down, the autocratic government overthrown—struck down but not utterly destroyed, not killed, *not annihilated*, not extirpated.

The provisional revolutionary government appeals to the people. Workers and peasants *take the initiative*. Complete freedom. The people organise their own lives. The *government programme*=full republican liberties, peasant committees for the *complete* reform of agrarian relations. The Programme of the Social-Democratic Party *is a thing standing by itself*. Social-Democrats in the provisional government=people delegated, *commissioned* by the Social-Democratic *Party*.

Next—the Constituent Assembly. *If* the people have risen, they ...* *may* (even though not immediately) find themselves in the majority (peasants and workers). *Ergo*, the revolutionary *dictatorship* of the proletariat and the peasantry.

Frantic resistance of evil forces. Civil war *in full sweep*—*annihilation* of tsarism.

Organisation of the proletariat grows, propaganda and agitation of the Social-Democrats increases ten thousandfold—all the government printing-presses, etc., etc. "*Mit der Gründlichkeit der geschichtlichen Aktion wird auch der Umfang der Masse zunehmen, deren Aktion sie ist.*"**

* One word illegible.—*Ed.*

** "As the thoroughness of the historic action increases, the magnitude of the mass whose cause it represents will also increase."¹⁵⁰—*Ed.*

The peasantry takes *all* agrarian relations, *all* the land, into its own hands. *Then nationalisation* becomes a fact.

Tremendous growth of productive forces—the entire rural intelligentsia, all technical knowledge, is brought into action to increase agricultural production, to get rid of fettering influences (uplifters, Narodniks, etc., etc.).... Gigantic development of capitalist progress....

War: the *fort* keeps changing hands. Either the bourgeoisie overthrows the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, or this dictatorship sets Europe aflame, and then...?

If we are to consider the question of revolutionary dictatorship from the standpoint of Marxism, we shall have to reduce it to an analysis of the *struggle of the classes*.

Ergo, what major social forces should be taken into account? *Ordre de bataille*?

(a) The bureaucratic, military, and Court elements stand *for* absolutism *plus* the unenlightened elements among the people (a rapidly disintegrating conglomerate, yesterday all-powerful, tomorrow powerless). (Dynastic and other conflicts within inevitable.)

Degree of organisation very high—maximum
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(β) The more or less big, moderately-liberal bourgeoisie. Here I include the liberal landlords, the top financiers, the merchants, manufacturers, etc., etc. This=Σ lords and masters of a bourgeois country. "Can do anything".

Degree of organisation very slight

Conflicts between the groupings inevitable; but all stand for a Constitution even now, and still more so tomorrow.

Ideological leaders—in abundance, from among the officials, landlords, and journalists.

(γ) The petty-bourgeois and peasant section. Tens of millions.
The "people" *par excellence*.

Degree of organisation — minimum

Greatest state of benightedness
and disorganisation.

Their plight most desperate, they have most to gain *directly* from the revolution. The greatest instability (to-day—for the revolution, tomorrow—for “law and order” after slight improvements).

Democracy.

Ideological leaders—a great number of democratic intellectuals. The Socialist-Revolutionary “type”.

(δ) The proletariat.

Very high level of organisation, and discipline

Revolutionary-minded. Critical attitude towards the petty bourgeoisie. Has *fewer* ideological leaders than all the others—*only* the Social-Democratic intelligentsia and the educated Social-Democratic workers. Compared with the preceding groups numerically very much weaker, but *Kampf-fähigkeit** very much stronger.

Object of the struggle=*Republic* (including *all* democratic liberties, the **minimum programme** and far-reaching social reforms).

α—absolutely against.

β—for a Constitution, *against* the Republic ($\frac{1}{2}$ and $\frac{1}{2}$).
((Bargaining.))

γ—in a revolutionary moment (not firmly) for the Republic ((the unstable elements of the struggle)).

δ—wholly and entirely *for* the Republic.

Written in June-July 1905

Published according to
the manuscript

* Fighting capacity.—Ed.

THE STRUGGLE OF THE PROLETARIAT AND THE SERVILITY OF THE BOURGEOISIE

An uprising and armed barricade fighting in Lodz, a bloody affray in Ivanovo-Voznesensk, general strikes and shooting at workers in Warsaw and Odessa, the ignominious end of the Zemstvo deputation farce—such are the major political events of the past week. If we add to this what the Geneva papers report today (June 28 [15]) concerning peasant disturbances in Lebedin Uyezd, Kharkov Gubernia, the pillaging of five estates, and the dispatch of troops to these places, we see, reflected in the events of a single week, the character of all the main social forces, which is now so openly and clearly revealing itself in the course of the revolution.

The proletariat has been in a constant state of unrest, especially since the Ninth of January, never giving the enemy a moment's respite. It is keeping up its offensive mainly in the form of strikes, while avoiding direct clashes with the armed forces of tsarism and preparing its forces for the great and decisive battle. In the industrially more developed areas, where the workers are better trained politically and where national oppression is added to the economic and general political yoke, the tsarist police and troops are going out of their way to incense and provoke the workers. And the workers, even those who are unprepared for the struggle, even those who at first confined themselves to defence, are now, through the proletariat of Lodz, setting a new example, not only of revolutionary enthusiasm and heroism, but of superior forms of struggle. They are still poorly, very poorly armed, and their uprising is still

local, isolated from the general movement; nevertheless, they are making a step forward, they are covering the city streets with scores of barricades thrown up with amazing speed, they are inflicting serious losses on the tsarist troops, they are putting up a desperate resistance in some of the houses. The armed uprising is gaining in breadth and intensity. The new victims of the tsar's executioners—nearly 2,000 people have been killed or wounded in Lodz—are kindling intense hatred towards the accursed autocracy in the hearts of hundreds of thousands of citizens. The new armed clashes demonstrate more and more strikingly that the decisive armed struggle of the people against the armed forces of tsarism is inevitable. All these separate outbreaks form more and more distinctly the picture of a widespread all-Russian conflagration. More and more districts, even the most backward, are being drawn into the proletarian struggle, and the zeal of the tsar's myrmidons but serves the revolution by turning economic conflicts into political conflicts, by making the workers everywhere realise from their own hard lot that the autocracy must be overthrown at all costs, and by making of them future heroes and fighters of the popular uprising.

Armed uprising of the people! This is the slogan—advanced so resolutely by the party of the proletariat, as represented by the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party—which the very course of events, the spontaneous process of expansion and intensification of the revolutionary movement, powerfully impels. Away, then, with all doubts and vacillations. Let it be realised by one and all, now and without delay, how absurd and discreditable are all pretexts today for evading this urgent task of the most energetic preparation of the armed uprising—how perilous it is to delay, how vital it is to unite and co-ordinate the local uprisings which are breaking out all over the country. Taken separately, these outbreaks are ineffectual. The organised force of the tsarist government can crush the insurgents group by group, if the movement continues to spread from town to town and from district to district as slowly and sporadically as it has been doing until now. But united, these outbreaks can converge into a mighty torrent of revolutionary flame, which no power on earth will be able to

withstand. This unity is on the way, it is coming by a thousand paths we do not know of or even suspect. These sporadic outbreaks and skirmishes are giving the people a lesson in revolution, and our job is never to lag behind the exigencies of the moment, but to be able always to point to the next, higher stage of the struggle, deriving experience and instruction from the past and from the present, and urging the workers and peasants on and on more boldly and more broadly to the complete victory of the people, to the complete destruction of the autocratic gang that is now fighting with the desperation of the doomed.

How often we would find people in the Social-Democratic movement, particularly in its intellectualist wing, who belittled the aims of the movement, faint-hearts who have lost faith in the revolutionary energy of the working class. Even now some think that because the democratic revolution is bourgeois by its social and economic nature, the proletariat should not aspire to enact the leading role in the revolution, to take the most energetic part in it, or to put forward such advanced slogans as the overthrow of the tsarist regime and the establishment of a provisional revolutionary government. Events are teaching even these politically backward people. Events are bearing out the militant conclusions that follow from the revolutionary theory of Marxism. The bourgeois nature of the democratic revolution does not mean that this revolution can benefit only the bourgeoisie. On the contrary, it is advantageous most of all, and necessary most of all, to the proletariat and the peasantry. Events are making it increasingly clear that only the proletariat is capable of waging a determined struggle for complete liberty, for the republic, in contradistinction to the unreliability and instability of the bourgeoisie. The proletariat can become the leader of the entire people and win over the peasantry, which can expect nothing from the autocracy except oppression and violence, and nothing from the bourgeois friends of the people except betrayal and treachery. Because of its class position in modern society, the proletariat can understand, sooner than any other class, that, in the final analysis, great historic issues are decided only by force, that freedom cannot be achieved without tremendous sacrifices, that the armed resistance of

tsarism must be broken and crushed by force of arms. Otherwise we shall never live to see liberty, otherwise Russia will meet the fate of Turkey—a long painful decline and disintegration, particularly painful for all the toiling and exploited masses of the people. Let the bourgeoisie abase itself and cringe, let it bargain and beg for sops, for a wretched travesty of liberty. The proletariat will go into action and lead with it the peasantry, which suffers under the vilest and most intolerable conditions of serfdom and humiliation; it will march forward to complete liberty, which can be made secure only by an armed people basing itself upon revolutionary power.

Social-Democracy has not advanced the slogan of insurrection on the spur of the moment. It has always fought, and will continue to fight, against revolutionary phrase-mongering, and it will always demand a sober estimation of forces and an analysis of the given situation. The Social-Democratic Party has ever since 1902 spoken of preparing the uprising, without ever confounding this work of preparation with the senseless artificial improvisation of rebellions which would merely dissipate our forces uselessly. And only now, after the Ninth of January, has the workers' party placed the slogan of insurrection on the order of the day, only now has the necessity of the uprising and the urgency of mobilising for it been recognised. The autocracy itself has made this slogan a practical slogan of the working-class movement. The autocracy has given the broad masses their first lessons in civil war. This war has begun, and it is being fought on an increasingly wider front and with increasing intensity. We have only to generalise its lessons, to explain the great significance of the words "civil war", to derive practical guidance from each encounter in this war, to organise our forces and prepare directly and immediately all that is necessary for a real war.

Social-Democracy does not fear to face the truth. It knows the treacherous nature of the bourgeoisie. It knows that liberty will bring the workers, not tranquillity and peace, but the new and still greater struggle for socialism, a struggle against the present bourgeois friends of freedom. But in spite of this—indeed, because of this—freedom is absolutely necessary to the workers, more necessary to them than to

anyone else. Only the workers are capable of fighting at the head of the people for complete freedom, for a democratic republic. And they will fight for it to the death.

Needless to say, ignorance and degradation are still widespread among the people; a good deal has yet to be done to develop the class-consciousness of the workers, not to speak of the peasantry. But see how quickly the slave of yesterday is straightening his back, how the spark of liberty is gleaming even in his half-dimmed eyes. Look at the peasant movement. It lacks unity and political consciousness, and we have only a faint inkling of its magnitude and its character. But one thing we know: the class-conscious worker and the peasant who is rising to the struggle will understand each other upon the first exchange of words, every ray of light will bring them closer together in the struggle for freedom; they will then not surrender *their* revolution to the contemptibly pusillanimous and selfish bourgeois and landlords—their democratic revolution which can give them land and freedom, which can give the working people every alleviation of their living conditions conceivable in bourgeois society to enable them to continue the struggle for socialism. We need but look at the central industrial region. How long is it since we thought it to be sunk in deep slumber? How long is it since only a sporadic, partial, petty trade union movement was considered possible there? And now a general strike has broken out in that region. In the hundreds of thousands they have risen there, and more are rising. Political agitation is spreading as never before. To be sure, the workers there are still far behind the heroic proletariat of heroic Poland, but the tsarist government is fast educating them; it is fast making them “catch up with Poland”.

No, the general armed uprising of the people is no dream. The complete victory of the proletariat and the peasantry in this democratic revolution is no idle thought. And what great perspectives such a victory would open before the European proletariat, which for so many years has been artificially held back from the pursuit of happiness by the reactionary militarists and landlords! The victory of the democratic revolution in Russia will be the signal for the beginning of the socialist revolution, for a new victory of

our brothers, the class-conscious proletarians of all countries.

How utterly contemptible, as compared with the mighty and heroic struggle of the proletariat, was the exhibition of loyalty displayed by the Zemstvo men and the *Osvobozhdeniye* gentry at the famous audience granted by Nicholas II. These mountebanks got their deserts. Before the ink had dried on their grovelling and rapturous reports of the tsar's gracious words, the true meaning of those words was revealed to all in new deeds. The censorship is on the rampage. The newspaper *Rus* ¹⁵¹ has been suspended solely for publishing a more than moderate address. The police dictatorship headed by Trepov is in its hey day. The tsar's words are officially interpreted as a promise to call a *consultative* assembly of representatives of the people, with the ancient autocracy "rooted in the native soil" remaining inviolate.

Prince Meshchersky's opinion of the reception, published in *Grazhdanin*, proved to be right. Nicholas knew how to *donner le change* to the Zemstvo men and the liberals, he wrote. Nicholas knew how to *lead them by the nose*!

The gospel truth! The leaders of the Zemstvo people and of the *Osvobozhdeniye* crowd have been led by the nose. It serves them right. They got what they deserved for their servile speeches, for their concealment of their true decisions and ideas on the constitution, and for their shameful silence after the tsar's jesuitical speech. They have haggled for a parody of freedom that will be "safe" for the bourgeoisie. All have haggled—Shipov with Bulygin, Trubetskoi with Shipov, Petrunkevich and Rodichev with Trubetskoi, and Struve with Petrunkevich and Rodichev. They are haggling while agreeing "provisionally" to the purely Shipovian programme of the Zemstvo delegation. These hucksters got what they asked for—a kick from the military jackboot.

Surely, this humiliation of the leaders of the Russian bourgeois *Osvobozhdeniye* trend should mark the beginning of the end! Surely, those who have the making of sincere and honest *democrats* will now at last turn their backs on that notorious Constitutional-Democratic Party. Surely they ought to realise that they are hopelessly disgracing themselves and betraying the cause of the revolution by support-

ing a "party", the "Zemstvo group" of which crawls on its belly before the autocracy, while the *Osvobozhdeniye* League repeats the like before the Zemstvo group.

We greet the finale of the Zemstvo deputation. The mask has been torn off. Choose, gentlemen of the landowning classes and of the bourgeoisie! Choose, gentlemen of education and members of "leagues" of every description: for revolution or for counter-revolution? for freedom or against freedom? He who would be a true democrat must fight, he must break with the grovellers and traitors, he must create an honest party that will have respect for itself and for its convictions, he must take his stand firmly and irrevocably on the side of the armed uprising. As for those who want to continue the game of diplomatising, of withholding their true opinions, who want to bargain and cringe, to make rhetorical threats believed by none and to go into raptures at the promise of a post of Marshal of the Nobility from the deified sovereign—as for such, let them be publicly branded with the unanimous contempt of all believers in freedom.

Down with the bourgeois betrayers of freedom!

Long live the revolutionary proletariat! Long live the armed uprising for complete freedom, for the republic, for the vital, urgent interests of the proletariat and the peasantry!

A THIRD STEP BACK

All comrades know from the resolutions of the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party what our attitude should be, in point of principle and organisation, towards the so-called Minority, or the new-Iskrists. While recognising the need for an ideological struggle against the survivals of "Economism", the Third Congress ruled that adherents of the Minority may be admitted to membership in Party organisations, provided they recognise the congresses of the Party and submit to Party discipline. Since this condition has not been met, all "Minority" groups must be regarded as being outside the Party. Practical *agreements* may, of course, be concluded with them at the discretion of the Central Committee and the local committees, along the same lines as the agreements with the Bund, etc.

At present all we can give the comrades is some information regarding the section abroad of the seceded Minority. Immediately after the Congress the C.C. wrote to the "League", as well as to the heads of the technical and financial departments of the Party, asking the former to state its attitude to the Third Congress, and the latter to turn over the Party property to the C.C. No reply was received to either of the letters. The new-Iskrists were not averse to using the Party printing-house and store, and to receiving money from the German Social-Democratic Party and from abroad in general, in the name of the entire Party; but they showed no desire to account to the Party for the use of Party property and the disbursement of Party funds. We consider comment on such behaviour superfluous.

In the article on the Third Congress (*Proletary*, No. 1*) we expressed the wish that the breakaway group of the Party might at least organise itself into some cohesive form as quickly as possible, since this would make agreements easier and the path towards future unity clearer. Unfortunately, even this wish of ours has proved almost unrealisable. The resolutions of the Minority "Conference" have now been published (see the highly interesting pamphlet, *The First All-Russian Conference of Party Functionaries*, a separate supplement to *Iskra*, No. 100; also *Iskra*, No. 100). We earnestly recommend this pamphlet to all Party organisations, for we cannot imagine any better material than this for combating the ideas of the breakaway section of the Party. These resolutions show the Minority's total incapacity to organise even its own followers. They could not even convene their own Conference; we did it for them, the Bureau of Committees of the Majority and the C.C., when we convened the Third Congress. The delegates of the Menshevik organisations went to the Congress on the instructions of their organisations, but arrived instead at the Conference! The Conference resolved not to recognise the decisions of the Third Congress—and to rescind the Party Rules adopted at the Second Congress! The Conference was unable to constitute itself as a congress; its decisions were the decisions of a *consultative* assembly, subject to the approval of each organisation. There is no complete list of the participants at the Conference, nor are there any minutes. The organisations of the Minority can therefore only give their ayes and noes to the question whether they will recognise any particular resolution. Thus, a vote will be taken on the resolutions with no opportunity for the voters to offer proposals for changes or to have before them a complete record of the discussion of the resolutions. Heaven only knows how these votes are to be counted, since the polls in favour of confirming or rejecting particular sections of the resolutions may differ. We have here the principle of Bonapartist plebiscites, as opposed to the principle of democratic representation generally recognised by Social-Democrats the world over. With us, democratically elected and responsible represent-

* See p. 443 of this volume.—Ed.

atives of qualified organisations consult with one another and reach a decision. With them, representatives as well as guests confer and make proposals, and the qualified organisations vote aye or no *post factum*. It is difficult to imagine a system better suited for disorganising the Social-Democrats. In practice this system of plebiscites always ends in a farce.

The Rules adopted by the Conference and consisting of thirteen clauses are a gem of their kind. They erect a six-storey party structure rising in the following order: (1) Directing Board; (2) Committee; (3) Regional Congress; (4) Regional Committee; (5) Conference; and (6) Executive Committee. Generally speaking, the lower body elects the higher. But the relations between the Directing Board and the Committee are not based on the principle of election but on the principle of "agreement", as the new-Iskrists see it, or on the principle of "confusion", as we see it. On the one hand, the Committee is included *en bloc* in the membership of the Directing Board, together with all the members, not only of the District Committees, but of "the groups working among the special sections of the population". On the other hand, "the District Committee includes also a representative of the Committee"! On the one hand, all important decisions must come from the Directing Board; on the other, in emergency cases, the Committee may act on its own initiative "before inviting the opinion [!] of the District Committees". What is more, "the Committee is obliged to report periodically on its activities to the district committees". If a majority of the members of the District Committees express no confidence in the Committee, the latter is reorganised "by mutual agreement between the Regional Committee and the District Committees". Neither the powers nor the composition of the other Party organisations (including the District Committee) are defined in any way. The concept of Party membership, of which the Mensheviks made a major issue at the Second Congress, has been jettisoned! Heretofore the principle of "agreement" among members of one and the same organisation or party, who sing in unison on all essential questions of programme and tactics, was regarded as an anarchist principle. Social-Democrats throughout the world have in such cases always followed the principle

of the subordination of the minority to the majority. The new-Iskrists want to show the world a shining example of the manner in which these two principles can be commingled in the most "poetic" disorder. Recently we came across a copy of a German newspaper bearing the motto, "*Weder Autorität noch Majorität*" ("Neither Authority nor Majority"), a principle akin to the organisation-as-process theory of the new-Iskrists. The newspaper is the organ of the German anarchists: *Der Anarchist*.

In the election of the centre ("the body that unifies all Party work") the new-Iskrists prefer indirect voting, through electors, to direct voting. The Executive Committee is not elected by the direct vote of the representatives of the Directing Boards, but in *four stages*! Why this sudden dislike of direct elections God alone knows. Some people wonder whether the new-Iskrists may not have been influenced by the example of Mr. Struye, who wants the Upper House to be elected by universal suffrage, but not by direct vote. How this four-stage election is to be carried out, again God alone knows, for there is not a word about it in the "Rules".

Obviously it would be absurd to take the Rules seriously, though we have not exhausted their charms by far. They will never be put into practice. The six-decker bus would not be able to budge an inch, even if it could be built. These Rules are of importance, not for their practical value, but as a statement of principles. They are a superb, peerless illustration of the famous "organisation-as-process" theory. Now even the blind must see that organisation-as-process means disorganisation. Hitherto the Mensheviks have acted as disorganisers of their opponents, of the Second Congress and the bodies created by it. Now they act as disorganisers of their own followers. This is truly disorganisation exalted to a principle.

That the Mensheviks have begun by breaking their own Rules does not surprise us. They have mapped out no scheme for the division of Russia into regions. They have elected no Executive Committee, not even *pro tem.*, pending the confirmation of the committees and organisations. The Conference elected an Organisation Committee, which was not provided for in the Rules, and assigned to it special

tasks! At present even temporary and partial agreements with the Mensheviks are made extremely difficult, for this Organisation Committee lacks official status, and no steps that it takes can have decisive significance. Anyone desiring to have dealings with the Mensheviks must now take the trouble of communicating with each of their organisations separately, and even with each individual "Pan" who may say, "*Nie pozwalam!*"*

Finally, the most astonishing thing about the "Rules" of the Minority is the omission of all reference to Party organs and to Party literature in general. Organs there are (*Iskra*, *Sotsial-Demokrat*¹⁵²) and will be, but the "Rules" adopted by the Conference establish *no* connection between them and the Party. This is incredible, but it is a fact. The publicists are outside the Party, above the Party. No control, no reports, no material dependence. Something reminiscent of the worst days of opportunism among the French socialists: the Party unto itself, and the publicists unto themselves. From this point of view the following decision of the Conference, viz., the resolution on *Party* (?) literature, should perhaps not seem accidental: "The Conference deems it necessary: (1) that the Organisation Committee take measures to furnish the Party publicists greater possibilities to wage a struggle in the legal press for the theoretical principles of the Party". A kind of prototype of Menshevik organisation: a group of "Party publicists", non-responsible and "independent", indispensable and irreplaceable. And attached to them—a committee to have charge of the work of ... legal publication!

It is difficult to discuss this type of organisation with the necessary seriousness. The nearer the revolution and the nearer the opportunity for Social-Democrats to write openly in the "legal" press, the more strictly should the party of the proletariat adhere to the principle of the unconditional responsibility of "Party publicists" to the Party, of their dependence on the Party.

As regards the tactical resolutions of the Conference, they admirably confirm the declaration of the Third Congress

* "I do not permit!"—the expression of the "*Liberum veto*" possessed by every member of the Polish Sejm in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.—*Ed.*

on the shadings of Social-Democracy "akin to Economism", and on "the constriction of the scope of Party work". We shall say nothing of the incredibly careless editing of the resolutions, which rather resemble jottings, aphorisms, reflections, and scraps of rough copy. In this respect the resolutions of the Conference can be rivalled only by the "Programme of the *Osvobozhdeniye* League". Instead of precise, clear-cut directives issued by the highest body of the Party, we find here ... stylistic exercises of some Party *literati*.

To take the contents. On the pressing question of the uprising, we are not told that it has become "essential"; that it is necessary to elucidate, not only its political significance, but its "practical and organisational aspect"; that we must "organise the proletariat" to this end and "form special groups as the need arises". (Resolution of the Third Congress.) Not at all. First we are told that the possibility of timing the uprising and preparing it by methods of secret organisation is "excluded"; we then read that, with broader agitation and organisation, it is possible to convert spontaneous movements into "planned insurrections". From this muddle the party of the proletariat is expected to derive ideological guidance! The Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. *repeats and confirms* all the old truths about propaganda, agitation, the general democratic movement, etc., but *adds* to this a new task: to organise the proletariat for the uprising, to elucidate the "practical and organisational aspect" of *new* methods of struggle, of the determined struggle for freedom. The Conference speaks only of "the preparation of the uprising" in general, with stale repetitions about agitation and organisation in general; it cannot bring itself to formulate a single new task independently, it advances no guiding slogan on the necessity to take a step forward from the general preparation, of which we have spoken since 1902, to the treatment of the matter from the point of view of practical organisation. Like the old Economists to a T. When new tasks of the political struggle emerged upon the scene, they were belittled, broken up into stages, and subordinated to the tasks of the economic struggle.

Not only economic struggle, but political struggle, and in the broadest and boldest forms, said the revolutionary Social-Democrats. The best means of political agitation is

economic struggle, answered the Economists. Not only propaganda and agitation in general, the revolutionary Social-Democrats now say, not only clarification of the political significance of the uprising, but also the formation of special groups, the immediate commencement of practical organisational work, "the most energetic measures for the arming of the proletariat." A planned uprising is excluded, retort the new-Iskrists; we must expand agitation, strengthen organisation, prepare the conversion of the spontaneous into the planned; only in this way "can the moment of insurrection be brought nearer", only in this way "can the technical fighting preparations acquire more or less serious importance"....

For them the moment of insurrection has not yet "come near"! For them the practical preparations have still to "acquire more or less serious importance"! Is this not tail-ism *par excellence*? Is this not a degradation of the "urgent" task (urgent in the opinion of the Third Congress), towards which we have as yet done dreadfully little? Are not these people backing away from uprising to agitation, as the Economists backed away from political struggle to economic struggle with the employers and the government? Read in *Osvo-bozhdeniye*, No. 71, how Mr. Struve is backing away from the slogan of the "armed uprising", how this leader of the liberal bourgeoisie is questioning the inevitability of the uprising (p. 340), how he lays himself out to minimise the importance of "the technical aspect of the revolution", how he "*gives depth*" to the slogan of the uprising by pointing to the "socio-psychical conditions", how he substitutes for this slogan the slogan of "imbuing the masses with the ideas of democratic reform"—and you will understand what a profoundly demoralising influence the tail-ism of the new-Iskrists must exercise on the proletariat, and into whose hands it plays.

The second urgent political question is that of the provisional revolutionary government. This question is clearly and distinctly formulated in the resolution of the Third Congress. The preamble speaks of the struggle for the republic, which can be won only through a completely successful uprising; of the need for the convocation of the Constituent Assembly by a provisional revolutionary government in order to guarantee truly free and fair elections; of the need to

prepare for the struggle with the bourgeoisie to safeguard the gains of the revolution. The conclusions and directives of the Congress: The proletariat must be made to realise the need for a provisional revolutionary government. The proletariat must put clearly defined demands before this government, namely, the realisation of the entire minimum programme. Social-Democrats may participate in the government (action "from above"), the object of such participation being clearly specified (a ruthless struggle against counter-revolution and defence of the independent interests of the working class). The conditions of such participation are made equally explicit. The formal condition is strict control by the Party; the material condition, i.e., the condition determining the expediency of such participation, is jealous preservation of the independence of the Social-Democratic position and the creation of the conditions for the socialist revolution. This enumeration of the conditions of participation in the government, the conditions of pressure from above, as a new form of activity characteristic of the revolutionary epoch, is supplemented by an indication of the form and the purpose of pressure from below, which must be steadily maintained under all circumstances—pressure on the provisional revolutionary government by the armed proletariat led by the Social-Democratic Party. Broadly, we have here a complete answer to the *new* political question, a precise indication of the significance of the *new* forms of struggle and their purpose, of the programme of the struggle and the conditions under which these forms may be employed.

And in the Conference resolution? The resolution begins with the grossly *erroneous* assertion that "the decisive victory of the revolution over tsarism" may be signalled either by the establishment of a provisional government "or by the revolutionary initiative of a 'representative institution, which, under the direct revolutionary pressure of the people, decides to organise a popular Constituent Assembly'".

The Party may and should be given tactical directions both for the contingency of a victory of the uprising and for the contingency of its defeat, both for the contingency of the convocation of a true Constituent Assembly along revolutionary lines and for the contingency of the convocation of

a travesty of popular representation by the tsar. But to apply the term decisive victory to something that lacks the essential element of victory is to confuse the revolutionary consciousness, not to lead it. Any "decision" of any representative institution to organise a Constituent Assembly is as far removed from decisive victory as word is from deed; for the tsarist government wields the power that can prevent word from becoming deed. There is nothing whatever to choose between the resolution of the new-Iskrists and the affirmation of the old Economists that the decisive victory of the workers may consist either in their winning the eight-hour day or in the government's granting them the ten-hour day, from which stage the workers will pass to the nine-hour day.

The Conference resolution repeats the incontestable theses of Marxism on the bourgeois nature of the democratic revolution, but interprets them narrowly or incorrectly. Instead of the militant slogan of "Republic", we are given a description of the process of "liquidation of the monarchist regime". Instead of setting forth the conditions and tasks of the *new* method of struggle "from above", which can and must be employed in a successful course of the proletarian uprising in the epoch of revolution, we are given the guiding rule "to remain the party of the extreme revolutionary opposition". This is a very useful thesis for the parliamentary struggle and action from below, but it would certainly be inadequate in the time of insurrection. At such a time the task of the "opposition" consists in the violent overthrow of the government; on this question the Conference was unable to offer a guiding slogan.

While admitting the possibility of partial and sporadic "seizures of power" in separate cities and districts, the Conference resolution abandons the "principle" of the new *Iskra* that participation in a provisional revolutionary government with the bourgeoisie constitutes a betrayal of the proletariat, that it is Millerandism, etc. Betrayal that is partial and sporadic is betrayal none the less. Limiting the problem to separate cities and districts does not solve it, however, but merely divides our attention and splits up the question, thereby befogging the issue. Lastly, the slogan of "revolutionary communes", embodied in the Con-

ference resolution, is more like an empty phrase on account of its unclarity, in contrast to the slogan of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.

The resolution of the new-Iskrists on the provisional revolutionary government suffers from the very fault that glares from their resolution on insurrection, namely, an inability to determine the new tactical tasks of the moment; reiteration of the much reiterated instead of the summons to go forward; the lack of a guiding slogan for the advanced class in the democratic revolution; a belittlement of the tasks and the scope of activity of this class, of its revolutionary enthusiasm and revolutionary energy. The political tendency of this erroneous tactical line is to bring new-Iskrism closer to *Osvobozhdeniye*-ism, to yield the leadership in the democratic revolution to the liberal bourgeoisie, to make the proletariat a mere satellite of the liberal bourgeoisie.

This basic error manifests itself also in the minor resolutions of the Conference. Thus, instead of the slogan of winning the eight-hour day by revolutionary means (resolution of the Third Congress), the old, now inadequate slogan of campaigning for the legislative introduction of the eight-hour day is put forward. Instead of the call for the immediate organisation of revolutionary peasant committees, we have the proposal solely to bring to the Constituent Assembly the demand for their formation. Instead of the slogan of combating the inconsistency, narrowness, and inadequacy of the liberation movement of the bourgeoisie wherever these traits manifest themselves (resolution of the Third Congress), the Conference resolution, repeating Starover's error, pursues the illusory aim of finding "the litmus paper", of enumerating the "points" conformity with which, if he meets them, entitles the bourgeois democrat to be called a true friend of the people. Of course, the "points" in the resolution of the new-Iskrists have shown themselves to be incomplete. The demand for the republic is missing. One is left to conclude that a democratic group like the "Russian Liberation Union" (*Proletary*, No. 4*) conforms to these

* See pp. 499-510 of this volume.—Ed.

"points", although in reality there is no guarantee whatever that the *Osvobozhdeniye* crowd will not predominate in this group.

It need hardly be said that in a newspaper article we could only give a very brief and general idea of the main error pervading the new *Iskra*'s tactical line, as expressed in the Conference resolutions. The erroneous tendencies of the new *Iskra*'s tactical line are as serious and important to the Party as its "organisation-as-process" is not serious. We therefore deal with these tendencies in detail in a special pamphlet which is now in the press and will appear very shortly.¹⁶³

Proletary, No. 6,
July 3 (June 20), 1905

Published according to
the text in *Proletary*

TO THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST BUREAU

Dear Citizens,

The editors of *Proletary* received a telegram today from Berlin. A comrade asks us to inform the International Socialist Bureau that, according to a private telegram to the *Berliner Tageblatt*, the Russian Government has requested the powers to dispatch their ships stationed at Constantinople to Odessa to help restore order in that city.

It is quite possible that the Russian Government, no longer trusting its own naval forces, will try to make the warships of European states fight against the Russian revolution under the pretext of defending the foreign *residents* of Odessa.

Thus, there is a great danger that the European peoples may be forced to play the part of executioners of Russian freedom. Therefore we request you, dear citizens, to consider this question and seek the means of preventing such an eventuality. Perhaps it would be advisable to publish in the name of the International Socialist Bureau an appeal to the workers of all countries. The appeal should emphasise that what is taking place in Russia is not mob rioting, but a revolution, a struggle for freedom, that this struggle has as its object the convocation of a Constituent Assembly, which is demanded by all progressive parties, in the first place by the Social-Democratic Labour Party of Russia. Perhaps such an appeal, translated into all languages, printed in the socialist press of the entire world and distributed by every means at our disposal, will be able to influence public opinion and frustrate the designs of the Russian Government—designs that would be fatal to freedom.

. We hope that you will let us know your opinion on this matter.

Accept, dear citizens, our fraternal greetings.

On behalf of the Central Committee
of the S.D.L.P. of Russia

N. Lenin (Vl. Ulyanov)

Written June 21 (July 4), 1905

Published according to
the manuscript.
Translated from the French

RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY
Workers of all countries, unite!

THREE CONSTITUTIONS OR THREE SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT

What do the police and officials want?	What do the most liberal of the bour- geois (the people of the <i>Osvobozhde- niye</i> , or the Con- stitutional-Demo- cratic Party) want?	What do the class- conscious workers (the Social-Demo- crats) want?
The absolute mon- archy.	The constitutional monarchy.	The democratic re- public.

OF WHAT DO THESE SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT CONSIST?

ABSOLUTE MONARCHY	CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY	DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
1. The tsar—an absolute monarch.	1. The tsar—a constitutional mon- arch.	1. No tsar.
2. A Council of State (officials ap- pointed by the tsar).	2. An Upper House of popular representatives (in- direct, not quite equal and not quite universal elec- tions).	2. No Upper House.

3. A State Duma, or consultative body of popular representatives (indirect, unequal, and non-universal elections).	3. A Lower House (universal, direct, and equal elections by secret ballot).	3. A single republican house (universal, direct, and equal elections by secret ballot).
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WHAT IS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT?

ABSOLUTE MONARCHY	CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY	DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
1 and 2. Complete power of the police and the officials over the people.	1. One-third of the power in the hands of the police and the officials, headed by the tsar.	1. No independent power for either the police or the officials; their complete subordination to the people.
3. Consultative voice of the big bourgeoisie and the rich landlords.	2. One-third of the power in the hands of the big bourgeoisie and the rich landlords.	2. No privileges for either the capitalists or the landlords.
No power for the people.	3. One-third of the power in the hands of the whole people.	3. All power—wholly, completely and indivisibly—in the hands of the whole people.

WHAT PURPOSE SHALL THESE
SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT SERVE?

ABSOLUTE
MONARCHY

That the courtiers, the police, and the officials may live on the fat of the land;

that the rich may rob the workers and peasants at their own free will;

that the people may remain forever without rights and live in darkness and ignorance.

CONSTITUTIONAL
MONARCHY

That the police and the officials may be dependent on the capitalists and landlords;

that the capitalists, landlords, and rich peasants may freely and easily rob the workers of town and country, by right and not by arbitrary rule.

DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC

That the free and enlightened people may learn to run things themselves, and, principally, that the working class may be free to struggle for socialism, for a system under which there will be neither rich nor poor and all the land, all the factories and works, will belong to all the working people.

Published in leaflet form
in June-July 1905

Published according to
the text of the leaflet

THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMY AND THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT

The uprising in Odessa and the siding of the armoured cruiser *Potemkin* with the revolution marked a further big step forward in the development of the revolutionary movement against the autocracy. Events have confirmed with amazing rapidity the timeliness of the calls to insurrection and to the formation of a provisional revolutionary government, which were addressed to the people by the class-conscious spokesmen of the proletariat as represented by the Third Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. The new outbreak of the revolutionary conflagration throws light on the practical significance of these calls and makes us determine more precisely the tasks of the revolutionary fighters in the present situation in Russia.

The armed uprising of the people is maturing and is organising itself before our very eyes under the impact of the spontaneous course of events. It was not so very long ago that the only manifestation of the people's struggle against the autocracy was *revolts*—unconscious, unorganised, spontaneous, sometimes wild outbreaks. But the labour movement, as the movement of the most advanced class, the proletariat, rapidly outgrew this initial stage. The goal-conscious propaganda and agitation carried on by the Social-Democrats had their effect. Disturbances gave way to organised strike struggles and *political demonstrations* against the autocracy. The brutal military reprisals of the past few years have "educated" the proletariat and the common people of the towns, and have prepared them for higher forms of revolutionary struggle. The criminal and ignominious war into which the autocracy has plunged the

people filled the cup of their endurance to overflowing. The crowds began to offer armed resistance to the tsarist troops. Real *street fighting, barricade battles*, started between the people and the troops. Quite recently the Caucasus, Lodz, Odessa, and Libau have shown us examples of proletarian heroism and popular enthusiasm. The struggle grew into an insurrection. Even the tsar's troops gradually began to see that they were being made to play the shameful role of executioners of freedom, of henchmen of the police. And the army began to waver. At first isolated cases of insubordination, outbreaks among reservists, protests from officers, propaganda among the soldiers, refusal of some companies and regiments to shoot at their own brothers, the workers. Then—the *siding of part of the army with the uprising*.

The tremendous significance of the recent events in Odessa lies precisely in the fact that, for the first time, an important unit of the armed force of tsarism—a battleship—has openly gone over to the side of the revolution. The government made frantic efforts and resorted to all possible tricks to conceal this event from the people, to stifle the mutiny of the sailors from the outset. But to no avail. The warships sent against the revolutionary armoured cruiser "*Potemkin*" *refused to fight* against their comrades. By spreading throughout Europe the report that the *Potemkin* had surrendered and that the tsar had ordered the revolutionary armoured cruiser to be sunk, the autocratic government only completed its disgrace in the eyes of the entire world. The squadron has returned to Sevastopol, and the government is hastening to disband the crews and to disarm the warships; reports are current of wholesale resignations of officers of the Black Sea Fleet; a fresh mutiny broke out on the armoured cruiser "*Georgi Pobedonosets*", which had surrendered. The sailors are also rising in Libau and in Kronstadt; clashes with the troops are becoming more frequent; sailors and workers are fighting the troops on the barricades (in Libau). The foreign press reports mutinies on a number of other warships (the *Minin*, the *Alexander II*, and others). The tsarist government finds itself *without a navy*. The most that it has been able to achieve so far is to hold back the fleet from actively going over to the side of

the revolution. Meanwhile, the armoured cruiser *Potemkin* remains an unconquered territory of the revolution, and whatever its fate may be, the undoubted fact and the point of highest significance is that here we have the attempt to form the *nucleus of a revolutionary army*.

No reprisals, no partial victories over the revolution can diminish the importance of this event. The first step has been taken. The Rubicon has been crossed. The siding of the army with the revolution has impressed itself as a fact upon the whole of Russia and the entire world. The events in the Black Sea Fleet will inevitably be followed by further and still more energetic attempts to form a revolutionary army. It is our task now to give the utmost support to these efforts, to explain to the broadest masses of the proletariat and the peasantry the nation-wide significance of a revolutionary army in the struggle for freedom, to assist various units of this army to unfurl the popular *banner of freedom*, the banner capable of attracting the masses and rallying the forces that will crush the tsarist autocracy.

Outbreaks—demonstrations—street fighting—units of a revolutionary army—such are the stages in the development of the popular uprising. Now at last we have reached the final stage. This does not mean, of course, that the movement in its entirety has advanced to this new and higher stage. No, there is still a good deal of backwardness in the movement; in the Odessa events there are unmistakable signs of old-time rioting. But it does mean that the advance waves of the elemental flood have already reached the very threshold of the absolutist “stronghold”. It does mean that the advanced representatives of the popular masses have themselves arrived, not as a result of theoretical reasoning, but under the impact of the growing movement, at new and higher tasks of the struggle, the final struggle against the enemy of the Russian people. The autocracy has done *everything* to prepare this struggle. For years it has provoked the people to an armed struggle with its troops, and now it is reaping what it sowed. The units of the revolutionary army are springing up out of the army itself.

The task of these units is to proclaim the insurrection, to give the masses *military leadership*, as essential in civil war as in any other war; to create strong points for the open

mass struggle; to spread the uprising to neighbouring districts; to establish complete political freedom, if only at first in a small part of the country; to embark on the revolutionary transformation of the decayed absolutist system; and to give full scope to the revolutionary creative activity of the masses, who participate but little in this activity in time of peace, but who come to the forefront in revolutionary epochs. Only by clearly understanding these new tasks, only by posing them boldly and broadly, can the units of the revolutionary army win complete victory and become the strong points of a *revolutionary government*. And a revolutionary government is as vitally essential at the present stage of the popular uprising as a revolutionary army. The revolutionary army is needed for military struggle and for military leadership of the masses against the remnants of the military forces of the autocracy. The revolutionary army is needed because great historical issues can be resolved only *by force*, and, in modern struggle, the *organisation of force* means military organisation. Besides the remnants of the autocracy's military forces there are the military forces of the neighbouring states for whose support the tottering Russian Government is already begging, of which later.*

The revolutionary government is needed for the political leadership of the masses, at first in that part of the country which has been wrested from tsarism by the revolutionary army, and later in the country at large. The revolutionary government is needed for the immediate launching of the political reforms, for the sake of which the revolution is being made—the establishment of a revolutionary self-government of the people, the convocation of a truly popular and truly Constituent Assembly, and the introduction of “liberties” without which there can be no true expression of the people's will. The revolutionary government is necessary for the political unification and the political organisation of the insurgent section of the people, which has actually and finally broken away from the autocracy. Of course, that political organisation can only be provisional, just as the revolutionary government, which has taken power in

* See pp. 568-72 of this volume.—*Ed.*

the name of the people in order to enforce the will of the people and to act through the instrumentality of the people, can only be provisional. But this work of organisation must start *immediately*, and it must be indissolubly combined with every successful step of the uprising; for political consolidation and political leadership cannot be delayed for a single moment. Immediate political leadership of the insurgent people is no less essential for the complete victory of the people over tsarism than the military leadership of its forces.

No one who is at all capable of forming a judgement can doubt the eventual outcome of the struggle between the supporters of the autocracy and the masses of the people. Yet we must not shut our eyes to the fact that the serious struggle is only beginning, that there are great trials in store for us. Both the revolutionary army and the revolutionary government are "organisms" of so high a type, they demand institutions so complicated and a civic consciousness so developed, that it would be a mistake to expect a simple, immediate, and perfect fulfilment of these tasks from the outset. No, we do not expect that; we are able to appreciate the importance of the slow, steady, and often imperceptible work of political education which Social-Democrats have always conducted and always will conduct. But we must not allow what in the present circumstances would be still more dangerous—a lack of faith in the powers of the people. We must remember what a tremendous educational and organising power the revolution has, when mighty historical events force the man in the street out of his remote corner, garret, or basement and make a *citizen* out of him. Months of revolution sometimes educate citizens more quickly and fully than decades of political stagnation. The task of the class-conscious leaders of the revolutionary class is always to march ahead of it in the matter of education, to explain to it the meaning of the new tasks, and to urge it forward towards our great ultimate goal. The failures inevitably involved in our further attempts to form a revolutionary army and a provisional revolutionary government will only teach us to meet these tasks *in practice*; they will serve to draw the new and fresh forces of the people, now lying dormant, to the work of solving them.

To take the military aspect. No Social-Democrat at all familiar with history, who has studied Engels, the great expert on this subject, has ever doubted the tremendous importance of military knowledge, of military technique, and of military organisation as an instrument which the masses of the people, and classes of the people, use in resolving great historical conflicts. Social-Democracy never stooped to playing at military conspiracies; it never gave prominence to military questions until the actual conditions of civil war had arisen.* But *now* all Social-Democrats have advanced the military questions, if not to the first place, at least to one of the first places, and they are putting great stress on studying these questions and bringing them to the knowledge of the masses. The revolutionary army must apply the military knowledge and the military means on the practical plane for the determination of the further destiny of the Russian people, for the determination of the most vital and pressing question—the question of freedom.

Social-Democracy has never taken a sentimental view of war. It unreservedly condemns war as a bestial means of settling conflicts in human society. But Social-Democracy knows that so long as society is divided into classes, so long as there is exploitation of man by man, wars are inevitable. This exploitation cannot be destroyed without war, and war is always and everywhere begun by the exploiters themselves, by the ruling and oppressing classes. There are wars and wars. There are adventurist wars, fought to further dynastic interests, to satisfy the appetite of a band of freebooters, or to attain the objects of the knights of capitalist profit. And there is another kind of war—the only war that is *legitimate* in capitalist society—war against the people's oppressors and enslavers. Only utopians and philistines can condemn such a war on principle. Only the bourgeois betrayers of freedom can stand aloof from such a war in Russia today, the war for the people's freedom. The proletariat in Russia has started

* Cf. Lenin, "The Tasks of the Russian Social-Democrats", p. 23, on the untimeliness (in 1897) of the question concerning the methods of decisive attack upon tsarism. (First published in pamphlet form, Geneva, 1898. See present edition, Vol. 2, pp. 342-43.—*Ed.*)

that great war of liberation, and it will go on with it, forming units of a revolutionary army, reinforcing the units of the soldiers or sailors that have come over to its side, enlisting the peasants, imbuing the new *citizens* of Russia, formed and steeled in the fire of civil war, with the heroism and enthusiasm of fighters for the freedom and happiness of all mankind.

The task of establishing a revolutionary government is as new, as difficult, and as complicated as the task of the military organisation of the revolutionary forces. But this task, too, can and must be fulfilled by the people. In this matter, too, every partial failure will lead to an improvement in methods and means, to the consolidation and extension of the results. The Third Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. outlined in its resolution the general conditions for dealing with this new task; it is now time to consider and prepare the conditions for its practical realisation. Our Party has a minimum programme, a complete programme of the changes that are immediately achievable within the framework of the democratic (i.e., bourgeois) revolution, and which the proletariat needs in its further struggle for the triumph of the socialist revolution. But this programme contains basic demands, as well as partial demands that follow from the basic ones or are assumed. In every attempt to establish a provisional revolutionary government it is important to advance precisely the basic demands in order to show to the whole of the people, even to the most unenlightened masses, in brief formulation, in sharp and clear outline, the aims of this government and its tasks that are of significance to the entire people.

There are, in our view, *six* such fundamental points that must become the political banner and the immediate programme of any revolutionary government. They should enlist the sympathy of the people for that government and should be regarded as the most urgent task, upon the accomplishment of which the whole revolutionary energy of the people must be concentrated.

The six points are: (1) a Constituent Assembly of all the people, (2) arming of the people, (3) political freedom, (4) complete freedom for the oppressed and disfranchised nationalities, (5) the eight-hour day, and (6) peasant revolutionary

committees. Of course, this is only a tentative list, representing the *headings*, the designations, of a series of changes that are required immediately for winning the democratic republic. We do not claim that the list is complete. We merely want to stress the importance of certain basic tasks. The revolutionary government must strive to secure the support of the masses, of the mass of the working class and of the peasantry; short of doing this, it will not be able to maintain itself; without the revolutionary activity of the people it will be a mere nothing, worse than nothing. It is our duty to warn the people against the adventurism of high-sounding but absurd promises (like immediate "socialisation", which even its advocates do not understand), while at the same time we must propose changes that are really practicable at the present moment and really necessary for strengthening the cause of the revolution. The revolutionary government must rouse the "people" and *organise* its revolutionary activity. Complete freedom for the oppressed nationalities, i. e., the recognition, not only of their cultural, but of their political, self-determination; the introduction of urgent measures for the protection of the working class (the eight-hour day as the first in a series of such measures), and lastly, the guarantee of serious measures, without regard for the egotistic interests of the landlords, in favour of the mass of the peasantry—such, in our opinion, are the chief points that every revolutionary government must especially emphasise. We shall not discuss the first three points, which are too obvious to require comment. Nor shall we discuss the need for practically implementing reforms even in a small territory, one, for instance, that has been wrested from tsarism; practical implementation is a thousand times more important than manifestos, and, of course, a thousand times more difficult. We merely wish to draw attention to the fact that it is necessary now, without delay, to spread by every possible means a correct idea of our general and immediate tasks. We must know how to appeal to the people—in the true sense of the word—not only with a general call to struggle (this suffices in the period preceding the formation of the revolutionary government), but with a direct call for the immediate imple-

mentation of the most essential democratic reforms, for their independent realisation without delay.

The revolutionary army and the revolutionary government are two sides of the same medal. They are two institutions equally necessary for the success of the uprising and for the consolidation of its results. They are two slogans which must be advanced and explained as the only consistent revolutionary slogans. There are many people today who call themselves democrats; however, many are called, but few are chosen. There are many spokesmen of the "Constitutional-Democratic Party"; but in so-called "society", in the would-be democratic Zemstvos, there are few *true* democrats, men who are sincerely in favour of the complete sovereignty of the people and are capable of waging a life-and-death struggle against the enemies of that sovereignty, the defenders of the tsarist autocracy.

The working class is free of the cowardice, the hypocritical half-heartedness that is characteristic of the bourgeoisie as a class. The working class can and must be fully and consistently democratic. The working class has proved its right to the role of vanguard in the democratic revolution by the blood it has shed on the streets of St. Petersburg, Riga, Libau, Warsaw, Lodz, Odessa, Baku, and many other cities. It must prove equal to this great role at the present decisive moment too. While never for a moment forgetting their socialist goal, their class and Party independence, the class-conscious representatives of the proletariat, the members of the R.S.D.L.P., must come forward before the whole of the people with the advanced democratic slogans. For us, for the proletariat, the democratic revolution is only the first step on the road to the complete emancipation of labour from all exploitation, to the great socialist goal. All the more quickly, therefore, must we pass this first stage; all the more decisively must we settle accounts with the enemies of the people's freedom; all the louder must we proclaim the slogans of consistent democracy: a revolutionary army and a revolutionary government.

THE RUSSIAN TSAR SEEKS THE PROTECTION OF THE TURKISH SULTAN AGAINST HIS PEOPLE

The foreign press of all countries and all parties is teeming with reports, telegrams, and articles concerning the siding of part of the Black Sea Fleet with the Russian revolution. The newspapers are at a loss for words in which to express their astonishment; they find no terms strong enough to describe the disgrace which the autocratic government has brought upon itself.

The peak in this disgrace was *the tsarist government's appeal to Rumania and Turkey for police assistance* against the mutinous sailors. Here is proof positive that the "Turks within" are a greater menace to the Russian people than all the "Turks without". The Sultan of Turkey is to protect the tsarist autocracy from the Russian people; the tsar cannot rely on Russia's armed forces, and so he begs other powers for help. Better proof of the utter bankruptcy of the tsarist regime can hardly be imagined. Better material to make the soldiers of the Russian army see the role they are playing could hardly be found.

Observe what *The Times* of July 4 (new style) writes editorially. It should be noted that this is one of the most affluent and best-informed newspapers in the world, and that this mouthpiece of the conservative English bourgeoisie finds even our *Osvobozhdeniye* liberals over-radical, sympathises with the "Shipovians", etc. In a word, no one can possibly suspect it of exaggerating the strength and importance of the Russian revolution.

"The impotence of the [Russian] Government at sea," writes *The Times*, "receives a striking illustration from the Note it is stated to have sent to the *Porte*, [i.e., to the

Turkish Government] and to the Government of *Rumania*. This document [of the Russian Government] calls upon the Governments in question to treat the mutinous sailors of the Russian fleet as common criminals, and warns them that should they act otherwise international complications may follow. In other words, the Government of the Tsar is stooping to beg the *Sultan of Turkey* and the *King of Rumania* to be good enough to do for him the police work which he is no longer able to do for himself. Whether *Abdul Hamid* will condescend to give him the required assistance or not remains to be seen. So far the only result of the mutiny upon the Turkish authorities has been to induce them to exhibit unusual vigilance, and the first exhibition of it has been that they fired a blank shot across the bows of the Russian guardship on Saturday, when she was entering the Bosphorus after dark with the *Russian Ambassador* on board. They would hardly have asserted their watchfulness in that fashion twelve months ago. The Government of Rumania rightly ignored the demand that the mutineers should be treated as criminals, as was to be expected from the rulers of a self-respecting nation. They issued orders that the mutineers were not to be furnished with coals or provisions, but they informed the 700 sailors on board the *Kniaz Potemkin* that if they choose to land they will be treated only as foreign deserters."

And so the Rumanian Government does not in the least side with the revolution; far from it! Yet it has no desire to stoop to police service for the universally hated and despised tsar of all the Russias. It refuses the tsar's request. It acts in the only way the "*government of a self-respecting nation*" can act.

That is how the Russian autocracy is now spoken of in Europe by those who only yesterday fawned on the "great and mighty monarch"!

Now comes confirmation in the German press as well of this new, unheard-of disgrace of the autocracy. A report telegraphed to the *Frankfurter Zeitung* from *Constantinople* under date of July 4 (N.S.) states: "The Russian Ambassador Zinoviev handed a Note yesterday [to the Turkish Government] from the St. Petersburg Cabinet stating that about 400 Russian seamen, after sinking a cruiser, had been

picked up the day before yesterday by an English merchant vessel bound for Constantinople. The [Russian] Ambassador demanded of Turkey the detention of the steamer during its passage through the Bosphorus and the arrest and extradition of the mutinous Russian seamen. That evening the Turkish Government called a special meeting of the Council of Ministers which considered the Russian request.... Turkey replied to the Russian Embassy that she was *unable* to comply, since according to her international obligations Turkey had no right to exercise police power on a steamer sailing under the English flag, even when the steamer puts into a Turkish harbour. Besides, there existed no extradition treaty between Russia and Turkey."

Turkey replied "courageously", the German newspaper comments on the incident. The Turks refuse to do police duty for the tsar!

It is also reported that when the destroyer *Stremitelny** and several other warships came to Constanța (Rumania) in pursuit of the *Potemkin*, the Rumanian Government pointed out to the Russian authorities that in Rumanian waters it was the Rumanian army and the Rumanian police that maintained order, even if the *Potemkin* was still in Rumanian waters.

Thus, instead of the *Potemkin* creating trouble for foreign ships (as the tsarist autocracy had predicted in order to frighten Europe), these ships are plagued by a host of annoying incidents caused by the Russian fleet. The English are indignant at the detention and search of their ship *Granley* at Odessa. The Germans are incensed by reports that, at the request of the Russians, the Turks will stop and search the German ship *Pera* on her way to Constantinople from Odessa. Perhaps, under these circumstances, it will not be so easy for Russia to secure European assistance against the Russian revolutionaries. The question of rendering such assistance is being discussed by a great many foreign papers, but in most cases they come to the conclusion that it is not Europe's business to help the tsar fight the *Potemkin*. The *Berliner Tageblatt* publishes a report that the Russian

* It is said that there are no ratings on the *Stremittelny*. Its crew consists almost entirely of officers. The aristocracy against the people!

Government has even requested the powers to send their warships from Constantinople to Odessa to help restore order! How much truth there is in this statement (denied by certain other papers) the near future will show. But one thing is certain: with the *Potemkin* joining the uprising the first step has been taken towards converting the Russian revolution into an international force by bringing it face to face with the European states.

This fact should not be forgotten in appraising the telegraphic report of M. *Leroux* to the Paris newspaper *Le Matin* from St. Petersburg on July 4 (N.S.): "Throughout this [*Potemkin*] affair," he writes, "the lack of foresight on the part of the [Russian] authorities has been astonishing; one cannot overstate the lack of *organisation of the revolution*. The revolution gains possession of a battleship, an event unique in history, but it does not know what to do with it."

There is, undeniably, a great deal of truth in this report. Without a doubt we are to blame for not organising the revolution sufficiently. We are to blame that certain Social-Democrats are but faintly conscious of the fact that revolution must be organised, that the uprising must be included among the urgent practical problems, and that the necessity of a provisional revolutionary government must be stressed in our propaganda. We revolutionaries deserve the criticism now levelled at us by bourgeois writers for our poor organisation of revolutionary functions.

But whether the armoured cruiser *Potemkin* deserves this reproach we do not venture to say. Perhaps it was the deliberate aim of the crew to show themselves in the harbour of a European power? Did not the Russian Government keep all news of the events in the Black Sea Fleet from the people until the *Potemkin* had freely entered the waters of Rumania? In Rumania the revolutionary battleship delivered a proclamation to the consuls with a declaration of war on the tsarist fleet and a statement to the effect that it would commit no hostile acts against neutral ships. *The Russian revolution has declared to Europe that a state of open war exists between the Russian people and tsarism*. By doing so the Russian revolution has actually made an attempt to **speak** in the name of a new, revolutionary government of

Russia. Undoubtedly, this is merely a first, feeble attempt, but, as the saying goes, the first step is always the hardest.

According to the latest reports, the *Potemkin* has arrived at Feodosia, demanding provisions and coal. The local population is in a turmoil. The workers demand that the request of the revolutionary battleship be granted. The Municipal Council decided to refuse coal, but to supply provisions. The whole of South Russia is agitated as never before. The number of victims of the civil war in Odessa is estimated at 6,000. Telegraphic reports speak of the shooting of 160 insurgents by court martial, and of an order from St. Petersburg "*to give no quarter!*" But the troops are powerless; the troops themselves are unreliable. In the factory suburbs of Odessa the turmoil has not subsided. Last night (July 4-5, N.S.) thirty-five people were killed. By order of the Governor-General, many of the troops have been withdrawn from the city *following the discovery of a serious lack of discipline among them.* In Nikolayev and Sevastopol disturbances arose in the government arsenals. Thirteen people have been killed at Sevastopol. Peasant uprisings have broken out in five uyezds of Kherson Gubernia. *Nearly 700 peasants were killed in the last four days.* "A life-and-death struggle between the people and the bureaucracy has apparently begun," says a telegram from Odessa to London dated July 5, N.S.

Yes, the real struggle for freedom, the life-and-death struggle, is only beginning. The revolutionary armoured cruiser has not said its last word yet. Long live the revolutionary army! Long live the revolutionary government!

THE BOURGEOISIE BARGAINS WITH THE AUTOCRACY, THE AUTOCRACY BARGAINS WITH THE BOURGEOISIE

Almost every day brings fresh evidence of this "bargaining", to which we have been directing the attention of the Russian proletarians for so long a time. Here is an interesting telegram from M. Leroux dated St. Petersburg, July 2 (new style): A meeting of municipal and Zemstvo representatives held on June 28 and 29 (15 and 16, old style) once more (for the hundredth time!) formulated constitutional demands and telegraphed them to the ministries. The demands are higher than usual: popular representation is made an absolute condition, and is to be incorporated in the *constitution*; the "Bulygin" Constitution is rejected outright; the demand is put forth for the immediate proclamation of the inviolability of the person, freedom of speech, etc. The conference is said to have unanimously adopted (*but not to have included in the petition*—in bargaining one must not show all one's cards!) the demand for universal suffrage.

How does the correspondent of the bourgeois paper judge this significant increase in the demands of the landlords and manufacturers? Oh, his judgement is a most sober one:

"It is obvious," he writes, "that the delegates demand more in order to get at least a little. But it is certain also that this little, to be acceptable to them, must lie between that which they demand and that which Bulygin is offering them."

A veritable market, at which the bourgeoisie is bargaining away the rights and interests of the Russian workers and the Russian peasants. As in a market, the buyer—the bourgeoisie, and the seller—the tsar shake hands on the

bargain, shout for the hundredth time that this is their "last word", swear that they are "losing money", threaten to go away, but cannot bring themselves to break up their close friendship.

If the tsar does not meet our demands, "one of the most prominent members of the [Zemstvo] conference" said to M. Leroux, "we will appeal to the people".

What is one to understand by this oft-repeated "appeal to the people"? the French correspondent asks himself and his readers. And he answers: here there is no Faubourg St. Antoine (the workers' district in Paris; cf. the article in *Vperyod*, No. 2¹⁵⁴). The people are inclined to keep off the street and to stay at home, to protest in the Tolstoian manner by refusing to pay taxes!...

Do not slander the people, you bourgeois betrayers of liberty! No slander will ever cleanse the stain of your shameful cowardice. The people are shedding their blood throughout Russia. Faubourgs St. Antoine of our own are springing up in a number of towns and in countless villages. The people are waging a desperate struggle. If you had really wanted to "appeal to the people" (and not merely threaten your ally, the tsar, to do so) you should not have assigned hundreds and thousands of rubles for your talking-shops, but millions for the armed uprising. You should have elected a delegation, not to cool its heels in the antechambers of the tsar, but to make contact with the revolutionary parties, with the revolutionary people.

The tsar and his gang know only too well that you are incapable of doing so because you are afraid for your moneybags, because you are afraid of the people. Therefore the tsar is entirely right in treating you as flunkies; in feeding you the same old promises, the same old Bulygin Constitution; in assuming that you will not dare to make even a real, emphatic protest, not even against that Bulygin sop. Small wonder that the special correspondent of the *Journal de Genève*, a "respectable" liberal paper, wrote recently: "The liberals do not conceal from themselves the imperfections [!] of the Bulygin plan, but *they think it should be accepted* in the interests of *order* and *progress*.... *To reject the government's plan would mean deliberately to destroy the last hope for a peaceful outcome to the present conflict between the*

people and the bureaucratic regime." (The last sentence is underscored by the correspondent himself.)

The bourgeoisie wants *peace* with the tsar and fears *the war of the people against the tsar*. The tsar wants peace with the bourgeoisie, but does not fear the war with the people, which he has started and is ruthlessly continuing. Is it not obvious that *if the people fail to achieve complete victory in spite of the treachery of the bourgeoisie*, the inevitable outcome of this situation will be the Bulygin Constitution?

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